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CONFIDENTIAL.

(8984.)

F.O. 424/210

F.O.

424

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

ASIATIC TURKEY.

[In continuation of Confidential Paper No. 8664.]

210

1906.

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1906.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
1	Sir N. O'Conor ..	253 Confidential	Dec. 30, 1905	Impending massacre of Armenians. Transmits despatch from United States' Consul at Kharput reporting prevalence of rumours concerning	1
2	To Sir N. O'Conor ..	19	Jan. 12, 1906	Armenians, massacre of at Kharput. Refers to No. 1. Approves action taken ..	2
3	Sir N. O'Conor ..	31	22,	Mosul, disturbances at. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bagdad reporting on	2
4	„ „ ..	36	23,	Sir W. Willcocks' irrigation scheme in Mesopotamia. Refers to Confidential Paper 8664, No. 73. Transmits Memorandum concerning	3
5	„ „ ..	61	Feb. 3,	Mosul, German Vice-Consulate at. Official has arrived to open	5
6	„ „ ..	62	4,	Samos, situation at. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Smyrna, reporting on unsatisfactory political situation	6
7	„ „ ..	77	7,	Armenian revolutionaries at Van. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's Acting Vice-Consul at Bitlis reporting rumoured arrival of at Van	6
8	„ „ ..	80	7,	Mosul postal robbery. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bagdad reporting on	7
9	„ „ ..	90	13,	Disturbances in Vilayet of Castambol. Reports cases of revolt against new taxes on domestic animals and households which have occurred at Casrambol and Sinope ..	8
10	„ „ ..	101	19,	Mosul, affairs at. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Bagdad, reporting mobilization of reserve troops, and intense cold	8
11	„ „ ..	123	27,	Smuggling of emigrant Armenians on British vessels at Alexandretta. Transmits report by His Majesty's Consul at Aleppo. Turkish gun-boat officers help Armenian refugees to escape to America	9
12	„ „ ..	148	Mar. 5,	German activity in Mesopotamia. Refers to No. 5. Transmits despatch from Bagdad respecting Herr André, new German Consul	9
13	„ „ ..	155	9,	Bomb outrage near Kaisarieh. Reports by persons supposed to be Armenians ..	10
14	„ „ ..	161	13,	Samos, political situation in. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Smyrna, relative to disorders. The Opposition ask for a Commission to superintend the elections	10
15	„ „ ..	181	19,	Samos, political situation in. Refers to No. 14. Situation still bad. Turkish Government is sending a Commissioner to make an inquiry. Transmits despatch from Consul-General at Smyrna. . ..	11
16	Sir N. O'Conor ..	186	Mar. 20, 1906	Tigris navigation. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah, inclosing correspondence relative to competition between Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company and Hamidieh Steamship Company	12
17	„ „ ..	191	21,	Russian, Persian, and German Consuls at Mosul. Refers to No. 12. Transmits Bagdad despatch respecting appointments of	14
18	„ „ ..	193	22,	Samos, disturbed political state of. Refers to No. 15. "Civil Guard" of Upper Vathy have kidnapped a Judge reported as unfavourably disposed towards the Opposition	15
18*	„ „ ..	208	30,	Demonstration against poll-tax in Erzeroum. Transmits Mr. Shipley's despatch respecting	16*
19	„ „ ..	216	Apr. 2,	Hedjaz Railway. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's Acting Consul at Damascus, reporting opening of Dera'a–Haifa branch of	16
20	„ „ ..	219	3,	Mussulman discontent in Erzeroum. Refers to No. 9. Transmits report by His Majesty's Consul on, caused by new tax. Mushir announces that Vali has been superseded, and situated has consequently improved	16
21	„ „ ..	224 Secret and Confidential	3,	Disturbances at Suk-el-Shiyukh. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah, reporting on serious. Turkish troops repulsed. Steps taken by Government	18
22	„ „ ..	231	4,	Erzeroum, situation in. Refers to No. 20. Transmits telegram from His Majesty's Consul, reporting on. Situation anomalous, owing to delay in departure of Mushir ..	19
23	„ „ ..	233	4,	Samos, political situation at. Refers to No. 18. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Smyrna, reporting arrival of Imperial Commissioner at, and restoration of order	19
24	„ „ ..	239 Confidential	9,	Bomb outrage at Cæsarea. Transmits letter from Dr. Dod, Head of Medical College at Cæsarea, to Mr. Pears, describing barbarous treatment of Armenians ..	20
25	„ „ ..	240 Secret and Confidential	9,	Disturbances at Erzeroum. Refers to No. 22. Measures taken to put an end to. Demonstration at an end	23
26	„ „ ..	245	11,	Insubordination of time-expired Turkish soldiers. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Bidlis, reporting on	24
27	„ „ ..	248	11,	Aleppo Vilayet. Transmits report on, received from His Majesty's Consul. Satisfactory situation	25
28	„ „ ..	256	16,	Immigration of Mahommedan refugees into Asiatic Turkey. Memorandum by Mr. Lloyd respecting refugees come from Caucasus and South Russia	26

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
29	Sir N. O'Conor ..	257 Very Conf.	Apr. 16, 1906	Mining in Asia Minor. Reports arrangement between Bagdad Railway and Mr. Whittall for Syndicate of Anglo-German origin to work mines	28
30	„ „ ..	259	17,	Activity of Germans in Asia Minor. Transmits despatch from Erzeroum respecting German engineers' surveys, &c. ..	29
31	„ „ ..	264 Confidential	17,	Bomb outrage at Cesarea. Refers to No. 24. Barbarous treatment of Armenian prisoners denied by Turkish Court of Inquiry ..	31
32	Friends of Armenia ..	..	27,	Outrages on Armenians by Turkish tax-collectors. Reported by Mr. Cole, American missionary, in province of Moush. Asks protection for women ..	31
33	Sir N. O'Conor ..	268	21,	Damascus Vilayet. Transmits despatch from Acting Consul at Damascus reporting on state of progress of Hedjaz Railway ..	31
34	„ „ ..	273	24,	Vilayet of Van. Transmits Report of Acting Vice-Consul on situation, which is not so bad as reported	32
35	„ „ ..	277	24,	Samos. Political situation in. Refers to No. 23 Consul-General at Smyrna reports fighting between parties since 22nd April	33
36	To Sir N. O'Conor ..	169 Confidential	May 4,	Outrages on Armenians by Turkish tax-collectors. Refers to No. 32. He should inquire as to accuracy of Mr. Cole's statements, and, if they are correct, make representations to Porte	33
37	Sir N. O'Conor. ..	284	Apr. 27,	Erzeroum. Disturbances at. Refers to No. 25. Transmits despatch from Consul at, reporting termination of demonstration. Forbearance of Moslems towards Christians. Discontent caused by increasing taxation and maladministration ..	34
38	„ „ ..	287	27,	Samos. Political situation in. Refers to No. 35. Mr. Cumberbatch reports fighting ceased. Amount of casualties. Further disturbances expected next week during elections	36
39	„ „ ..	295 Confidential	May 1,	German policy. Russian Ambassador's conversation with German Ambassador on future of Mesopotamia, and possibility of Russo-German understanding to thwart British designs. M. Zinoview expressed view, to Russian Government, that understanding with Germany could only be obtained under conditions which would place country under complete control of Germany	36
40	„ „ ..	98 Tel.	9,	Murder of late Vali of Archipelago. Abedin Pasha reported assassinated by Kurds. Other disturbances near Cesarea ..	36
41	„ „ ..	320	8,	Electoral campaign in Samos. Refers to No. 38. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Smyrna reporting further disturbances	37
42	To Sir N. O'Conor ..	347	18,	Election disorders at Samos. Refers to No. 41. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Smyrna respecting	37

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
43	To Sir N. O'Conor ..	96 Tel.	June 1, 1906	Attack on steam-ship "Khalifah." Should make inquiries and representations to Porte	38
44	Sir N. O'Conor ..	372	May 29,	Maladministration of Armenia and Anatolia. As result of his representations, Valis have been instructed to make a tour of their provinces and inquire into grievances	38
45	„ „ ..	379	29,	Inauguration of German church at Smyrna. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General respecting visit of Baron Marschall von Bieberstein and ceremony..	39
46	M. Verseesian ..	..	June 6,	Outrages on Armenians. Draws attention to state of affairs in Armenia	40
47	Sir N. O'Conor ..	391	7,	Ill-treatment of Armenians in the Moush. Refers to No. 36. His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Bitlis confirms statements of "Friends of Armenia." Has been instructed to investigate the conditions of that province	42
48	„ „ ..	392	7,	Defeat of Ottoman troops in the Muntefik. Refers to No. 21. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah giving further details	42
49	„ „ ..	394	7,	Attempted murder of Gaidzak Arabian. Refers to No. 212. One of the thirty-three Armenian prisoners has been condemned and hanged	43
50	„ „ ..	404	12,	Attack on Messrs. Lynch's depôt. Has made strong representations. Grand Vizier declares a new and capable Vali will be appointed to Bussorah	43
51	To Sir N. O'Conor ..	240	18,	Maladministration of Armenia and Anatolia. Refers to No. 44. Approves language held to Grand Vizier	44
52	Sir N. O'Conor ..	422	19,	Attack on Messrs. Lynch's steamer. Refers to No. 50. Further information respecting, and representations made to Grand Vizier. Transmits despatches from His Majesty's Consuls at Bagdad and Bussorah ..	44
53	„ „ ..	431 Confidential	24,	Northern Mesopotamia. Transmits two Reports on a journey made by Mr. Mark Sykes in	47
54	„ „ ..	438	26,	Consular district of Jerusalem. Transmits Report by His Majesty's Consul for the quarter ended 31st March	57
55	„ „ ..	440 Confidential	27,	Disturbances in Vilayet of Bussorah. Refers to No. 48. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah relative to inquiries made by Veli Pasha into conduct of late Vali and causes of his dismissal ..	58
56	Question asked in the House of Commons (Mr. Lonsdale)	..	July 2,	Disturbances at Bagdad and Bussorah. His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople is giving every attention to the matter ..	60
57	Sir N. O'Conor ..	450 Confidential	3,	Disturbances at Erzeroum. Refers to No. 37. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's Consul reporting on the general situation and discontent among the Mussulman population and troops	61

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
58	To Sir N. O'Conor ..	106 Tel.	July 10, 1906	Disturbances in district of Bussorah. Fears entertained by Euphrates and Tigris Company for safety of their steam-ship. Should urge Porte to take necessary measures. Would presence of a British gun-boat be advisable?	63
59	Sir N. O'Conor ..	142 Tel.	12,	Disturbances in district of Bussorah. Refers to No. 58. Traffic on the Tigris still unsafe. Impracticable to send a gun-boat	63
60	„ „ ..	499	24,	Mutiny among Turkish Redifs at Sana'a. Turkish encounter with Arabs near Amran. Despatch from Hodeidah respecting	63
61	„ „ ..	518	30,	Nejd. Transmits despatch from Acting Consul at Jeddah reporting disturbed state of. Bin Saood has raided Bareda and carried off Sheikh. Attack on troops on way to Medina	64
62	„ „ ..	521	31,	Armenian Patriarchate in Constantinople. Memorandum as to present position of. Transmits	65
62*	„ „ ..	522 Confidential	31,	Smyrna district. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General reporting the lawless state of. Has spoken to the Grand Vizier on the subject ..	66A
63	Mr. Findlay ..	136 Confidential	Aug. 1,	Italian proposal for surveillance of Arabian coast. Transmits observations of Soudan Government, which is not in a position to incur the responsibility. Objections to scheme	66
64	Sir N. O'Conor ..	532	4,	Bagdad-Damascus road. Native capitalists apply for authority to form Company for repair of, and establish coaching service..	67
65	„ „ ..	533	5,	Armenian Patriarchate, difficulties of. Refers to No. 62. Mgr. Ormanian persuaded temporarily to resume functions, and believes his determined stand on behalf of his Church has made impression on Porte	67
66	„ „ ..	547	10,	Smyrna dynamite plot. Trial of Armenians implicated in. Intervention of His Brittanic Majesty's Consulate-General on behalf of a British subject	68
67	„ „ ..	561	15,	Maghil case and attacks on steamers. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah, reporting interviews with Acting Vali, during which he pressed for a settlement and punishment of offenders. Proposes to make fresh representations to the Porte, and urge appointment of a capable Vali	72
68	M. Hagopian ..	..	18,	Armenia. Draws attention to condition of. Transmits letter from an Armenian reporting harsh treatment of prisoners at Van ..	75
69	Sir N. O'Conor ..	574	21,	Condition of Yemen. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Hodeidah, reporting on. Turkish campaign againt the Imam	76
70	„ „ ..	576	21,	Piracy in the Persian Gulf. Transmits reply of Turkish authorities at Bussorah to Ministry of Interior relative to *note verbale* from British Embassy	82

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
71	Sir N. O'Conor ..	579	Aug. 21, 1906	Yemen and Nejd. Transmits Memorandum by Military Attaché on state of affairs ..	82
72	„ „ ..	609	Sept. 1,	Aden delimitation. Refers to No. 5. "Discrepancies" discovered in the map by Turkish officers. Transmits note from Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Proposes to take act of declaration in it that the maps signed by the Commissioners are the only authenic ones	88
73	„ „ ..	618 Confidential	4,	Vilayet of Bagdad. Transmits from His Majesty's Acting Consul-General inclosing diary of events. Competition of German and British steam-ship Companies ..	89
74	Mr. G. Barclay ..	638	18,	Vilayet of Bussorah. Appointment of Hassan Bey as Vali. He has done excellent work as Vali at Kharput	90
75	„ „ ..	643	18,	Bin Saood. Acting Consul at Jeddah reports negotiations of Sami Pasha with. Consul at Bussorah reports indications that the Turks intend to tighten their hold on Arabia	91
76	Mr. Hagopian ..	..	26,	Ill-treatment of Armenian prisoners at Van. Refers to No. 68. Transmits further report on	92
77	Mr. G. Barclay ..	656	25,	Vilayet of Diarbekir. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's Vice-Consul forwarding the Budget of, with his observations..	93
78	„ „ ..	659	25,	Brigandage round Broussa. Refers to No. 62*. Transmits despatch from British Vice-Consul. Proposes to draw attention of the Grand Vizier to the matter ..	97
79	„ „ ..	662	24,	Military organization and Government works at Erzindjan. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Erzeroum inclosing Report by Captain Mark Sykes on ..	100
80	„ „ ..	665	28,	Hedjaz Railway. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Damascus reporting inauguration of the Tebûk section ..	104
81	„ „ ..	666	28,	Imam of Yemen. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's Acting Consul at Jeddah relating to the return of the Commission sent by the Grand Shereef of Mecca to ..	105
82	„ „ ..	667	28,	Sheikh of Koweit's contribution towards the Hedjaz Railway. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah regarding	106
83	„ „ ..	670	20,	Persian refugees at Kerbela. Owing to efforts of Turkish authorities to exact payment of taxes, Persian subjects have taken refuge in His Majesty's Consulate..	106
84	India Office ..	..	Oct. 8,	Muscat Arbitration. Transmits telegram from Viceroy. Resident fears that M. Goguyer, who is returning to France, may present matters in a distorted form to his Government	107
85	„ „ ..	..	11,	Aden hinterland. Transmits correspondence relative to the future policy regarding ..	107

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
86	Mr. G. Barclay ..	198 Tel.	Oct. 12, 1906	Kerbela disturbances. Refers to No. 83. Refugees increasing. Vali has been authorized, upon his suggestion, to give his assurance that rioters shall not be punished	121
87	„ „ ..	679	8,	Beyrout-Aleppo Railway. Hama-Aleppo section open to traffic	121
88	„ „ ..	688	12,	Fighting between Hauran Druses and Arabs. His Majesty's Consul of Damascus reports	121
89	„ „ ..	689	13,	Kerbela. Refers to No. 86. Transmits telegram from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bagdad concerning the Persian refugees at British Vice-Consulate ..	122
90	„ „ ..	199 Tel.	18,	Kerbela. Refers to No. 86. His Majesty's Consul-General at Bagdad reports that the Vali is preventing settlement. Grand Vizier has instructed Vali to give assurance of impunity to refugees. Has informed Russian Ambassador	122
91	To Sir F. Bertie ..	568	18,	Muscat dhows. French Minister for Foreign Affairs appreciates conciliatory attitude of His Majesty's Government, and will send a definite reply as soon as possible ..	123
92	Mr. G. Barclay ..	693	15,	Van. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's Consul reporting on condition of ..	123
93	„ „ ..	695	16,	Yemen. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Hodeidah, reporting his arrival at Sana'a, and describing the country round..	127
94	„ „ ..	699	17,	Burning of prison at Van. Report of His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Van on the alleged ill-treatment of Armenian prisoners	129
95	„ „ ..	701	17,	Aleppo. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's Consul on condition of affairs at	130
96	„ „ ..	704	18,	Kerbela. Refers to No. 89. Transmits telegram from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bagdad on the situation at. Has drawn the attention of Porte to the attitude of the Vali, and Grand Vizier has repeated his instructions	132
97	„ „ ..	713	24,	Smyrna-Aidin Railway. Transmits "Convention-Annexe," by which the Company obtains prolongation of its Concession and extension of line to lakes Eghirdir and Bourdour	133
98	„ „ ..	204 Tel.	29,	Kerbela. Repeats telegram from Vice-Consulate reporting presence of refugees..	135
99	„ „ ..	205 Tel.	29,	Kerbela. Refers to No. 98. Proposes to complain to Grand Vizier, and insist on impunity being assured to refugees ..	135
100	„ „ ..	718	25,	Erzeroum. Refers to No. 37. Recrudescence of disturbance at	135
101	To Mr. G. Barclay ..	180 Tel.	30,	Kerbela. Refers to No. 99. Concurs in action proposed	136
102	Mr. G. Barclay ..	207 Tel.	31,	Kerbela disturbances. Refugees have vacated British Vice-Consulate. Forty Persians killed	136

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
103	Mr. G. Barclay ..	731	Oct. 30, 1906	Kerbela. Refers to No. 98. Representations to Grand Vizier and his Highness' reply. Transmits telegram and despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bagdad. Further details	136
104	„ „ ..	732	30,	Erzeroum. Refers to No. 100. No change in situation. Grand Vizier states Vali and General are being replaced and calm being restored	139
105	„ „ ..	733 Confidential	30,	Nejd. Transmits Memorandum by Mr. Gaskin on condition of affairs in Nejd and position of the young Amir. Desire to throw off the Turkish yoke	140
106	„ „ ..	735	30,	Hama-Aleppo Railway. Refers to No. 87. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's Consul of Damascus respecting the opening of	142
107	„ „ ..	736 Confidential	30,	German trade in the Persian Gulf. Refers to No. 73. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah respecting establishment by the Hamburg-America Line of a service to the Persian Gulf ..	142
108	Memorandum communicated by M. Cambon	..	Nov. 8,	Muscat dhows. Views of French Government as to the carrying out of the Award and its application to the flag-holders ..	143
109	Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company	..	9,	Desirability of running a third steamer. In view of accumulation of goods at Bussorah, request representations may be made to Porte to allow them to run a third steamer	145
110	India Office ..	..	10,	Nejd. Transmits telegram, dated November 9, to Viceroy. British interest and influence should be restricted to coast ..	146
111	„ „ ..	..	15,	Collection of dues by Turkish officials in Subaihi country. Transmits correspondence respecting, and suggests representations should be made to the Porte, either at Constantinople or to the Resident at Aden	146
112	To Mr. G. Barclay ..	503	16,	Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company. Transmits No. 109, and requests opinion as to whether representations would be of any avail	169
113	Mr. G. Barclay ..	743	9,	Kerbela. Refers to No. 103. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bagdad relative to the Persian demonstration at	170
114	„ „ ..	751	13,	Kerbela. Refers to No. 113. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bagdad relative to the Persian demonstration at	171
115	„ „ ..	754	13,	Erzeroum. Refers to No. 104. Transmits Report by His Majesty's Consul on the disturbances	172
116	„ „ ..	755 Confidential	13,	Nejd. Refers to No. 105. Transmits letter from Political Agent at Koweit to His Majesty's Resident Bushire, recording conversation with Sheikh Mubarek on subject of allowances paid by Turkish authorities to Ibn Saoud and Ibn Reshid ..	175

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
117	Mr. G. Barclay ..	757	Nov. 13, 1906	Armenia. General Report on state of during past year. Suggestion as to attitude to be taken up by His Majesty's Embassy. Transmits report by Vice-Consul at Bitlis	176
118	India Office ..	..	19,	Encroachment of Turkish officials at Wadi Shaab. Transmits correspondence respecting	178
119	To Mr. G. Barclay ..	507	20,	Collection of revenue by Turkish officials in Subaihi territory. Transmits No. 111, and authorizes him to make representations to Porte unless he considers it preferable that Resident at Aden should deal with the matter	180
120	India Office ..	..	22,	Muscat Award. Refers to No. 108. Comments on French Memorandum. Claim that Omanis in the service of French Residents in Muscat are entitled to fly French flag should be resisted	180
121	„ „ ..	..	24,	Invitation to Sheikhs of Koweit and Bahrein and Trucial Chiefs to visit India. Transmits telegram from Government of India suggesting, and telegram to Government of India objecting to	181
122	Mr. G. Barclay ..	758	17,	Hedjaz Railway. Transmits Memorandum by Mr. Lloyd on	181
123	Sir C. Spring-Rice ..	352 Tel.	28,	Kerbela disturbances. Excitement caused in Tehran by	210
124	Mr. G. Barclay ..	771	26,	Mesopotamia. Transmits translation of articles in the "Ikdam" on the trade possibilities of	210
125	„ „ ..	774	28,	Bagdad Residency. Transmits political diary of for week ending October 29.. ..	212
126	„ „ ..	781	Dec. 3,	Bagdad Residency. Transmits diary of His Majesty's Consul-General for week ending October 29. Mosul disturbances..	213
127	„ „ ..	783	4,	Yemen Vilayet. Transmits despatch from Vice-Consul Richardson on the situation in	214
128	„ „ ..	786	5,	Kerbela. Refers to No. 103. Grand Vizier has succeeded in securing removal of Vali of Bagdad, and appointment of Hazim Bey in his place	215
129	To India Office ..	..	10,	Muscat Award. Refers to No. 120. Concurs as to points which need not be pressed. Inquires how far new French claim should be resisted	216
130	Mr. Barclay ..	794	10,	Engagement between Turkish troops and Arabs at Hassa. Tribes finally bought off after the Turks had suffered considerable loss	216
131	Mr. Lloyd	..	18,	Tigris and Euphrates Steam Navigation Company suggests His Majesty's Government should support their demand for permission to run a third steamer ..	217
132	India Office ..	..	20,	Muscat Award. Refers to No. 120. Transmits telegram to Government of India. French claims which His Majesty's Government propose to resist. Inquires if they can suggest any reservation to acceptance of French claim with regard to Omanis	218

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
133	Mr. G. Barclay ..	805	Dec. 14, 1906	Collection of revenue by Turkish officials in Subaihi territory. Refers to No. 119. Transmits Memorandum by Mr. Fitzmaurice respecting and *pro-memorid* to the Porte requesting orders may be sent to the local authorities to refrain from violation of boundary agreement	218
134	To Mr. G. Barclay ..	559	24,	Third steamer for the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company. Should take action with a view to obtaining permission for	221
135	Mr. G. Barclay ..	818	22,	Vilayet of Diarbekir. Transmits despatch from Acting Vice-Consul Graves on the state of lawlessness in	222
136	„ „ ..	820	26,	Alleged hoisting of British flag at Nejwa. Turkish complaint against	223

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting Asiatic Turkey.

[In continuation of Confidential Paper No. 8664.]

[990]

No. 1.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 8, 1906.)

(No. 953. Confidential.)

Constantinople, December 30, 1905.

Sir,

IN connection with the apprehensions which have been expressed of late in various quarters of the possibility of a massacre of the Christians in Turkey, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a despatch from the United States' Consul at Kharput to his Legation, which has been confidentially communicated to me by Mr. Jay, the American Chargé d'Affaires.

Mr. Young considers the political situation in the Mamouret-el-Aziz Vilayet to be far from satisfactory, and clearly believes that a massacre of the Armenians has been contemplated by the Moslem population.

I am calling the attention of the Porte to the condition of things described by Mr. Young, and I shall urge that every precaution may be taken to prevent an outbreak of fanaticism.

I have, &c.

(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Mr. E. Young to Mr. J. Leishman.

American Consulate, Mamouret-el-Aziz, December 15, 1905.

Sir,

I REGRET to state that the present political condition of the province is far from satisfactory. Rumours of another massacre are prevalent.

After a careful investigation of these various stories, I beg leave to submit the following report for the information of the Legation:—

The articles recently published in Constantinople papers in regard to attempts on the part of Armenians against the life of the Sultan, and other prominent Turks, together with the natural resentment of the entire Turkish people towards the action of the Powers in the Macedonian matter, have undoubtedly greatly excited all Moslems.

During the recent earthquake shocks in this vicinity, several Turkish women are known to have cried out "that the earthquake was a punishment sent by God on account of the present plan to massacre all Armenians."

The French Consul from Diarbekir, M. Gugs, who is now at this place, informs me that he will remain here until the crisis is past.

One battalion of Turkish troops will shortly be sent from Mamouret-el-Aziz to Diarbekir. It is then feared that the remaining battalion would constitute an entirely inefficient force to check any outbreak, even were they so disposed.

Ammunition from the arsenal near here has been brought into the city.

If the condition does not materially improve within the next few days, I shall call upon his Excellency the Vali and discuss the situation in a friendly manner with him, but endeavour to impress upon him the necessity of suppressing firmly and at once any action which might result in another outbreak.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EVAN YOUNG, *Consul.*

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[999] No. 2.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 19.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 12, 1906.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 953, Confidential, of the 30th ultimo, relative to the rumoured contemplation of a massacre of Armenians by the Moslem population of Kharput.

I approve your action in calling the attention of the Porte to the situation in that province.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD GREY.

[3463] No. 3.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 31.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January* 22, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bagdad, reporting on the lawless conditions prevailing in part of the Vilayet of Mosul.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 3.

Consul-General Newmarch to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 1009/97).
Sir, *Bagdad, December* 21, 1905.

I HAVE received the following information from the British Consular Agent at Mosul:—

The Vali of Mosul has dismissed the Nakib of Suleimaniyah and the members of the Administrative Council of that town owing to the continued disturbances and murders between their faction and the followers of a certain Sheikh Saeed. The Major of gendarmes at Suleimaniyah has also been dismissed. The Mutessarif of Suleimaniyah and Sheikh Saeed have been summoned to Mosul by the Vali to concert measures to conciliate the tribes in the vicinity of Suleimaniyah. The Vali, it is said, rather favours Sheikh Saeed, and this has given offence to the Nakib and the members of the Administrative Council.

A Kurdish bandit named Sefor Agha has, with the help of about twenty-five armed Kurds, who have deserted from the Turkish army, been plundering caravans in the neighbourhood of Dehook. They recently came into Dehook and forcible collected a sum of about 80 medjidiehs from the Jewish residents. The Kaimakam sent all the zaptiehs he had to arrest Sefor Agha, but after a great deal of firing on both sides Sefor Agha escaped. Some of Sefor Agha's men subsequently killed an influential citizen of Dehook, named Saleh Effendi-el-Namaan. This man is said to have instigated the Mutessarif to arrest Sefor Agha.

On the 5th December the Turkish post was attacked and looted at a place called Kani Kodack by about eighteen Arab horsemen. They seized the post horses, took

away the zaptiehs' guns, and bound the zaptiehs and couriers; they broke open the bags and took away parcels of the value of about 800 liras. These Arabs subsequently attacked two caravans which happened to pass, *en route*, and captured thirty mules. These attacks took place not far from a gendarme station consisting of a Lieutenant and twenty-four zaptiehs. These, however, took no action until after the post and the caravans were plundered, when they hastened to release the zaptiehs and couriers, helped them to collect the letters, and sent them on to Mosul. The Vali of Mosul, on hearing of the above incidents, immediately sent two officers with 130 horsemen in pursuit, with orders not to return till they had arrested the robbers. They came upon the robbers at a place called Bishaboor (in the Jezira), but the son of one Mustapha Pasha-el-Hamide, with whom the robbers had taken sanctuary, refused to deliver them up. He agreed, however, to return the plundered property. As Mustapha Pasha's son happened to have 500 of the Hamidieh at hand, the two officers did not venture to attack him without the special permission of the Vali. They referred to the Vali, and the latter is said to have referred the matter to Constantinople, and is awaiting an answer.

From the Consular Agent's report it would appear that this son of Mustapha Pasha and the Hamidieh troops with him must be held responsible for the several robberies which have lately occurred on the River Tigris between Diarbekir and Mosul. He is said to have his men posted at different points on the river's bank, who hold up passing rafts and take what they like from them. It is said that he has recently given orders to take ten bales from every raft carrying food-stuffs.

I have, &c.
(For Political Resident in Turkish Arabia and
His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General),
(Signed) C. B. M. CONAGHY,
Captain, I.M.S.

[3467] No. 4.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 36.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January* 23, 1906.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 543 of the 7th August, 1905, relative to the scheme put forward by Sir William Willcocks for the irrigation of Mesopotamia, I have the honour to transmit herewith a Memorandum describing the proceedings of that gentleman for the prosecution of his projects so far as they are known to me.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Agent and Consul-General at Cairo.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 4.

Memorandum on Sir W. Willcocks' Projects in Southern Mesopotamia.

EARLY in the autumn of 1904 Sir W. Willcocks proceeded to Southern Mesopotamia, where he spent the winter in examining the districts between the Tigris and Euphrates in the vicinity of Bagdad, with a view to ascertaining what schemes of irrigation would be practicable in that region.

On the completion of his studies Sir William compiled a pamphlet entitled "The Irrigation of Mesopotamia," which was printed in Egypt in April 1905. (A précis of this pamphlet was forwarded to the Foreign Office in Sir N. O'Conor's No. 306 of the 12th June, 1905, *q.v.* for explanation of general lines of Sir William's projects 4 and 9.)

Although Sir William caused this paper to be marked "Confidential and Private," he distributed copies with such freedom that the contents were soon made known to all persons (both British and foreign) interested in the matter. However, it would be as well to note that Sir William's brochure only contained general suggestions and calculations, and avoided entering into very precise details.

In June 1905 Sir William visited Constantinople and asked his Excellency the

Ambassador whether he would draw the attention of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan to the schemes 4 and 9, outlined in his pamphlet, saying that he hoped to be able to form a Company in London for the purpose of carrying them out, should the proposals meet with the approval of the Turkish Government.

Sir Nicholas O'Conor laid the general features of the two schemes before His Imperial Majesty, who stated that he would be prepared to consider them when a Company had been formed and its terms made known to him.

Sir W. Willcocks then proceeded to London, but was unable to obtain sufficient British capital to carry out his schemes, and for a time the matter dropped. Although Sir William's projects excited considerable attention both in France and Germany, which resulted in various vague comments in the Continental press, no definite proposals were brought forward, though the Turkish authorities themselves dispatched a French Engineer (M. Cuny) to inspect the Hindié Barrage, and to examine the bed of the Euphrates, to find out whether the river could be made navigable. Curiously enough both the navigability of the Euphrates and the bad condition of the Hindié Barrage were touched on by Sir W. Willcocks in his pamphlet.

It has been ascertained from a private source that M. Cuny submitted his reports to Sir W. Willcocks for correction before sending them to the Turkish authorities.

In October 1905 Sir W. Willcocks formed in Egypt a Company, named the Anglo-Egyptian Land Allotment Company, for the purpose of acquiring, improving, and reselling lands in Egypt and the Soudan, with a power of further interesting itself in works of agricultural development in the neighbouring States, presumably the adjoining provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The Directorate of this Company is composed almost entirely of Egyptians, several of whom are persons of Anglophobe tendencies in politics, and of slight importance financially.

Sir W. Willcocks is at the present time engaged in endeavouring to secure a concession to work the two schemes already laid before His Imperial Majesty the Sultan. Sir William says that he has obtained sufficient financial support to work these projects, and that the capital will be one-third German and two-thirds British, the composition of the British share, however, is doubtful, as it may comprise some of the capital of the Anglo-Egyptian Land Allotment Company, although it is generally supposed that the bulk of this is already engaged in other schemes. Sir William desires to obtain his concession from the Civil List, which has large properties in the areas to be developed. Sir William stipulates that the payment for the improvement of these properties should be made by free grants of derelict land, which he proposes his Company should reclaim, and sell at a profit to Ottoman subjects.

Whether Sir William will gain his object or no seems at present a matter of doubt, as there are reasons both for and against his success. The fact that Sir William is an Englishman militates strongly against his obtaining concessions in zones in such close proximity to the Persian Gulf, where British aims are viewed with undisguised suspicion. Sir William's connection with the Anglo-Egyptian Land Company counts against him, as the presence of wealthy Egyptians on its Board of Directors would cause apprehension in Constantinople. On the other hand, Sir William is dealing with the Civil List, a Department inclined to take a view less political and more practical as regards matters touching the development of its properties. Sir William is also prepared to make considerable concessions to the sentiment of the Turkish authorities by giving his Company a sympathetic name, which would make it appear as if it were under the supervision and direction of the Civil List, a line of conduct which may influence that Department in his favour.

Much depends on the view the Turkish authorities take of the plan of remunerating Sir William's Company with grants of derelict but reclaimable land. It is possible that the economy of this method of repayment may commend itself to the Civil List Department, but it is obvious that unless the Company is bound down by very precise terms, the authorities will find it difficult to oblige the Company to sell the lands, should it find it more profitable to retain them, and the prospect of a foreign Company becoming the permanent owner of a large area is one which would fill any Ottoman official with alarm.

If on the other hand the Civil List binds down the Company to sell the lands to Ottoman subjects within a given period, it is hard to see how the Company could prevent the Turkish Government from taking steps to make such sale impossible at a profit, with the object of buying the lands itself at a low price. However, these difficulties may be overcome by Sir William's making such terms with the Civil List as would give him a tenure of the lands handed over to him, of sufficiently long duration to enable Sir William's Company to make a profit before compulsory sale.

There is one other point of considerable importance as regards Sir William's schemes in Mesopotamia, and that resolves itself into the question as to what will be the attitude adopted by the Bagdad Railway Company towards the development of Southern Mesopotamia by a Company in which the greater part of the capital is English.

It will be generally admitted that, supposing Sir William succeeds in putting his schemes into operation, his Company will assume a position of far greater importance than the Bagdad Railway in Mesopotamia, as the railway would then sink into the comparatively insignificant position of transport agent to the Irrigation Company, upon which the whole internal prosperity of the country would depend. Now it may be presumed that the Bagdad Railway is only intended as a stepping-stone to greater things, a glance at its Convention is sufficient to demonstrate that that document is only a cloak which conceals under the name of a railway a multitude of equally important ventures, such as the exploitation of mining, forestry, river navigation, and petroleum deposits. The whole intention and purpose of German financiers and politicians is evidently to engross for themselves alone the whole wealth and industry of the Ottoman Empire by running a number of smaller Companies under the ægis of the Bagdad Railway. Now the advent of a British Irrigation Company in Mesopotamia, which would undertake neither to push German trade, subordinate itself to German interests, nor even attempt to spread German influence, would be in the highest degree repugnant to those who are at present interested in the Bagdad Railway. It would seem more than probable that, unless the German financiers could obtain a representation on the Board of Directors of Sir William's proposed Company sufficiently strong to make it their tool, they would strain every nerve to frustrate its designs.

The only legal weapon of which the Bagdad Railway Company could make use to interfere with Sir William's schemes is Article 6 of the Bagdad Railway Convention, and although it is obvious that the Article only refers to rights of quarrying, yet the vagueness of the word "Établissement" is such that with a little good-will the Article in question could be made to mean almost anything the Directorate of the Bagdad Railway Company wished.

(Signed) MARK SYKES.

Extract from Article 6 of the Bagdad Railway Convention.

"THE lands requisite for temporary occupation during the progress of the work will be handed over by the local authorities to the concessionnaire, who will, however, be required to indemnify the owners.

"If in the said lands necessary for the 'Établissement' of the railway and its dependencies there should be lands of the category known as 'Arazii-Emerie-Halie,' viz., derelict Crown lands, they will be abandoned gratuitously to the concessionnaire."

[5091] No. 5.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 12.)

(No. 61.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February 3, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to report that His Majesty's Consul at Diarbekir, in a despatch dated the 17th ultimo, informs me of the arrival at and departure from that place of Mr. Anders, who is to open the German Vice-Consulate at Mosul.

Mr. Anders states that the object of the new German post is to supervise and protect the Germans employed on the new excavation works 100 kilom. down the river.

I believe that Mr. Anders is a German ex-officer, whose mission to Mosul has disturbed, in no small measure, the Russian Embassy in Constantinople, and whose appointment is an unmistakable symptom of the increasing interest of Germany in these regions.

I have, &c.

(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

[5092] No. 6.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 12.)

(No. 62.)
Sir, *Constantinople, February 4, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Smyrna, reporting on the unsatisfactory political situation which exists in Samos, and expressing apprehensions that disorders may arise during the coming elections.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 6.

Consul-General Cumberbatch to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 7.)
Sir, *Smyrna, February 2, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that Mr. Vice-Consul Marc reports, under date of the 27th instant, that the political situation in the Island of Samos is in a very bad state, and that grave disorders are generally expected to result from the approaching elections. He is of opinion that the present Government has no prospect of obtaining a majority, in spite of their strenuous efforts.

In Marathocampo the populace has united in unanimous opposition. It does not recognize the present Government, and has dismissed all its officials.

The Prince Governor has at his disposal no sufficient force to cope with the rebels, many of whom are armed.

It is to be feared that the example set by Marathocampo may be followed elsewhere.

A few days ago the Prince, accompanied by the Chiefs of the local gendarmerie, visited the district aforesaid in the Turkish guard-ship, for the purpose of removing the archives of the Marathocampo Court, which, in accordance with the existing Iradé, should be transferred to Carlovassi from the 1st ultimo onward. The people, however, refused to allow their removal, fearing that the same might be used illegally to their detriment, since the President and the Judges are entirely dependent on the party now in power.

The origin of the Marathocampo troubles was the illegal act of the Government in dismissing a certain M. Nicoli, Senator for Marathocampo, although such an act was contrary to the terms of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan's Firman.

The state of things has been reported to the Sublime Porte, and the Prince Governor is awaiting instructions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. A. CUMBERBATCH.

[5107] No. 7.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 12.)

(No. 77.)
Sir, *Constantinople, February 7, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Acting Vice-Consul at Bitlis relating to Armenian revolutionaries at Van.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 7.

Acting Vice-Consul Geary to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 51.)
Sir, *Bitlis, December 26, 1905.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency, with all reserve, that two Armenian travellers, who arrived here from Van last week, bring intelligence that, on the approach of the winter snows, the revolutionaries in the neighbourhood took up their residence in Van itself. According to this report, they intend to continue with the utmost vigour their revolutionary propaganda during the winter in the hope that their efforts will be brought to fruition by the outbreak of serious trouble in the spring.

It is quite possible that this is merely the annual scare, in accordance with which the prophecy of trouble in the spring seems to be a standing dish in these provinces, but I thought it well to bring the report to your Excellency's knowledge.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR B. GEARY.

[5110] No. 8.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 12.)

(No. 80.)
Sir, *Constantinople, February 7, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bagdad relating to the recent Mosul postal robbery.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 8.

Consul-General Newmarch to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 1035/100.)
Sir, *Bagdad, December 30, 1905.*

I HAVE received the following information from the Consular Agent at Mosul in a letter dated the 20th December, 1905:—

"1. The money lost in the recent robbery of the post, reported in my letter of the 6th December, 1905, is said to have been recovered by Muhammad Khedar and Fewlik Bey, who informed the Vali that they recovered it from Abdul Kerim-bin-Mustapha Pasha Hamide.

"The mules of the caravan that was looted, most probably by Abdul Kerim's men shortly after the robbery of the post, have not been recovered. Abdul Kerim refuses to hand over to the authorities the men who committed the robberies.

"2. The Government dues and taxes are being collected with the utmost severity. No extension of the period of payment is granted. Defaulters are mercilessly beaten and thrashed. When they cannot pay their relations are seized and beaten until they pay it. Christians and Jews only are subjected to this treatment. A Jew (a relation of a Government defaulter) was lately beaten to death by Zaptiehs on his refusing to pay his brother's taxes. The authorities pay no heed to this state of affairs, even when they are brought to their notice by the heads of the religious communities or by the people themselves, and the judicial authorities decline to interfere.

"3. Under orders from Constantinople the 3rd battalion of the 18th Regiment of the 24th Brigade, belonging to the 12th Division, left Mosul within twenty-four hours for the Persian frontier. But in the evening the soldiers returned and robbed people of their cloaks, turbans, money, &c. The reason is said to be that they were unpaid, and had insufficient clothing to protect them from the cold. The next day they left for their destination. The troops, and some others from Kerkouk, Suleimaniah, &c., have been sent to the frontier between Rawandooz and Sablagh where there is some dispute about the land occupied for the last thirty years by the Persian tribes. The Turks now claim these lands. A fight is said to have occurred, resulting in great loss to the Turks. Reinforcements are said to have been sent from Anatolia. Brigadier-General Yousuf Pasha of Mosul is also under orders to proceed to the frontier.

"4. While at Kerbala (on tour) I heard that the Kurds on the Persian side had committed great atrocities on their Turkish captives, and had cut off their noses and ears."

I have, &c.
(Signed) L. S. NEWMARCH,
Lieutenant-Colonel.

[5984] No. 9.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 19.)

(No. 90.)
Sir, *Constantinople, February 13, 1906.*

THE Porte has received information that a revolt against the new taxes on domestic animals and on households (poll tax) has occurred at Castambol, where the population have expelled the Vali, Mektoubdji (Secretary), and Defterdar (Treasurer) of the province who are now on their way to Constantinople. A similar movement has taken place at Sinope, where the Mutessarif has been forcibly placed on board a steamer bound for the capital.

I understand that there is considerable apprehension that the example set in the Castambol Vilayet may be followed in other parts of the Empire, the two taxes above mentioned being universally unpopular.

Only a few weeks ago a riot took place at Mossul in connection with the collection of them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

[6906] No. 10.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 101.)
Sir, *Constantinople, February 19, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Bagdad respecting affairs at Mosul.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 10.

Consul-General Newmarch to Sir N. O'Conor

(No. 82.)
Sir, *Bagdad, January 18, 1906.*

I HAVE received the following information from the British Consular Agent at Mosul:—

1. During the last week of 1905 the Turkish authorities mobilized all the privates of the Reserve in this city, and the neighbourhood and the barracks are now empty.

2. On the 25th and 26th December, 1905, snow fell at Mosul, and after this the cold was intense. The waters of the Tigris were frozen and people walked on the ice. Owing to this severe cold many birds and sheep in the desert died.

There has since been rain.

There has not been such cold here for 149 years.

I have, &c.
(Signed) L. S. NEWMARCH, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
Political Resident in Turkish Arabia.

[7712] No. 11.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.— (Received March 5.)

(No. 123.)
Sir, *Constantinople, February 27, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Aleppo, relative to the smuggling of emigrant Armenians on board British vessels by the officers of a Turkish gun-boat at Alexandretta.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 11.

Consul Barham to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 7.)
Sir, *Aleppo, February 19, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that a few weeks ago a party of sixteen Armenians made their way down to Alexandretta from the interior, in the hope of finding means of escaping from this country. They had with them sufficient money to pay their passage to America, and also, in case of need, to bribe the officials to let them go.

There is at Alexandretta a Turkish gun-boat forming part of what is fatuously called the "flying squadron," which, however, so rarely puts to sea as to justify the belief that its machinery is useless.

It was, one may suppose, stationed at Alexandretta for the purpose of preventing smuggling, yet, strange to say, its actual rôle is to lend a helping hand whenever it is a question of smuggling arms, ammunition, or tobacco into the country.

More remarkable is the part the officers play in helping Armenian refugees to embark on British ships for America.

The Armenians of whom I write found no difficulty in arranging with the Captain and officers of the Turkish gun-boat that they should be conveyed after sunset to a steamer of Bell's Asia Minor Company which was to leave for Alexandria that night, the price to be paid being 3 liras for each person.

Ten of the passengers were duly taken on board the British vessel in the gig of the gun-boat, which then returned to land to fetch the remainder, but a dispute arising between the officer in command of the gig and one of the sailors as to the payment of the money, the sailor went off and betrayed the matter to the Porte police, alleging that the Armenians were revolutionaries whom the Second Lieutenant of the gun-boat was helping to escape. The Commissary of Police telegraphed the news to the Palace, and orders were sent to Faik Pacha, the Admiral in Command at Beirout, to proceed to Alexandretta and hold an inquiry.

The Pacha found more than sufficient evidence to prove that, not only in this instance, but habitually, the officers of the gun-boat are engaged in smuggling Armenians out of the country, but he found it desirable to stifle the matter, and the only result of his mission was that the Second Lieutenant was placed under arrest during two weeks for what was called "breach of discipline."

The Armenians who remained on shore waiting to be conveyed to the ship on the gig's second journey were arrested and are now in prison.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY D. BARHAM.

[8543] No. 12.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 12.)

(No. 148.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March 5, 1906.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 61 of the 3rd ultimo, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Agent and Consul-General at Bagdad, reporting on German activity in Mesopotamia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 12.

Consul-General Newmarch to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 168/13.)

Sir, *Bagdad, February* 5, 1906.

IN continuation of my despatch, dated the 2nd February, 1906, I have the honour to submit, for your Excellency's information, the following further extract from my diary to the Government of India of to-day's date :—

"I hear that the new German Consul at Mosul is Herr André, who was for some time employed on the excavations at Babylon.

"He is clever and capable.

"I also hear that several German topographical parties have begun surveying in Northern Mesopotamia, but in this respect my information is at present indefinite."

I have, &c.

(Signed) L. S. NEWMARCH.

[9528] No. 13.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 155.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March* 9, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to report that news of a bomb outrage which occurred a few days ago in the neighbourhood of Kaisarieh has reached this city.

It appears that five or six Khodjas, Mussulman teachers, travelling to Kaisarieh, got into conversation at a khan, 7 or 8 miles outside the town, with some persons supposed to have been Armenians, who requested them to take charge of a bundle and to deliver it to an employé of the Ottoman Tobacco Régie in Kaisarieh. The Armenians then left, and shortly afterwards an explosion took place, by which two of the Khodjas were killed and others wounded.

The authorities state that they have taken all possible measures to prevent ebullitions of Mussulman indignation as a result of this outrage.

I have, &c.

(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

[9530] No. 14.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 161.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March* 13, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Smyrna, with reference to the political situation in Samos.

I am, &c.

(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 14.

Consul-General Cumberbatch to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 14.)

Sir, *Smyrna, March* 3, 1906.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 7 of the 2nd ultimo, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that Mr. Vice-Consul Mare further reports, under date of the 3rd instant, as follows:—

"In view of the approaching elections on the 19th March (o.s.), the Samian Government party is exerting its influence in the Courts and elsewhere to the detriment of the Opposition, whose irritation bids fair to culminate in disturbances. Moreover, the gravity of the situation is enhanced by the existence in Samos of at least 2,500 Gras rifles, with ammunition in plenty.

"At present there is no local authority in Marathocampo, for in the course of last week the Mayor and all members of the municipality were expelled by the Prince Governor for refusing to hand over to him the archives of the Tribunal.

"The prevailing state of things is the outcome of the unconstitutional act of the Samian Government in dismissing the Senate for the Marathocampo district.

"The Samian gendarmerie, hitherto 100 men strong, has recently been increased to a strength of 160.

"That measure, approved by the Turkish Government, was adopted in the interests of good order, but the Prince Governor would do well to exercise greater discrimination in the matter of recruiting the force in question, and to place a check on the Senators, who obtain the appointment of their own too fanatical nominees.

"Responsibility for the disorders lies to a great extent upon the police, who wound and arrest persons without provocation.

"A collision took place on the 25th ultimo between the rival parties in the upper Vathy, some 100 shots being exchanged. As it was night-time, however, little damage was done, the combatants retiring to their houses.

"Only one man was killed, and he by a gendarme, who, with three other individuals, was afterwards severely wounded by partisans of the Opposition. Thereupon, upwards of 100 men of the latter party assembled, put the gendarmes to flight, occupied the main centres of the town, and began to fire down Port Vathy whenever they caught sight of their opponents. A rush down to Vathy, which would have led to further bloodshed, was fortunately prevented by the leaders.

"The Opposition party then formed a committee and submitted to the Sultan, by telegraph, an account of the events, as well as their protest against the maladministration of the island.

"Subsequently, further telegrams were sent to His Imperial Majesty asking that a special Commission should be sent to superintend the coming elections.

"Members of the said committee visited the British and French Vice-Consulates urging that telegrams might be sent to their respective Embassies to the end that they should support the suggested appointment of a Commission in the interests of peace in Samos."

Mr. Vice-Consul Mare is of opinion that unless the Ottoman Government give timely instructions to the Prince Governor to administrate the island impartially, not suffering himself to be the puppet of the Senators, and unless the gendarmerie be reorganized, the impending elections will result in very lamentable disturbances.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. A. CUMBERBATCH.

[10394] No. 15.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 26.)

(No. 181.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March* 19, 1906.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 161 of the 13th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Smyrna, reporting further upon the political situation at Samos, and the appointment of a Commissioner to investigate the matter.

I have, &c.

(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 15.

Consul-General Cumberbatch to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 16.)

Sir, *Smyrna, March* 16, 1906.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 14 of the 3rd March, I have the honour to inform you that Mr. Vice-Consul Mare further reports, under date of the 10th March, as follows :—

The situation in the island continues in the same bad state. About 100 persons belonging to the Opposition party in the Upper Vathy are still armed. They have sent away all the gendarmes, and the town is now guarded by themselves.

The Senators a few days ago telegraphed to Constantinople requesting permission to employ the Imperial garrison in forcibly compelling these people to submit to their authority. On being informed of this, the latter hoisted the Turkish flag and prepared to defend themselves.

Fortunately the reply was in the negative, and thus very grave disturbances were avoided.

On Thursday last a telegram was received by the Prince-Governor to the effect that the Imperial Government is sending a Commission to inquire into affairs, and every one here is anxiously awaiting his arrival.

I take this opportunity to express my opinion that in the event of a change being made of a Prince-Governor, it would be desirable that the Imperial Government should send a strong and competent person, like Berovitch Pasha, to govern the island, and thus put an end to the present unfortunate state of things, which is detrimental to the interests of the island.

I must also bring to your notice that a few days ago the Greek police authorities confiscated at Syra 75 rifles bought at Athens by a certain Sot. Chrissas on behalf of the Samian Government, and 125 more purchased at the instance of merchant, M. Hadjiyanni, Senator for the district of Carlovassi. The matter was immediately reported to the Sublime Porte.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. A. CUMBERBATCH.

[10399] No. 16.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 26.)

(No. 186.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March 20, 1906.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 643 of the 19th September, 1905, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah inclosing copies of letters which he has received from the local agent of Messrs. Lynch Brothers, and from Captain Denne, of the Turkish steamer "Hamidieh," with reference to the competition between the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company and the Hamidieh Steam-ship Company.

Mr. Crow offers some interesting remarks on this correspondence, but I think it is also worth noting that the letter of Messrs. Lynch's agent clearly recognizes that there is ample and remunerative work for both Companies on the Tigris; and the fact that his Company have not thought it necessary to lower their cargo rates to the charges made by the Hamidieh Administration may be taken as a sure proof that Messrs. Lynch's steamers have quite as much of the carrying trade as they can conveniently handle, and that the competition of the Turkish steam-boats is not sufficiently severe to affect their profits.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure 1 in No. 16.

Consul Crow to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 9.)

Sir, *Bussorah, February 22, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, inclosed to your Excellency, copies of letters received from Messrs. Lynch Brothers, and Captain Denne, of the Turkish steamer "Hamidieh," with reference to the competition between the two Tigris River Companies.

Transport on the river is less congested than formerly. Messrs. Lynch Brothers state that there is less cargo to carry, while, from Captain Denne's letter, it would appear that the Turkish line secures the bulk of the direct cargo from home and Lynch's Company that forwarded in transit viâ Bombay.

The "Hamidieh's" engines have lately broken down, and the vessel is laid up temporarily. I am informed that the Turks are at a loss how to repair them, as the English engineers have left. I have no further information regarding the purchase by the Turks of vessels in Belgium, beyond the statements in the inclosed letters. Messrs. Lynch Brothers suffer considerable annoyance from the arbitrary proceedings of the Hamidieh Administration's servants in river matters. I have brought instances of the bad behaviour of the latter to the Vali's notice, and have asked him to caution the Manager. I am, however, as yet unable to say whether my representations have had the desired effect. I think—at present, at all events—that Messrs. Lynch Brothers are more likely to suffer from the bad handling of the Turkish vessels than from the effects of any genuine competition in the carrying trade of the river; but the "Hamidieh" undoubtedly takes a large proportion of the through cargo to Bagdad.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. E. CROW.

Inclosure 2 in No. 16.

Mr. S. Dods to Consul Crow.

(Private and Confidential.) *Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company,*
Dear Mr. Crow, *Bussorah, February 16, 1906.*

WITH regard to your request for confidential information about the Hamidieh Steam-boat Administration.

The competition experienced by our Company during 1905 has been very keen, especially for the native passenger traffic.

The increase of their fleet by the steamers "Hamidieh" and "Burhanieh" should have enabled them to deal with double the amount of cargo they were formerly able to carry. However, the expectations about the performance of these steamers has not been fulfilled. They are faulty in design, and inferior material has been used in their construction, consequently they are frequently breaking down.

Both these steamers have been dispatched from Bussorah either a day or a few hours, as occasion demanded, ahead of our steamers in order to attract the native passengers.

Cargo rates have been reduced by them to 2*s.* 0*d.* lower than our Company's. Our figures for through cargo (*i.e.*, booked in Europe) from Bussorah to Bagdad are at present 32*s.* 6*d.* per ton for general cargo, and 30*s.* per ton for sugar.

It is reported that the Hamidieh Steam-boat Administration have purchased two new steamers from Messrs. Cockerill and Co., of Belgium, and we presume the Turks will take due care that the faults which have come to light in the "Hamidieh" and "Burhanieh" will not be again repeated.

When these steamers commence running, the competition will no doubt be even keener than it now is.

May I draw your attention to the following incidents, which only too plainly illustrate the risks encountered by our steamers when meeting the Turkish steamers while under weigh.

While lying at anchor at Bussorah on the night of the 29th April last, our steam launches "Ishtar" and "Asp" were damaged to the extent of over 200*l.*, and our steamer "Blosse Lynch" at the same time was nearly run down by the Hamidieh Steam-boat Administration Company's steamer "Ressafah."

On the 20th December their steamer "Mosoul" ran into and sank the barge of the "Bagdad" while they were stopped alongside the bank near Khalet-Saleh.

Since the "Ressafah" collided with the "Khalifah" in December 1902, our steamers stop and keep as near the bank as possible when they meet the Turkish steamers.

In connection with the damage sustained by our launches, Lloyd's agents were requested by the underwriters to prosecute the Hamidieh Steam-boat Administration, but they replied and informed the underwriters that to do so would only be throwing money away. The "Hamidieh" and "Burhanieh" are officered by natives (with the exception of one European) who have no professional training, and with two more powerful Turkish steamers on the river, also being run by incompetent officers, the risk of accident by collision to our steamers will be greater than before.

I would also beg to remind you that it is now four years our Company has been defending the "Khalifah"-"Ressafah" case, where a sum of £T. 16,780 is claimed.

The fact that the Turkish Government are the prosecutors debars our Company from obtaining justice, and the poor consolation we have to accept is that we can appeal against the inevitable adverse verdict and carry the case to Constantinople, which will entail additional heavy expenses.

If the object of the Turks is to demonstrate the impossibility of our Company obtaining redress for accidents caused by those in command of their steamers they have every reason to be satisfied with their tactics.

Yours very truly,
(Signed) SAML. DODDS.

Inclosure 3 in No. 16.

Captain Denne to Consul Crow.

Dear Mr. Crow, "*Hamidieh*," *at Bussorah, February* 2, 1906.

I AM sorry, I had so much to do during my stay here last voyage, that your note entirely escaped my memory.

I do not know that there is much to say about our steamers. There are always two sent from Bussorah to Bagdad every week, and they seem to be paying very well indeed.

I think we have the larger proportion of cargo from home. The transhipment cargo via Bombay is, I think, mostly handled by Lynch's boats. We get most of the deck passengers, and Lynch, partly owing to their arrangement with the British India, carry nearly all the European passengers.

Two more boats are to be built in Belgium, I believe, but I cannot say when they are to be delivered. Probably at the end of this year.

There is very great need on this river of a Conservancy Department for the removal of wrecks, &c., and a few lights would not do any harm; but I do not suppose the amount of British shipping at present up here would justify you in raising the question if you felt disposed to.

There seems an idea amongst the unthinking part of the population that I am bribed by Lynch to run my steamer detrimental to the interests of the Sonea. It is, of course, ridiculous; and as a matter of fact the "Hamidieh" runs much more regularly and with less accidents, &c., than the "Burhanieh," which is commanded by a Turkish marine officer.

Lynch's steamers have run like clocks during the last year, and I much fear that our two new steamers, although they are perhaps faster, cannot become such a well-conducted concern as Lynch Company.

The deck passengers travel by our steamers principally on account of the fare being generally less.

There was an accident the other day which resulted in the sinking of one of our cargo barges. The cargo was saved, but the barge is a total wreck.

I do not think there is anything more to say, and this is very little.

Yours truly,
(Signed) G. H. A. DENNE.

[11228] No. 17.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir E. Grey. (*Received April* 2.)

(No. 191.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March* 21, 1906.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 148 of the 5th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bagdad, in which mention is made of the appointment in the near future of a Russian and a Persian Consul at Mosul.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 17.

Consul-General Newmarch to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 220/22.)
Sir, *Bagdad, February* 15, 1906.

IN continuation of my despatch, dated the 12th instant, I have the honour to submit, for your Excellency's information, the following further extract from my diary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department:—

"Herr André, the German Consular Agent at Mosul, whom the British Consular Agent at that place now describes as a Vice-Consul, has exchanged visits with the British Consular Agent there, and shown himself to be very friendly to the Consular Agent.

"The British Consular Agent reports that a Russian and a Persian Consul are shortly to be appointed to Mosul."

I have, &c.
(Signed) L. S. NEWMARCH.

[11230] No. 18.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 2.)

(No. 193.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March* 22, 1906.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 181 of the 19th instant I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Smyrna, reporting further on the disturbed political state in Samos.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 18.

Consul-General Cumberbatch to Sir N. O'Conor.

Sir, *Smyrna, March* 19, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that Mr. Vice-Consul Mare reports, under date of the 13th March, as follows:—

A few days ago a special Court, consisting of five Judges, was empannelled to examine objections made to certain names on the list of voters.

It appears that M. Sofouli, Leader of the Opposition, was yesterday informed that three out of the five Judges (two being neutral), a sufficient majority, will pronounce for the removal from his list of voters of ninety-four names.

The same evening, accordingly, a detachment of the "Civil Guard" of Upper Vathy descended to Port Vathy and carried off from his residence one of the said three Judges, M. Const. P. Yoannon, who is now in their keeping in Upper Vathy.

Thereupon the Prince Governor called a meeting of the Consuls, and entreated them to take the necessary measures for the release of M. P. Yoannon, he himself being powerless in view of the resignation of many of his gendarmes.

The Consuls refused to enter into negotiations with the Opposition, advising the Prince Governor either to remain entirely inactive until the arrival in Samos of the Imperial Commissioner, or else to dismiss the Judge in question, replacing him by a person of known impartiality.

The latter alternative was set aside by the Senators, who shortly afterwards addressed a petition to the Consuls that they should report to their Ambassadors on the state of affairs, in the hope that their intervention might induce the Sublime Porte to reinforce the local authorities.

The Prince Governor knew nothing of this petition until later, when he informed the Consuls that he considered it as null and void.

It is obvious that the Prince is in no small anxiety as to his own position. As it is incumbent on him to keep good order in the island, he is answerable for any disturbances occurring before the arrival of the Commissioner.

M. Marc adds that the Greek Consul made a lengthy speech to the Senators and Consuls, in which he pointed to the present troubles as the outcome of irregularities on the part of Samian Tribunals.

Things having reached so grave a crisis, the re-establishment of order will be no light task. Under the present system things are going from bad to worse, and radical changes in the Constitution of the island are imperative.

M. Marc incloses copy of a letter addressed to the Prince Governor by the "Civil Guard" of Upper Vathy. It is a somewhat lengthy document, calling upon the Prince Governor to dismiss the Senate, in order to insure freedom of action during the approaching elections, and it is made apparent that they intend holding M. Yoannon as hostage till something is done to satisfy their demands.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. A. CUMBERBATCH.

[12146] No. 19.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 216.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April 2, 1906.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 708 of the 14th October, 1905, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Acting Consul at Damascus reporting on the opening of the Dera'a–Haifa branch of the Hedjaz Railway.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 19.

Acting-Consul Edmonds to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 8.)
Sir, *Damascus, March 22, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that the engineering difficulties of the Yarmuk Valley section of the Haifa–Dera'a Railway have been finally overcome. The first through train from Haifa arrived in Damascus on the 19th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. S. EDMONDS.

[12149] No. 20.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 219.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April 3, 1906.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 90 of the 12th February, respecting the revolts which had taken place at Castambol and Sinope owing to the unpopularity of the new taxes on domestic animals and households, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Erzeroum, reporting the serious discontent which the imposition of the new poll-tax had aroused among the Mussulman population of that city.

From the telegram from Mr. Shipley, which I forwarded in my despatch No. 208 of the 30th March, you are aware that the ferment among the Mussulman population culminated in their seizing the telegraph office and laying their grievances directly before the Palace, and that the Sultan had replied that orders had been sent to the Commander-in-chief of the 4th Army Corps at Erzinjan to proceed to Erzeroum as Special Commissioner to deal with the question.

His Majesty's Consul has informed me in a later telegram that the Mushir has announced to the Commandant of the troops at Erzeroum that the Sultan has ordered the Vali to be superseded, and has appointed him to be Vali *ad interim*, and that he will proceed to Erzeroum as soon as possible.

This message was made known at once by the Military Commandant at Erzeroum, and had a good effect on the situation, the Mussulmans having reopened their shops and resumed business, although the tension has not been entirely removed.

[11480] No. 18*.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 3.)

(No. 208.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March 30, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith paraphrase of a telegram from His Majesty's Consul at Erzeroum.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 18*.

Consul Shipley to Sir N. O'Conor.

(Telegraphic.) P. *March 29, 1906.*

POLL tax.

Mussulmans are demanding recall of Vali, and yesterday, late in the afternoon, they closed their shops as a demonstration against him, and took possession of telegraph office. The greater part of the night was passed in exchanging telegrams with the Palace; and a message has, I learn, just been received from His Majesty, stating that directions have been sent to Mushir of Erzinjan to proceed as Special Commissioner to Erzeroum.

Governor-General has shown such forbearance and tact that public order has not been disturbed, except that business has been brought to a standstill. Among the Christians there has been no panic, as the Mussulmans' conduct throughout has been such as to give no cause for alarm.

Sultan's reply is now being discussed by Mussulmans. I will not fail to keep your Excellency informed of the situation, but I anticipate no further immediate trouble.

The Vali, however, asserts that he has received no intimation either from the Porte or the Palace of his having been superseded, and he thinks that the intention is to leave him nominally in charge of the administration until the arrival of the Mushir.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 20.

Consul Shipley to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 6.)
Sir, *Erzeroum, March* 20, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that the announcement of the new "shakhsi verghi" (poll-tax) is provoking serious ferment amongst the Mussulmans of Erzeroum. The latter I learn have even gone so far as to sound two or three of the leading local Christians as to the possibility of organizing a mass meeting of Christians and Mussulmans in front of the Government buildings as a protest against the new burden about to be imposed on them.

As was to be expected, however, the Christians very prudently declined to give any countenance to a proceeding the consequences of which would be likely to fall chiefly on themselves, pointing out instead that a better plan for their Mussulman friends would be to bring their grievances to the notice of the Governor-General, Nazim Pasha, by means of a representative deputation.

This advice seems at first to have been adopted by the Mussulmans, but the latter, being apparently not satisfied with their reception by his Excellency, insisted on sending a telegram direct to the Palace at Constantinople, and in the meantime proceeded on Sunday last to give more open expression to their dissatisfaction by making a demonstration in front of the former's house, and by tearing down during the night the placards which had been posted up by the Government giving public notice of the imposition of the new tax.

The Chief of the Erzeroum municipality and the head of the Veterinary Department would also appear to have come in for a share of their displeasure, the former, as far as I can gather, on account of the octroi duties which are felt to be vexatious by the population, the latter owing to his connection with the tax on cattle.

One of the grievances felt by both Mussulmans and Christians alike against the new tax might, I cannot help thinking, have been avoided by the exercise of a little care on the part of the Government. The particular grievance in question is that the amount to be paid under the new tax has been fixed at 400 piastres, 200 piastres, and 35 piastres, or, in English currency, about 3*l.* 13*s.* 4*d.*, 1*l.* 16*s.* 6*d.*, and 5*s.* 10*d.* respectively, according to the category under which each person may be placed, and it is generally considered that under this method of assessment the burden of the incidence will fall heavily on the poor, while the sum to be paid by the rich is ludicrously small as compared with the latter's means.

There is considerable truth in this contention, bearing in mind the state of penury to which the poorer class of artizans in this part of the country has been reduced, and while the Turkish Government may not have at its disposal the machinery necessary to assess each individual according to his ability to pay, it is felt that, failing the exemption of the poorer classes altogether, a somewhat more elastic and less arbitrary system should have been devised.

But however this may be, and whether the Mussulmans persevere in their present opposition or not, there can be no doubt that the feeling of discontent among them produced by this latest addition to the burdens already imposed is so very deep and widely spread as to merit the serious attention of the Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. S. SHIPLEY.

[12154] No. 21.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 224. Secret and Confidential.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April 3, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah, reporting the outbreak of serious disturbances at Suk-el-Shiyukh, in the Muntifik, owing to the refusal of the El Hacham (Hidjam) tribes to pay the Government taxes, and the efforts of the local authorities to collect them.

I have received through a secret and confidential source confirmation of the serious character of the revolt of these tribes, and of the repulse suffered by the Imperial troops which were dispatched against them.

The Grand Vizier, in a communication addressed to the Minister of War, states that the Vali of Bussorah had telegraphed that on the 24th ultimo, in a conflict between the troops and the Arab tribes, 100 soldiers were killed or wounded, and their Commander, Colonel Moustapha Bey, having lost his head, the Mutessarif of Amara, together with Lieutenant-Colonel Aziz Bey, who was in the district, had been dispatched in all haste to the scene of the encounter with detachments of troops, which were immediately mobilized from all sides.

The Minister of War replied that telegraphic instructions had been sent to the Vali and Commandant of Bussorah to proceed at once to the scene of the encounter with a considerable force collected from the surrounding districts, and also to the General of the VIth Army Corps to proceed to the spot in all haste with a considerable force taken from the head-quarters of the corps.

In a subsequent message the Grand Vizier communicated to the Minister of War a further telegram from the Vali of Bussorah, pointing out the impossibility of putting down the rebel tribes with the military force which had been dispatched to Suk-el-Shiyukh, and urging that three more battalions, 800 strong, should be sent at once to the scene of action.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 21.

Consul Crow to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 11.)
Sir, *Bussorah, March 5, 1906.*

THERE has been serious trouble among the Arabs at Suk-el-Shiyukh, in the Sanjak of Muntifik, resulting in considerable loss of life on the side of the Turkish troops, and the immediate recall of the Mutessarif of Muntifik to Constantinople. The cause of the disturbances appears to have been the persistent refusal of the El Hacham tribes during the past two years to pay taxes to Government, and the attempts of the authorities to enforce payment.

On the 11th ultimo the town of Suk-el-Shiyukh was surrounded by El Hacham Arabs, the inhabitants were under arms, temporary fortifications were thrown up, and fighting was going on. The El Hacham were aided by the Abu Hameydi and El Hassan tribes, and, as affairs were becoming serious, urgent representations were made to Bussorah for the dispatch of troops. 500 Redifs were sent from Nasriye and 200 from Amara, while 300 soldiers proceeded from Bussorah to the scene of action; 30 gendarmes, under Lieutenant Suleyman Effendi, were attacked by the El Hacham Arabs on their way to Suk-el-Shiyukh, and Suleyman Effendi was wounded. The Mutessarif of Nasriye and the Commandant of the troops proceeded to Suk-el-Shiyukh to direct operations, and artillery was used against the Arabs, who were finally repulsed, it is believed, after loss of life and destruction of property. The accounts of the fighting are, however, disjointed and confused, and up to the time of my leaving Amara on the 1st instant it was not clear to the minds of the Bussorah authorities what had precisely occurred. It is known on the Turkish side 16 soldiers were killed and 14 wounded, including a Major slightly and a Colonel Agassi severely wounded. I hear that the Mutessarif of

Muntifik has left for Constantinople in obedience to a summons from the Sultan, who is said to be distressed at the loss of life occasioned by the disturbances.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. E. CROW.

[12161] No. 22.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 231.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April 4, 1906.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 219 of the 3rd instant, I have the honour to forward herewith paraphrase of a telegram from His Majesty's Consul at Erzeroum, reporting further on the situation in that city.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 22.

Consul Shipley to Sir N. O'Conor.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Erzeroum, April 3, 1906.*

THE delay in the departure of the Mushir and the absence of any official statement from the capital seem to be producing an impression among the Moslems that the authorities do not intend to keep faith with them, and the bazaars have again been closed. The attitude of the Moslems towards the Christians is reassuring and friendly as hitherto, and they continue to show great self-restraint and regard for public order, but the situation is anomalous (there is always a risk of complications). The position of the Vali is untenable—he has now no authority; and in the interest of both Moslems and Christians it is most desirable that definite orders should be sent from Constantinople, either for his dismissal or for the immediate departure of the Mushir.

The troops continue to show marked friendliness towards the population.

[12163] No. 23.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 233.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April 4, 1906.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 193 of the 22nd ultimo, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Smyrna reporting the arrival of the Imperial Commissioner, Izzet Bey, at Samos and the restoration of order in the island.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 23.

Consul-General Cumberbatch to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 19.)
Sir, *Smyrna, March 27, 1906.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 17 of the 20th instant, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that Mr. Vice-Consul Mare reports, under date of the 22nd instant, that the Imperial Commissioner, Izzet Bey, arrived in Samos a few days before, and had succeeded in arranging the differences between both political parties.

The revising Judge captured by the Opposition, M. Papa Joannon, had been set at liberty on the 21st, and a general amnesty is shortly to be granted by the Prince Governor.

The General Elections for the Assembly have been postponed until the 9th (22nd) April, and perfect tranquillity prevails for the present.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. A. CUMBERBATCH.

[12795] No. 24.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 17.)

(No. 239. Confidential.)

Constantinople, April 9, 1906.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 235 of the 6th instant, respecting the recent bomb outrage at Cæsarea, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a letter written by the United States' missionary, Dr. Dod, Head of the Medical College at Cæsarea, and handed to me privately yesterday by Mr. Pears, giving an account of the barbarous treatment by the local authorities of five Armenians, who were arrested and detained in prison on the suspicion of their complicity in the outrage.

I have made very strong representations to the Sublime Porte with a view to the punishment of the officials who may be found guilty of these inhuman acts.

The letter is, as you will observe, unsigned, but Mr. Pears assures me of its authenticity.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

[Inclosure in No. 24.

Dr. Dod to Mr. Pears.

Talas, Turkey, March 24, 1906.

YOU have heard that on Friday, the 2nd March, there was a dynamite outrage committed near here by which two Turkish students were killed. The guilty persons, two in number, were said to have come towards Talas. Search was therefore made here, every possible clue being followed up with searching of houses and arrests, all in the Armenian quarter. In this search a counterfeiting outfit and counterfeit money was found in one house, so that the scent became a double one. We soon began to hear stories of torture inflicted on prisoners in order to compel them to confess and to implicate others. These tortures were vile and fiendish. Under this torture statements were made implicating others, and such persons were at once arrested and thrown into prison, even though the confessions implicating them were retracted when the tortures were intermitted.

Five of the men thus imprisoned have been released and have returned to Talas, nothing being found against them. I have taken the statements of three of these from their own mouths, and give them below.

Hadji, a barber, Armenian, says that he was taken to prison the 9th March, and was to have been put into the common prison with the criminals, but found a corporal who was a friend of his, who secured the privilege for him of being sent to the barracks instead, and that no indignities were practised on him. He was examined and nothing found against him, and he was released on the 21st March. Of course he had to provide his bedding and food and fee his gaolers freely, but that is a matter of course, and is hardly counted as a cause of complaint.

Jebrael Effendi Korajian, Armenian, aged 50, one of the prominent and well-to-do men in the Armenian community of Talas, was arrested in the afternoon of Tuesday, the 6th March, taken to Cæsarea, and thrown into prison just before nightfall. He was put into a room in the criminals' prison where fourteen condemned criminals were serving out sentences for varying terms, some even for life as murderers. (These prisoners are known as the vilest, most abandoned, and merciless creatures known as human beings. For one man, especially a rayah, to be confined in one of these cells overnight is universally considered to mean that he is put there for them to torture and treat as they will, in the hope of extracting some confession from him.) He was stripped naked, was made to kneel on a stick of rough firewood, with another stick behind the knees, and thus sit on his feet; then, in that position, with another similar stick he was beaten on the thighs above the knees. If he leaned forward at all to relieve the strain, as he must involuntarily do, he was struck violently under the chin to force him to hold his chin erect. (For five days thereafter he was unable to shut his teeth together.) Then he was beaten on the lower legs over the shin-bones. A shoemaker's awl was driven under the nail of the third finger of the right hand, of the big toe and second toe of the right foot, and of the big toe of the left foot. There

was a hole in the wall like a stove-pipe hole. His hand was thrust through, and the criminals in the next room burned his hand with heated tongs in several places. Then the fire-shovel was heated in the coals, and he was burned in four places on the buttocks and back. Then with the red-hot tongs his scrotum was seized and twisted and burned. Slighter burns were made on his face and forehead. His ears were pulled and twisted until they bled. Then he was compelled to drink urine (not his own) from the vessel in the room. He thanked God that the fire in the mangal was so nearly out that they could not heat the shovel again. They tried to get some fire from the next room, but it was out there also. After this he was left standing naked for at least five hours, until towards morning he was allowed to dress and sit down on the mud floor. During these tortures he was continually urged to "confess," to say something about some one, that such a man in Talas was a member of a "Committee" or something of that sort. But he remained firm all through. He was asked if he was a Giaour or a Mussulman, implying that if he would acknowledge Islam he would be released. The zaptiehs at the door would continually urge on the criminals, suggesting to them what to do. Of the fourteen criminals there, two sat by and refused to take part in the barbarities.

I asked Jebrael if he knew what other prisoners had suffered, and he said that he did not, because all were treated separately; only he heard Siragan screaming for mercy. Also Hadji Selimin Oglou, who was in the next room, had his arm thrust through the same hole in the wall already mentioned, and the criminals on this side burned it, and he heard him say, "Jebrael Effendi, you were the head of our Committee of twenty-five. Jebrael Effendi, I am not saying this; they are making me say it."

The next morning, supported by two men, he was taken before the Mutessarif and immediately made complaint of the way in which he had been treated. He insisted on opening his clothes and showing his wounds. The Governor professed sorrow, said it was a mistake and should not happen again. He was examined and sent back to another part of the prison where he could be more comfortable. A Greek physician was allowed to see him once and treat him. The city physician, a Turk, was sent to see him, but he refused treatment from him, and demanded a report from him of his condition that he might bring suit against the Government. Influential Armenians in Talas worked for him, and finally on the 17th March he was sent home.

I saw him on the 22nd March, sixteen days after the receipt of the injuries. The burns on his face were healed. The left ear was swollen and inflamed. Discolouration on upper part of left arm from bruise was about 2 inches by 4 inches in extent. Third finger of right hand was much swollen, inflamed, skin peeling off, evidently in course of healing after a severe wound infection. Third finger of left hand had a large partially healed wound, and there were seven or eight scars of burns on the back of hand. There were four wounds on the back and buttocks, evidently from burning, not yet healed, with scabs over them, about 3 to 4 inches wide by 5 inches long. The scrotum was a mass of scabs peeling off, still red and inflamed. On each leg above the knee the discolouration from bruising was marked, extending 6 or 8 inches above the knee-cap. Below the knee and on the heels were scars of bruises and burns.

Hadji Selimin O., Armenian, aged 35. Arrested at same time as Jebrael, Tuesday, the 6th March, and was taken to next room to him. He was stripped naked. His right arm and hand were thrust though the hole in the wall into the next room where Jebrael was, and burned with the tongs. An awl was thrust under the nail of the thumb. His fingers were bent back until they seemed to break. He was beaten on the back and told to charge Jebrael with being the head of the Committee. He called out, "Jebrael Effendi, were you not the head of our Committee? Jebrael Effendi, I am not saying this; they are compelling me to say it." (These two men had not seen each other at all since that time.) Then he was beaten more for saying this. He was placed in the same position as Jebrael, with the sticks under and behind the knees, and beaten on the legs above the knees with a stick of firewood. He was seized by the throat and choked. Awls were driven into the soles of his feet. A stake was sharpened, and he was made to sit on it with it pressing against the perineum, and then a man sprang on his back. The stake did not penetrate into the rectum. The criminals then prepared to commit sodomy on him, using soap for lubrication. Seventeen of them desired it, but the other three (there were twenty in the room) refused, and said it should not be done in their room. The others therefore gave it up. A rope was put round his neck and drawn up until he was choking, when the "guardian" of the prison came along and

told them not to do that. Later a handkerchief was tied round his neck and twisted until he was choking, and meanwhile he was beaten on the back, but at the eighth blow he fainted. Later long nails were brought to drive through his feet to the floor, but this was not done. He was made to stand in cold water up to the knees (still naked) holding a mangal of hot coals in his hands for an hour and a-half. At the least sign of dropping it he was beaten. Some time after midnight he was allowed to crawl into the charcoal bin and go to sleep. While still sleeping suddenly some one took a handful of earth and crowded it into his mouth, dragged his fez down over it with one hand, and choked him by the neck with the other. He seemed to be just dying when some one else released him. Blows on the head and face, small burns on the face, kicks, &c., were common all through the time, and he said he did not count that. In the morning he was brought before the Governor, and when he complained of his treatment the Governor said, "My son, this is a mistake. I am very sorry for it. It won't happen again." The rest of the time he was imprisoned elsewhere. He was released on the 14th March. Release, of course, means that absolutely nothing was found against him.

I saw Hadji on the 22nd March, sixteen days after the receipt of the injuries. There was a large unhealed sore with a scab on his right arm, 3 inches long. The wound made by the awl is still to be seen under the nail of the right thumb, down to the root of the nail. There were three sores on the lower part of the back and buttocks in the shape of a rude cross 4 or 5 inches each way. (The men had said while doing it: "This is your God. We will mark you with it.") There was discolouration from bruises on both legs extending 6 inches below the knees and on the heels. He says that one foot is still without any sensation.

There are others still in prison of whom it is said that they have been tortured. What I can gather by inquiry is little, for little is known.

Der Der O. Muggerditch, of Monjasoon. Said to have been beaten, to have been hung up by the armpits, to have had irons on his feet.

Mardessor Demirdjian, of Talas, 22 years old. Imprisoned the 5th March, said to have had nails driven through his feet, a cow's horn thrust into his rectum, to have had sodomy committed on him.

Mammas Koozoo Koulak O., of Cæsarea. Similar things to the above.

Hadji Haritune, of Talas, the counterfeiter. He has confessed to this crime. Was tortured in all sorts of ways to make him confess to knowledge of the dynamite also. Named others as implicated, who were then arrested. He afterwards retracted these statements, even though beaten for it.

Gulbonk, of Talas. Similar things to the above.

Siragan Koeshker O., of Talas, a near neighbour of ours. Said to have been hung by the neck till almost dead (the one who was heard screaming by Jebrael).

Arshavir Hadji Sahagyan, of Bog-Hazlaian, a lad of 18 or 20 years of age. After being imprisoned in the barracks for two days, was seen being taken to the criminals' prison. The Captain of the gendarmerie told me that he had been sent to his village, but I have reason to believe that this is not true. It seemed to be said to prevent my making further inquiries about him.

Der Hagop, the priest, accused of being a partner of the counterfeit. No tortures are reported for him.

In view of these things, being acquainted with many of these men, and after consultation with the other men of the station, I went to Cæsarea yesterday, hoping that, going as a physician to see if I could do anything for them, I might be allowed to see them. I went to the Captain of the gendarmerie, who after a moment's hesitation gave me permission to go and see any one I wanted to, but only in the ante-room in the presence of officials. I called for Marderos, and he came. I asked him how he was, and he said he was well, but I saw that it was going to be impossible to talk freely with him. As the prison Mudiri turned his back for a moment I asked, "Have they done much to you?" "Yes, they have," he whispered to me. Just then the guardian of the prison came hurrying in and ordered Marderos back to prison. I said that I had permission to see him. He replied, "No permission except from the Governor." I immediately rose up and said I would see the Governor myself to ask permission. I went and met him leaving his house. Word had evidently been sent him of my going to the prison, and he had forbidden it, and it appeared as though he were going away so as not to be found for a second request. He inquired at once before I spoke what business I had with the young man. There were others around, and I replied that we had heard that he was sick, &c. Then I said that if the Governor had a few minutes to spare I would like to see him alone. So we went

into a room. I saw that it was no use to present any excuse, so I told him that we had heard that some of these men had been abused by the criminals, and I wanted to see them. He said that it was not so, nothing whatever had been done; under the shadow of the Sultan such things were impossible, that he was protecting every one, &c. I then told him that such things had, however, been done, because I had seen them with my own eyes in Talas. "Oh, that was because those one or two men had stirred up a row with the criminals and had suffered for it," but he had stopped it at once and had the guilty ones put in irons. I said that such barbarity ought not to be committed here. He again denied that anything was done. "How could the Government do so?" I said that it was done by putting these innocent persons into the room with these criminals. He said that could not be helped. Could he give every one of them separate rooms in his own house? &c. In fine, he absolutely refused to let me see them. I said that if there was nothing the matter with them, if nothing had been done to them as he said, it would certainly do no harm for me to see them; that from what I had seen in others I doubted about them, and it would be well to let me be convinced. But he said that it was contrary to rule, &c. So I came away.

Later.—I have just seen one more of the men released from prison, Margarios Effendi Atamian, of Talas, a teacher, over 50 years of age. I asked him about tortures. He said that very little had been done to him in comparison to Jebrael Effendi. He was beaten on the legs in the same manner, he was thrown down and kicked on the body, then, when he was standing up, his head was thrust between the legs of one of the men and he was held in that doubled-over position, and he supposed that they were going to commit sodomy on him, but just at that moment the Governor sent for him for examination, and he was saved. It had been reported of him that this indignity had been accomplished on him. I told him that I had not obtained any actual testimony of this crime from any one; was there any truth in the many reports that I had of it? He said, "Yes, it is true; it has been done to several, but no one is willing to acknowledge it. If it had been done to me I would not acknowledge it."

Furthermore, I have just had a private call from the wealthiest Armenian in the town, a man who has the closest relations with the Government and is notoriously subservient. He asked about my going to see the Governor yesterday, and whether Jebrael Effendi had sent for me or not. I told him that he had not sent for me at all, that I had gone to see him myself. He said that the Government had called for him (my caller) after I went away yesterday, and had charged him with complaining to the foreigners; was he a Consul that he should come here inquiring? &c. The man denied that they had made complaint to any one; that, as loyal subjects, they would not think of referring to any but their own Sovereign if they had anything to say, &c. Then he told me that the Governor had intended not to send any of these men home until their wounds were entirely healed, so that nothing could be seen on them, but that he had pleaded for Jebrael Effendi, and so at last consent had been given, but only with the promise both from himself and from Jebrael Effendi that they would not make complaint or call any one to see him. He went on to tell me of the indignities and tortures and oppressions that they were obliged to suffer, and that without daring to open their mouths, and almost in the same breath he hinted very strongly that he hoped I would not make any more inquiries, that the results might be only to make them suffer more.

I send you this account in unvarnished language. I leave it with you to do what you think best with it. To try to do anything may only bring more suffering to those oppressed people, and yet it seems wrong to keep silent.

With best regards, &c.

[12796] No. 25.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 17.)

(No. 240. Secret and Confidential.)

Constantinople, April 9, 1906.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 231 of the 4th instant, respecting the disturbances at Erzeroum in connection with the levying of the new poll tax, I have the honour to report that a special Council of Ministers was held, and an Imperial Iradé issued instructing the Commandant of the IVth Army Corps to immediately select a capable and trustworthy General of division from his army corps, and to

dispatch him to Erzeroum with a sufficient force from Erzinjan with a view to putting an end to the disorders, and arresting the ringleaders, using armed force if necessary. Further, Mustapha Bey, Member of the Council of State, and Husni Effendi, former Mutessarif of Mush, were to proceed at once to Erzeroum to hold a special inquiry into all the circumstances of the outbreak, and telegraphic instructions were to be sent at once to the Mufti and Ulema of Erzeroum, to give religious advice to the Mussulman population.

A telegram was addressed on the 5th instant to the Commander-in-chief of the IVth Army Corps at Erzinjan, informing him that the Vali of Erzeroum had been dismissed and replaced by Ata Bey, the Vali of Diarbekir. Pending the arrival of the General of division with the troops from Erzinjan, the Mushir was to instruct the Commandant of reserves at Erzeroum to conduct the affairs of the vilayet, and to take all possible steps, with the force at his disposal, to restore and maintain order, to collect the Government taxes, and to uphold the dignity of the Government.

I have received confirmation of these measures, adopted by the Imperial Ottoman Government, from His Majesty's Consul at Erzeroum, who telegraphed on the 7th instant that the ex-Vali had left for Diarbekir, and that the shops were now open and the demonstration at an end.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

[12801] No. 26.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 17.)

(No. 245.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April 11, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Bitlis, reporting the insubordination of time-expired Turkish soldiers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 26.

Vice-Consul Geary to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 11.)
Sir, *Bitlis, March 10, 1906.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 6 of the 17th ultimo, I have the honour to report a further instance of insubordination on the part of the eighty time-expired soldiers, whose attack on the Major of their regiment I then had the honour to report to your Excellency.

It appears that their action on that occasion was so far effective that the "tes-chey-chs," authorizing their return home, were received this week by Said Bey, the Acting Commandant. On his informing them that the issue of the same would be effected in a few days, they proceeded to the post-office in order to enforce the transmission of a telegram to the Mushir (General) complaining of this further delay.

The post-office official refused to comply, and the infuriated soldiery thereupon attacked this "Mufetish," and after wounding him in the head, proceeded to a general raid on the bazaar, assaulting all those inoffensive tradesmen who attempted to oppose them. The latter fled, and the soldiers were at length induced to adopt a more reasonable attitude on the personal appearance of the Commandant; at first they even threatened an attack on this officer, but were appeased by his promise to issue the permits forthwith.

This promise has now been fulfilled, but further trouble is anticipated if the soldiers proceed to demand their arrears of pay, as the officers have no force at their disposal with which they can resist such acts of insubordination.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR B. GEARY.

[12804] No. 27.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 17.)

(No. 248.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April 11, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a Report by His Majesty's Consul at Aleppo upon the administration of that vilayet during the quarter ended the 31st ultimo.

The general condition of affairs in the vilayet, as well as the character of the relations between Mr. Consul Barnham and the Vali, Nazim Pasha, are of an exceptionally satisfactory nature.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 27.

Report upon the Administration of the Vilayet of Aleppo.

Vali.—It is a great pleasure to report that I have rarely had such satisfactory relations with a Turkish official as with the present Vali of Aleppo, his Excellency Nazim Pasha.

I have always found him ready to listen and open to conviction, and I do not recall one official question which he has not settled to my satisfaction during the four months of our acquaintance. With respect to my charge of Greek interests, in which my field of action is ill defined and the duties exceedingly irksome, I am especially grateful to him for his readiness to settle questions of Greek nationality without reference to Constantinople. This friendly attitude towards myself, as well as my colleagues, is very remarkable when it is remembered that this is the same official who, as Mutessarif of Mersina, was five years ago dismissed, at the instance of the Austrian Embassy, in connection with the arrest of the Austrian Lloyd agent, an incident in which he probably acted by superior orders, but for account of which he seems, in any case, to bear no ill-will to Europeans. He is a capable man, and anxious to do good work, but hampered by want of money. In the early days of January, when the Treasury at Aleppo was quite empty, he was called upon to find £T. 32,000, being the annual contribution of this vilayet towards the payment of the Russian indemnity. He was given a week to find the money under pain of dismissal, and was only able to save himself by making an appeal to the leading merchants for advances against havalés.

Judiciary.—Ismail Bey, the Inspector of Justice, has made his mark here by the drastic measures he has adopted for improving the Tribunals. Within a fortnight he obtained from the Minister of Justice the dismissal of the President of the Criminal Court of First Instance, the Procureur-Général, his Assistant or "Moavin," the Examining Judge of the Criminal Court, "Mustantik," and two members of the same Court. I saw him a few days ago, and he told me that other changes were impending, among others the reform of the Commercial Court, a matter which has a special interest for the European Colony.

The accumulation of cases untried goes back to many years, registers are not kept regularly, or are falsified, and each of the officials who have been removed has been guilty of some special dereliction of duty except the Procureur-Général, who had become insane.

Circassians.—Two hundred families, being the larger part of the Circassian immigrants who arrived last November, will leave Aleppo for Rakka next week. Suitable land for the erection of half-a-dozen villages has been found near Nahr-ul-Belleck, a small but perennial stream rising near Harran, the proposed Settlement being about half-way between Rakka and Suroudj.

As these Circassians form a small community and would be open to attack by the nomad Arabs who frequent that part of the country at this time of the year, some of the more active and stalwart from among them have been equipped as gendarmes and armed with rifles. These Gabartai Circassians are not a fighting race, and are anxious to pursue an even tenour of life unmolested.

Excavations at Rakka.—Rakka was formerly one of the summer residences of the Caliph Haroun-al-Raschid, who here established an earthenware factory, the remains

of which were discovered a few years ago. Early this year Mr. Macridis, of the Stamboul Museum, was engaged in collecting specimens of this work for removal to the Museum, and he passed through Aleppo a few weeks ago with three cases full. The specimens I have seen were urn-shaped vases from 6 inches to 9 inches high, of the colour of Etruscan pottery and covered with a beautiful glaze.

Draining of the Marshes at Alexandretta.—A Commission has been sent to Alexandretta to inquire into charges of misappropriating funds, derived from the tax upon animals, which had been reserved for the work of draining the marshes.

Probably no more important work than this has ever been attempted in the vilayet, for it has transformed the port of Alexandretta from a death-trap to a comparatively healthy spot; but pending this inquiry, which has now been proceeding three months, the work has been brought to a standstill.

Railway.—The railway works are being pushed on with the greatest energy, and it is hoped that the new line will be ready and inaugurated on the 1st September, the anniversary of the Sultan's accession.

A station similar in size and accommodation to that of Hama (900 metres by 400 metres) is being erected on the west side of the town, at the point indicated in my last Quarterly Report. Like that of Hama, it will be provided with a separate military platform and sidings, repairing shops, and goods sheds.

Small-pox.—Small-pox is prevalent all over the country, having been introduced by the Circassians. At Alexandretta and in the Vale of Antioch it is of the malignant form known as "black small-pox," and is commonly fatal. The authorities do nothing to encourage the practice of vaccination.

(Signed) HENRY D. BARNHAM,
His Majesty's Consul.

Aleppo, April 2, 1906.

[13656] No. 28.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 256.)

Sir, *Pera, April* 16, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith an interesting Memorandum by Mr. G. A. Lloyd, Honorary Attaché to His Majesty's Embassy, on the immigration of Mahommedan refugees from the Caucasus and Southern Russia into various parts of Asiatic Turkey.

The influx of these Moslem refugees, which is encouraged by the Ottoman Government, will necessarily have considerable political and commercial effect on the districts where they are introduced, and it is therefore not without interest to watch the process of their settlement.

Some 2,000 are already distributed along the Eskishehir–Konia Railway, and the report is current that several thousand more will be located in the same district, the Railway Company advancing considerable sums for their establishment.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 28.

Memorandum on Immigration of Russian Moslem Refugees.

REPORTS that have recently been obtained from various parts of Anatolia and Syria on the introduction of Moslem refugees from the Caucasus and Southern Russia into Asiatic Turkey show that a marked increase in this immigration has taken place during the last few years.

For upwards of the last fifty years the flow of immigration from Southern Russia has been continuous, and the unusually acute distress and troubles that have taken place in the Caucasus recently, together with the anxiety of the Ottoman Government to facilitate in every possible way the introduction and settlement in Anatolia, Syria,

and Mesopotamia of these Moslem refugees, make it seem likely that the numbers of these immigrants will continue to increase, and make it important to note approximately their numbers, the purposes to which they are put, and the effect they appear to be having upon the districts in which they are settled.

The history of the immigration of these refugees, who comprise Tcherkess, Lesgi, Chechen, Kabartai, Karapapacs, and lately Tartars, into Asiatic Turkey dates back from the close of the Crimean War. The long struggle of the Caucasus, from 1842 to 1856, under Schamyl, was finally brought to a close a couple of years after the end of the Crimean War; and the Treaty of Berlin (Article XV), which forbade the introduction of Circassians into European Turkey, was the cause of the large immigration into Western Anatolia of these peoples during the decade that followed the defeat of Schamyl.

The large and important settlements of South Russian Moslems now existing round Ismidt and its neighbourhood all date back from that time, and it is estimated that no less than 400,000 emigrants from the Caucasus alone came into Anatolia between the years 1864 and 1870.

The same causes that led to this wholesale immigration at that time still hold good to-day, and the Circassian and other tribes, who are fastened in between a Christian and a Moslem Power in the Caucasus, tend continually to put themselves under Moslem rule, and to avoid the distasteful military service in a Christian army.

The Ottoman Government, on the other hand, encourage this tendency to the utmost of their power, and see in these strong and hardy mountain races a strong Moslem element that, judiciously spread about and settled amongst Arabs, Kurds, and Armenians, may be counted on as loyal, and unlikely to allow the Christian to become active or powerful in any districts where the two may come into contact.

Generally speaking, their introduction has been very beneficial to the State, especially in the case of the more northern settlements; as agriculturists they have been proved to be industrious and fairly capable, and they have largely been settled on "Miri," or Crown lands, and on farms and properties belonging to the Civil List.

On arrival in Anatolia, Syria, or Mesopotamia, land is usually given to them by free grant, either by the Government or purchased for them by funds raised by forced contributions from the people. Exemption from all taxes for ten years is given them, and from military duty in the first generation.

Some idea of the numbers at present existing in various parts of the Empire may be obtained by reference to the numbers imported into the Vilayet of Damascus during the last thirty years. Figures show that since 1873 upwards of 30,500 Russian immigrants have been settled in this vilayet alone.

All of these are peasants employed in agricultural work on Miri or Crown lands, with the exception of a few who are directly employed on lands belonging to the Civil List.

At the moment there are 1,000 lately arrived, who are being kept at Homs at Government expense pending the building of villages for their settlement, and about 1,500 more are expected to arrive in a few days.

Round Beyrout the numbers are much smaller, the settlements up to now amounting to about 3,500 souls; but this year more have been introduced, and during the last few weeks 500 new arrivals have taken place, and preparations are being made for the settlement of a further number, who are stated to amount to about 1,500 persons, now on their way to the port of Tripoli.

In the Vilayet of Aleppo 2,000 immigrants arrived in the month of January. Some have settled in the neighbourhood of Killis and Aintab, some few hours north of Aleppo, but the majority of these are temporarily housed in the mosques and khans of Aleppo pending their settlement, a public subscription meanwhile being raised for providing them with building material, cattle, and seed.

In other parts of Syria there are large and flourishing communities, a few being scattered a considerable way south along the line of the Hedjaz Railway. In many of these districts the Circassians have transformed barren tracts into well-cultivated and prosperous lands.

In Mesopotamia large colonies exist at Deir, Jebel Abd-ul-Aziz and Ras-ul-Ain, whose numbers it is very difficult to ascertain at all accurately at the present time; but here the settlements have been less successful, the warm climate, combined with dirty habits, having rendered them idle and somewhat liable to sickness, while their superior courage enables them to vie with the Bedowin and Kurds in horse stealing and brigandage.

Thus in Syria and Mesopotamia a strong "Circassian" element has gradually

come into force which may become an important political factor. It looks somewhat as if this immigration had been encouraged with the object of creating a force on whose fidelity the Sultan can rely in the event of any serious rising of the Syrian Arabs against his authority.

Round Bitlis and Van it is reported that no immigration to speak of has taken place just recently, but here, as in other cases, the local authorities have shown reluctance to give any information on the subject, and it seems likely that this district has, in common with its surrounding districts, done its share in settling a considerable quantity of immigrants.

In Diarbekir and the neighbourhood several hundreds (estimated at between 500 and 700) arrived in 1901, mostly Tartars and Papaks, whilst two more villages were put in course of construction last year; one has already been built, and the second is to be completed in a few weeks. These are to hold about 500 people.

Various other districts are known to have received considerable numbers of immigrants during the last year or two, but as yet there are no statistics whereby to estimate the exact numbers.

The Directors of the Bagdad and Anatolian Railway Companies have been busily occupied lately in making arrangements for the settlement of a large further number of Circassians and Tartars along their line of rail. During the last few days 2,000 immigrants have arrived in Konia, and as many as 20,000 more are being arranged for whose arrival is shortly expected. The funds for their settlement are being raised by the Vali, in conjunction with the Railway Company, and villages will probably be built along the Bagdad Railway between Konia and Eregli, to put into cultivation those parts of the plain that are within close reach of the line.

Whilst as a rule the nature of these immigrants is to be industrious, their nature and religion tend to make them domineering, and apt to bully their neighbours, especially Christians, and this tendency, combined with their thieving and predatory habits, have given rise to some complaints in several districts. They are, however, firmly supported and backed up by the local authorities, and this fact, together with their rapidly increasing numbers must without doubt considerably influence the districts in which they are being settled.

[13657] No. 29.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 23.)

(No. 257. Very Confidential.)

Sir, *Constantinople, April* 16, 1906.

DURING the course of the prolonged negotiations connected with the amendments of the Mining Law, I was fully aware of the privileged position secured to the Germans by Article XXII of the Bagdad Railway Convention and of the effect which it would have on British mining enterprise in the vast regions traversed by the line. That Article states: "Le concessionnaire aura la faculté d'exploiter les mines qu'il aura découvertes dans une zone de vingt kilom. de chaque côté de l'axe de la voie, en se conformant aux lois et Règlements y relatifs, et sans que cela constitue pour lui un privilège ou un monopole." It is, indeed, probable that, if strictly interpreted, the saving clause providing against a monopoly by the Company would secure to a foreigner his rights and privileges derived from first discovery of a mine within the 40-kilom. belt; but, on the other hand, there can be little doubt that in face of the special advantages possessed by the Railway Company, competition would be difficult, if not altogether fruitless, even under the conditions of the new Mining Law. It was with this situation in mind that I yesterday discussed the question, in all its bearings, with Mr. Edwin Whittall, the head of the firm of Whittall and Company, with a view to discovering what steps, if any, could be taken to make good the rights of British subjects to *permis de recherches* in case of the discovery of mines which had not been applied for by the Railway Company or their associates. Mr. Whittall then revealed to me that he had been in communication with a German Syndicate of which the Deutsche Bank is a predominant member, for the working of mines within the railway's privileged zone, and that he had come to an agreement with the Germans for the formation of an Anglo-German Syndicate according to which 45 per cent. of all mining undertakings would go to the English and the remaining 55 per cent. to the Germans, while it was further provided that the agreement should affect not only the privileged area, but should be extended to mines discovered by either party in other parts of the country.

Mr. Whittall said that a highly influential Syndicate, composed of some of the South African mine-owners, was already in course of formation in London, and that he had no doubt of obtaining all the financial support required for the development of such mines as they discovered. In his opinion, Asia Minor would, before very long, be the South Africa of the northern hemisphere as regards mining enterprise.

He regarded the new Mining Law, which the Embassy had succeeded in obtaining, as a great stimulant to such undertakings.

It is with extreme satisfaction that I report this arrangement, as it will, in all probability, open a fruitful field for the profitable employment of British capital, and will, moreover, remove a competition which, while injurious to the financial interests of both parties, could hardly fail, in the course of time, to produce serious friction, especially when mining developments extended to the southern districts of Anatolia and to the rich oil-fields near Kerbela.

Mr. Whittall requested me to regard the information he had given me as confidential, as the negotiations are not yet completed, and it is not desirable that the Ottoman Government should be aware of them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

[13659] No. 30.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 23.)

(No. 259.)

Sir, *Pera, April* 17, 1906.

I AM informed that Dr. Zander, the President of the Anatolian and Bagdad Railway Companies, has just succeeded in obtaining a promise from the Sultan of a concession for a scheme of irrigation in the plain of Konia by water obtained by draining the marshy area, extending to some 80,000 donums (16,000 acres), in the neighbourhood of Lake Karavila (Beyshehir), a project which the Germans have had in view for some time past. The consideration for which the concession is to be granted is understood to be an advance of 23,000,000 fr. to the Civil List, while, on the other hand, the Anatolian Railway Company is to receive 50 per cent. of the profits of the undertaking. Detailed information of the scheme is at present lacking; but as the negotiations have now reached a point where success appears to be certain and secrecy no longer necessary, I hope to be shortly in a position to report further on the matter.

The Germans, as a rule, manage to work their designs very quietly and secretly, and, as an instance, I may mention a project now being talked of for a railway from Konia to Erzeroum. As early as December last I received information from Dr. Jewett, at Sivas, that a party of engineers under M. Daudix, of the Anatolian Railway Company, had recently arrived and was engaged in surveying a route to Erzeroum, viâ Sivas and Erzinjian. I requested His Majesty's Consul at Erzeroum to inquire as to the proceedings of the party, but Mr. Shipley was no more able than Dr. Jewett to obtain any admission from the local authorities as to the object of the survey.

A copy of Mr. Shipley's despatch, which shows the route followed by M. Daudrix, is inclosed herewith.

Another railway project which has come to the fore again quite recently, is for a line from Sams-oun to Angora, or possibly even to Konia, but I am unable to say that any definite negotiations for a concession have been set on foot by Dr. Zander.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure 1 in No. 30.

Consul Shipley to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 5.)

Sir, *Erzeroum, March* 7, 1906.

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch of the 10th January last, requesting information respecting the work and proceedings of a party of engineers consisting of M. Daudix, the engineer of the Anatolian Railway Company, his Secretary, M. Segno, with five Turkish officers who have been engaged in the work of surveying a route

from Erzeroum viâ Erzinjian to Sivas, I have the honour to transmit to your Excellency the following particulars which I have obtained from correspondents at Erzinjian and other places on the route.

It should be stated that from Erzeroum to Erzinjian there are two roads for ordinary traffic, viz., the first from Yeni Han, Ashkalé Baibourt, and Kelkid Tchiftlik; the second, which is shorter, branching off at Yeni Han (about four hours from Erzeroum), and, after passing through the village of Mama Khatoun, crosses the Euphrates at Kotur Keupri, whence, after skirting the Sipikor or Djebidjé range, it proceeds through the plain of Balaban to Erzinjian. M. Daudix and his party, however, according to my informant, adopted neither the Baibourt nor the Mama Khatoun route, but, after proceeding from Erzeroum to Askhalé by the ordinary road, kept, on leaving the latter place, to the banks of the Euphrates all the way to Erzinjian, passing through the above-mentioned Kotur Keupri, the villages of Karghin, Vidjan, Halil Agha Han, and the Balaban plain. From Erzinjian onwards to Kemakh (a distance of some twelve hours), a survey was made of the road on both sides of the Euphrates, including an examination of places suitable for the construction of five bridges. About one hour before reaching Kemakh there is the junction of a stream called Keumur Tchai with the Euphrates, and from this spot, if the information supplied to me be exact, the engineers made two surveys of a line to Sivas, one in a northerly direction by Gerdjanis, Sou Shehr, and Enderis, near Shebhan Kara Hissar in the Sivas Vilayet; the second, westwards through Zimara to Divrighi.

The above details are, I fear, of a somewhat scanty nature, and the delay in forwarding my report to your Excellency is due to the fact that, such as they are, I have been entirely dependent for them on correspondents in outlying districts, no information being procurable at Erzeroum. Nazim Pasha, the Governor-General, in reply to a question which I put to him on the matter, stated that no report from M. Daudix had reached him as to the results of the latter's proceedings, his own instructions having merely been to furnish all the needful facilities.

As regards the question of the eventual possibility of the line being constructed or, if made, of its giving a reasonable return on the outlay expended, I have not sufficient material at my disposal to form an opinion. In view, however, of the great distance which such a line would have to traverse, it is considered by some that the additional facilities thereby afforded for the export of Erzeroum grain would, to a great extent, be neutralized by the heavy freight which would necessarily have to be paid. On the other hand, the advantages from a military point of view of connecting Erzeroum with the already existing Anatolian Railway system are obvious, and it is felt that if the line is constructed at all it will be from considerations of the above nature. A less ambitious project which, I understand from Nazim Pasha, has already been sanctioned, is the construction of a carriageable road from Erzeroum through Izpir to Rizeh and the Black Sea. This would not have the military advantages alluded to above, but as its length, compared with the road already existing from Erzeroum to Trebizond, would be about one-half, the increased facilities which would thereby be afforded to the trade of Erzeroum with the exterior and to the transit trade with Persia are obvious.

I inclose, herewith, the itinerary followed by M. Daudix and party from Erzeroum to Erzinjian.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. S. SHIPLEY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 30.

Itinerary of M. Daudix and party from Erzeroum to Erzinjian.

	Hours.
Erzeroum to Ashkalé	9 00
Ashkalé to Lidj	4 30
Lidj to Shokh	1 00
Shokh to Pekeritch	6 30
Pekeritch to Kotur Keupri	3 00
Kotur Keupri to Karghin	2 00
Karghin to Vidjan	1 30
Vidjan to Halil Agha Han	4 30
Halil Agha Han to Erzinjian	6 00
	38 00

NOTE.—Above distances represent journeying by caravan.

[13664] No. 31.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 264. Confidential.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April 17, 1906.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 239, Confidential, of the 9th instant, respecting the charges of barbarous ill-treatment of five Armenian prisoners brought by the United States' missionary, Dr. Dod, against the local authorities of Cesarea, I have the honour to report that, in consequence of my representations on this subject, the Grand Vizier telegraphed to Cesarea ordering a special Court of Inquiry, comprising two Juges d'Instruction from Angora, to be held, with a view to examining impartially into the truth of these accusations.

His Highness has communicated to me the result of this inquiry, which entirely exculpates the local officials; declares that the Armenians in question have been examined by an Armenian doctor, who reports that they bear no traces of having been subjected to the alleged tortures, and, finally, maintains that the stories spread by the Americans are pure inventions calculated to damage the Ottoman authorities.

I gave the Grand Vizier to understand that what was wanted in the present case was not a report of the usual Turkish kind, exonerating all the persons implicated, but the punishment of the local authorities responsible for the tortures which, according to undoubted medical authority, were inflicted on the five Armenians.

As the reports emanated from American sources, the United States' Chargé d'Affaires has also been in communication with the Grand Vizier on the subject.

I understand that a version of the Turkish report has been telegraphed to Musurus Pasha, with instructions to issue "démentis" of any account of the matter which may appear in the British press.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

[14352] No. 32.

Friends of Armenia to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 28.)

47, *Victoria Street, Westminster, London,*
Your Excellency, *April 27, 1906.*

ON behalf of the Committee of the "Friends of Armenia," I beg to lay before you the following information, received on Saturday last, from Mr. R. Cole, an American missionary, who has been working at Bitlis for many years, in connection with the Boston American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. As it would injure his work if his name were divulged, we must ask you to regard this as given in confidence.

In the province of Moush "unnameable indignities" have been inflicted on Armenian women by Turkish tax-collectors. They have been "hung up by their hair and beaten, and forced to open their mouths to be spit in. A man had a rope put round his neck, and he was hung up till blood began to come from his mouth and nostrils, and, only that a common policeman took compassion on him, and cut him down, he would have been killed outright."

The tax-gatherers are now at similar work in a village where some of our orphan girls who have been married are settled, and we would pray for protection for them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. CANTLOW, *Secretary*

[14555] No. 33.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir E. Grey.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 268.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April 21, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Acting Consul at Damascus, reporting on the state of the Damascus Vilayet for the past quarter.

I venture to draw especial attention to Mr. Edmonds' remarks respecting the progress which is being made in the construction of the Hedjaz Railway.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 33.

Acting Consul Edmonds to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 10.)
Sir, *Damascus, April 4, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith my General Report for the last quarter. Besides the change of Vali and Mushir, which I have reported in my despatch No. 9 of to-day, I have to record that Riza Bey Es-Sulh, who had been Mutessarif of Kerak since the 4th December, 1905, changed positions on the 1st February with Ferîd Pasha, Mutessarif of Poli, in Kastamouni. It is thought generally that the removal of Riza Bey was due to his failure to provide supplies for the Akaba garrison.

Mgr. Mélétius, Greek Orthodox Patriarch, died on the 9th February. Mgr. Athanasius, Bishop of Homs, is acting as Patriarch pending the election of the successor of Mgr. Mélétius. It is probable that Mgr. Athanasius will be elected to the see, as he enjoys the favour of the natives and active Russian support. He is a Russophile, who handed over the schools in his diocese to the Russian Palestine Society some eight years ago. The two candidates next in importance are Mgr. Grogorius, Bishop of Tripoli, who is also a Russophile, and Mgr. Gerasimus, Bishop of Beirût.

The prospects for the grain and fruit crops are good.

General trade is normal and without fresh developments.

Trains are now running on the Hedjaz Railway as far as Mudevvera, which is about 570 kilom. from Damascus and 110 kilom. beyond Ma'an. From Mudevvera to Tebûk, a further distance of 127 kilom., the earthwork is nearly complete, but no rails have as yet been laid. Surveys have been made from Tebûk as far as Akhdar, which is about 70 kilom. from Tebûk, and 765 kilom. from Damascus. Trains have not yet begun to run regularly between Haifa and Damascus.

The project of building a line from Amman to Salt has been abandoned, as the phosphate deposits at Salt had been over-estimated. If, however, the Hedjaz Railway Commission decides on building a branch to Jerusalem, this would probably pass through Salt.

Work in connection with the Damascus electric tram, power, and light scheme has been confined to operations at the power station in the Anti-Lebanon, and to collecting materials. The rate of progress depends to a large extent on the attitude adopted by the new Vali with regard to the scheme. It is improbable that trams will be running in the next three months.

With the departure of Nazim Pasha the scheme for bringing good water to the town has been dropped. It is to be hoped that the new Vali, Shukri Pasha, will give so necessary an improvement as much support as his predecessor.

The Mecca pilgrims began to arrive here by train on the 31st ultimo. The Mahmal is expected in about one week.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. S. EDMONDS.

[14560] No. 34.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 273.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April 24, 1906.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 82 of the 21st February, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Acting Vice-Consul at Van, who reports that, though not good, the situation of the vilayet is by no means so serious as was reported in the inclosure to the despatch under reply.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 34.

Acting Vice-Consul Sbordone to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 2.)
Monsieur, *Van, le 30 Mars, 1906.*

A LA date du 4 de ce mois, votre Excellence a bien voulu me demander des renseignements sur la situation actuelle du Vilayet de Van.

En réponse, j'ai l'honneur de faire savoir à l'Ambassade que l'état du pays n'est pas brillant, mais qu'il est loin d'être tel qu'il a été représenté au Secrétaire d'État.

La population n'est nullement menacée par la famine. Il n'y a pas disette de blé. Cette céréale se vend en ce moment de 50 à 55 piastres les 68 kilog.; il valait de 70 à 80 piastres l'année dernière à pareille époque. Le pain coûte maintenant 50 paras l'oke de Van, qui représente 1 kilog. 700 grammes; en Juillet dernier il coûtait 50 paras; dans les premiers jours du mois d'Août le prix descendait à 30 paras, pour remonter trois ou quatre jours plus tard à 40 paras, et dans le commencement du même mois à 50 paras, qui est même le prix actuel. A un moment, à cause du petit rendement de la dernière récolte, on a pu redouter non la famine, mais une hausse considérable des prix. Il fallait empêcher que les spéculateurs pussent accaparer tout le grain. Pour cela des achats de blé ont été faits par la Mission Américaine et par le Gouvernement dans le Vilayet de Bitlis, où la récolte avait été bonne; mais le Gouverneur-Général de Bitlis s'opposait à à l'exportation du blé de sa province; c'est alors que le Capitaine Tyrrell télégraphia à l'Ambassade.

Dans ces conditions il ne saurait être question de typhus occasionné par la famine. C'est là une maladie qui chaque année fait des ravages à Van et qui est causée par l'eau et aussi par la misère. Il y a eu cette année quelques cas particulièrement graves; une missionnaire Allemande de la Mission Américaine est même morte de cette maladie; mais il n'y a rien eu d'alarmant. Quant à l'unique hôpital de cette ville, l'hôpital de la Mission Américaine, il se compose d'un petit nombre de lits et renferme en ce moment quarante malades; aucun n'est atteint de typhus.

Ce qui est certain, c'est que la population Arménienne de ce pays est très misérable. La cause de cette misère vient du manque de sécurité, qui rend tout commerce et toute transvites [*sic*] impossible et empêche tant qu'il durera le développement du bien-être. En outre, la création d'impôts nouveaux (impôt personnel), l'augmentation continuelle de ceux déjà existant (impôt militaire), rendent la situation de plus en plus précaire; mais je ne m'entends pas sur cette question, que les titulaires de ce poste ont déjà traitée longuement.

Jai, &c.
(Signé) G. SBORDONE.

[14564] No. 35.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 277.)
Sir, *Pera, April 24, 1906.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 233 of the 4th instant, respecting the political situation in the Island of Samos, I have the honour to report that I have this evening received a telegram from His Majesty's Consul-General at Smyrna, stating that fighting has been taking place between the political parties at Samos since Sunday, the 22nd instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

[14352] No. 36.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 160. Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 1, 1906.*

I TRANSMIT to you herewith copy of a letter from the "Friends of Armenia" on the subject of the alleged ill-treatment of certain Armenian women by Ottoman tax collectors in the Province of Mousb.*

* No. 32.

I have to request that you will make inquiries as to the accuracy of Mr. Cole's statements, and, in the event of their proving substantially correct, that you will make representations to the Ottoman Government on the subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD GREY.

[15441] No. 37.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 7.)

(No. 284.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April 27, 1906.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 240, Secret and Confidential, of the 9th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Erzeroum, reporting the termination of the demonstrations which have led to the removal of the Vali, Nazim Pasha, and giving a general review of the causes and course of the movement.

Mr. Shipley calls attention to the fact that throughout a very trying period the Moslems, both civil and military, of Erzeroum showed perfect good feeling towards their Christian neighbours; but satisfactory as this is in itself, the occurrence of such a demonstration as the present one, coupled with those of a similar nature at Castambol and Sinope—all of which were principally, if not wholly, the work of the Moslem population—may well justify apprehensions that the patience of the Mussulmans is beginning to give way before the persistent maladministration and ever-increasing burden of taxation of the present régime.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 37.

Consul Shipley to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 7.)
Sir, *Erzeroum, April 12, 1906.*

BY my telegram of the 7th instant your Excellency will have learned that the demonstration against Nazim Pasha, Governor-General of this Vilayet, the various phases of which were referred to in my telegrams of the 29th ultimo, the 2nd, 3rd, and 6th instant respectively, came to an end on Saturday last, the bazaar which had remained closed for a period of nearly ten days being reopened by the Mussulmans on the departure of his Excellency on the day in question for his new post at Diarbekir.

In giving your Excellency the following few further details respecting the above affair, I should point out that the agitation was not at the outset directed in any way against Nazim Pasha personally:—

The first protest, as your Excellency will recollect from my despatch No. 6 of the 20th ultimo, was made by the Mussulmans on or about the 18th of that month, and was followed up by them by numerous telegrams to the Palace, asking for the remission of the tax complained of. As, however, no satisfactory answer would appear to have been vouchsafed to any of these telegrams, the demand for the recall of the Governor-General, coupled with the closing of the shops, was at length on the 28th ultimo resorted to by them. It is generally felt that in taking the above course the Mussulmans showed that they possessed considerable acumen and knowledge of Turkish affairs, for by making the demand for the recall of his Excellency the pretext for closing their shops, they both compelled attention to their demands, while avoiding, outwardly at least, the appearance of being in direct opposition to the will of the Sultan. It was further, under the circumstances, inevitable that a certain amount of the discontent felt by the population against the Government should fall upon the Governor-General, as the latter's representative and the absence of reply from Constantinople, to which I have above alluded, was further unfortunate, as it led to the accusation, of which, however, no proof has been forthcoming, that

their telegrams were purposely not allowed by his Excellency to reach their destination.

In any case, the above accusation proved sufficient to excite popular resentment against the latter, while the fact that inquiries were being set on foot as to the identity of the leaders in the movement would seem, by giving the latter grounds for apprehension for themselves should Nazim Pasha be maintained in his position, to have further contributed to the demand for the latter's recall. The impoverished state, moreover, of the finances of the vilayet, leading to the non-payment of sums due to contractors and others, was also somewhat unreasonably laid by the population to the charge of his Excellency, entirely ignoring the difficulties of the latter with regard to the demands made upon him from Constantinople.

In reporting to your Excellency the reasons which to the best of my belief caused the agitation to be turned against Nazim Pasha, I would beg to insist on the fact that this was in reality nothing but a side issue, the movement itself being essentially a popular one from first to last.

In my despatch No 6, above alluded to—I ventured to point out that the widespread feeling of discontent provoked among the Mussulmans by the imposition of the new poll tax merited the serious attention of the Turkish Government, and if further proof of this were needed it would be supplied by the remarkable unanimity with which all classes hastened to sign the demand for its abolition, and by the fact that the money (no inconsiderable amount) necessary for the dispatch of the telegrams to Constantinople was immediately forthcoming.

The depth of the feeling excited among the Mussulmans may be further estimated by the outspoken freedom of the criticism indulged in by the latter. The high salaries paid to certain of the functionaries, the waste of public money with no results to show for it, and the wretched state to which the country had been brought by the present Government, were all freely canvassed by them. Nor were references wanting to recent events in Russia, while hopes were openly expressed that the financial control established in Macedonia might be extended to Erzeroum.

The shocking state of neglect into which the roads and streets of the town had been allowed to fall by the Municipality notwithstanding the heavy local rates imposed for their maintenance seems, as already stated in my despatch No. 6, to have particularly aroused the resentment of the Mussulman part of the population and, as a further instance of the newly awakened spirit of criticism among the latter, I may mention that on certain of the streets in front of the various Consulates and public buildings being at length cleared of snow by the municipal overseers it was remarked by the people that while this was as it should be the work ought to be carried out in other quarters of the town as well.

I have in my telegram above referred to had occasion to bring to your Excellency's notice the great regard for the maintenance of public order manifested by the Mussulmans throughout, with the exception perhaps of a couple of bakers (both Mussulmans) being compelled to sell their bread at the legal price fixed by the municipality, not a single case of disorder or of insult to a Christian was brought to my notice during the whole of the proceedings. This is the more remarkable as with the exception of the few military patrols—for whose services, however, there was at no time any occasion, the town was for nearly ten days in the hands of the population, the usual representatives of the civil authority having during that period practically abdicated their functions. It was indeed commonly remarked that the town had never been so quiet and free from disturbance as during the so-called revolution. Further, beyond the order to close the shops no attempt was made by the Mussulmans to associate the Christians with them in their opposition to the Government, and if the helpless position of the latter be taken into consideration the forbearance shown in this respect by the Mussulmans is, I venture to think, additionally praiseworthy.

The decision of the Government to yield so far to the demands of the population as to transfer Nazim Pasha to Diarbekir came, it is felt on all sides, none too soon for it was obvious that a situation so abnormal as that described above could not be prolonged without risk of serious complications.

The decision in question was the more timely as, in view of the fact that the sympathies of the troops were so evidently on the side of the population, a dangerous conviction had sprung up among the latter that under no circumstances would they be fired upon by the former.

I should add that Lieutenant-General Shevket Pasha, of the artillery from Erzindjan, yesterday took temporary charge of affairs, pending the arrival from Diarbekir of the new Governor-General Ata Bey, and that a Commissioner from

Constantinople is shortly expected to hold a special inquiry. Although the town has now resumed its usual aspect the Mussulmans, I learn, have not abandoned their intention to obtain redress for their grievances so that the task of the Commissioner seems likely to be no easy one.

The agitation, I am informed, has also spread to Baibourt, Narman, and Hassan Kalch, though the example given by Erzeroum of closing the shops would seem to have been followed in the last mentioned district only.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. S. SHIPLEY.

[15444] No. 38.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 7.)

(No. 287.)
Sir, *Pera, April 27, 1906.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 277 of the 24th instant, I have the honour to report that Mr. Cumberbatch informs me that the fighting in the Isle of Samos has ceased, and the casualties amount to one killed and ten wounded.

Further disturbances are expected to occur during the general election which takes place next week.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

[15451] No. 39.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 7.)

(No. 295. Confidential.)
Sir, *Pera, May 1, 1906.*

I HAVE had occasion more than once of late to draw attention to the methods of German diplomacy in this country, and I think that the following account, which M. Zinoview gave me on the 25th ultimo, of a conversation which he had with the German Ambassador on the latter's return from leave at the end of last year is not without considerable interest as throwing light on the attitude of Germany towards ourselves and her anxiety to secure a commanding position in the Near East.

The subject of conversation had been the future of Mesopotamia, and the German Ambassador, after dwelling on the common interests of Russia and Germany in those regions, where he declared it was Great Britain's aim to create another Egypt, ended by inquiring whether, in M. Zinoview's opinion, it would not be possible for them to come to an understanding with a view to thwart our ambitious designs.

M. Zinoview answered by asking what means he proposed to adopt for the purpose, but the question elicited no reply.

In relating the incident to me M. Zinoview said that it had taken place shortly after the conversation with myself (recorded in my despatch No. 888, Confidential, of the 8th December), in which we had expressed our common desire for a better understanding between our countries, and he added that, in reporting it to his Government, he had expressed the view that an understanding with Germany could only be purchased at the price of commercial concessions which would practically place those regions under the complete control of Germany.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

[15885] No. 40.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 9.)

(No. 98.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, May 9, 1906.*

THE late Vali of the Archipelago, Abedin Pasha, was assassinated to-day. Kurds, in wild revenge for some past ill-treatment, are the supposed authors.

I have heard a report that serious trouble, in which about seventy Armenians are said to have been killed, has occurred near Cesarea.

[16343] No. 41.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 14.)

(No. 320.)
Sir, *Pera, May 8, 1906.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 287 of the 27th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul-General at Smyrna, reporting further disturbances by the partizans of the two rival political parties in the Island of Samos.

(Confidential.)
I learn through a secret and confidential source that the German Ambassador has recently called the attention of the Sublime Porte to the disturbed condition of the population of the island in the localities where the elections are taking place, and has suggested the dispatch of an armed force to maintain order until the elections are over.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 41.

Consul-General Cumberbatch to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 31.)
Sir, *Smyrna, May 2, 1906.*

WITH reference to my telegrams of the 24th and 28th April, on the subject of the disturbances connected with the electoral campaign at Samos, I have the honour to report that Mr. Vice-Consul Mare informs me, under the date of 28th ultimo, that for five days (24th to 28th April) the island had been in a very disturbed state, specially in the town of Upper Vathy, where about 200 armed partizans of the Opposition leader had entrenched themselves, and were attacked by as many armed adherents of the party in power.

Firing continued for about 48 hours, but only resulted in the killing of one man and the wounding of ten others.

In the Village of Neochori one man was killed, and a few more were wounded in other villages where encounters took place.

On the 26th April the Commandant of the Turkish troops received orders from the Sublime Porte to employ them in maintaining order, and now the towns of Upper and Lower Vathy (which are apparently the centres of the agitation) are patrolled by the soldiers.

In the meantime, though the Prince Governor has granted a general amnesty to parties implicated in these disturbances, the general excitement has reached such a high pitch that a recurrence of the disorders on a large scale is expected next week, when the general elections of Deputies take place.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. A. CUMBERBATCH.

[18117] No. 42.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 28.)

(No. 347.)
Sir, *Constantinople, May 18, 1906.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 320 of the 8th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Smyrna, reporting election disorders at Samos.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 42.

Consul-General Cumberbatch to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 35.)

Sir, *Smyrna, May* 14, 1906.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 31 of the 2nd instant, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that, in a despatch dated the 11th instant, Mr. Vice-Consul Mare reports as follows:—

The general elections for the Samian Assembly took place on the 6th instant, resulting in a large majority against the Government party.

The inhabitants of Mitylinions, Pyrgos, and Marathocampo, still continue to be in an excited state, and fighting has been going on continuously in those localities, but with only two fatal results.

The island has never been seen in such a troubled state in connection with elections, and this is put down to the incapacity of the Prince Governor.

A few days before, the steam-ship "Angheliki," of the Hadji Daoud Line, conveyed fifty Turkish soldiers, and on the 10th over 100 were brought by the stationnaire "Sureyah" from Smyrna, as reported by telegram.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. A. CUMBERBATCH.

[18791] No. 43.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 96.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, June* 1, 1906.

ACCORDING to a report from Messrs. Lynch, Arabs near Amarah, where Vali of Bussorah is residing, have fired on steam-ship "Khalifah," which was proceeding from Bagdad to Bussorah with mails and passengers.

Consul Crow should be instructed to make inquiries, and you should, if he confirms the report, make energetic representations to the Porte. I leave it to your discretion whether to demand the dismissal of the Vali, which is very desirable.

You should point out to the Porte that this outrage, following so closely on the Manghil incident, is particularly serious.

[19099] No. 44.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 5.)

(No. 372.)

Sir, *Constantinople, May* 20, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to report that, having lately received several despatches and letters from His Majesty's Consular officers and private persons in Armenia and Anatolia depicting the condition of the inhabitants in extremely gloomy colours and pointing to the exactions and rapacity of the local authorities as the cause of the increasing misery and impoverishment of the people, I represented the main facts to the Grand Vizier in an interview I had with him on the 21st instant, and urged that steps should be taken to check the maladministration, which was rapidly growing worse.

As a result of my representations, the Grand Vizier stated to-day that he had sent a Circular to the Valis of Van, Bitlis, and Trebizond, instructing them to make a tour of their provinces and inquire into the grievances of all classes of the inhabitants; they were also to remove from their posts all functionaries who had been guilty of injustice and malpractices. His Highness went on to say that the Mutessarif of Khinas, in the Vilayet of Erzeroum, had been dismissed, and that he had ordered the Vali of Aleppo to make a similar *tournée* in his province, and the Governor-General had now reached Alexandretta. The Vali of Trebizond was about to be dismissed on the grounds of incompetence. The Grand Vizier added that from this Circular the Valis and their subordinate functionaries, as also the population, would understand that the central Government wished to bring about an improvement in the methods of administration, and that good results would ensue.

His Highness concluded by remarking that the new Vali of Erzeroum had not yet reached his post, but that as soon as he arrives and has had time to pick up the threads of administration in his province, he too will make a tour of the Vilayet of Erzeroum.

A band of 200 Armenians had recently attempted to cross the border from Russia in the neighbourhood of Bayezid, and had had an encounter with a detachment of Russian troops which had tried to bar their passage. The Russians had some casualties, and did not succeed in turning back the band. The Grand Vizier stated that he had ordered the Governor of Bayezid to proceed to the frontier to calm the effervescence and anti-Armenian feeling which this action of the Armenian band had aroused among the Kurds. His Highness had received information that the invading Armenian band had been turned back and dispersed without giving rise to any incident of a disagreeable nature.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

[19106] No. 45.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 5.)

(No. 379.)

Sir, *Constantinople, May* 29, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Smyrna, reporting the recent visit to that place of my German colleague, Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, for the inauguration ceremony of the new German church.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 45.

Consul-General Cumberbatch to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 38.)

Sir, *Smyrna, May* 24, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to report that his Excellency Baron Marschall von Bieberstein arrived here this morning on board the German stationnaire "Loreley," and attended the inauguration ceremony of the new German (Protestant) church, under special instructions from His Majesty the Emperor, who, with the Empress, has taken a keen interest in the building, and has contributed towards its erection.

The new church is a much finer and larger building than the German colony originally intended to erect, but this is due to the Emperor having himself modified the plans to the present dimensions, and to his having insisted upon their being carried out, notwithstanding that the church will accommodate four times the number of the present German Protestant congregation.

The interest of the Emperor in this church dates from the occasion of his visit to Palestine, and public opinion credits His Majesty with a desire of being prepared for future developments of German interests in Turkey.

Under instructions from the Palace, the Governor-General has accorded Baron Marschall unusual honours, and will entertain his Excellency this evening at a banquet, which would have been followed by a ball were the German Court not in mourning.

The ceremony in the church was attended by me and my American and Danish colleagues.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. A. CUMBERBATCH.

[19537] No. 46.

M. Vérsessian to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 7.)

Excellence, *Paris, 36, Rue Lafayette, le 6 Juin,* 1906.

AU nom de l'Union Arménienne de Paris, nous venons attirer la haute attention de votre Excellence sur la situation sinistre et très périlleuse qui règne en ce moment dans l'Arménie Turque. Tous les renseignements qui en arrivent depuis quelque temps sont de nature à nous faire craindre une reprise des grands massacres de 1895–96.

Les conditions de vie que les Turcs imposent aux paysans Arméniens sont cent fois plus horribles que celles où se trouvaient les esclaves de l'antiquité; un frisson d'horreur traverse l'opinion Européenne lorsque la nouvelle arrive de tueries en masse, mais les souffrances morales et matérielles subies par les populations pendant les périodes de répit sont plus épouvantables que l'égorgement pur et simple. Voici un fragment de lettre d'Erzeroum, à la date du 20 Avril, et qui donne une idée de l'oppression abjecte que les autorités Turques font peser sur les villages Arméniens:—

"C'est une véritable tragédie que la situation qui règne dans les villages du district de Khnous.

"Des détachements de 'Suari' (cavalerie) vont de village en village, et partout ils commettent des atrocités qui ne peuvent être imaginées que par les fonctionnaires Turcs.

"Les soldats descendent, par groupes, dans les maisons; les gens, les biens, l'honneur de chaque maison, sont à leur merci. Ils s'emparent de tout ce qu'ils y trouvent et ils déshonorent le foyer. Chaque fonctionnaire dans ce pays se croit le maître souverain des hommes qui se trouvent sous son pouvoir. Ils prétextent parfois qu'ils sont envoyés pour percevoir un 'bakié' (arriéré d'impôt) qui est déjà payé trois fois. Chaque soldat dans ce pays se croit le droit de commettre les actes les plus monstrueux contre les Arméniens, et cela au nom du Sultan."

Ce qui se passe à Khnous se répète dans toute l'Arménie Turque. Et à la moindre tentative faite par les Arméniens pour défendre leur vie, leurs biens, et ce qui est plus sacré que tout, leur honneur, les autorités Turques répondent par l'arrestation, par les tortures dans les cachots, par l'incendie, et le massacre.

Le Gouvernement prend toutes sortes de mesures pour appauvrir et affaiblir la population Arménienne; il permet aux Kurdes d'enlever les instruments aratoires et le bétail des paysans Arméniens; tout Turc ou Kurde peut impunément s'emparer de la maison d'un Arménien. Ces jours-ci encore le Gouvernement Turc vient de décider que tous les biens appartenant aux Arméniens émigrés en Amérique seront donnés à des Turcs. La circulation de province à province, de ville à ville, et même de village à village n'est accordée aux Arméniens que très rarement et avec une extrême difficulté; l'activité commerciale en est étouffée.

"A Van," dit une lettre récente, "les affaires sont arrêtées, la misère est grande; le prix exorbitant des objets de première nécessité est chose commune depuis quelque temps. La famine est imminente."

"Les paysans des villages," dit encore une lettre de Van (Janvier 1906), "accourent dans les villes pour mendier du pain. Aux coins des rues les gens qui n'osent pas mendier meurent de faim.

"Depuis les événements de 1895–1896 la porte de Constantinople est fermée à l'Arménien, qui allait y chercher quelques sous. Ceux des Arméniens (originaires d'Arménie) qui y restaient encore sont expulsés, les uns renvoyés dans leur pays natal, les autres jetés hors des frontières. Malgré le froid, des centaines d'hommes de Van ont été en plein hiver expulsés de Constantinople; la plupart sont tombés en route et sont morts.

"A Artchavnz, les Kurdes, comme dans beaucoup d'autres endroits, ont créé un nouvel impôt pour les Arméniens. Malheur à l'Arménien qui refuse de payer!

"De même, chaque fonctionnaire reçoit la dîme comme il l'entend et quand il le veut."

Une autre lettre de Van, plus récente, confirme ces renseignements sur la situation des Arméniens de Van, et elle donne quelques détails nouveaux:—

"La misère est très grande dans la Province de Vaspouragan. Bon nombre d'Arméniens, épouvantés par les dangers qui les menacent, quittent le pays et

s'enfuient au Caucase; 150 personnes du district de Timar ont passé la frontière et viennent d'arriver à Tiflis."

Et voici maintenant les nouvelles qui annoncent la reprise des massacres.

Une dépêche de Moush, à la date du 12 Avril, fait savoir que vers le 10 Avril deux villages Arméniens du district de Moush, Kheybian, et Khas, ont été complètement détruits par les Turcs, qui ont massacré tous les habitants. Le même sort attend la ville de Moush elle-même et tous les villages de la plaine de Moush.

Les journaux de Paris viennent de recevoir la dépêche suivante de Constantinople:

"La nouvelle d'un massacre important d'Arméniens, provoqué par les Kurdes à Césarée, vient d'arriver à la Porte. On ne connaît pas les détails; on croit savoir cependant que le nombre des morts s'élèverait à soixante-dix."

Un danger imminent menace tout particulièrement Zeïtoun. Une lettre envoyée d'Alep à la date du 5 Mars par un voyageur Européen donne les détails suivants:

"Les arrestations des Arméniens continuent. Récemment on amena ici des gens arrêtés à Zeïtoun, Marache, Adana, et Hadjino. La situation des Arméniens est triste, surtout celle des Arméniens de Zeïtoun.

"Le nouveau Gouverneur d'Alep, Nazim Pacha, est un véritable bourreau; c'est lui qui ordonne les arrestations des accusés politiques et se les fait envoyer à Alep pour les juger lui-même.

"10,000 Circassiens, venant de Russie, se sont installés aux environs de Zeïtoun. Pour nourrir ces hommes, on fait des souscriptions forcées et on fait payer les impôts à l'avance.

"La situation de Zeïtoun est des plus tendues. Les soldats se couchaient sans se déshabiller prêts à marcher à la moindre alerte.

"On sait qu'en vertu de l'accord conclu en 1895 entre la Porte et les Puissances le Gouvernement Turc ne doit pas faire entrer à Zeïtoun les soldats sans l'avis des Puissances Européennes."

En 1895, lorsque, après une résistance héroïque de six mois contre l'armée Turque, qui voulait le détruire, le Zeïtoun, à bout de forces, fit appel à l'Europe, les Consuls des six Puissances accoururent à son secours et obtinrent de la Porte des conditions garantissant sa sécurité; depuis cette époque les Zeïtouniotes n'ont en rien provoqué les autorités Turques; ils ont conservé une attitude absolument paisible. Le Gouvernement Turc a été parjure à toutes les conditions qu'il avait acceptées: il a d'abord tenté d'affamer la population de Zeïtoun en coupant toutes ses relations avec les autres villes de la Cilicie, il a fait construire autour de Zeïtoun quatre casernes qu'il a remplies de soldats, et maintenant il prépare une attaque générale en vue de supprimer le Zeïtoun.

En souhaitant l'arrivée prochaine de l'heure où l'Europe introduira dans l'Arménie Turque un régime de justice qui rende définitivement impossible le retour de pareilles atrocités, nous serions bien reconnaissants à votre Excellence de faire, au nom de l'humanité, ce qui est possible pour prévenir le danger de massacre qui menace le Zeïtoun et toute l'Arménie Turque.

Nous prions, &c.
Le Président,
(Pour le Comité Directeur de l'Union Arménienne de Paris),
(Signé) V. VERSESSIAN.

Le Secrétaire,
(Signé) A. TCHOBANIAN.

[20661] No. 47.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 18.)

(No. 391.)

Sir, *Therapia, June 7, 1906.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 169, Confidential, of the 4th ultimo, I have the honour to report that I have received from His Majesty's Acting Vice-Consul at Bitlis an account of the ill-treatment of Armenian women by Ottoman tax-collectors in the Moush Province, which is identical with the statements contained in the letter from the "Friends of Armenia," copy of which was inclosed in your above-mentioned despatch.

Mr. Geary obtained his information from an American lady missionary who had just returned from a tour in those districts.

I have made verbal representations to the Minister of the Interior on this subject, and in order to obtain an independent account of the condition of the Armenian inhabitants of the Moush Province, I have instructed Mr. Geary, who is to be at Erzeroum on the 18th instant for his examination for promotion to the rank of Vice-Consul, to return to Bitlis by way of Moush so as to investigate personally the condition of affairs in those districts, and to inquire into the truth of the allegations of the American missionaries.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

[20662] No. 48.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 18.)

(No. 392.)

Sir, *Therapia, June 7, 1906.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 224, marked Secret and Confidential, of the 3rd April, inclosing copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah, reporting the outbreak of serious disturbances in the Muntefik and the defeat of the Ottoman troops by the revolted Arab tribes, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a further despatch on the subject which I have received from Mr. Crow.

It would appear that the Vali of Bussorah, who, as I reported in my above-mentioned despatch, had been ordered to proceed at once to the scene of the disturbance and place himself at the head of the troops, has himself suffered a serious reverse at the hands of the rebel Arab tribes in the neighbourhood of the town of Suk-el-Shiyukh, and was with great difficulty able to beat a retreat to that place and save his artillery.

As a result of this disaster the Vali has been summoned to Constantinople, whither he proceeded on the 10th ultimo.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 48.

Consul Crow to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 20.)

Sir, *Bussorah, May 12, 1906.*

I HAVE received the following account from the Vali of events at Suk-el-Shiyukh subsequent to the fighting reported in my despatch No. 11 of the 5th March last.

A succession of officials during the past three years have vainly tried to get the Arabs in Muntefik to pay their taxes, which the latter state were unfairly assessed from the first, their lands and crops being rated out of all proportion to their value by the local Government. The arrears are now considerable, and the Government refuses to accept any reduction. Early in March the Mutessarif of Amara was transferred temporarily to Nasriye, but his efforts to effect a settlement were not successful, and the fighting continued. On the 17th the Vali himself received orders to proceed to Muntefik with sufficient troops to restore order. The El Hachim and other Arab tribes round Suk-el-Shiyukh were by this time in open rebellion, and, encouraged by their previous successes against the Government troops, were no longer in the mood to parley. The Vali's proposals for a settlement of the taxation question on more

equitable terms were rejected, and certain small mud forts occupied by the rebels near the town had to be reduced. Friendly Arabs, who offered themselves as guides, and who appear to have treacherously misled the Vali and persuaded him to allow them to act as his advanced guard in order to lure him into danger, proceeded to turn the rebels out of the fort nearest the town. This was accomplished without opposition, and the Vali marched after them himself with four battalions and two field guns and occupied the place. He then directed his Arab irregulars to execute the same manœuvre in regard to the next fort. They absolutely declined to go on, and while the discussion was being prolonged the hostile Arabs closed round the fort in large numbers and poured in a destructive and unexpected fire. The friendly Arabs fled, and the Vali, surrounded by a force superior to his own in numbers, and better armed, seems to have been unable to use his artillery, and was compelled to cut his way back to the town across reeds, marsh, and rice fields or date gardens; intersected by broad irrigation channels—country ill-suited for military operations, and rendering the task of dragging the guns by no means easy. He reached Suk-el-Shiyukh in the evening in a pitiable plight with the loss of fourteen killed and twenty-four wounded, according to his own account, and only saved his guns with the greatest difficulty.

The rebels surrounded the town and sniped all night, but retired and disappeared completely in the daytime. The Arabs of Muntefik remain practically in open rebellion, and the Vali, on reporting the circumstances, was, as I informed your Excellency by telegram on the 11th instant, immediately summoned to Constantinople.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. E. CROW.

[20664] No. 49.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 18.)

(No. 394.)

Sir, *Therapia, June 7, 1906.*

WITH reference to Mr. Townley's despatch No. 810 of the 17th October, 1904, relative to the trial and sentence of thirty-three Armenians at Trebizond in connection with the attempted murder of Gaidzak Arabian, I have the honour to report that I have received a despatch from His Majesty's Acting Consul at Trebizond, informing me that Hampartzoun Khedishian, who was the only one of the thirty-three prisoners condemned to death, was hanged in a public place in the town in the early morning of the 25th ultimo, in obedience to an Imperial order received some ten days previously by the local authorities.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

[20674] No. 50.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 18.)

(No. 404.)

Sir, *Therapia, June 12, 1906.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 331 of the 15th ultimo, I have the honour to report that I, yesterday, made strong representations to the Grand Vizier on the subject of the unsatisfactory progress which is being made at Bussorah with respect to the arrest of the remaining members of the gang of Arabs who were guilty of the attack upon Messrs. Lynch & Co.'s repairing depôt at Maghil and the murder of the British subject, Mr. Glanville.

His Highness assured me that the appointment of a new and capable Vali to Bussorah was imminent, and by his orders fresh and stringent instructions were telegraphed to the local authorities for the arrest of the criminals concerned in the Maghil outrage and the attack on a British Indian's house, recently reported by Mr. Consul Crow.

The Grand Vizier further informed me that it was the intention of the Imperial Ottoman Government to dispatch a Military High Commissioner to investigate and report upon the military disorganization prevailing in the Vilayets of Mosul, Bagdad, and Bussorah, and to take steps to remedy the state of disorder which had arisen

through the dispersal of the troops in those vilayets in connection with the Persian frontier incident, the Arab rebellion in the Muntefik, and the critical condition of affairs in Kassim and Nejd.

I hope that, as soon as an energetic and capable Vali is appointed to Bussorah, Mr. Crow will have no difficulty in securing the surrender from the Sheikh of Mohammerah of the two persons whom he has arrested on the suspicion of complicity in the Maghil outrage, and that the trial of the other culprits, who are now in prison, will proceed without further delay.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

[19099] No. 51.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 210.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, June 18, 1906.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 372 of the 29th May reporting a conversation with the Grand Vizier on the subject of the maladministration of Armenia and Anatolia.

I approve the language which you held to his Highness on this occasion.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD GREY.

[21397] No. 52.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 25.)

(No. 422.)
Sir, *Therapia, June 19, 1906.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 371 of the 29th ultimo, respecting the unsuccessful attempt made by a number of Arabs to board Messrs. Lynch's steamer "Medjidieh" at a spot on the Tigris some 30 miles north of Kurna, I have the honour to report that on the 1st instant I received telegraphic information from His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah to the effect that the "Khalifa," another of Messrs. Lynch's steamers, was attacked by a number of Arabs, estimated at 2,000, on her down journey at a spot about half-an-hour above Amara, and that, although there were no casualties, the heavy fire, which was returned by the Turkish guard on board, caused a certain amount of damage to the vessel. Mr. Crow further stated that the trouble was spreading, that Turkish vessels had also been fired on, and that the Ottoman authorities were taking no active steps to check the prevailing lawlessness on the river.

On receipt of this information I at once made representations to the Grand Vizier, and on the same day I was able to inform His Majesty's Consular Representatives at Bagdad and Bussorah by telegraph that his Highness, while telegraphing to the Valis of those provinces to report immediately on the attacks on the two steamers above mentioned, had given orders that, in order that the steamer service should not be interrupted, steps should be taken to afford the necessary protection to river traffic.

On the 2nd June Mr. Crow saw the Acting Vali of Bussorah, who had not by then received the Grand Vizier's instructions, and reported by telegraph that a Turkish river gun-boat had proceeded to the scene of the disturbance and that troops were being dispatched from Bagdad.

On the 8th instant, however, I received a further telegram from His Majesty's Consul stating that the gun-boat had not gone beyond Amara and that no troops had been sent from Bagdad. Mr. Crow also reported that a house near the Consulate, occupied by a British Indian subject, had been attacked on the previous night, and that, after heavy firing, the occupant had been wounded and the house looted.

In view of the aggravated situation thus brought about, I made strong representations to the Grand Vizier concerning the general state of lawlessness and disorganization prevailing in the provinces of Bagdad and Bussorah, as evidenced by the attack on Lynch's steamers, the murder of Mr. Glanville, &c. His Highness thereupon made out a report on the subject and had it read to the Council of Ministers, which

suggested to the Sultan the appointment of an Extraordinary Military Governor to take command of the forces in the two vilayets, replacing the present Acting Commandant of the 6th Army Corps, Suleiman Pasha, and the present Vali of Bagdad, Majid Bey, and the appointment of a capable and energetic Governor-General of Bussorah.

These proposals have been sanctioned in principle by His Imperial Majesty and Mustapha Hilmi Pasha, ex-Governor of Benghazi, has been summoned to Constantinople with a view to taking charge of the military forces in Bagdad and Bussorah. The Grand Vizier is anxious to select a new Vali for Bussorah, and his choice will probably fall on Husni Bey, Governor of Mousb.

In views of these facts and of the instructions previously referred to sent by his Highness to the Valis of Bagdad and Bussorah with a view to the protection of the river traffic, it is clear that the Turkish Government do not in any way disclaim their obligation to maintain order to the full extent of their power.

Since the telegraphic correspondence already reported, I have received despatches from His Majesty's Consular Representatives at Bagdad and Bussorah respecting the attempt to board the steamer "Medjidieh," copies of which I have the honour to transmit herewith.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure 1 in No. 52.

Consul-General Ramsay to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 461/42.)
Sir, *Bagdad, May 21, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a letter received from the Bagdad agents of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, reporting an attempt to board the steamer "Medjidieh" on the night of the 12th May, 1906. Instead of sending your Excellency a copy of Captain Rawlins' report, I send a copy of a more detailed statement that has been recorded by me and signed both by Captain Rawlins and by Mr. Campbell, the first officer of the "Medjidieh." Had the Arabs been able to board the steamer, they probably would not have hesitated to use violence; it therefore appears to me to be very fortunate that the steamer was not at anchor, and that the officers in charge of her managed her so skilfully.

2. The attempt was committed within the limits of the Bussorah Vilayet, and I am therefore sending a copy of this despatch, with a copy of its inclosure, to His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Bussorah. I am also sending a telegram to Mr. Crow, informing him of the attempt. I shall also inform the Vali of Bagdad of what has occurred. At the present moment Suleiman Pasha, the Commander of the VIth Army Corps, is in charge of the Bagdad Vilayet, but I understand that, as a Military Commander, he has considerable powers in the Bussorah Vilayet also.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RAMSAY, *Major,*
Officiating Political Resident in Turkish Arabia.

Inclosure 2 in No. 52.

The Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to Consul-General Ramsay.

Sir, *Bagdad, May 19, 1906.*

WE have the honour to inclose herewith a copy of a report made under date of the 19th instant by Captain Rawlins, of the steam-ship "Medjidieh."

In bringing this report to your notice, we desire to draw your attention to the increasing difficulties with which the officers of our steamers have to contend, owing to the unprotected state of the River Tigris and the lawlessness of the Arabs frequenting its banks.

We attribute the avoidance of a collision and the probable loss of life with the Arabs, who were evidently bent on attacking and robbing the ship, to the careful manner in which she was handled by the officers in charge.

A serious attempt at a concerted attack on one of our steamers navigating the

river so soon after the attack on our dock premises at Maaghil, near Bussorah, when one of our English engineers lost his life, cannot be lightly passed over, and we beg to solicit your assistance in representing to the Turkish authorities the necessity of affording greater protection by strengthening the guard on the river banks in the lawless areas.

We have, &c.
(p.p. Stephen Lynch and Co.),
(Signed) F. W. PARRY, *Agents.*

Inclosure 3 in No. 52.

Statement made before Consul-General Ramsay by Mr. Rawlins, Commander, and Mr. Campbell, Chief Officer of the Steam-ship "Medjidieh."

ON the night of the 12th and 13th May, 1906, at about midnight, Captain Rawlins and Mr. Campbell, the captain and the first officer of the "Medjidieh," a steamer of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, were both on the bridge. The steamer was coming up from Bussorah and had reached a place about 15 miles below Ezra's tomb, when it was seen that there were two mashoofs* floating down the stream broadside on, and immediately across the bows of the "Medjidieh." The officers of the ship, in order to avoid running down these mashoofs, were obliged to stop the engine on one side and reverse the engine on the other side. By this means a collision was avoided. When the steamer acted in this way the two mashoofs came alongside the steamer, one on each side, and in addition to the two mashoofs that were across the bows of the steamer, there were eight other mashoofs, some on one side, some on the other side of the river; these also came as close to the steamer as was possible for them. The steamer was going at about 6 knots, or a little less, at the time (*i.e.*, progressing at that rate), and the mashoofs found it difficult to keep up, also on account of the wash. The people on the steamer shouted to the men in the mashoofs to keep off, but the people in the mashoofs made no reply. They did not actually get on board. The night was clear, but the moon was only just rising, and it was not possible to see whether the men in the mashoofs were armed. It is estimated that there were about 100 men in all the mashoofs, and in addition to this there were from 10 to 20 men swimming. The place where this occurred is along the reaches of the river known as Suraifa and Hamayan. The Arabs cleared off on the steamer approaching a "shabana" (police station). On arriving at Ezra's tomb the steamer stopped to put down passengers, and there it was heard that at about the place where the Arabs had appeared a more successful attempt had been made on the "Burhaniya," which was about twenty-four hours ahead of the "Medjidieh," from which some goods had been taken.

(Signed) F. W. RAWLINS.
CHAS. A. CAMPBELL.

Recorded by me to-day.
(Signed) J. RAMSAY, *Major,*
May 20, 1906.

Inclosure 4 in No. 52.

Consul Crow to Sir N. O'Conor.

Sir, *Bussorah, May* 26, 1906.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 41 of the 21st May, I have the honour to report that I have received from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bagdad a copy of his despatch No. 161/42 of the 21st May to your Excellency, relative to the Arab demonstration round Messrs. Lynch's steamer "Medjidieh" near Ezra's tomb at midnight on the 12th May. No actual attempt seems to have been made to board the vessel or to commit any act of hostility. It seems probable, however, that the Arabs would have pilfered if they had succeeded in checking the vessel's progress. They treated the Seniye steamer "Burhanieh" in the same way on her last trip and

* A kind of boat usually propelled by paddles.

stole a bag of sugar from her barge. From the Seniye steamer "Mosul" on her last trip they stole a bed quilt, the Arabs having lashed their canoe to the stern of the vessel and boarded her. Such incidents are not infrequent.

I informed the authorities, and asked them to instruct the Kaïmakam of Kurna to hold an inquiry and to adopt precautionary measures for the protection of our shipping in the river.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. E. CROW.

[22155] No. 53.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 431. Confidential.)
Sir, *Therapia, June* 24, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of two Reports on a journey lately made by Mr. Mark Sykes, Honorary Attaché to this Embassy.

The one describes his journey in the Northern Jezîré district of Northern Mesopotamia, and the other in the Rowanduz district, a map of which is attached.

Both reports contain a great deal of interesting, as well as valuable, information, and I am confident that the zeal and ability with which they have been compiled during Mr. Sykes' rough travels will be fully appreciated, especially at a moment when the asperity of the Turco-Persian dispute invests these districts with particular interest.

I also beg to inclose an extract from a private letter from Mr. Mark Sykes written from Diarbekir, and dated the 3rd May, in which he shows how dangerously the political situation is affected by the formidable military Turkish concentration at Passova.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure 1 in No. 53.

Report by Mr. Sykes on Northern Jazirah or Northern Mesopotamia.

IN making the following journey my chief object was to traverse, if possible, such districts of the so-called desert of Northern Mesopotamia as had not yet been thoroughly explored. The two ordinary routes taken by travellers proceeding from Aleppo to Mosul or *vice versâ* are either viâ Birejik, Urfa, Mardin, and Nisibin, or else by Deir Zor, Shedadeh, and Tell Afar. Between these two routes there lies a large tract of country which, according both to Kiepert's and to the War Office maps, is almost wholly unvisited, intending travellers having generally been prevented from passing through this region, either by the tales of the citizens of the towns or the objections of the Government authorities. To any one unacquainted with the desert the descriptions given by non-desert natives of the massacre, bloodshed, and strife which is supposed to be continually taking place in the pastoral regions are, indeed, enough to make the boldest ponder on the advisability of visiting them, but a little knowledge of the Arab character and the actual nature of desert hostilities suffice to reduce the apparent danger to very minute proportions.

Having obtained an escort of three soldiers from the Vali of Aleppo, I proceeded to Meskené by the ordinary caravan route, which, being a well-known highway, needs no description, although in passing it may be well to compare its present condition with that in which it was when I crossed it last, eight years ago. Formerly cultivation spread but little beyond the city of Aleppo, and three hours' ride eastward carried one almost beyond the zone of villages, though it is true that as far as Deir Hafer one still saw isolated collections of mud huts inhabited by low Bedouins who, though they had abandoned their tents, still followed a pastoral life and barely cultivated the soil. In the summer the Fedaan and Anazeh Arabs roamed at will over the pasturage, while in winter the whole region was a wretched wilderness, empty, bleak, and repellant.

The Colonies of Circassians which have been founded in the vicinity of Membidj, although in fact nests of robbers have done much to break the power of the Bedouin, who have retired before the accurate marksmanship of the refugees, who, in their turn, rob the sedentary population, but in a much less outrageous manner than their predecessors.

However, since the first Bedouin took to living in a settled state, a mixed population of Kurds, Arabs, and so-called Turks has been steadily moving into the country from the vicinity of Aintab, Alexandretta, and Urfa. Consequently any one riding from Aleppo to Resm-el-Khamis now sees, in place of a desert, a glorious stretch of cornbearing land spotted with well built villages belonging to a population of sturdy and industrious peasants. These people are peaceful, kind-hearted, and hardworking, and seem to be fusing into a solid population with great rapidity; old tribal names of the Kurds are merging into Arab equivalents; the Turks vanish in one generation, while the Arabs, from a free admixture of foreign blood, are being quickly weaned from their old thriftless and idle ways, and I think I may say that in the Shamieh one of the finest agricultural populations in Asiatic Turkey may be seen in the making. The vast and rapid improvement of this district is entirely owing to the splendid police work accomplished by the late Ali Pasha while that capable officer had charge of the military police, and though his successor is incompetent and venal, there is no fear of the district undergoing a relapse into its former wretched condition. The vested interests in Aleppo are far too great to allow of any depopulation of the newly colonized lands, and the whole order of things has grown far too complicated, both from the point of view of the Aleppine landowners and Government officials, to permit of a return to the late condition of anarchy and disorder in the Shamieh. The inhabited zone now comes to an end at a point about 6 miles west of Meskené, but as these most easterly Settlements were only made last year, I think there is every hope of the Euphrates Valley itself being inhabited by a settled population before any great length of time has elapsed. I would draw especial attention to this rapid colonization and resettlement of uninhabited country on the advent of a modicum of public security as indicative of what will most certainly take place on a more extended scale the moment the Bagdad Railway reaches the east bank of the Euphrates.

The day after reaching Meskené I crossed the Euphrates at M'raybet. On landing I was directed to the encampment of Sheikh Naif, of the Weldi Arabs—a poor tribe, who possess neither horses nor camels, but have to depend on donkeys for the transport of their tents and furniture. Sheikh Naif, who was a pleasant, but rather birdlike old gentleman, sat brooding amidst a little forest of coffee-pots in the company of some twenty cackling oldsters of his own age. After we had been entertained with the customary coffee, nutted butter, and sour milk, we asked the Sheikh whether he would give us a guide across the waste to Tell-es-Semn, a point on the River Belikh. Sheikh Naif replied that the best and safest way was to go to Ragga—a statement which, although true, did not interest us, as that route was already well known. In the course of half an hour's conversation, I convinced my host that I particularly wished to avoid going to Ragga, and desired to cross the desert to Tell-es-Semn. Sheikh Naif thereupon replied that that road was impassable, and that if we attempted it we should certainly die. This remark provoked the Sheikh's companions to contradictious laughter. "By God," mumbled one toothless patriarch, "there is water in such numberless wells, that men may not walk at night for fear of falling into them; there are tents in such quantities that the ground is black; there are Kurds, Bedouin, and fellaheen, and all the tribes of the Jezireh gathered together there. Straight as a lance is the road, and as smooth as a trencher." I naturally asked whether no one would direct me along this famous highway, whereat another, even older than the first speaker, came forward brandishing a little stick. "Look you," he croaked, "were I 20 years younger, and I had a mare of my own, I would ride with you to the end of the creation and back again; but alack, here I am old and mareless, as you see; but, however, I will direct you as best I can from here; you cannot miss this road if you can but once find it. Now see, here is a tell, a little tell beside another; now behind that there is a spring of water, poor enough water for a feeble stomach in the spring of the year, but not weakening for a young man such as you, and" . . . . Here all directions as to the road were lost in half an hour's digression on the medicinal qualities of the Euphrates and its tributaries, which provoked a general argument on the subject, and completely dashed my hopes of obtaining a guide. However, later in the day the sergeant of my escort returned to camp with a noted sheep stealer, named Khalaf, who had just come out of prison, and professed

himself willing to act as our guide. I might mention that all through the Jezireh guides are very difficult to obtain; they are invariably one of the following three kinds of men:—

1. Robbers such as Khalaf, who are obliged to make détours to avoid meeting enemies;
2. Religious mendicants who insist on visiting every ruin and tomb for purposes of prayer; or else
3. Low fellows who act as odd men and servants to the various Sheikhs, who, being often half-witted, sometimes lead one completely astray.

On the whole, the best guides are undoubtedly the thieves, as they know every hill and wady by name, and are well acquainted with the local politics and tribal feuds. Khalaf was a man representative of his class, being a Bedoui of good family who had taken to the road after losing all his sheep through sickness. He affirmed on oath that he had never robbed a poor man in his life, a statement which was corroborated by all the leading Sheikhs I subsequently met, who themselves had suffered from his depredations and greatly desired as they said to slay him.

The following morning we set out across the desert to Tell-es-Semn. I hope the accompanying map will serve to give a view of the country sufficiently detailed to enable the observer to judge of its general conformation. The scenery resembles that of no other country I have visited, being neither like the Texan or Mexican plains nor yet bearing any affinity to the South African veldt. The atmosphere which is at once clear and hazy produces a very curious optical illusion, a pile of stones 800 yards away appears to be close at hand, yet a mountain on the horizon 4 miles away appears to be double that distance; as may be imagined the two effects combine to give an impression of vastness and of space difficult to describe in words. The sky, which in spring is often cloudy and overcast, throws strange streaks of shadow over the landscape, a dull definite line of grey on the horizon will change suddenly to a clear bright ridge of yellow hills, which are equally quickly transmuted to a dark range of purple mountains, the wadies form trailing serpents of lush olive grass and brilliant flowers, the rolling wolds run in lines of green and grey, thus marking the good grazing land from the barren stony tracks. On the sky-line herds of camels move to and fro almost imperceptibly, while on the green hillsides dappled flocks of sheep speckle the country with dots of brown, black, and white. Occasionally a thunderstorm rushes across the land, and for a moment one finds himself in a strange world of rushing waters, roaring winds and rolling thunders through which the lightening blazes with a strange unearthly glare, but these tempests are of short duration, and in a few moments leave the country as vast, silent, and as calm as before.

All that day we met not a soul save two Anazeh on foot, over whose heads my sergeant fired a shot out of pure light-heartedness. "They must be wicked men," he explained, "or they would not be here." Towards evening we came across three black tents, also belonging to the Anazeh; the hospitable owners gave us some lucid misdirections as to the encampment of Shalim Beg, their Chief, which ended in our sleeping in a wady. The next morning we rode on until we reached the tents of Sheikh Saleh, of 'Ain-el-Arus, whom we found to be an old man of wolf-like expression and thinness; he arose to greet us, a strange, gaunt figure, in a long quilted gown, with a large ragged green turban bound round his head. On my dismounting he clapped me on the back merrily enough and hustled me to the fire; when he heard of the trick the Anazeh had played us, he bewailed our lot in having had to sleep out in the rain at his very threshold. I was not a little puzzled at finding this strangely habited person a Sheikh of nomad Arabs, whose fashion in dress is rigid and unanimous; however, the mystery was explained by the fact that Sheikh Saleh is the head of a holy family whose duty it is to attend to the sacred fish and tortoises who live in the pool at 'Ain-el-Arus. As a healer and holy man, Sheikh Saleh has a great reputation, and has attained such merit that he can devour live charcoal and thrust knives into his stomach without receiving any hurt; he has even been reported to have fired a Martini into his vitals on one occasion of great exaltation. He lives a man apart from the rest of the Bedouin, and his flocks are sacred from the depredations of plundering parties. His influence among the local tribesmen is very considerable, and his blessings are as eagerly sought after as his curses are feared. It is the vulgar belief in the Jezireh that Ibrahim Pasha owes much of his prosperity to the prayers and benedictions of this holy man. I ventured to ask Sheikh Saleh how it

came that he had charge of the fountain of Abraham, and his account is curiously interesting, as it shows there is a connection between the shrine fountain of Abraham and that at Hebron; his story was as follows:—

A certain holy family had charge of the fountain of Abraham from the days when the saint lived on earth. Now three generations ago this family was reduced to one Sheikh who lived alone with his tribe without marrying. On a certain day a stranger came to his tent, on foot, and the Sheikh spoke to the stranger as follows: "You have come from the shrine of Hebron as it was ordained from the beginning and you are of my family and this place is your place; take charge of this shrine, marry and begot children who shall tend the shrine after your death and the wolf will obey you." "What wolf?" said the stranger, and the old Sheikh called out into the desert and presently a great wolf came running up to him. "This," said the Sheikh, "is my shepherd; he guards the flocks, and when a guest comes to the tent he fetches a sheep from the desert." "Does he not devour the sheep?" asked the stranger; but the Sheikh told him "not to be afraid, for the flocks were sacred to man and beast. So it came about that the stranger from Hebron took charge of the shrine and the tribe, and the old Sheikh went away, no one knew whither. Now, that stranger was my great grandfather, and I am his successor; now, look you, I have no wolf to tend my flocks." Here Sheikh Saleh paused and glared round the assembly, his eyes brightened with suppressed rage, "No wolf to guard my flocks but a wolf of a Dowlah (Government) to gather taxes of me and my people. I am here to tend a mosque falling into ruins, and they tax me so that I sit in rags and starve, bread and butter is all I have to give guests when I should slay three sheep a-day for the poor." As he spoke the tears rolled down the old man's cheeks, "Tell the Sultan I have been stripped and fleeced beyond all custom, tell him that," so saying, the Sheikh sprang up, and wetting his finger, ran it round my neck, and blew on me, "There," he said, "You have my blessing, you are my son; go, tell the Sultan the shrine of Abraham is falling into ruins through illegal taxation." While we were talking, three Anazeh boys with lances, rode up to partake of hospitality; they said they had been to the River Belikh to raid the flocks of the Shammar, but had taken nothing, as the water had been too high to permit of their crossing. Sheikh Saleh neither praised nor blamed them, but said, indeed, that these Ghazus (raiding parties) were ill-work for the fellaheen, on whom all the burthen fell. It was then explained to me that when the great tribes were at war, the Ghazus invariably attacked the poor dependents of their enemies, and avoided meeting one another as much as possible. I also learnt that since Martinis had come into fashion there was much less bloodshed than when men were only armed with lances, as formerly many men were accidentally killed in the charges and scurries, while now such occurrences were rare. Khalaf, my guide, it is true, had had a bullet through his coat, but as he explained to me, he was a thief and not a raider, and in the desert a private adventurer carries his life in his hands.

From the tents of Sheikh Saleh we rode to Tell-es-Semn in three hours, about 3 miles before reaching Tell itself we passed Gol Bashi or El Guela. El Guela is a large sheet of water which is connected with the River Belikh by an ancient canal, the lake is evidently artificial as it is held up by a gigantic dam some 2,000 yards long and 20 feet high. The lake appears to have been used as a reservoir for irrigating the country between Tell-es-Semn and Ragga, as I was able to trace the remains of a canal which ran along the road nearly the whole of the distance between these two places. I would suggest that this canal bed should be accurately surveyed as its coincidence with numerous ruins and mounds marking the sites of ancient cities at present standing in waterless districts points to its being the cause of a prosperity which might be revived. At Tell-es-Semn I made the acquaintance of Sheikh Khalaf, the Headman of the local fellaheen. He is an Arab of the Arabs and a person well worth knowing. In appearance he is slim and aristocratic, which is always a sign of good breeding in the desert, and although his face has been somewhat disfigured by a deep sabre cut extending from the bridge of his nose to his left ear, his expression is bright and pleasing. In character he exhibits all the good qualities of the Arabs and none of their failings; he was dignified and gentlemanly in his behaviour, and his reputation is that of a brave, just, and honest man. His business is to try and cultivate the banks of the Bilekh when the Ghazus of the shepherd tribes will permit his people to do so, but he told me this was growing daily more and more difficult, and that he was being forced against his will to take to pastoral work. He said it annoyed him more than he could say to see his land lying idle when he knew it would bear in abundance any crop he chose to put on it, yet

owing to the stupid selfishness of the nomads, for whose petty quarrels he had a hearty contempt, he had to let it lie fallow. "What is their fighting about?" he cried, "a few camels, a few sheep and goats, when the banks of the Belikh would bear a million men and all wealthy." I asked him directly at what rate agricultural works were decreasing on the Belikh. Sheikh Khalaf's answer was as follows. "After the death of Haroun-al-Rashid a certain Khalif ruled over this country: and about that time two owls dwelt in this neighbourhood. Now the youngest owl fell in love with the daughter of the elder. So after some thought he approached the senior and begged of him his child in marriage. Quoth the old owl "My daughter is accustomed to live in great comfort; have you a deserted village wherein to entertain and another with which to endow her." Now when the young owl heard these words he rejoiced and replied "O owl, at present I have only eighty ruined villages in my domain, but if God wills our Lord the Khalif live another three years I shall be the sole possessor of all the villages between here and Bagdad."

I taxed the Sheikh Khalaf with the fact that by all accounts matters were certainly better than they were thirty years ago; to this he agreed, but added that this was no excuse for the present wretched state of affairs. "Our eyes have been opened," he remarked; "we know what we could do if we were allowed; cotton, rice, barley, tobacco will grow here; our eyes have been opened but our hands are short."

From Tell-es-Semn I rode to Ragga by the direct road which I have mentioned follows the line of the old canal; I might draw attention here to the fact that the canal was evidently used to irrigate the lands cut off from the Belikh by the Golban Belikh range of hills (see map). The town of Ragga, which is largely inhabited by Circassians, is beginning to increase in size and importance, and is used as a depôt and market by the local tribes who are beginning to trade more freely in butter and wool since Ibrahim Pasha the Kurd showed the way to wealth.

After a day's stay in Ragga we set out to cross the Belikh, an operation no unattended by difficulty since the river, though narrow, is deep and runs between soft banks. The only passage in early spring is over a kind of rude causeway made of twigs and fascines of brushwood. The bridge is the property of Sheikh Darwish of the Afadli Arabs, and he expects a small gratuity from those who make use of it.

Sheikh Darwish is a holy man and is the servant of the tomb of the late Sheikh Abd'l Kader, but he has very little influence among the surrounding tribes, and has to pay his share of the general pains and penalties exacted by the powerful clans. Soon after we had crossed the river we ascended the line of bluffs which overlook the Euphrates; hardly had we done so than shrill cries and yells attracted our attention on the left, where, amid a cloud of dust, we could discern the mares of poor Sheikh Darwish being driven off by a Ghazu of the Anazeh, among whom we could recognize our friends whom we left at Sheikh Saleh's tents. Never did I see men ride as did those Arabs, the doubling, turning and galloping were superb, and I realized in a moment what excellent sport raiding must be, but I also realized that once a man has taken to it he will become as incurable as a sheep-worrying dog or morphomaniac.

My escort begged to be allowed to join in the fun, as one of them naïvely explained that if only they could recapture the mares Sheikh Darwish would be obliged to give them a lira a-piece, but as they admitted he would probably get them back for half of that sum I refused to allow them to assist him.

We camped for the night a little way up the river amidst magnificent crops of barley, the property of the Afadli; the whole of the valley of the Belikh is naturally irrigated by a number of small branches of the river, which run off from the main stream and rejoin it at various points lower down, thus cutting up the flat corn lands into a number of islands.

The valley of the Belikh varies from about 1 to 3 miles in breadth and though but little cultivated would be one of the most productive tracts in the Empire if it were but inhabited. The numerous ruins along its banks point to a very large population having at one time subsisted on both banks of the river, and when I rode for no less than three-quarters of an hour through a mass of broken mounds (see map) indicating the remains of some great city I began to think Sheikh Khalaf's estimate of a possible population of 1,000,000 as a permissible exaggeration. The fact that this region stands ready for the hand of the cultivator and that the Weldi, Afaldi, and Aghedaat Arabs are ready and willing to settle on its banks should have a material effect on the prospects of the Bagdad Railway. The moment a little security is felt a tremendous development cannot fail to take place, and security will be assured the

moment the railhead reaches Harran. I would even venture to prophesy that a great many new villages would be built before the line was actually in working order. As we rode up the valley tents grew scarcer and scarcer, and after passing Tell-es-Semn we found the whole stretch between Zab-al-Alwanieh and Tell-el-Hamam absolutely deserted. Save for a Ghazu of forty Anazeh whom we noticed on the other side of the river we did not meet with a single soul until we reached Tell-el-Hamam, where we found a small encampment of Turcomans. These people were very poor and earned their livelihood chiefly by cultivating small patches of barley for Ibrahim Pasha, who mills it and distributes the flour among his tribesmen.

After reaching Hamam we changed our course and turned towards Ras-ul-Ain, traversing country similar to that I described in my Report of last year, though on this occasion I was marching north-east instead of south-east. The whole of this region is thickly studded with remains of ancient towns and villages, which prove that the arid and rocky appearance of the ground belie its nature, though I should imagine that a considerable amount of work would have to be done before it was fit for cultivation. Seemingly in early times a considerable portion of the waters of the Khebar was diverted into the Wady Hamar and other dry river beds, while the great wells which are still to be seen in various places were evidently used for storing the water from the torrents which seam the land from north-east to south-west.

At Bir Ulleh we found an encampment of the Lukka, a curious tribe of Arabs, Kurds, and nondescripts who are gathered together under one of Ibrahim Pasha's Aghas. I was not able to obtain much information from these people, as the Agha had an impediment in his speech and his son was a natural, who thought it funny to empty a bucket of water over my head during dinner. Although the boy stripped himself stark naked after performing this practical joke, no effort was made to restrain him, nor was any comment made concerning his behaviour. The next day we proceeded directly to the encampment of Ibrahim Pasha. The first sign of the proximity of the chieftain's encampment was the increase of travellers upon the road; Armenians and other Christians were met in ones and twos, travelling in peace and safety on various errands, being either merchants, servants or common peddlers trafficking with the tribes. Such people told me that once they were within range of the Pasha's jurisdiction they were perfectly safe, and were treated with kindness and liberality. We also encountered two travelling companies of entertainers and jugglers, who were moving from camp to camp giving performances of conjuring and acrobatics. Late in the afternoon we at last reached the tents of Ibrahim himself. He seemed unfeignedly glad to see me, but chaffed me most unmercifully about the complaints made last year to the Sublime Porte by the Embassy on his account. As I have by me a copy of my last Report, I find there is really nothing for me to add concerning this remarkable man, as my second visit was practically the same as the first.

After five days' rest we left for Ras-ul-Ain which we reached in three hours from leaving the Pasha's encampment. The village of Ras-ul-Ain presents a sad and mournful picture; here are the mounds and ruins of many noble cities which have risen one upon the ashes of the other, marking in turn the Greek, the Parthian, the Roman and Arab dominion, each one has served its purpose and each one has followed the fate of its predecessor in becoming the prey of a conqueror; lastly, we find a crumbling town of even more recent date; it is a deserted settlement of 5,000 houses built by the refugee Circassians some twenty years ago. These colonists were sent out by the Turkish Government to restore the ancient fertility of the sources of the Khabur; thither they went with their families and, delighted with the pleasant prospect of the oasis, set manfully to work to build, to cultivate and restore. Alas! their hopes were doomed to disappointment. Small-pox, cholera, fever, and unsuitable clothing worked havoc among the wretched people, and in a short time the grave-yard contained more occupants than the town. The settlers abandoned their fields in dismay leaving behind only a few determined men who still cling doggedly to their new homes. This woeful disaster should not, however, discourage those who hope for the restoration of the Jezireh. The Circassians are a people who have many admirable qualities, but unfortunately cleanliness is not one of them; also a mistaken sense of honour obliged them to retain their close-fitting native dress and heavy woollen kalpak, which they refused to abandon for fear of losing their nationality. The consequence of this obstinacy on the part of the settlers was that cholera, small-pox, and apoplexy found them an easier prey than it would almost any other type of colonist, and their failure need not be taken as indicative of any insuperable difficulties in the way of resettlement. For details of my route beyond Ras-ul-Ain, I must refer the reader to the map. Once the Khabur is passed the whole aspect of the country undergoes a

complete change; from a land of low grassy wolds, where the view is always curtailed by an horizon of rolling undulations, we passed into a region where the visible distances are immense and the natural features distinct and pronounced. To the north the mountains of the Karaja Dagh hang suspended as it were in the air; to the north-west one can easily descry the mountain and Castle of Mardin at a distance of nearly 50 miles, while if one looked south the distant but forbidding bulk of the Sinjar stood before him. Nor is it a flat and empty plain which is inclosed by these far off barriers; intead of empty wadies we crossed deep but narrow perennial streams which threaded their way through broad valleys or alongside dark unending ranges of hills. In place of the green grass we had grown so accustomed to, we rode over masses of flowers which dazzled the eyes with their brilliant and variegated colour and almost oppressed me with their heavy scent; on the river side the growth of daisies and cowslips was so thick that at times our horses could hardly force their way through them. Yet this well watered plain, the fertility of which breaks out in a torrent of blossom is almost entirely uninhabited; and an encampment of the Kikieh at Gingan was the only trace of life we saw between Khatmiyeh and Ras-ul-Ain. While encamped at Girgan the Chief of the Kikieh paid me a visit which, I think, is worthy of description. Abdur Rahman Agha is a descendant of one of the Abbasid Emirs, and has a great contempt for his Kurdish followers whom he looks on as barbarians similar to Turks, Circassians, and Albanians. He is a singularly forbidding-looking man, and his laconic utterance is at times somewhat startling. When he came to my tents he brought with him his Mollah and nephew, and, after staring at me in stony silence for a short time, asked me when I thought the new Bagdad Railway would be built as far as Ras-ul-Ain. He and the Mollah were both strongly in favour of the scheme, and the latter, proud of his knowledge, began reciting a list of cities formerly existing in those regions in the days of the Caliphs of Bagdad. The good man grew very eloquent on the subject, and, pushing his spectacles up on his brows, described the remains of the canals and irrigation works still existing along the Khabur, and broke into ecstatic prophecies regarding their speedy restoration, "and," as he continued, "under any other Government it would have been done long ago." "We all know that," cut in Abdurrahman, "but you are a fool to say it before this man;" the latter part of the sentence I need not say referred to me. However, the Agha continued to talk to me on the subject, "formerly my Kikieh lived in villages here, then the Shammar Arabs came and drove us out of them, so we were forced to go and build others on the Karaja Dagh, where we now cultivate the land; however, we still come down here to pasture our flocks in spring and also to show we have a right over the district. Formerly, the Shammar gave us much trouble, and tried to prevent our even pasturing in these parts. Then we only had lances, and the Bedouin were more numerous than us, besides, as you see my people are only Kurds and always used to run away in battle. I was obliged to contrive some way of guarding my flocks, so at great expense I bought fifty Government Martinis, but it was the same as before, the Shammar used to shout and gallop, and my men were worse with the rifles than with the lance. On thinking over the matter I got a new idea; it seemed to me that if a man had a gun on foot he would easily beat a man with a lance on horseback, so I taught my men to dismount and give their horses to others to hold; after I had made them learn to do that I taught them how to shoot at stones and marks until they could hit them, but it was very expensive in cartridges. Last year the Shammar drove off many thousands of my sheep; I went out after them with my fifty Martini men; when we came up with the Arabs I told my men to dismount, at which they all got very frightened, but obeyed my orders; now the Shammar thought we had come to surrender, and rode at us shouting according to custom, but we all stayed quite still until they were a minute's distance away; then I said shoot, and my men fired all together; we fired in that way four times, and the Shammar fled and left us our sheep. The Shammar Sheikhs were very angry about it (for we had killed eleven of them) and said it was shameful, but I do not care for that, as I can now leave my flocks to graze in peace. All these Ghazus are very foolish. Ibrahim Pasha likes them because they amuse him, but they do not lead to riches as does fellaheen business and farming. When the Railway Company comes I shall be very rich; I shall bring all my people down here and the Government will be obliged to protect them; I shall own perhaps 600 or 700 villages; the Shammar will go back to Nejd or else act as herdsmen for us. We are all waiting for the railway except Ibrahim Pasha, even he would be glad if it came were it not that he feared he might be made to travel to Constantinople by it."

I give Abdur Rahman's opinions as they were given to me, and I think that they are the views of a great majority of the tribal leaders in the Jezireh. It is important to note that Abdur Rahman's ideas coincide identically with those of Sheikh Khalaf and Sheikh Saleh, and that it may be deduced from this that a great number of the nomads would immediately take to settled life if only security were assured them, and that the difficulty of populating the Jezireh will not be great. However, on the other hand, the experiment at Ras-ul-Ain is sufficient to prove that European or Circassian colonization would be unlikely to succeed.

Two more days' ride brought us to Sinjar, where we entered upon a new country which it is not in the province of this paper to describe. I need only add that the zone of fertility and pasture ends at the Jagh-Jagh, and that the area between Tell Kokab and Khatunizeh is a barren and irreclaimable desert.

(Signed) MARK SYKES.

Inclosure 2 in No. 53.

Report by Mr. Sykes on the District of Rowanduz.

[To accompany Map B.]

THE accompanying map will serve to show the general dispositions of the Turkish forces in the neighbourhood of Rowanduz. However, it may be well to take a general view of the country before describing the condition of the army at present collected on the Persian frontier.

If a line were drawn from Zakho to Akra and from Akra produced to Koi Sanjak and from thence to Suleimanié, it would approximately coincide with the high and difficult ranges of mountains which separate the lowlands from the highlands of ancient Irak. The startling difference between the mountainous and level country is not only confined to the physical features of the land, but extends as might be expected to the population and climate. The plains of Mossoul, Erbil, and Kerkouk are zones in which a mild winter and a tropical summer prevail, the vast rolling spaces are covered by immense crops of barley, which are harvested as early as the 5th May by the inhabitants of the numerous villages which cover the plains. The sedentary population, although composed of Turkish, Arabian, and Iranian elements, is, in fact, homogeneous in habit, appearance, and custom, though diverse in religion and language. There are the Turkish towns of Altin Kenpru, Kerkouk, and Erbil, there are Christian villages of Jacobites and Chaldeans, such as Bartola and Enkowa, there are settlements of the so-called Persian Shabak, even as there are Arab and Kurdish districts, but in effect these distinctions count for little, and the population may be said to be equally laborious, unwarlike, and sunk in the lowest depths of moral depravity. The villages are well built, the ground is well cultivated, and, as I have said, the people openly and shamelessly licentious. Besides this sedentary population, which except as a source of supply would count for little in event of war, there is a considerable sprinkling of nomads in the plains. These may be divided roughly into three classes, the low-class Arabs, such as the Jibbour and Tai who haunt the lower reaches of both Zabs, Zoaran Kurds, who migrate from the vicinity of Akra towards the Great Zab in early spring and return again in June, and the bastard tribes of the Daoudié and D'sdey, who frequent the districts between Erbil and the Tigris. None of these tribes, either Arab or Kurd, have the slightest affection for the Government or the least enthusiasm for the Khalifate, the Arabs having all the contempt of an Arabian for the Turkish barbarian, the Zoaran Kurds being entirely occupied by their infinitesimally small feuds, and the Daoudié and D'sdey being sore from excessive taxation.

Having taken a brief review of the lowlands it now remains for us to examine the highlands of Irak. The mountainous country is divided by nature into two distinct regions, which, however, are unnamed and unrecognized. The first includes the towns of Amadia, Akra, Serdesht, Rowanduz, and Passova, and from the western side can only be entered by difficult and circuitous routes; it is a zone of gigantic mountains, precipitous paths, narrow gorges, and deep narrow valleys. Travelling is so difficult that donkeys are almost the only animals of burthen in use, and many of the inhabitants have not seen a horse more than ten times in their lives. At this altitude the winter is severe and terrible, the spring long and mild, the summer brief, but intense, the autumn pleasant and refreshing; consequently, the crops are abundant both in tobacco, grapes, rice, wheat, and barley. The inhabitants are almost all Kurds (the number of Christians and Jews being inconsiderable), and although divided into many tribes may be separated into three classes. The first, being composed of tribesmen inhabiting the western bank of the Zab, are lukewarm in their loyalty to the Government and take absolutely no interest in events occurring at a greater distance than 10 miles from their villages; their Aghas, indeed, talked to me about the Passova dispute much as a Somerset rustic might discuss an earthquake in Klondike. These people, though apparently courageous and well armed, have a fearful terror of Government troops, and, I think, may be looked upon as mere cyphers from a military point of view. The second class of Kurds are those under the chieftainship of Sheikh Sadik. Unfortunately, I have never yet had an opportunity of making the acquaintance of this very remarkable man, but from all I have seen and heard he is a person of considerable mental capacity; all those whom I have met who have lived in his district tell me that he maintains strict order and justice within his own borders, though like all feudal leaders he is liable to ravage and plunder beyond them. Under Sheikh Sadik there is a large confederation of tribes, which presents a solid front of 6,000 rifles.

I understand (though Captain Tyrrell will be able to correct me) that the force under Sheikh Sadik is almost entirely composed of footmen; if, indeed, he has any mounted men at his disposal, they must belong either to his northern or Persian allies, and should be added to the number of rifles I have given as at his disposal. Sheikh Sadik is a considerable religious power on the Persian frontier, besides having much traditional prestige from his connection with Sheikh Obeidullah. Sheikh Sadik has always been granted a considerable amount of liberty by the Ottoman Government, and is credited with boundless ambition, even to the extent of wishing to become independent Sultan of Azarbaijan. The region in which Sheikh Sadik is paramount extends from Nori to Rowanduz, the mountain fastnesses between Rowanduz and Koi Sanjak being entirely in the hands of the Khoshnao Kurds. The Khoshnao Kurds are strong Sunnis, and fanatically attached to the Ottoman Government; their Aghas are all eager to assist the troops, either by money, supplies, or with armed force. I can say this without fear of contradiction, since I was present at the collection of their sheep tax, and noted the willingness with which they paid it. This tribe is sedentary, and possesses no horses, but the men are all well armed with Martinis, and, as I gathered from conversation, versed in every ruse of mountain warfare. Their system of fighting is to extend a body of 400 or 500 men in groups of four at intervals of 15 to 20 yards, the Chiefs giving orders by criers who station themselves in various coigns of vantage among the rocks; the men are all hunters, and very fair shots; their nimbleness and agility is amazing, and their abhorrence of cold steel commendable. Having now described the rugged and Alpine zone of the frontier-range, I will now turn to the second, which includes Soujboulak, Suleimanié, Koi Sanjak, and Rania.

In this region the mountains are much less precipitous, and the roads less difficult; it is inhabited entirely by Baba Kurds, the most important tribes being the Hamawand, the Bilbas, Mengor Jaff Girdi, and Sheikh Bizeni; for the numbers of mounted riflemen at the disposal of these tribes I refer to the map. The Aghas of these tribes have long been at feud, but since the arrival of the Turkish troops all inter-tribal fighting has been at a standstill, and the whole of the fighting men have been waiting for the word from Constantinople to swoop into Persia. Various Aghas told me that the plunder would be immense and the resistance slight. The whole of these tribes are nomadic, and spend the summer in the vicinity of Passova. Mohammed Agha, of the Mengor, and Ibrahim Agha, of the Bilbas, have both fled to Persia, but they have been replaced, and their men have no intention of following them.

These mounted Baba Kurds are by far the most effective fighting people in Asiatic Turkey; they are courageous and intelligent, and totally unlike either the Bedouin or the Hamidié of the Van district. However, it seemed to me that their appetite for war had been roused, and that it would be very difficult for the Turkish Government to relinquish the position it had assumed in regard to Passova without risking a considerable insurrection, which might eventually spread like wildfire from Suleimanié to Bagdad and Ourfa. The whole of the frontier tribes are learning their strength, and, although at present loyal, might easily change their sentiments if they suspected the Ottoman Government of weakness. As regards the Turkish troops in the field, there is very little indeed to be said, as the arrangements and organization of the army was rather to be measured by standards of minus than plus. Such regiments

as I saw on the march were much more like ordinary caravans than military units. The whole of the force at Passova had to be supplied from Erbil. In the winter there were no supplies, and, even if there had been, the road was blocked with snow—consequently the troops had to subsist on what they could pick up; but at least three-quarters of the men survived. Ammunition was in May as short as food had been in winter, 250 rounds being carried per man and twenty boxes being held in reserve per battalion. However, efforts have been made to remedy this deficiency by sending down enormous quantities of ammunition from Diarbekir to the Lower Zab. However, there is a considerable lack of transport animals, so I doubt very much whether the ammunition will be got up to Passova under another eight weeks. As far as I could ascertain, 500 donkeys was the whole available supply of beasts of burthen.

The distribution of the troops will be seen on the map. The five battalions at Erbil are intended eventually to proceed to Passova, so as to bring the division there up to its full strength, six battalions having been detached to remain under the nominal command of Sheikh Sadik, but in reality to prevent his making a sudden forward move.

The medical arrangements are absolutely nil, and consisted, at Rowanduz and Erbil, of two apothecaries in each hospital. As I did not see any of the Staff officers I cannot venture to give any opinion as to their capacity, but, from all accounts, Ahmed Daghestani Pasha had made himself very popular, both with the troops and the Kurds.

It is impossible for me to give any forecast of what may take place in the event of hostilities, as I am absolutely ignorant of the nature of the Persian army—even of its existence; but I suggest that a force of 5,000 or 6,000 cavalry or Cossacks might, under a bold leader, sweep in through Suleimanié, destroy Kerkuk, and then either take Erbil and Mossoul or raise a Shia insurrection in Bagdad, before a finger could be raised to prevent them, so thoroughly have the Turks locked themselves up in the mountains while ignoring the plains.

(Signed) MARK SYKES.

Inclosure 3 in No. 53.

Mr. Sykes to Sir N. O'Conor.

Dear Sir Nicholas, *Diarbekir, June 3, 1906.*

I HOPE the two reports will prove of some interest. I beg pardon for their dirty appearance, but I really only had a very short time to compile them, and the maps took hours putting together. I omitted putting in anything very confidential in the Frontier Report, as I did not know whither you might wish to send it, and therefore confined myself to bare facts.

As far as I could make out, the Commission at Rowanduz were three real blackguards. I think the chief mover in the whole affair is the Mutessarif of Kerkuk; he is a Pomak, bitterly anti-Frank, clever, and very unscrupulous. There was one thing struck me as being very plain, and that was that the Turks cannot go back without very grave risks. They have been allowing the tribes to arm themselves for years; they have been exciting the frontier Kurds with religious teaching (particularly the Khalifa theory). Now for a forward move. The Kurds are all loyal, but at the first sign of Turkey's giving way to Persia I should seriously fear a revolution; the first thing that would strike the Kurdish frontier nomads would be that the Sultan was not all-powerful, and the disillusionment would provoke them to strike for independence and a few days might see the whole country from Mosul to Bagdad in utter confusion, which, if it once spread, might put the whole Eastern Empire in a blaze. I am really inclined to think that the local feuds would not suffice to keep the tribesmen squabbling among themselves. The whole of Mesopotamia is thoroughly disaffected, and would add to the confusion if things went wrong on the frontier. What I fear is, of course, not a regular organized revolt, but a general breakdown of the Government's hold on the country. The troops in the Bagdad and Passova region are completely locked up in the mountains, and it would take weeks to withdraw them or weeks to reinforce them seriously. Deserters from the Yemen are beginning to trickle through North Arabia, and the tales they tell do not tend to improve matters.

Of course, in this country it is impossible to prophesy, but I do believe the risks I suggest actually exist, and, as far as I could gather, the Turkish officials have some inkling of them.

My frontier journey was from Mosul to Erbil, Erbil to Koi Sanjak, Koi Sanjak to Rowanduz, Rowanduz back to Erbil, so I had plenty of opportunities of judging of the state of the country. I might have gone to Passova, but thought you probably would not wish it.

Yours sincerely,
(Signed) MARK SYKES.

[22162] No. 54.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 438.)
Sir, *Constantinople, June 26, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Jerusalem, being his Report on that Consular district for the quarter ended the 31st March last.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 54.

Consul Dickson to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 31.)
Sir, *Jerusalem, May 26, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that the trade of this Consular district during the quarter ended the 31st March last was in a prosperous condition, as will be seen from the Returns of the Exports and Imports and Shipping at the port of Jaffa compared with the similar period of 1905.

The total value of the exports and imports amounted to 292,485*l.*, as against 200,370*l.* during the three months ended the 31st March, 1905, showing an increase of 92,115*l.* in March quarter 1906.

The exports during last quarter showed an increase of 50 per cent. compared with the like period of 1905, the value of the exports during the three months ended 31st March last having been 171,810*l.*, as against 114,170*l.* in March quarter 1905.

The imports also indicate an increase during last quarter compared with the similar three months of 1905. During the quarter ended the 31st March last, the total value of the imports through the port of Jaffa was 120,675*l.*, as against 86,200*l.* in the similar three months of 1905, or an increase of 40 per cent.

The total number of vessels that entered and cleared at the port of Jaffa during the quarter ended the 31st March last was 174 of an aggregate tonnage of 272,514 tons, as compared with 170 vessels and 259,692 tons during the similar period of 1905, giving an increase of four vessels and 12,822 tons for March quarter 1906. The number of steam vessels was 170 of a total tonnage of 272,306 tons, as against 167 vessels and 259,639 tons in the three months ended 31st March, 1905, or an increase during last quarter of three steam-vessels and 12,677 tons. The number of sailing craft that visited Jaffa during the past quarter was four, of an aggregate tonnage of 208 tons.

British shipping showed an increase of 8·6 per cent. in the tonnage during last quarter as compared with the like period of 1905, the number of British vessels (all steam) that entered and cleared at Jaffa having been 61 of a total tonnage of 104,188 tons, as against 64 vessels and 95,932 tons in the three months ended 31st March, 1905.

In view of this steady increase in the exports and imports and in the Returns of Shipping the trade and commerce of this province may be said to have been in a prosperous state during the quarter ended the 31st March last.

The number of vessels of foreign nationalities, together with their tonnage, exclusive of British, which called at Jaffa during the three months ended the 31st March last was as follows:—

Nationality.	Number.	Tonnage.
Russian	27	31,976
French	20	43,035
German	8	17,352
Greek	3	2,613
Austrian	25	36,311
Italian	17	30,649
Norwegian	6	2,081
Ottoman	3	789

of which 2 were sailing-vessels (36 tons). Belgian, 2 (2,468 tons); and American, 2 (172 tons); both of which were sailing-vessels.

The general state of this province during the quarter ended the 31st March last continued the same as previously described, but I would mention that there was more readiness manifested on the part of the police to cope with evil-doers and to maintain order. The unusually abundant rains which fell during the winter have given promise of plentiful crops, and as the cisterns have been well stored with water there is little apprehension of scarcity of drinking-water in the coming summer. On the other hand, the prospect of a rich harvest has made the authorities look forward to a considerable increase in the tithes, and, as they will no doubt insist on levying a much larger sum than the previous year, it is probable that the peasant will find himself little benefited by the unusually good season.

I have kept back this Report hoping to have been able to inclose the Budget of the Mutessarifat for the financial year ended 28th February, 1321 (13th March, 1906), but the Financial Department has not yet made it up. I shall, therefore, forward it in my next Quarterly Report.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JOHN DICKSON.

[22164] No. 55.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 440. Confidential.)
Sir, *Therapia, June 27, 1906.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 392 of the 7th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah relative to the inquiries made, under orders from the Sultan, by Veli Pasha into the conduct of Mukhlis Pasha, the late Vali of Bussorah, and the causes of his dismissal.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 55.

Consul Crow to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 36. Confidential.)
Sir, *Bussorah, May 29, 1906.*

VELI PASHA, a Liwa and Aide-de-camp to the Sultan, has been sent here from Bagdad to inquire into the conduct of the late Vali, Mukhlis Pasha, principally with reference to the recent fighting in Mountifik, about which very strange and discreditable rumours are current, and also in regard to his charges against Suleiman Pasha, Mohammed Pasha Daghestani, and Fakhri Pasha, whom he accuses of improper dealings with Gadban, Chief of the Beni Lam, alleging that they gave the latter military control of the Persian frontier from Khanikin to Mohammerah, and appointed him "Commander" on the border.

According to inquiries made by Veli Pasha, I am informed that the Vali's action in Mountifik was inspired solely by the desire to crush Sadun and oust him from his lands at Suk-el-Shiyukh, where he had been permitted by the Government to settle last year. Falih Pasha, a cousin of Sadun, supported the Vali, hoping to get his cousin's lands. Last year Sadun was expelled by armed force. The Vali pursued him, but, through lack of cavalry, was unable to get in touch with him. He returned to Bussorah for Ramazan, leaving Falih Pasha in possession of the land. The ostensible pretext for the Mountifik expedition was to recover arrears of taxes—£T. 359,000—due to Government. It is said they claim £T. 112,000 from Suk-el-Shiyukh alone. The Arabs contend that their crops were assessed at too high a value by the local officials, and that the basis of taxation is therefore unfair. They have refused to pay anything for the last three years, and have staved off pressure by making large presents to officials. The Vali, who is exceedingly vindictive and obstinate, would brook no interference in prosecuting his schemes against Sadun. The authorities at Bagdad appear to have disapproved of his action, and Mukhlis Pasha having announced his intention of returning to Mountifik after Ramazan to capture Sadun, it was thought politic to have recourse to milder measures, and he was instructed not to proceed there. Sadun was in direct communication with Constantinople, and his representations as to the validity of his title to the land in dispute seem to have commended themselves to the Palace and to have received support. It is interesting to note that in the official data collected by Veli Pasha, the Vali is stated to have reported that Sadun was supported in his pretensions by the English.

It was at this juncture that the troubles occurred at Amara over leasing the Sultan's lands, and Mukhlis Pasha was dispatched there to effect a settlement between the Seniye Department and the civil authorities, and to turn out Gadban, Sheikh of Beni Lam, from Kumeid belonging to the Imperial domain lands. The circumstances attending the dispute were reported to your Excellency in my despatch No. 12 of the 6th March last. Gadban seems inclined to resist with all the force at his disposal, and his resources are not inconsiderable. Fighting broke out again in Mountifik in March, as reported in my despatch No. 11 of the 5th March, the immediate cause, according to Veli Pasha's inquiry and my information also, being the murder of a member of the El Hacham tribe by Ashirets dependent on Falih Pasha near Suk-el-Shiyukh. In order to take their revenge the El Hacham surrounded the town, and serious disturbances occurred, resulting in loss of life on both sides as already reported. The Mutessarif of Amara was dispatched to Suk-el-Shiyukh, but failed to restore order, and in April the Vali himself was directed to proceed there with a considerable force. The official reports state that he had six battalions of infantry and four field guns. The effective of the battalion here is about 350 men. He also sent to Bussorah for the band. His Excellency's account of what occurred and his subsequent discomfiture were reported to your Excellency in my despatch No. 29 of the 12th May. The version of the affair obtained by Veli Pasha is somewhat different, and is as follows:—

On the night of the Vali's arrival at Suk-el-Shiyukh the Arabs, reinforced, I understand, by Sadun, attacked the town in force and poured in volleys all night. Twenty-four soldiers were killed and many wounded, but the Vali kept indoors. On the following day he marched out with his six battalions and four guns, accompanied by a large body of Arabs, and was surprised by an ambush. The Vali halted when the fighting began, and took refuge on the "Alus," the river gun-boat in which he travelled from Amara. The debacle seems to have been general. Most of the troops fled. In one battalion there remained only eighty-four men. One gun was captured by the Arabs, but it was subsequently returned by means of friendly representations to the Turkish authorities. Sixty men were killed and many wounded, and the Arabs pursued the Vali to the water's edge. They were dispersed by the captain of the "Alus," who trained the ship's solitary gun on the crowd and opened fire. The Merkez Commandant of Suk-el-Shiyukh having reported to the military authorities at Bagdad that the troops were throwing away their rifles and that the Vali had fled, Mukhlis Pasha was immediately superseded and ordered to proceed to Stamboul.

The second matter which forms the subject of Veli Pasha's investigation arises out of the quarrel between Suleiman Pasha, Commander of the 6th Army Corps at Bagdad, and Mukhlis Pasha. The enmity between them dates, I am told, from the time when Mukhlis Pasha commanded the gendarmerie at Salonica and Suleiman Pasha was inspector of railways there. On Suleiman Pasha's appointment to Bagdad he applied to the Bussorah Vilayet to pay him his salary. As Commander of the

6th Army Corps his request is not unusual. The Vali declined, and no money was forthcoming up to the date of his departure. The Vali claimed the right of acting independently. There was much confusion owing to the issue of contradictory orders from the two military centres. Hamid Pasha, who proceeded to Mountifik by the orders of Suleiman Pasha, was taken to task by the Vali for going there without his leave, and on applying to the Vali of Bussorah to victual his men was refused. He asked permission from Bussorah to leave on his appointment as Director of the Seniye Department at Amara, and was told to get his instructions from the authorities who had sent him there. This conflict of military jurisdiction led to a lamentable want of cohesion in the arrangements for the Mountifik expedition. Orders were subsequently sent to Suleiman Pasha not to interfere with the Bussorah Vilayet.

In the course of the negotiations at Amara, Gadban, Chief of the Beni Lam, showed the Vali a letter which he had received from Mohammed Pasha Daghestani, asking him to furnish any information of interest to the Government on the frontier-line from Khanikin to Mohammerah and to keep an eye on those districts, as there were no Turkish military posts there. The writer stated that any good service on his part would be rewarded by Government. The Vali impounded the letter, and telegraphed to Constantinople charging Mohammed Pasha and the Bagdad military authorities with interference in his affairs, and accusing them of carrying on underhand dealings with a rebellious tribesman. The Vali even stated that Gadban had been appointed Military Commander of the Persian frontier by Mohammed Pasha, and declared that his own attempts to settle the land dispute had been neutralized by the promises of reward held out to Gadban. The Bagdad authorities were interpellated, but denied the charge, stating that the Vali was misinformed. Shortly after this Gadban received another letter signed by Suleiman Pasha, Fakhri Pasha, and Mohammed Pasha Daghestani, thanking him for services rendered on the frontier, and again asking him to watch the interests of the Government in that quarter. The letter was brought to the Vali, who telegraphed, I am informed, in a paroxysm of rage to Constantinople denouncing the signatories of the letter as rogues, rascals, and traitors to their country, adding that he had written evidence of their guilt. The Vali's violence frightened his Secretary, who begged to be excused from dispatching such a message to the Palace. Veli Pasha has been commissioned to examine the letters, which are said not to justify the Vali's denunciation.

Mukhlis Pasha's vindictive temperament and his obstinacy evidently carried him away, and finally led to his disgrace. The brutal manner in which wounded prisoners, who attacked him in the town gaol last year, were beaten in front of his house is still fresh in our recollection. He was violent and bigoted, ignorant of administrative matters, and devoid of patience or inclination to understand them. His favourite argument was the Circassian riding whip, which he wore in his boot, and which he is said to have used with effect at more than one sitting of the Administrative Council when his wishes were opposed. He drank heavily at night, and bullied his subordinates. His manners were rustic, and he made himself as difficult of access as possible. On the other hand, he took no bribes, and was generally honest in his dealings, though he omitted to pay rent for his house. He took a keen interest in public works, built fine barracks in the Maqam, and a depôt for the gendarmerie in Bussorah with the aid of public subscription. He began several roads, and tried to improve the town to the best of his ability. As long as he was in residence his masterful presence acted as a strong deterrent from lawlessness, and the town was quiet. When he absented himself at Amara disorder set in again. He seems more fitted for some executive post in the gendarmerie than for administering a vilayet. Like most Turks, he was a sad boaster, and professed himself to be animated by the best intentions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. E. CROW.

[22680] No. 56.

Question asked in the House of Commons, July 2, 1906.

Mr. Lansdale,—To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he has received information of the murder of several British subjects recently in the vilayets of Bagdad and Bussorah; and what steps are being taken to restore order in that area, and protect the lives and property of British subjects.

Answer.

His Majesty's Government have received information of the murder of one British subject, Mr. Glanville, at Maaghil, and His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople is giving every attention to the matter. A special Commission is being dispatched by the Ottoman Government to concert such measures as are required for the maintenance of order.

[23215] No. 57.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 9.)

(No. 450. Confidential.)
Sir,

Therapia, July 3, 1906.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 284 of the 27th April last respecting the disturbances at Erzeroum, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from Mr. Consul Shipley, giving some interesting information on the general situation at Erzeroum since the arrival of the new Vali, Atta Bey, and calling attention to the discontent prevailing among the Mussulman population and the troops in consequence of the maladministration of the province, and the exhaustion of the revenues of the vilayet to supply the requirements of the Central Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 57.

Consul Shipley to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 12. Confidential.)
Sir,

Erzeroum, June 15, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that although during the past few weeks and since the arrival of Atta Bey, the new Governor-General reported in my despatch No. 11 of the 8th May last, the town has to all appearance resumed its normal aspect, the situation cannot be considered as altogether satisfactory. The Mussulmans, it is true, are now quietly pursuing their usual occupations, nor have I observed any sign whatever of a desire on their part to renew the conflict with the Government. I would, however, venture to point out that the present tranquillity is more apparent than real, and is largely discounted by the fact that no attempt is being made by the Government to collect any of the obnoxious special taxes, the imposition of which was the cause of the original trouble. Further, all the information which reaches me goes to show that the Erzeroum Mussulmans, so far from abandoning the position which they have taken up of freely criticising the shortcomings of the Administration, have only been encouraged by the success which has hitherto attended their protest to question the right of the former to impose special taxation at all, except for purely local needs. Why, they are now asking, should they have to find money for the erection of a school, say at Damascus, with which they have no concern, as if there were not plenty of deserving objects in their own district. The fact that these and similar opinions are being almost openly expressed is significative of the extent to which the respect for constituted authority—hitherto a leading characteristic of the Turkish population—has been lessened, and although the Government for the moment seemed inclined to adopt a temporizing policy, it is impossible that they can acquiesce in a state of things which, if allowed to continue, can only serve to strengthen the existing spirit of opposition. It is, I venture to submit, here that the danger of the situation lies, for it is felt that any attempt by the Government to use coercive measures unless accompanied by the display of an overwhelming force, would, in the present temper of the Mussulmans, be the signal for a dangerous outbreak.

A further very serious factor which has to be taken into account by the Imperial authorities is that the troops, both officers and men, have now become infected with the prevailing disaffection. To such an extent, indeed, is this the case, that as I had the honour to report to your Excellency in my despatch No. 7 of the 12th April last, the Mussulmans have acquired the conviction that under no circumstances would they be fired on by the former, and though I should hesitate considerably to hazard an opinion as to how far this conviction of theirs might find itself to be justified, it may

very possibly not be far from the truth to say that the tenderness which the Turkish Government have all through shown to what was after all an act of rebellion against an Imperial Decree, may have been largely due to the above consideration. The primary cause of the discontent among the military, both officers and men, is, of course, due to the hardships of all kinds they are compelled to suffer owing to the non-receipt by them of their proper pay, and this, I find, they attribute, equally with the civilian population, to the fact that the vilayet is being drained of its resources to supply the necessities of the capital. Further, if a tithe only of the information which reaches me be correct, there is a deep-rooted dissatisfaction among the officers with the general way in which affairs are being conducted by the present Administration. I need not repeat to your Excellency the various utterances which from time to time have been brought to my notice, confirmatory of the existence of this dissatisfaction, but I may mention that the feeling produced among them by the result of the recent Egyptian affair, so far from being one of hostility to England is, as far as I can gather, merely condemnatory of a Government which they appear to consider has needlessly lowered the prestige of their country. What, they ask, will become of them if a policy of this sort is persisted in for the next ten years. Without wishing to attribute a too great importance to these expressions of discontent on the part of what may perhaps be only a minority among the officers, I think that your Excellency will agree that, unless great prudence is exercised by the Imperial authorities, the disaffection alluded to above may at any moment lead to serious consequences.

Unfortunately, the method of investigation pursued by the Commission sent, as reported in my despatch No. 9 of the 30th April last, to inquire into the reasons which led to the closing of the bazaar by the Mussulmans, and whose departure for Constantinople I had the honour to telegraph to your Excellency on the 19th ultimo, has been such as to give little ground for hope that any amelioration of the existing grievances will be the result of their labours. The inquiry itself was not a public one, but enough of the proceedings has transpired to show that the only question to which any importance appeared to be attached by the Commissioners were whether the Armenians had offered, or had been asked for, pecuniary aid by the Mussulmans in the prosecution of their demonstration, and whether the latter had sent deputations to any of the foreign Consulates in Erzeroum requesting their intervention.

To these questions the reply of the Mussulmans interrogated, among whom were the Mufti, several Ulema, and the heads of the various Guilds consisted, I am told, of an emphatic and categorical denial. Their protest, they said, was entirely their own work, wrung from them by the burdens under which they were labouring, and if the Commission doubted the truth of this latter statement, they were ready to furnish such proofs as might be required. All my inquiries, however, made both at the time and subsequently, have failed to elicit any evidence that any attempt was made by the Commissioners to avail themselves of this offer, and under these circumstances it is not surprising that very little expectation is entertained by the Mussulman part of the population that the outcome of the Commission will be the redress of their grievances, while among the Christians the suspicion has not unnaturally been aroused that one of the main objects for which the inquiry was instituted, was to fasten on them some of the responsibility for the recent occurrences, an attempt which was frustrated by the honesty of their Mussulman follow-townsmen. But whether this opinion be well founded or not, I have no hesitation in stating that any report which would endeavour to show that the late demonstration was the work of a few seditious agitators, or to represent it as other than a spontaneous outburst of popular feeling, would be to entirely ignore its nature and to lead to a serious misconception on the part of the Central Authority at Constantinople.

I would beg to add that the Mussulmans in stating that no deputation had been sent by them to the foreign Consulates in Erzeroum asserted, as far as this Consulate, and, to the best of my belief, as far as the others also were concerned, nothing but the truth. There was, indeed, I have reason to believe, some question among them of their taking such a course, but it was not carried out, and I need hardly say that had such a deputation presented itself at this Consulate I should not have received it failing an express authorization from your Excellency.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. S. SHIPLEY.

[23481] No. 58.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 106.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, July* 10, 1906.

FEARS are entertained by the Euphrates and Tigris Company for the safety of their mail-steamer "Mejidieh," which is due at Bussorah on the 7th July from Bagdad with six British subjects on board. Their agent at Bussorah reports renewed disturbances on the 9th July at Amarah; the local authorities helpless, and the telegraph wire destroyed.

The Company suggest that a guard of Indian troops should be placed on their mail-steamers. It appears to us that this plan would prove ineffective, but we are desirous of giving what protection we can. The presence of a gun-boat, even though it could not regularly act as escort to the steamers, might deter the Arabs from firing on the British flag. Do you think that at this season it would be feasible to send one to patrol the route once or twice?

You should urge the Porte to take immediate measures for protection, and communicate with the Consuls at Bussorah and Bagdad on the subject.

[23719] No. 59.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 13.)

(No. 142.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, July* 12, 1906.

MY immediately preceding telegram and your telegram No. 106.

Mr. Crow reports that in places on the Tigris above Kurna there is only about 6 feet of water; that the river is falling, and impracticable for a gun-boat.

Lynch's steamers could be escorted by the "Comet," but there are objections to this course, which I have already explained. I am informed that fourteen battalions have been sent to the disturbed area, but up to the present the Tigris traffic seems unsafe.

[25846] No. 60.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 30.)

(No. 199.)
Sir, *Constantinople, July* 24, 1906.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 187 of the 18th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Hodeidah on the subject of the recent mutiny among Turkish Redifs at Sana'a and encounters between Arab insurgents and the Turkish forces near Amran.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 60.

Vice-Consul Richardson to Acting Consul Hussain.

(No. 55.)
Sir, *Hodeidah, July* 7, 1906.

DURING the past fortnight there have been rumours prevalent here of dissatisfaction among the Turkish Redifs stationed in the vicinity of Sana'a, which eventually took the form of open mutiny.

Nine battalions from Amran and two or three others from towns in the south-eastern district left their respective stations on or about the 17th ultimo and marched into Sana'a without their officers, but carrying their arms and ammunition. They were met outside the capital by the Field-Marshal, who inquired of them what their grievances were.

The mutineers insisted on being sent back to their country, as they were given to understand that their services would be requisitioned for three months only in the

Yemen, whereas they had already been over a year there. They further complained that they were starving, and that their salaries were seldom paid to them.

Failing to appease the reserves with promises, and finding that they were assuming a defiant attitude, and had refused to return to their posts, Fezi Pasha ordered the regulars at Sana'a and the forts to open fire on the mutineers.

After nearly twenty-seven had been killed and over fifty wounded the mutinous Redifs surrendered, agreeing to return to their stations on condition that they would be sent back to their homes when fresh troops should arrive.

Various accounts have been circulated regarding the actual loss suffered by the mutineers. The local Arabs state that about 400 men were killed, but I think this is an exaggeration. It is even mentioned freely that eighteen battalions in all participated in the mutiny, but it is difficult to obtain correct information.

The authorities are naturally very reticent on the subject of this incident, and strict censorship is exercised on all correspondence arriving from Sana'a.

About the same time the Imam's adherents were active, and had advanced from Sunnetain to Khamri, which is about 15 miles north of Amran. A big fight was reported in the vicinity at a place called El-Ghoula, where the Turks commanded by Yussuf Pasha lost heavily before driving off the insurgents.

On the 3rd instant reports were current at Hodeidah that fighting was still proceeding between the Turks and Arabs very close to Amran. The former were obliged to call up reinforcements from the Anis district, who, marching from Damar, united with Yussuf Pasha's force.

A few days later mother section of the Imam's forces, under the leadership of Syyed Ali-es-Surnji showed great activity at Wady Shirs, which is 12 miles east of Hajje. A fortified position called Husn Affar was surrounded and attacked by the Arabs, and I now hear that the position has been captured. The garrison consisted of two companies of infantry.

Last night orders were received from Sana'a to move two battalions of troops from Loheia in company of an Arab Sheikh, Boni Pasha. These are intended for Hajje, most probably to retake Affar and disperse the rebels that are accumulating in strong force at Wady Shirs.

Yesterday the Hodeidah authorities put up a notice in the town that the insurgents that had arrived at places called Djebel Aiyal Yezeed and Hudlan near Amran had been severely defeated and dispersed by Yussuf Pasha.

During the course of last month Ali Mikdad, a notorious brigand chief, who has always proved a thorn in the side of the authorities in the Anis district, gave some trouble near Wady Farsh. Troops were drawn from Djebel Reima, who eventually succeeded, with little loss, in driving off the robbers and in capturing a few troublesome Arab rebels.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. A. RICHARDSON

28799] No. 61.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August 7.*)

(No. 518.)
Sir, *Therapia, July 30, 1906.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 499 of the 3rd instant, I have the honour to transmit copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Acting Consul at Jeddah reporting on the present disturbed state of Nejd.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 61.

Acting Consul Hussain to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 43.)
Sir, *Jeddah, July 18, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to report that news has been brought here that more than a month ago Bin Snood made a raid on Bareda, the chief town of Cassim, and, after some fighting the Sheikh of Bareda, Sheikh Saleh Mahanna was taken prisoner with

some of his relations and taken to Azena. Nothing is known here what happened after that; also nothing is known here as to the movements of the son of Abdulaziz-bin-Reshid.

About 300 to 400 Turkish troops have left Medina about a fortnight ago under the Military Mutessarif of Cassim on their way to Nejd.

I have, &c.
(Signed) MOHAMMAD HUSSAIN.

P.S.—*July 19.* News has been received this morning that at Hanakiah, two days' march from Medina, the troops going to Nejd were attacked by large numbers of men of the Mater tribe, and all the stores and provisions accompanying the troops were carried away and the troops returned to Medina.

M. H.

[26801] No. 62.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August 7.*)

(No. 521.)
Sir, *Therapia, July 31, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit, for your information, copy of a Memorandum from the dragomanate, respecting the present position of the Armenian Patriarchate in Constantinople.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 62.

Memorandum by Mr. Lamb.

YOUR Excellency is aware that, for the fourth time since he was elevated to the Armenian Patriarchate, Mgr. Ormanian recently tendered his resignation to the Sultan, or, more correctly speaking, requested His Majesty to find some means of relieving him from a situation which had become intolerable. He accompanied this request by a long Report, setting forth the reasons which, in his opinion, render it impossible for him to carry on the affairs of the Patriarchate with advantage either to the Government or to the Armenian nation, since which he has ceased officially to perform any of the functions of his office.

This Report specifies in particular five points, which have since formed the subject of protracted negotiations with the Ministry of Public Worship and the Porte, where a special Commission was instituted, under the Presidency of Memdouh Pasha, to consider them.

These points are as follows:—

1. *The Renewal of the Council of the Patriarchate.*—According to the constitution of the Armenian community this Council ought to be renewed by election every two years, its members being ineligible for re-election for consecutive terms. Ten years have elapsed since the election of the present body, during which time five of its members have died, and others are incapacitated from attending or else refuse to attend any more.

2. *New Bishops.*—The Porte refuses to sanction the appointment of Armenian Bishops for Roumania and Bulgaria, as well as for Castamouni and other places in the Ottoman dominions where there are Gregorian communities which have not hitherto possessed Bishops.

3. *School Question.*—The Porte has hitherto refused to issue permits to Armenian communal schools in the name of the community, but has insisted that the permits should be in the name of the Director, thus assimilating them to private schools.

4. *Property Question.*—The Patriarchate demands the restoration of ten or twelve properties belonging to churches or monasteries in the Asiatic provinces which have been "jumped" by Kurds or Mahadjirs.

5. *Exceptional Treatment of Armenians,* by reason of which all circulation of persons of that nationality is practically prohibited.

The special Commission recently sent up its Report to the Palace, recommending that satisfaction, subject to certain limitations, should be given to the Patriarch on points 3 and 4, making no mention at all of point 2, and offering only futile suggestions in regard to 1 and 5, the latter of which is obviously the one of greatest importance.

On Thursday last the Patriarch received a notification to the effect that this Report had been submitted to the Sultan, who had issued an Iradé approving of its suggestions, and inviting him accordingly to resume the official performance of his duties.

Mgr. Ormanian has replied to the effect that the suggestions of the Commission are inadequate and afford no real relief. The situation therefore remains practically unchanged.

(Signed) HARRY H. LAMB.

Constantinople, July 28, 1906.

[27562] No. 63.

Mr. Findlay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 13.)

(No. 136. Confidential.)

Sir, *Alexandria, August* 1, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to reply to your despatch No. 158 of the 21st June last on the subject of a proposal put forward by the Italian Government that each Power interested in the safety of the Red Sea should be intrusted with the surveillance of the part of the Arabian coast which faces its African possessions.

I have referred this despatch and the accompanying correspondence to the Government of the Soudan for their observations, and I have now the honour to inclose copy of a communication from Captain Parker, Acting Soudan Agent in Cairo, from which you will perceive that the Government of the Soudan is not in a position to incur the proposed responsibility, and has no particular interest therein.

The coast of Egypt on the Red Sea is patrolled on land by camel corps belonging to the coast-guard, and, on the sea, by a coast-guard cruiser or two. The Egyptian Government are satisfied with the results, and have neither the wish to incur further responsibility nor the means of undertaking it.

From a general point of view it would appear most undesirable that His Majesty's Government should be a party to any such scheme, especially at present.

The objects of a European surveillance of portions of the Arabian coasts would be certain to be misrepresented, and would be interpreted as a menace to the Holy Places. The Pan-Islamic press would seize on such an opportunity to raise the cry that the very existence of Islam was in danger, and to urge all true believers to rally round the Khalif. In the present state of Egypt it is most undesirable that such a cry should be raised with even the slightest appearance of truth.

I further venture to point out that the proposal of the Italian Government appears to be the first step in marking out spheres of influence in Arabia. Italy seems cursed with a craving to absorb some of the most indigestible portions of the globe. Her ambitions in Albania and Tripoli are well known. It is therefore not incredible that she should harbour similar views on Arabia, in spite of the small profit and certain trouble that would result from possessions in that turbulent country.

As regards the Italian proposal to practically occupy the Islands of Harrish and Gebel Zukur, I can hardly think that it would be viewed by the Admiralty with a favourable eye. The Red Sea is narrow enough already.

It is, moreover, notorious that temporary occupations have a strong tendency to be permanent.

I have, &c.

(Signed) M. DE C. FINDLAY.

[26802] No. 62[a].

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 7.)

(No. 522. Confidential.)

Sir, *Therapia, July* 31, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herein copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul-General at Smyrna, reporting on the present lawless state of the Smyrna district, where brigandage is rife, and criticising the ineffectual measures adopted by the authorities to cope with the evil.

Upon receipt of Mr. Cumberbatch's despatch, I spoke to the Grand Vizier on the subject, and complained of the inaction of the local authorities, and pointed out the danger which it involved to the security of the vilayet, as well as to the foreign trade of the district.

His Highness replied that most of the ill was to be attributed to the son of Kiamil Pasha, the Vali of Aidin, but that he would at once telegraph to the authorities at Smyrna to distribute the Martini rifles to the gendarmerie and police, and to take all possible measures for the public security.

I have, &c.

(For the Ambassador),

(Signed) RONALD MACLEAY,

Second Secretary of His Majesty's Embassy.

Inclosure 1 in No. 62[a].

Consul-General Cumberbatch to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 52. Confidential.)

Sir, *Smyrna, July* 19, 1906.

IN my annual Reports on the economic and administrative condition of this Consular district, I have had occasion to refer to the insecurity to life and property caused by brigandage, which has always existed in this region in a more or less active state, but which at the present moment has assumed somewhat alarming proportions.

In view of the nomination of a Special Commission, composed of an Italian officer of gendarmerie and two or three Turkish officers, to inspect and, presumably, to reorganize the gendarmerie force of the Aidin Vilayet, I have the honour to forward herewith a Memorandum enumerating those cases of brigandage that have occurred within the last two or three years, and of which authentic information has been obtainable. This list by no means comprises all the acts of brigandage that have been committed, but it will sufficiently demonstrate the necessity of strong measures to stamp out the evil.

To this Memorandum I have handed a rough sketch map of the district showing the centres of brigandage marked in red, and from this it will be seen that the Ottoman Railway (Smyrna–Aidin) runs through this district and is naturally affected by this unsatisfactory state of things which is telling on its business both as regards its passenger and goods traffic—not to mention the danger in which its officials and station-masters are placed.

The local authorities have shown a certain amount of energy in coping with the evil, and within the period covered by my Memorandum, they have captured ninety-five brigands and killed forty, at a loss of twenty-four gendarmes killed and eight wounded.

Notwithstanding this, brigandage is perhaps more rife at the present moment than it has ever been, and the public anxiety and nervousness greater than I can remember its having been at any other time.

The fault for this state of things is not to be entirely laid to the door of the Governor-General and his officials, but to the apparent apathy of the Central Government and to the intrigues of Tewfik Pasha, General of Division and Commanding Officer at Smyrna.

I know as a fact that the Governor-General has been pressing for three absolutely necessary things, *i.e.* :—

1. The augmentation and regular payment of the gendarmerie force;
2. The supply of Martini rifles to replace the old Gras rifles with which the men are armed, so as to place them on equal terms with the brigands, who have the most improved kind of rifles; and
3. The reinforcement of the gendarmerie by soldiers, especially cavalry.

Owing to the stringent orders to the Defterdar, by which every penny of the revenues is transmitted to Constantinople, where the budget of the vilayet is decided upon, the pay of the gendarmes, like that of all Government employés, is kept in arrears for months. Consequently, the force is deprived of its best men, who seek other employment, and are replaced by men drawn from the lowest classes, who are fit for nothing else, and who, to make up for the want of pay, resort to extortion and other irregular means to make both ends meet. These men cannot be expected to display any alacrity in the pursuit of brigands, with whom, if anything, they probably sympathize.

The necessity of arming the gendarmes with the most modern rifles is obvious, as it is not to be expected that, armed as they are at present, they can tackle their enemies, who are all excellent shots, and have the great advantage of a much longer range.

It must also be remembered that, owing to the disorganized state of the gendarmerie, the men are far from being in that state of efficiency which is necessary to cope with the numerous bands now infesting the country.

After a long delay the Government ordered the Seraskerate to supply this vilayet with Martini rifles, but owing to the interference of the Commanding Officer at Smyrna, who, as usual in Turkey is not on friendly terms with the Governor-General, the rifles were not sent. About a month ago Kiamil Pasha, having threatened to resign unless he was furnished with the necessary funds and rifles, the rifles were dispatched to Smyrna, where they have, however, been taken possession of by the Commanding Officer, who refuses to hand them over to the Gendarmerie Commander on the pretext that he has no Iradé to that effect.

As regards the third demand of the Governor-General for military assistance, he has, as a matter of fact, had the assistance of a certain number of soldiers, but owing to the jealousy of the Military Commandant they have been of little practical use, as the officers commanding the men are not allowed to move them without orders from their superiors at Smyrna in each individual case. Orders were actually issued from Constantinople for the formation of a detachment of cavalry, but the Military Commandant reported that, in his opinion, the mounted gendarmerie were quite sufficient for the work, and that regular cavalry were unnecessary, consequently the latter were never supplied.

The moment has undoubtedly arrived for the same drastic measures as were taken in the Adrianople district in 1888, when, after the holding up of the Orient express by a band of brigands, General Edib Pasha was sent to Adrianople with a special commission and full powers.

He received every assistance from both military and civil authorities, and he presided over a special court-martial before which the numerous brigands and other bad characters, caught by the soldiers and gendarmes, who scoured the country, were summarily tried and condemned. The results were most efficacious.

Unless similar measures are adopted at once it is to be feared that the audacity of the brigands and other bad characters will lead to serious troubles, especially as they are daily being reinforced by recruits who have been deserting in great numbers on their way from their homes in the interior to Smyrna for embarkation to the Yemen.

It is calculated that the number of men at present roaming about the mountains is 1,000, and, according to some, it is placed at 2,000, including the military deserters.

A curious and incomprehensible feature of the tactics followed by the authorities is the free pardon accorded to the six most powerful bands of brigands on their promising to give up their depredations. In the case of the most renowned brigand, Tchakirdji Mehmed, the free pardon was renewed twice.

Such action in itself alone is an acknowledgment of the weakness of the Government, and gives currency to suggestions of complicity in high official quarters. It is also most undesirable as it only encourages the formation of other bands.

Another curious feature is that among the list of victims there has not been a single foreigner captured or robbed by brigands during the period under review. The explanation given for this is that the brigands have observed that the authorities do not pursue them so keenly when an Ottoman subject is involved as when a foreigner is captured.

The famous Tchakirdji Mehmed is credited with having expressed himself in this sense, and that he abstained from molesting Europeans because he did not wish to cause his Sultan any annoyance from foreign intervention.

On one occasion when I was visiting a mine in the interior the authorities took unusual measures to insure my safety, as Tchakirdji and his band were known to be in the neighbourhood. He, however, managed to send one of his men to the house I was lodging in during the night to tell me that I need fear nothing from him as he only dealt with Turkish officials, Boys, and such like extortioners.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. A. CUMBERBATCH.

Inclosure 2 in No. 62[c].

Memorandum respecting Cases of Brigandage in the Vilayet of Aidin.

(A.)—*In the Sandjak of Aidin.*

1. *May* 1903.—Near town and station of Aidin: Michali Barontzi and Hay Nicholas Georgindi, captured and held to ransom.

2. *May* 1903.—Near village and station of Omurlu: Davy Levy taken from his house opposite the station, carried half-an-hour's distance and murdered.

3. *June* 1903.—Near village and station of Sukia: Yia Boy carried off and held to ransom.

4. *August* 1904.—Near village and station of Herbeyli: The son of Hajji Mehmed Effendi taken and held to ransom.

5. *August* 1904. Near village and station of Kosbounar: One D. Mavren carried off and held to ransom.

6. *October* 1904.—Same locality: The son of one Pehlivan Ali, carried off and held to ransom.

7. *February* 1905.—At Daoulia: One Psartinkis receives a letter allowing him twenty-one days to collect and pay £T. 800.

8. *March* 1905.—Aidin: A notorious brigand, Mussoglou, ransacks a flour mill, the property of Anastasiades Brothers, at the same time directing the manager to pay £T. 1,000 within ten days, a sum eventually increased to £T. 1,500, which is said to have been duly paid.

9. *March* 1905.—Near village and station of Kiosk: Yovanni, son of Youssufak Shonkour, is found murdered. This is thought to be the work of Mossoglou, who had previously demanded £T. 300 from the above without success.

10. *March* 1905.—Same locality: One Anastassides and his brother are compelled, by repeated threats, to leave the neighbourhood.

11. *April* 1905.—Daoulia: K. Papacosta's house broken into. He is tortured, and made to pay £T. 50.

12. *July* 1905.—Omurlu: The house of Hypocratis Nicolai attacked, but successfully defended with the help of some neighbours.

13. *July* 1905.—Burunkeny: One Kefalos robbed and murdered.

14. *July* 1905.—Dalama: One Nurri Effendi is compelled by blackmail and threats to keep a body guard of twelve men. The authorities powerless to protect.

15. *July* 1905.—K. Papacosta's house again entered. He is more severely tortured, and made to pay £T. 10—all he possesses.

In the same month a grocer Constanti is robbed.

16. *July*, 1905.—Kamaria: Athanasi Exarchos robbed and murdered.

17. *July* 1905.—At Lidja: Murder of a Turk and his wife.

18. *July* 1905.—Dijmalikion: Two mill owners, Yani Varasco and Yani Tsascos robbed and murdered.

19. *July* 1905.—Meles: General insecurity.

20. *July* 1905.—Teke: In broad daylight George Atranassi and his brother Nicolaon and their nephew Evangelos Anastassi carried off and murdered barbarously.

21. *September* 1905.—Daonlia: The house of Georgi Triandafilon Indje Oghi is broken into; £ T. 300 are seized, and the son of the above taken and held to ransom.

22. *September* 1905. Mustlaja: Hajji Dervish tortured and burnt alive.

23. *October* 1905.—Near village and station of Karabournar: A band of brigands enters the place in order to carry off Athanass Ilgu Costandinon, who, however, eludes them. Two days later Hajji Yonous of Kotzarli is kidnapped by the same band and held to ransom.

24. *November* 1905.—Same locality: General insecurity reported.

25. *November* 1905.—Daonlia: Anastasi Malami, Yeorghi Abadoghi and Aleki Ramo are tortured and held to ransom. Yovan Shakunoglou carried off and murdered.

26. *November* 1905.—Kotzarli: General insecurity reported.

27. *December* 1905.—Yamalaki: General insecurity reported.

28. *January* 1906.—Karaghatch: Hajji Keli seized, and after brutal treatment, robbed of £ T. 80. Brigands threatened to return for £ T. 300 more.

29. *January* 1906.—Karaklessa: A descent is made upon the village. Hajji Mussa robbed of £ T. 100. He is expected to die from the effects of his brutal treatment. His ears were cut off, and boiling oil was poured over his body.

30. *January* 1906.—Yiamala near Horsunlu: Brigands visited Selim Effendi and robbed him of £ T. 120, after ill-treating him and his wife.

31. *January* 1906.—Karran near Horsunlu: Brigands murdered Hajji Ali after robbing him of £ T. 55.

32. *January* 1906.—A band of thirty brigands, headed by Tchakirdji Mehmet, visited the village of Hamjali near Nazli in two companies. One company surrounded the four coffee shops where all the villagers were collected, and the other company went to the houses of Hajmé Hanoum and Hajji Mollah, who they severely wounded and robbed of over £ T. 350 in money and jewels.

33. *January* 26, 1906.—Near Nazli: A soldier and a rural guard, who were returning to the village of Atliche, fell in with a band of brigands, who killed the guard and severely wounded the soldier.

34. *February* 1906.—Hamyali: General insecurity.

35. *March* 16, 1906.—Bilara, a village on the Imperial farm near Horsunlu: Whilst the villagers were in their mosque fourteen brigands surrounded them. The chief of the band entered the mosque and read out the names of the principal villagers from a list he had in his hand. As his name was called out each man had to come forward and conduct the chief of the band to his house and hand over all the money he possessed.

When the list was completed the remaining villagers were only allowed to leave the mosque on handing over all they had in their purses.

The troops from Nazli, who were sent in pursuit towards evening, refused to pursue the brigands closely as they were afraid of them, and they returned to Nazli without doing anything.

36. *March* 19, 1906.—Hamitler, one hour from Karabournar: Eight well-armed brigands attacked the house of Cafaroglou Hassan, and carried off this man's brother, Dourmous.

37. *July* 12, 1906.—Near Bendjeli Station (O.R.C.): A band of four brigands seized four horses from carters and threatened to rob station.

38. *July* 12, 1906.—Coljabash Station (O. R. C.): Four brigands passed, making inquiries about money at station. Went on to Kaklik, robbed an employé of a M. Barontdji. Station-master of Coljabash took refuge at Kaklik Station.

(B.)—*In the Sandjak of Smyrna.*

39. *July* 1902.—Near village and station of Odemish: Money seized on two occasions from villagers.

40. *October* 1902.—Same locality: Money seized and two men murdered.

41. *December* 1902.—Same locality: B. Davidian murdered near his factory. Another man murdered. A gendarme shot.

42. *April* 1903.—Same locality: Two officers murdered in a watch-house.

43. *September* 1903.—Same locality: A man murdered. The nose of another cut off.

44. *October* 1903.—Same locality: Four men murdered.

45. *November* 1903.—Same locality: Twenty-four men killed. Two suspected brigands killed.

46. *November* 1903.—Near village and station of Tireh: Brigands break into the house of Guldji Oghlu and carry off £ T. 200.

47. *December* 1903.—Odemish: Eight men murdered in two days. Another murdered shortly afterwards.

48. *February* 1904.—Same locality: Four gendarmes killed. The notorious brigand Tchakirdji kills five of his own family on suspicion of treachery.

49. *April* 1904.—Same locality: Nine men murdered (five in one day).

49*. *May* 1904.—Same locality: Three murdered, one wounded.

50. *July* 1904.—Same locality: Two gendarmes killed, one wounded.

51. *August* 1904.—Same locality: Four gendarmes killed.

52. *September* 1904.—Same locality: Four gendarmes killed. The Kaimakam of Odemish wounded.

53. *November* 1904.—Same locality: Three men killed.

54. *September* 1904.—Near village and station of Tireh: N. Saroglou taken at a short distance from the village and held to ransom.

55. *December* 1904.—Odemish: Four men killed. A brigand murders his mother.

56. *December* 1904.—Near village and station of Tireh: Hajji Ibrahim Oglu Mustapha seized in the village, carried off, and held to ransom.

57. *January* 1905.—Near village and station of Chiplak: A Tahtaji carried away and murdered for having no money.

58. *January* 1905.—Omedish: Seven men killed.

59. *February* 1905.—Near village and station of Tireh: Indjo Sonloglu seized in a café in the village, carried off, and murdered.

60. *August* 1905.—Odemish: Seven more killed.

61. *August* 1905.—Near village and station of Tireh: Kadir Effendi captured and held to ransom.

62. *September* 1905.—Odemish: Three gendarmes killed in an encounter.

63. *October* 1905.—Near Smyrna: Hassan Bey captured and held to ransom.

64. *October* 1905.—Chiplak: Five woodcutters carried away and released on payment of £ T. 500.

65. *October* 1905.—Odemish: Anastasios Ilgu Costandinon attacked whilst on his way to a vineyard near the town. Thanks to the speed of his horse, he escaped.

66. *November* 11, 1905.—Odemish: Tcharkirdji Mehmet, after killing six Circassian gendarmes on their way back to Ayassoloük, a village 6 miles from Odemish, proceeded to the latter place, where he killed three more Circassians.

67. *January* 1906.—Awali: Olives plundered. Property destroyed.

68. *January* 1906.—Adranuttion: Olives plundered. Property destroyed.

69. *January* 1906.—Aghasnation: Ten Albanian brigands under one Layos extort £ T. 800 from the inhabitants.

70. *January* 1906.—Pergamos: Agriculture prevented. Property unsafe. One Tsatsani, a brigand, enters Pergamos and assassinates George Karanitsos, a wealthy merchant, for refusing to pay £ T. 300.

71. *May* 18, 1906.—Nymphio, near Smyrna: Atif Hodja carried off by brigands and ransomed for £ T. 100.

72. *July* 14, 1906.—Tireh: Three brigands armed with Martini rifles invaded the engine-shed of the Ottoman Railway Company, seized the "cleaner" and questioned him as to the salary of the engine-driver and of the fireman and as to the contents of the safe at the station. They remained one and a-quarter hours in the shed. The Kaimakam later on sent an officer with ten soldiers to guard the station.

73. *July* 15, 1906.—At Boudjah, the country residence of several well-to-do British subjects and other foreigners, 5 miles from Smyrna, a band of eight brigands, composed of bad characters of Boudjah and Yourlah, have taken to the neighbouring hills during the last three or four weeks. No special act of brigandage by them has been reported, but the residents of that place and the neighbouring village of Boumdat are very uneasy. Strong patrols of gendarmes have been placed all round the village.

74. *July* 15, 1906.—Boumbat, also the country residence of several of the leading

British merchants and other foreigners, 5 miles from Smyrna, a band of six Cretans has recently been reported as hovering about the neighbouring hills. They have already captured one rich Turk, and hold him to ransom.

(C.)—*In the Sandjak of Denizli.*

75. *August* 1905.—Near village and station of Seraikeny: The son of the Muktar of Bouladan is seized and held to ransom.

76. *October* 1905.—Same locality: The son of one Tahtaji, Kara Oghi, living near Hierapolis, is taken and held to ransom.

Inclosure in No. 63.

Captain Parker to Mr. Findlay.

War Office, Cairo, July 31, 1906.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to return herewith Foreign Office despatch No. 158 of the 21st ultimo, with inclosure.

With reference to this inclosure, I am directed to submit the following observations to you:—

1. That, so far as is known to the Soudan Government, the state of affairs in the interior of the Yemen scarcely affects the coast line, and that, therefore, shipping would not appear to be endangered thereby.

2. That the Slave Trade would appear to be easiest stopped from the African side.

3. That the placing of Italian troops on the Islands of Harrish and Zukur, though possibly undesirable from an Imperial point of view, does not appear to affect the Soudan.

4. That the Soudan Government is contemplating the purchase of a gun-boat, but that, in any case, this gun-boat could do little more than look after Soudan Government waters.

5. That, with regard to the preceding paragraph, if it be decided that the Soudan Government is to be responsible for a surveillance of the Arabian coast opposite, it could only be accomplished with the assistance of the British Government.

6. That, although it appears undesirable that the Turkish Government should have the right of search over Soudan boats, the matter does not seem at the present moment to be a pressing one, considering the fact that Soudanese shipping is still insignificant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. C. PARKER.

[27446] No. 64.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 13.)

(No. 532.)

Therapia, August 4, 1906.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that, according to an announcement in the local press, certain native capitalists have applied for authority to form a company for the repair of the Bagdad-Damascus road and the establishment of a coaching service. The applications have been referred by the Ministry of Public Works to the Vali of Bagdad for examination and report.

It is added that the enterprise in question would have an important bearing on communications, as the duration of the journey from Bagdad to Damascus, which now takes twenty-five days on swift dromedaries, would be considerably lessened; it would further link up Bagdad with the Hedjaz Railway, and afford great facilities for pilgrims taking that route.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

[27447] No. 65.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 13.)

(No. 533.)

Therapia, August 5, 1906.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 521 of the 31st ultimo relative to the present difficulties of the Armenian Patriarchate, I have the honour to report that Mgr. Ormanian has been persuaded temporarily to resume the official discharge of his functions, until it appears what effect is given to the qualified promises which he has received from the Palace.

Without being very sanguine on this point, his Beatitude professes to believe that the determined stand he has made on this occasion on behalf of the rights of his Church has made some impression upon the Ottoman Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

[28340] No. 66.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 20.)

(No. 547.)

Sir, *Therapia, August 10, 1906.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 444 of the 27th June last, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Smyrna, forwarding a full Report on the proceedings at the recently concluded trial of the Armenians implicated in the bomb conspiracy which was discovered at Smyrna in the summer of last year shortly after the bomb outrage at Yildiz.

The Consular dragoman, Mr. Altintop, appears to have followed the case very carefully, and it is doubtless in great measure owing to his exertions and the official intervention of His Majesty's Consulate-General that Carabet Balli Danielian, the only British subject among the accused, who seems undoubtedly to have been implicated in the conspiracy, escaped with such a relatively light sentence.

I have, &c.

(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure 1 in No. 66.

Consul-General Cumberbatch to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 55.)

Sir, *Smyrna, August 1, 1906.*

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch of the 21st June, inclosing a letter (returned herewith) from Pastor Yardumian, and to my previous despatch on the subject of the Armenians accused of participation in the Smyrna dynamite plot of last year, I have the honour to transmit herewith a full Report of the trial, which, as stated in my despatch No. 48 of the 21st June, was concluded on the 19th June.

I entirely agree with the concluding remarks of Mr. Altintop on the case in general, and I feel certain that the opportunity offered for the interference of this Consulate-General, owing to the presence among the accused of a British subject, acted not only as a stimulus towards a speedy termination of the proceedings, but also insured a more impartial hearing of the case than would otherwise have been obtained, to judge from my former experience of similar trials connected with the Armenian revolutionists and their supposed adherents.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. A. CUMBERBATCH.

Inclosure 2 in No. 66.

Report on the Proceedings in connection with the Trial of Armenians implicated in a Dynamite Plot (Smyrna, 1905–1906).

SOON after the abortive attempt on the Sultan's life at Yildiz in July 1905, the strictest orders were issued to the provincial authorities to be on the look-out for any clue that might be discovered as to the authors of the plot.

This led to the discovery of a great number of bombs and explosives in a house in Smyrna, inhabited by some suspicious Armenians, who, however, were in time to make good their escape.

The Governor, nevertheless, caused the arrest of some 150 supposed associates, of whom 43 were definitely detained and committed for trial.

Some of the men owned up to being members of a secret Society, and to having direct connection with the introduction into the country of dynamite and bombs with the avowed intention of blowing up public buildings and offices, mostly belonging to foreigners. After a preliminary and secret inquiry before a special Commission ("Hiyet-i-Tahkikiyé"), which was unduly protracted, the trial came on before the Criminal Court of Appeal in Smyrna on the 31st March last, and was concluded on the 19th June, having occupied, in the meantime, fifteen sittings of the Court, each lasting three to five hours.

Among the accused there were three British subjects, all members of the Danielian family of Magnesia; of these, Hadjatur and Bertch were without much difficulty

released; but the third, Carabet Balli Danielian, a youth of 19, appeared to be more than superficially implicated in the affairs of the Society to be allowed out on bail. The Consulate-General, however, insisted, and succeeded in keeping him at the Consular prison pending his trial.

It was on this prisoner's behalf that the dragoman watched the case at every stage, the only proceedings to which he was not invited to assist being the Istintak ("interrogatoire") of the other prisoners and witnesses, which was manifestly irregular, and which was the weakest point in the chain of evidence against the British prisoner.

The charge against the prisoners was, in the terms of the indictment, as follows:—

(*a.*) That they were members of a secret Society formed with a criminal object, and with branches at Alexandria, Geneva, and Philippopolis.

(*b.*) That members of this Society had planned the plot at Constantinople, and had also smuggled into Smyrna dynamite and other explosives for a similar object.

(*c.*) That it was intended to blow up Government offices, public buildings, disturb the public peace, and bring about troubles among the different classes of the population.

The evidence adduced in support of this charge was:—

1. The discovery of the bombs and dynamite.
2. The confession of the prisoners themselves; and
3. Documentary and other circumstantial evidence.

The list of the accused, with particulars, is annexed herewith. Of these, Nos. 44, 45, 46, and 47—Ashot, Sissak, Leon, and Edgar—were described as foreign Armenians (? Russians) who had crept into the country, disguised and under false names, as emissaries and mandatories of the committees abroad, had supplied the local committees with the means of carrying out their plans, had manufactured the bombs, and had levied blackmail on wealthy Armenians.

At the first meeting of the Court, on the 31st March last, the chief prisoner, Dicran Nalbantian, No. 1—who had in the meantime, under promise or hope of pardon, been taken to Constantinople, and had given full information both as regards the members and their plans—asked for leave to read a paper, which, however, he was not allowed to finish, owing to the objections of the Public Prosecutor.

He declared himself a member of the Armenian Revolutionary Society, set forth its purpose, which is to bring about an amelioration in the condition of the eastern provinces of the Empire, deplored that the Government had failed to carry out the solemn engagement it had undertaken by the Berlin Treaty and the Memorandum of the 11th May, 1895, and declared that the revolutionists in despair had thus been forced to resort to admittedly reprehensible measures in order to attract the attention of the European Powers to the injustice done to the beneficiaries under those two international documents, and thus provoke their intervention on their behalf. He finally appealed to the Court's sense of fairness and justice in appreciating their case. He confirmed in Court, in the main, his statements before the examining Judge or the Commission of Inquiry, in which he tells the story of the plot as follows:—

Some months previous to his arrest, while he was settled at Magnesia, he was introduced by Adjem Carabet, the head of the local committee, to Antranik (an Armenian, native of Rodosto), who had come from abroad. The latter proposed, and prisoner accepted, the offer that he should go to Smyrna, hire a butcher's shop on the quay, and help individuals without passports to leave the country. Antranik (Yilandjian) had three other associates, named Ashot, Leon, and Edgar. They were all officers of the "Troussak" Society, of which prisoner is a member.

He received two cheques, remitted to him from Alexandria, one for about £ T. 450, the second for £ T. 350, in all about £ T. 800, which he had, after cashing them at the Crédit Lyonnais Bank, to hand over to Antranik, save some £ T. 60, which he had kept for his business.

Dynamite was imported through a certain Nicoli of Bonljah. From a conversation between Antranik and Deli Mardik he concluded that the latter had been entrusted with the blowing up of some bridges on the Smyrna–Aidin Railway, and another person had been assigned a similar duty regarding a bridge on the Smyrna–Cassaba Railway beyond Alesheliir. The part prisoner himself had to play was to blow up his shop with the neighbouring buildings, among which are the offices of the Public Debt and the British Sailors' Home.

Adjem Carabet had smuggled in some 300 okes of dynamite and a number of rifles into Magnesia and distributed them among the local members.

The above, which is a résumé of the chief prisoner Dieran Nalbantian's declarations, both before the Commission of Inquiry and in Court puts the whole case in a nutshell. The main facts of the case have now been told. The statements made by the other prisoners add scarcely anything new to what is already known, beyond confirming and developing what has already been related.

As regards the British subject Carabet Balli Danielian of Magnesia, the charge brought against him, as set forth in the Public Prosecutor's indictment, was this :—

(*a.*) That he also was a member of the Magnesia Committee.
(*b.*) That he used to receive dynamite and rifles from Adjein Carabet.
(*c.*) That he used to contribute to the funds of the Society.
(*d.*) That he collected subscriptions to the same fund.
(*e.*) That he accompanied Adjein Carabet and other members on their excursions into the interior where they used to read seditious papers and practise at a target with rifles and revolvers.
(*f.*) That incriminating papers had been found in his house.

These charges against Danielian were based on alleged denunciations made by the other prisoners, particularly by Melki Hanzetian Balikdji, Vahan Bozoglon, Terzi Roupen, and Ohannes Cabakjian, all of Magnesia like himself.

Parties denied in Court the statements thus imputed to them, or pleaded that they had been forced into making them under torture.

The papers, however, found in Carabet's house, and the cumulative force of the various and sundry indications tend to confirm the view that he was not quite a stranger to the movement.

Among the other prisoners the case of Agob Cazarossian may be specially cited as of interest, he having hired the safe in the Crédit Lyonnais Bank, and deposited there by instalments 42 packets of dynamite, in company with Kitabdji Setrak, a defaulter.

The trial was concluded on the 19th June, 1906, and the sentences were as follows :—

Five, *i.e.*, Ashot, Sissak (alias Simbat), Leon, Edgar, and Antranik (five men, all defaulters) to capital punishment.

Nine, *i.e.*, Adjem Carabet, Kevork Apetian, Setrak Tokatzian (Kitabji), Antranik (joiner), Agob Kitz Ohannes, Alexis Kromidakis, Kevork, Aram, and Nicoli (of Bondja), also defaulters, to detention in a fortress for life.

Eight, *i.e.*, Prisoners Dieran Nalbantian, Andreas Nalbantian, Ohannes Papassian, Bozoglan Vahan, Melki Hanzetian, Deli Mardik, Roupen Kapakian, and Mihran Kiyidjian likewise to detention in a fortress for life.

Six, *i.e.*, the prisoners Agob Cazarossian, Nazaret Herbetian, Shamli Avedis, Boghos Papassian, Stepan Alexian Homshit, Dieran Artashesh (teacher) to three years' detention in a fortress.

Seven, *i.e.*, Carabet Balli Danielian (B.S.), Mosheh Krikov (teacher), Ohannes Damatian, Hoven Zarmarian, Artin Simonian, Oussob Cavassian, and Murat Ohannes to one year's imprisonment.

Twenty-two.—The remainder acquitted.

List of Prisoners.

No.	Names.	Detention in a Fortress.		Imprisonment for One Year.	Acquitted.
		For Life.	For Three Years.		
1	Dieran Nalbantian	1	..	..	..
2	Andreas Nalbantian	1	..	..	..
3	Agob Cazarossian	..	1	..	..
4	Ohannes Papassian	1	..	..	..
5	Melki Hanzetian	1	..	..	..
6	Vahan Bozoglon	1	..	..	..
7	Deli Mardik	1	..	..	..
8	Roupen Kapakian	1	..	..	..
9	Mihran Kiyidjian	1	..	..	..
10	Mosheh Krikov (teacher)	..	..	1	..
11	Artin Dzizmedjian	..	..	..	1
12	Leon Boyadjian	..	..	..	1
13	Ohannes Damatian	..	..	1	..
14	Ohannes Cabakjian	..	..	..	1
15	Agop Balcerian	..	..	..	1
16	Nazaret Herbetian	..	1	..	..
17	Hoven Zarmarian	..	..	1	..
18	Dieran Zarmarian	..	..	..	1
19	Avedis Z akay Shamli	..	1	..	..
20	Sevdui Ohannes	..	..	..	1
21	Boghos (or Paul) Papassian	..	1	..	..
22	Stepan Alexandre Homshit	..	1	..	..
23	Dieran Artashesh (Papazian)	..	1	..	..
24	Carabet Balli Danielian	..	..	1	..
25	Leon Cazaros	..	..	..	1
26	Artin Simonian	..	..	1	..
27	Ousseb Cavassian	..	..	1	..
28	Murat Ohannes	..	..	..	1
29	Stephan Djamilian	..	..	..	1
30	Varbet Ohannes	..	..	..	1
31	Serkis Kitz Ohannes	..	..	..	1
32	Serope Assadourian	..	..	..	1
33	Baghdid	..	..	..	1
34	Hadjik Terinikian	..	..	..	1
35	Yervant Avakoglon	..	..	..	1
36	Carabet Shahinian	..	..	..	1
37	Agob Saghir Ohannes	..	..	..	1
38	Mardiros Sativan	..	..	..	1
39	Takvor Papilian	..	..	..	1
40	Artin Krospekian	..	..	..	1
41	Artin Keropian	..	..	..	1
42	Serkis Kiyadjian	..	..	..	1

List of Defaulters.

No.	Names.	Detention in a Fortress for Life.	Capital Punishment.
44	Ashot	..	1
45	Sissak (or Simbat)	..	1
46	Leon	..	1
47	Edgar	..	1
48	Adjem Carabet	1	..
49	Kevork Apetian	1	..
50	Setrak Tokatzian (Kitabji)	1	..
51	Antranik (joiner)	1	..
52	Antranik (photographer)	..	1
53	Agob Kitz Ohannes	1	..
54	Alexis Kromidakis	1	..
55	Kevork	1	..
56	Aram	1	..
57	Nicoli (of Bondja)	1	..

Remarks of Mr. Alltintop, Dragoman of the British Consulate-General, on the Case in General.

HAVING followed up the case almost from its very commencement to its final conclusion, I venture to state the impression I gathered as to the manner in which it was conducted, and as to the justice or otherwise of the sentences passed.

The main charge that a secret Society was formed, that it had members both in Smyrna and Magnesia, that they were concerting plans, with the assistance and under the leadership of ringleaders who had crept into the country from abroad, that they had planned to destroy certain public buildings, and that they had smuggled in a large quantity of dynamite and accessories, has been established:—

(*a.*) By the accused's own confession.
(*b.*) By the presence of the explosives.
(*c.*) By the denunciations confirmed by facts of the accused themselves.
(*d.*) By documentary and other circumstantial evidence.

It is, however, certain, although it will be officially denied, that most of this evidence was obtained by torture.

The sentences therefore are, in my estimation, in accordance with the evidence.

The proceedings, on the other hand, were irregular:—

(*a.*) The Consular dragoman was not invited to assist at the examination of parties who, whether as coaccused with the British subject, or as witnesses, gave information against him.

(*b.*) The "Chambre de mises en accusation" merely endorsed the decision ("cavarnaine") of the examining Judge (Monstantik), without even reading the minutes of the sittings at which the depositions were taken.

(*c.*) Before the Court, although the prisoners were allowed perfect freedom of speech, their protests against the illegality of the tortures to which they had been subjected, and under which they had been forced to make the statements imputed to them, have not been taken into serious consideration, and the sham examination of the officials accused of having ill-treated the prisoners was a farce not worthy of a Court of Justice.

(*d.*) Another charge I have to make against the Court is that it treated the case superficially.

It satisfied itself that there was a conspiracy to commit a crime, and that preparations had been made in that direction. This was deemed enough to justify the passing of the most extreme sentence the law would admit of. It did not stop to examine whether there were any attenuating circumstances in favour of the accused.

The men declared that they were forced to resort to criminal measures because the Imperial Government, after solemnly engaging itself, by two official documents, to ameliorate the condition of the Asiatic provinces of the Empire, refuses to carry out its engagements.

To draw Europe's attention to this injustice is the main and sole object, the men say, of the whole movement. The means selected they own to be shamefully bad, but they plead that they are allowed no choice.

As for the British subject, Carabet, sentenced to one year's imprisonment, rightly or wrongly, I feel greatly relieved he g. t off so cheaply.

(Signed) B. A. A.

Smyrna, July 28, 1906.

[26354] No. 67.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 20.)

(No. 561.)
Sir, *Therapia, August 15, 1906.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 523 of the 31st ultimo, reporting the conclusion of the court-martial and the sentences passed upon the persons accused of complicity in the attack on Messrs. Lynch's depôt at Mâghil and in the murder of Mr. Glanville, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah, giving an account of interviews which he had with Medjid

Bey, the Acting Vali of the province, during his visit to Bussorah, and in the course of which he had pressed for a settlement of the Maghil case and for the punishment of the persons who had attacked the house of the British-Indian Joseph Pollock.

Mr. Crow also discussed with the Acting Vali the attacks recently made by rebellious Arab tribes at Amara on the vessels of the Tigris and Euphrates Steam Navigation Company and the necessity for steps being taken to preserve order.

I propose to make fresh representations on this subject to the Sublime Porte, and will inquire when the appointment of a capable and strong Vali for the Province of Bussorah may be expected.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 67.

Consul Crow to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 47.)
Sir, *Bussorah, July 17, 1906.*

MEDJID BEY, Vali of Bagdad and Acting Vali of Bussorah, arrived here on the 10th instant. I visited his Excellency by appointment on the 13th instant and took the opportunity to press for a settlement of the Maghil case and for the punishment of the persons who attacked the house of the British-Indian Joseph Pollock and wounded him.

In regard to the Maghil case, I drew his Excellency's attention to the apparent inability of the local authorities to catch the remaining culprits, and remarked that, although orders had repeatedly been given to effect their arrest, the police were either too timid or too corrupt to execute them.

His Excellency admitted the possibility of both these suppositions. I also observed that the proceedings of the court-martial were unnecessarily delayed, and urged that the culprits already under arrest should be tried at once. His Excellency remarked that it was difficult for him to interfere with the working of the court-martial, which was subject to military regulations, and admitted of no interference on the part of the civil authorities. I replied that the business of the court-martial was not to catch, but to try, the offenders; and that, if the police and civil authorities failed to find them and hand them over for trial, all proceedings were inevitably blocked. I therefore asked his Excellency to take stringent measures for the arrest of the culprits so that the court-martial could do its work. I also remarked that I had received trustworthy information that the majority of the suspected persons were still on Ottoman territory.

I then described to his Excellency in some detail the attack on the British-Indian's house as witnessed by Europeans from the neighbouring roofs, and I laid some stress on the fact that the attack occurred in the European quarter, near the Consulate, and that I myself had been roused by the shooting and alarm. I pointed out that the patrol, some soldiers, and the marine guard at the arsenal were all present, and neither rendered assistance nor attempted to catch the thieves; that one of the offenders had been subsequently recognized by Joseph Pollock, that he was a sapper in the Imperial army, and that, in spite of my representations, his immediate superior, a captain in the artillery, continued to prevent his arrest. I pressed for his immediate imprisonment. His Excellency replied that he had cognizance of the matter, and would give it his attention. I have since learnt that the man has been given up and imprisoned.

I then suggested that I should give his Excellency a written statement of our complaints, to enable him to examine and settle them, and I again impressed upon him the necessity of remedying the inefficiency of the police, as it was hopeless to expect the local authorities to do their duty as long as the police systematically evaded orders and connived at the escape of criminals. His Excellency promised to consider the question and to attend to our requirements.

I then touched on the disturbances at Amara, and urged on his Excellency the necessity of protecting our steamers from interference on the river. I remarked that Gadban fired on them with the object of eliciting our interference, and in order to put pressure on the Ottoman Government. The Vali replied that, if that were the case, he had not gained much, as the land in dispute had been given neither to Gadban nor to Seyhood, but to an independent party.

According to my information, this statement is false, as the Vali's dealings with Gadban are notorious, and the lessee of Kumaid is stated to be a mere nominee of

Gadban's, who paid Medjid Bey over 4,000 liras to keep the land out of Seyhood's hands. I said, however, that I was glad to hear he had found a satisfactory conclusion, and I hoped that it would last; but as the attack on the "Khalifeh" occurred on Gadban's land he was primarily responsible for it, and ought to be punished, and I asked his Excellency whether he proposed to take any steps to call him to account for it. The Vali replied that it was not easy to fix the blame or to find the actual aggressors. I said I did not see the necessity of that, but I thought, on public grounds alone, that the Arab Chief, in whose district the attack occurred, should be held personally responsible. Was the Ottoman Government with its troops and its administrative resources unable to keep the Arabs in order, or to punish a man in Gadban's position? His Excellency replied that it could no doubt be done, but it was a wild country, and the Arabs a wild people. He seemed disinclined to move in the matter; and in view of my information regarding the line he had taken, I thought it useless to pursue the subject.

His Excellency stated that he thought it was a great mistake ever to have separated the Vilayets of Bagdad and Bussorah. I told him I could not agree with him. Bussorah was an important commercial centre, and its affairs could not be administered properly without a resident Vali. I said he ought to be a civilian with some knowledge of trade requirements, to which he agreed, and added that the local military authority ought to be directly subject to his orders.

I forwarded to the Vali yesterday three Memoranda, dealing with:—

(*a.*) The Maghil case;
(*b.*) The attack on the British-Indian's house; and
(*c.*) The theft of property still unrecovered from the premises of my dragoman's brother-in-law, of which 131 liras belonged to my dragoman, Naoum Ahho.

The Vali returned my visit to-day, and in the course of conversation stated that exaggerated reports about the disturbances on the river had been sent to Constantinople. He said the Porte had telegraphed that the "Medjidie" was lost, trade interrupted, and sailing-vessels were being attacked and plundered on the river. I replied that grave fears had been entertained for the safety of the "Medjidie," as she left at a disturbed time, and no timely news of her arrival at Amara could be obtained, owing to the telegraph lines having been cut. Steps had, however, been taken in time to check the disorders, and she reached her destination safely. I said: "Sailing craft had undoubtedly been attacked." He replied: "Perhaps some time ago, but not recently." I said: "Not very long ago," and the result has been that the Nakhodas were scared and afraid to proceed, and had detained their ships at different points of the river. Some sixty to eighty with grain and liquorice had waited a long time at Amara. As long as merchants could not get grain from up-river, owing to the unrest, they were prevented from loading their ships and could not fulfil their contracts. Under these conditions, trade was certainly interrupted. Now, however, owing to the steps taken, and the assurances given, the evil had been removed and the situation had temporarily improved. Sailing-vessels were coming down freely with guards on board. I said I hoped the improvement would continue, and the Vali laughed. He gave me no further assurance on the subject, but asked the date of the arrival and departure of the "Medjidie" this week. I think he is alive to the necessity of taking steps to preserve order. He has evidently received his instructions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. E. CROW.

P.S. *July* 19, 1906.—On the 19th instant the Vali wrote me an urgent letter to the effect that the Grand Vizier, at the instance of the Embassy, was asking about an attack alleged to have been made on two English steamers. His Excellency asked me to inform him at once of the names of the steamers, and to state where, how, and by whom they had been attacked, in order that he might arrest and punish the aggressors. I wrote in reply to say that the British vessels attacked were the "Medjidie" and the "Khalifeh." That on the night of the 12th May the "Medjidie" was surrounded by 100 Arabs, and her progress impeded about 15 miles below Ezra's tomb. As for the "Khalifeh," as his Excellency was aware, and has had been stated in my letter No. 73 of the 16th June to the vilayet, the attack on that vessel occurred on the 30th May near Nehr Ariz, that the author of these attacks was Gadban, Sheikh of the Beni-Lam, and that no further attacks on British vessels had been reported to me since.

The Vali leaves for Nasryeh on the 20th instant, to-morrow.

F. E. C.

[28462] No. 68.

M. Hagopian to Foreign Office.—(*Received August* 20.)

25, *Chesilton Road, Fulham, London,*
August 18, 1906.

My Lord,

THE accounts I receive from Armenia do not yet record any appreciable amelioration in the condition of the country, but I hope that sensible progress is being made, and that I shall have the honour of receiving from you information that will encourage and sustain our revived hopes.

While there is the usual tale of isolated cases of murders committed on Armenians by Kurds and others, who go unpunished, and of the peculiarly unjust, cruel, and ruinous system of tax-collecting which still remains in force, I beg to submit that nothing is more likely to conduce to pacification and the restoration of confidence than the knowledge that the British Government has been successfully exerting itself on behalf of the desperately oppressed Christians of Armenia and Asia Minor.

In the meantime, I beg to bring to your Lordship's notice the incidents detailed in the inclosed report I have translated from the Armenian on the occasion of a fire which recently broke out in the Central Prison at Van, and the extremely harsh treatment which the Armenian prisoners received at the hands of Husni, the Tabour Aghassi or Chief of the Local Police, his officers, and the Turkish soldiery. I believe that the account given in this report is authentic. Should this turn out to be so, the Tabour Aghassi and his friend the gaoler of the prison should be dismissed and punished.

It would be an excellent measure if the Acting Consuls in Armenia and Asia Minor could at will gain free access to the prisons, and inquire into the condition of the political and other Christian prisoners.

An account received from Cesarea states that, because a dynamite bomb was found in the possession of a Turk, the incident was ascribed to the Armenians, and twenty young men of these were arrested and subjected to horrible tortures in the prison, tortures which recall the middle ages. The American missionary, Mr. Dotte, has inquired into the matter and reported it to his country. The writer says, "no proof could be found establishing the guilt of the Armenians, but it is the innocent who are always in prison."

I am, &c.
(Signed) G. HAGOPIAN.

Inclosure in No. 68.

Letter addressed to M. Hagopian.

Van, July 14, 1906.

My dear friend,

NEITHER my time, nor the circumstances, nor my inclination permit me to write to you at any length. Besides, what is the use of dwelling upon the details when everybody knows all our sufferings, sorrows and hardships which comprehend long tales of tragedies and martyrdom.

I am writing in haste and in a summary form the following harrowing incidents, which are sufficiently eloquent in themselves and explain everything.

We have now forgotten the grievances of our people, and the eyes of all of us are fixed upon the prison here—that Gehenna, that hell!

Recently most abominable barbarities have taken place, and the whole city laments them and is filled with burning indignation.

Our barbarous Government, in order to carry out its devilish measures, possesses savage officials ready to execute its behests, who all day long imagine and devise monstrous contrivances and various forms of brutality in order to be agreeable to their great Chief. Van possesses Husni, the Tabour Aghassi, and his worthy compeer, the Mudir or Gaoler of the prison.

For some time past these monsters have been concocting together new expedients for initiating a persecution against the Armenian prisoners, and specially against the more prominent ones from among them. The infliction of cruelties began twenty days ago, and, of course, without any cause.

They put chains on the hands and feet of Vartkes and tried to poison him, and eight days ago they conceived the fiendish project of exiling him, being undoubtedly persuaded that they could inflict some injury on the long-suffering hero. But these devices in part did not succeed, and in part did not appease their insatiable appetite.

They thought of a more terrible idea, namely, to burn down the prison. Yesterday, at night time, while the prisoners were asleep, a fire broke out, and as they spread, the flames became more and more threatening. Thereupon a commotion ensued, and the whole prison was in an uproar. The police, instead of putting out the flames, began to fire from above. When the belated soldiers arrived, they, instead of saving the prisoners, mounted guard at the prison gate and prevented any one from getting out; the prisoners in the fifth ward were on the point of being burnt alive when the chief of the staff conceived the idea of demolishing the roof. When this was done the soldiers and the police rushed in, and thinking to have found their opportunity, began to use their swords and bayonets. Many fell down lifeless from the effect of blows, wounds, and smoke—and so there was tranquillity!

But these brave deeds were evidently insufficient. Orders were issued that the Giavour prisoners should be brought out; the order was carried out. The result is not difficult to guess, namely, a general castigation, because it was assumed that the fire was a stratagem of the Armenians to effect their escape. The half-dead bodies were taken out separately or in batches of twos and threes and placed in narrow, damp, deadly cells.

Husni's brutal instincts were not yet appeased, for that hound did not repair to his own house, but ordered that the Giavour, Vartkes, should be brought before his presence. Vartkes was brought to him at midnight in his nightshirt. The maddened Husni pulled off that garment, and, stretching him on the ground, beat him with his own hands so cruelly that the poor victim ceased from breathing and moving.

In consequence of these inhuman acts many are lying ill and several are dying. I have already learnt that they have carried out the body of a murdered young man named Mugerditch.

The Government is trying by every means in its power to hush up the matter. No relatives are permitted to visit the prisoners. The Consuls remain indifferent.

[29028] No. 69.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 27.)

(No. 574.)

Sir, *Therapia, August 21, 1906.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 449 of the 24th ultimo I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Hodeidah, inclosing a most interesting report, and one well worth perusal, which he has compiled on the political, administrative, and economic condition of the Yemen Vilayet during the period extending from the 1st November, 1905, to the end of June of this year, and including a full account of the operations of the Turkish expeditionary force under Field-Marshal Fezi Pasha against the Imam's stronghold, Shahara, in the last cold weather season.

During Dr. Richardson's absence on leave it was very difficult for His Majesty's Embassy to obtain any trustworthy information in regard to the progress of events in the Yemen, and such meagre news as was allowed to transpire never revealed the seriousness or the magnitude of the reverse suffered by the Turkish troops in their unsuccessful attack on Shahara, which is so graphically described in the inclosed Report.

Dr. Richardson estimates that the two months' campaign against the Imam's mountain stronghold cost General Fezi Pasha 8,000 men, including, with killed and wounded, the losses of men taken prisoner and deserters. A significant fact in connection with the retreat of the Turkish troops from the Shahara is the attitude of the Hashid tribe, who, having previously submitted to General Fezi Pasha, turned against him after his defeat by the Imam's forces, and harassed his retreat.

Dr. Richardson estimates the total strength of the Army Corps in the Yemen at the end of June at from 32,000 to 35,000 men; this is exclusive of the forces employed in the Province of Assyr. He reports the disembarkation of 4,000 reinforcements during the month of July; and information has reached this Embassy of further drafts being sent from Trebizond, Mersina, and other ports in Asia Minor and Syria to

Hodeidah, and notably of the dispatch of some 4,200 recruits from Smyrna in two large transports recently purchased in England.

Although the Turks appear to have recovered in the early months of this year a little of the ground lost after the disastrous expedition against Shahara, chiefly owing to successes won by General Yussuf Pasha, yet their present position, as Dr. Richardson points out, cannot be regarded as in any way a satisfactory one.

To quote his own words in summarizing the situation: "After operations on a large scale, extending over eighteen months and involving terrible sacrifice of life and considerable expense, the Turks have now only been able to recover lost territory and secure it against invasion. They have not succeeded in attaining the principal object of their long and expensive campaign, viz., the capture of the Imam, the annexation of his territory, and the crushing of his influence for all time. They have failed also both in recovering their lost guns and in inflicting the severe lesson intended on the rebels, who will, without doubt, rally and rise again when a suitable opportunity offers."

Indeed there would seem to be great likelihood of the Turks losing the Yemen altogether if they do not take energetic steps to improve the condition of military service in the province, and to reconcile their disaffected and mutinous forces to the hardships of a campaign in a difficult country with an inadequate water supply and insanitary climatic condition.

Some radical improvements in the methods of transport from the coast to the interior, such as the projected railway from Hodeidah to Sana'a, and a far more generous supply of money and men, will be necessary before the expeditionary force under General Fezi Pasha can hope to meet with any decided success. The few thousand men recently dispatched to the Yemen will not suffice for what is practically the reconquest of a rebellious country under an active religious leader.

As regards the other portion of Dr. Richardson's despatch, I am requesting him to supply me with any further information he may be able to procure in regard to the discoveries of mineral wealth, which are said to have been made by the members of the Yemen Reform Commission at Mokha, Taiz, Yerim, and other districts of the province.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 69.

Report by Vice-Consul Richardson respecting the Yemen Vilayet, Political, Administrative, and Economic, during the period from November 1, 1905, and June 30, 1906.

PERHAPS it would not be out of place to retrace the steps of the Turkish army in Yemen that we left in October last in possession of Sana'a and its environs, and that had recaptured Hajje from the rebels, and had re-established security and order in the south-eastern districts, between Sana'a and Taiz.

Early in the month of Ramadan (end of October 1905,) Field-Marshal Fezi Pasha was back again at the capital recuperating after the arduous operations conducted against the rebels in the reconquest of Taweela, Kaukaban, Haboor, and other places, not to omit Hajje.

About the middle of November a strong expedition, consisting of 10,000 men and six guns under the personal command of the Field-Marshal, supported by a force under Syyed Pasha, advanced against Shahara, the Imam's stronghold, where the majority of the cannon, rifles, and ammunition, removed by the insurgents from Sana'a after its fall, were deposited. It also contained a considerable store of grain and food-stuffs that supplied the rebel army, and immense treasure accumulated by the present Imam's father.

The position presents innumerable and unsurmountable obstacles. The principal villages that the rebels occupied, and from which they opposed the Turks, are situated on a plateau that is almost inaccessible. Water was obtainable above in abundance, and all supplies, in fact, were plentiful in the fortress.

This mountainous height is about six days' march from Sana'a, and in a northerly direction in relation to the capital.

It would appear that several unsuccessful assaults were directed against the rebel fastness by the Turkish artillery that proved ineffective. On the other hand, the

Arabs under Lieutenant Hussain, a deserter from the Turkish artillery, used two guns with great effect, and from their advantageous position inflicted heavy loss on the army below.

Every minor path leading to the position by which access was possible was mined by the rebels, and scaling was rendered dangerous and impracticable. No good cover was obtainable by the Turks below.

One Turkish battalion displayed great bravery, and part of it managed to gain access to the entrance of a position that commands the high plateau, dislodging the Arabs. Avalanches of huge stones were thereupon hurled on the attackers from above, accompanied by a shower of bullets, who in a very short time were almost completely wiped out.

Panic ensued in the ranks, and a retreat hastily begun, without the orders of Fezi Pasha. Utter defeat, amounting to a serious disaster, was suffered by the Imperial troops.

Confusion prevailed, and it was decided to abandon the attempt to take Shahara. The Turks were unable to remove two siege guns and two pieces of field artillery during the retreat, that ultimately fell into the hands of the Imam.

It was impossible to carry away the sick and wounded, who were left to die at the mercy of the insurgents.

All the Turkish services proved inefficient—ammunition and stores soon ran out, the commissariat failed, and last, but not least, the transport service completely collapsed.

The disaster at Shahara actuated the Hashid tribe to take up arms against the Turks and harass them during the retreat, notwithstanding the fact that the tribesmen had tendered their submission to Ahmed Fezi Pasha on his advance through their country *en route* to Shahara. They had been treated very generously, on the whole, by the Commander-in-chief, who, besides granting the tribe a complete amnesty had paid large sums of money to its principal Sheikhs.

Fezi returned to Haboor where he punished the Hashid Arabs severely, but continued the retreat to Sooda. This entailed sacrificing a considerable number of men to cover the retreat, as the insurgents in strong force were in pursuit.

The force was, at this time, again running short of ammunition, and 100 camels transporting same were dispatched from Sana'a, convoyed by two battalions of Albanians that had been moved from Taiz, Yerim, and Damar. *En route*, at a place called Djebel-el-Yezeed, one battalion was dispatched to relieve half a company of men that were besieged at some little distance. The Arabs thereupon, in considerable force, surrounded and attacked the other battalion on the march, and annihilated it; the ammunition was captured by the rebels.

The troops were really ambuscaded, the stratagem being devised by a Sheikh, Hizam Bey, who had formerly surrendered and had been appointed Kaïmakam of Amran by Fezi Pasha. The above event took place on or about the 10th December last year.

At about the same time Fezi and his troops were in a difficult position, being hard pressed by the Arabs on all sides, and his communication with Sana'a cut off. Yussuf Pasha, with a relieving force from Hajje, arrived in good time and facilitated the retreat further.

The Commander-in-chief at last arrived at Khamr, with the rebels at his heels.

The Imam, who was under the impression that the Turks would take Shahara, had previously retired into the interior, but after the debacle at the above position, reappeared on the scene with a strong following.

In the environs of Khamr further disaster awaited the Turks. General Riza Pasha with 600 men, while proceeding to occupy a certain post four hours' march from the town, on reaching a village called Jeraf Khamr was attacked by the rebels. Fighting lasted for two days, when the Turkish ammunition was exhausted and Riza Pasha was obliged to surrender.

The Arabs, however, showed no quarter, massacring the General and what remained of his force.

The Turkish army next retired to Sumuctain, where the Arabs faced them, but suffered defeat and severe loss at the hands of Yussuf Pasha. Among the dead were recognized many Arabs of Sana'a.

Fezi Pasha, after a series of reverses and misfortunes, at last reached his capital on the 10th January last with five battalions, eight remaining with Generals Syyed and Yussuf Pasha at Amran.

The public estimate of Fezi's losses throughout the two months' campaign against

Shahara is twenty battalions. Allowing for exaggeration, the Turkish losses could not have been less than 8,000 men between killed, wounded, prisoners, and desertions, when one can imagine the hopeless and miserable state of the various services in this vilayet—the medical department very inefficient, no ambulance, no commissariat, and no transport, with a rough, difficult, and hostile tract of country to operate in, and labouring under the most serious of difficulties, viz., scarcity of water.

In January last some activity was shown at Hajje, and it was found necessary to dispatch Ghalib Pasha with a force collected from Menakha, Hujjeila, and Zaidyia to strengthen the garrison there.

About this time many Turkish minor positions were in the hands of the Imam.

The mortality among the Government transport mules was very great throughout the above operations. It will hardly be credited that of the 5,000 mules that had been landed in the Yemen, barely a couple of hundred now remained. A considerable quantity of fodder and grain for the animals that had been sent to Hodeidah by the Imperial authorities had to be disposed of by auction.

It was noticeable that throughout Fezi's expedition against Shahara, and in the retreat to Sana'a, that Arabs from Beni Matar, Beni Behlool, Beni Harith, and Beni Hushesh (districts situated round about Sana'a) opposed the Turks, while at the same time their country was quiet and their crops flourishing.

The Hodeidah–Sana'a route throughout the period under review was secure, and caravans were not molested.

The months of February, March, and April were spent by Fezi Pasha in Sana'a recuperating his exhausted and shattered army. Reinforcements were telegraphed for from Constantinople.

Forces under Syyed and Yussuf Pashas were utilized in guarding the Turkish positions between Sana'a and Amran, that had occasional skirmishes with the insurgents.

Eight thousand drafts arrived from Turkey, and were disembarked at Yemen ports during the first five months of the current year, against 2,000 that were invalided home.

Although the Turks had failed to capture the Imam or his stronghold and retake all the guns, rifles, and ammunition that fell into the insurgents' hands after the capitulation of Sana'a, at the end of May their position was fairly strong, and they were able to prevent inroads into their territory by the followers of the Imam.

Yussuf Pasha, with a strong force, approached Shahara a few months ago, and after punishing the Arabs and driving them away from many important positions, returned to Amran with a quantity of dhurra he had captured.

The tribesmen had now begun to get tired of the revolt, being fairly exhausted. They were dissatisfied and disgusted with the treatment received from the Imam's lieutenants. Many active rebel Chiefs came into Sana'a and tendered their submission to Fezi Pasha.

A new phase has been added to the Arab revolt in Yemen during the past six months in the activity displayed by a second rival Imam—called Syyed Hassan-el-Kasimi—who, financed by the Turks, challenged the right of Syyed Yahya to the Imamate of Yemen. The head-quarters of the rival claimant are situated west of Sada at a place called Falelah.

In March some fighting between the adherents of these two personages was reported near Sada, in which Syyed Yahya lost three of his commanders.

It would appear that both Imams have now declared an armistice, and that Syyed Hassan, the Kasimi, has been appointed "Saif-el-Islam" on the Imam's staff.

During May and June a band of rebels under Ali Mikdad gave trouble near Wady Farsh, south of Jebel Aniz. Troops had to be drawn from Jebel Reima, and, after some fighting and loss on both sides, the insurgents were driven off.

The month of June was marked, as has already been reported, by dissatisfaction among the reserves serving at the front. About twelve battalions returned to Sana'a, and assuming a mutinous attitude, demanded to be sent back to their homes. As they could not be induced to accept the promises of Marshal Fezi Pasha, the latter ordered the regulars and the forts at Sana'a to fire on them. The mutineers were, however, at last obliged to surrender, and returned to their posts, when nearly 100 of their comrades were either killed or wounded. These reserves have since been distributed amongst the regular battalions stationed at Sana'a, Amran, and Hajje.

It would be difficult to make a proper estimate of the strength of the Turkish forces in this vilayet as they stood at the end of June. However, a few fairly accurate figures might throw some light on the subject.

To put the total strength of the Army Corps in Yemen before the rebellion down at 20,000 men of all arms, would be making a pretty correct guess. This would include some 3,000 men serving in the Assyr Sandjak.

During 1905 55,000 soldiers were disembarked at Hodeidah, of whom about 5,000 were conveyed by sea to Cumfuda, the port for Assyr.

During the same period 2,000 invalids were sent home, and desertions from the army would amount to another 3,000.

The total losses during the twelve months of 1905 must have been at least 30,000 men, comprising 6,000 that died during the siege of the capital, 15,000 killed, wounded, and abandoned in battle in various parts and made prisoners, including the early operations against Shabara, and the remaining 9,000 that succumbed to typhoid, scurvy, and other maladies during the same period at Menakha, Sana'a, and other places.

This would leave 32,000 troops, roughly, remaining at the end of 1905.

Since the beginning of the present year and up to the end of June 8,000 drafts have arrived from Hodeidah against 3,000 invalids and time-expired men sent back to Turkey. Quite 5,000 men must have died from disease or been killed in the operations conducted against the Imam in the early part of this year.

The total strength of the Army Corps in the Yemen would therefore not exceed from 32,000 to 35,000 men at the end of June; 4,000 reinforcements have been disembarked during July, that would swell the total figures up to between 36,000 and 40,000. I do not think that my estimate is far out; it is certainly not above the mark.

The Turkish position in the Yemen, in short, cannot be considered satisfactory at this stage. After operations on a large scale extending over eighteen months, and involving terrible sacrifice of life and considerable expense, the Turks have now only been able to recover lost territory, and secure same against invasion.

They have not succeeded in attaining the principal object of their long and expensive campaign, viz., capture of the Imam, the annexation of his territory, and the crushing of his influence for all time. They have failed also both in recovering their lost guns and in inflicting the severe lesson intended on the rebels, who will without doubt rally and rise again when a suitable opportunity presents.

The troops in Yemen, besides being exhausted, are seething with discontent.

Funds from the Imperial Government are not received here as regularly as they used to be twelve months ago wherewith to maintain the big army in this vilayet.

Should the Sultan not decide to build a railway between Hodeidah and the interior at an early date, and send adequate reinforcements from time to time with money and supplies to maintain same, it would not be rash to predict that the Turks will be driven, sooner or later, to their only resource, viz., to come to some understanding with the Imam, which would also mean partial loss of territory, not to mention loss of prestige locally and in the eyes of the Moslem world generally.

Administrative.

Many of the old Yemen favourites of Ahmed Fezi Pasha have been appointed to administrative posts in the vilayet since his Excellency took over charge.

Mahmoud Nedim Bey, who appears to be a very capable official, still holds his appointment as Adjoint of the Vali, although he has been acting as Mutessarif of Hodeidah during the past three months.

Izzat Bey, formerly Kaïmakam of Damar, has been transferred to Kattaba. The above officer, who is known to me personally, is an able and pleasant official to deal with.

Mahomed Raoof, ex-Kaïmakam of Menakaha, who was imprisoned by Hilmi Pasha about four years ago for corruption, has been released recently and appointed to the Kaukaban Kaza.

Kiamil Bey, Kaïmakam of Ibb, who was Civil Turkish Commissioner dispatched to Medi to attend to the British demands there in connection with the piracies committed in the Red Sea in 1902, has resigned his post and returned to Constantinople. He was one of the most enlightened and affable of Turkish officials serving in this vilayet.

Hifzi Pasha, who held the Hodeidah Mutessarifik from August 1905, resigned in April last and sailed for Constantinople. As is already known to His Majesty's Embassy, Hifzi Pasha was quite incompetent to occupy the high and responsible post to which he was appointed, and was a most unscrupulous Governor.

General Ahmed Pasha, in command of the 14th Division of the 7th Army Corps stationed at Hodeidah, was degraded and sent to Constantinople under arrest.

Ferid Pasha, who I believe, has a good record in Turkey, and who distinguished himself in the Greco-Turkish war, was nominated as President of the Yemen Reform Commission, *vice* Shakir Pasha, and arrived here early in January last.

The Commission visited Mokha, Ibb, Taiz, and Yerim last April, making several interesting discoveries of mineral wealth in these districts. It returned to Hodeidah on the 15th May, and is now expected to move on to Sana'a.

Economic.

On the 17th January M. Zaborosky, representing a French Company, visited Hodeidah, and proceeded thence to Sana'a, to make a survey of the road in connection with the project of constructing a railway line between these two points on behalf of the Ottoman Government.

M. Zaborosky also examined the proposal of construction of a port at Jabana, 4 miles north of Hodeidah, where there is a protected and fairly deep anchorage for vessels of a big size and deep draught.

It is hoped to be able to submit a separate report on these two subjects, giving details, in due course.

The octroi in the Hodeida district was farmed out for the current year to Syyed Ahmed Pasha Es-Sherai, a notable Arab personage at Hodeidah, for £ T. 49,000.

Possessed of great influence, chiefly owing to the support received from both the present Vali, Fezi Pasha, and his Adjoint, this wily and unscrupulous Sheikh, disposed of his only rival at Hodeidah, Ahmed Ubeid Harrazi, a wealthy Arab merchant, by means of an assassin in December last year.

The exactions at the various octroi centres are most arbitrary, and even at Hodeidah the Pasha and his subordinates practice under the eyes of the authorities all sorts of irregularities to which native merchants have to submit through fear of this Sheikh.

Trade at Hodeidah during the period under review has, in a way, taking all circumstances into consideration, been satisfactory.

The coffee crop of last season, though not to be compared anywhere with the best of a decade ago, was an improvement on that of the preceding year owing to a good rainfall in Yemen. The export of coffee beans during the first six months of the current year amounted to 20,207 bags, against 15,460 bags sent out in the corresponding period in 1905. The average weight of a bag of coffee is about 75 kilos., or 1½ cwts. The prices this year have been 10 per cent. higher than those of last year. Business was chiefly speculative as the local prices were not in conformity with quotations from the European and American markets that control the same at Hodeidah.

The export of skins is much less this year owing to plentiful rains in the interior, and consequent smaller mortality among cattle.

The quality of the article is decidedly superior in the case of goat's skins.

The rainfall has been normal so far, and the prospects for the forthcoming coffee and grain crops are very hopeful.

There was an outbreak of small-pox among camels between the months of December 1905 and February last; the Government camel transport suffered badly.

Hodeidah Pier.

Some little progress can at last be reported on the work of construction of the Hodeidah pier, that has been dragging along for the past two and a-half years, and, perhaps, if this continues, it is hoped that the pier will be completed within a year.

(Signed) G. A. RICHARDSON,
His Majesty's Vice-Consul, Hodeidah.

Hodeidah, July 22, 1906.

[29030] No. 70.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 27.)

(No. 576.)

Sir, *Therapia, August 21, 1906.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 471, Secret and Confidential, of the 10th ultimo, and to my despatch No. 843 of the 27th November, 1905, inclosing copy of the *note verbale* No. 70 of the 19th September, 1905, addressed by His Majesty's Embassy to the Sublime Porte on the subject of the piracies committed by Ahmed-bin-Selman in the Persian Gulf, I have the honour to report that I received communication from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the 11th instant of a reply which has been returned to the Ministry of the Interior by the authorities of the Vilayet of Bussorah, to whom our *note verbale* had been referred, which is couched in the following terms:—

"It results from a correspondence exchanged with the Mutessarif of Nejd and the Kaïmakam of Katif that no complaints have been made to the local authorities by any one whatever in reference to the act of piracy attributed by the British Embassy to Ahmed-bin-Selman at Katif. Seeing that this person is a native of Bahrein, a cousin of the Sheikh of Bahrein, and domiciled and resident with his family at Bahrein, it is not improbable that he attacks vessels from there when occasion offers. This person has been condemned by default in the Criminal Court of Nejd to fifteen years' imprisonment, and the authorities of Katif are endeavouring to eradicate him, but as he does not come to that neighbourhood he might easily be captured if search were made for him by the authorities of Bahrein."

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

[29033] No. 71.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 27.)

(No. 579.)

Sir, *Therapia, August 21, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for War, the accompanying Memorandum by Colonel Surtees, Military Attaché at this Embassy, on the state of affairs in the Yemen and the Nejd. The Memorandum, which contains a good deal of interesting information on the military situation, is based on reports the accuracy of which it is not always easy to verify.

I have no knowledge of the incident mentioned on p. 12, *i.e.*, the entry of a battalion of Turkish troops into Koweit in 1901, and it is doubtless apocryphal. Colonel Surtees tells me that his informant had the story recently from a Turkish officer now in the Nejd.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure 1 in No. 71.

Colonel Surtees to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 12.)

Sir, *Constantinople, August 9, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to request that you will be so good as to forward to London, for the information of the military authorities, the accompanying Memorandum on the state of affairs in the Yemen and the Nejd.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. CONYERS SURTEES, *Colonel, Military Attaché.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 71.

Memorandum respecting Affairs in the Yemen and Nejd.

This Memorandum is based upon reports—the accuracy of which it is not always possible to guarantee.

THE Ottoman Government has, it would seem, decided to make a supreme effort to quell once for all the rebellions in the Yemen and Nejd.

Pertev Pasha—recently Military Attaché in Japan, and who is credited with the possession of considerable ability—has been sent to Bagdad, nominally as Chief of the Staff of the Marshal Suleiman Pasha, but, in reality, with full powers to reorganize the VIth Army Corps, which for a long time has been in a lamentable condition of disorganization—all the more unfortunate from a Turkish point of view, as this Corps should be an important factor in dealing with the rebellion in the Nejd, as well as with possible developments on the Persian frontier and in the Koweit district.

Pertev Pasha, it is understood, has received instructions to form, as soon as he has reorganized the VIth Army Corps, a flying column at Bussorah, fully equipped with the *matériel* necessary to a desert campaign, and with it to penetrate into the Nejd and the adjacent country, which is peopled by tribes who have never yet really submitted to Turkish authority.

There is no reason to doubt that Turkey is really anxious to solve the Arabian question by a complete and permanent conquest, followed by the introduction of such tangible reforms as will give her a recognizable claim to the hegemony of Islam.

Without entering far into detail, it seems worth while to examine the general causes of rebellion.

Much has been written and still more said in this connection, but no one seems to have adduced the real cause, which is not the bad administration of the country, but the almost entire absence of administration.

Those districts of the vast territory known as the Yemen, which have more or less recognized Turkish rule, are to-day better governed than perhaps they have ever hitherto been, and that a revolution to-day exists is not the fault of the Arab, but of the Turk.

For thirty-five years the Arab populations have remained generally loyal, and have in no sense adopted the policy so often attributed to them of "reculer pour mieux sauter."

It is practically impossible for us to arrive with any certainty at the immediate causes for the rebellion, since in war as well as in times of armed political tension the Turk always acts up to the motto "Omne ignotum pro magnifico."

At the time when Marshal Abdullah Pasha was in command of the VIIth Army Corps certain vague rumours reached Constantinople from the Yemen respecting troubles which were said to have arisen in consequence of the annual tax gathering, but these were not taken very seriously. The Porte, however, being desirous of acting with caution, sent Hussein Hilmi Bey (now Inspector-General in Macedonia) to the Yemen with orders to initiate reforms by arranging with the tribal Chiefs for the establishment on a sound basis of such a form of civil government as would indissolubly knit the Yemen to Turkey as an integral portion of the Sultan's dominions.

It is now, however, abundantly manifest that notwithstanding the undoubted ability shown by Hussein Hilmi Pasha in dealing with difficult situations in Macedonia, his talents were unsuited to the task of pacifying such countries as Arabia and the Yemen. He endeavoured to substitute for a form of government which had existed for a quarter of a century, and under which the country had been ruled through the medium of the tribal Chiefs—a direct administration which admitted of no intermediary. Under the older system the Sheikhs found themselves called upon not only to preserve intact the ties of allegiance which bound their subjects to the Vali, but also to devise means whereby they might satisfy the avarice and rapacity of the Turkish officials.

Such a form of government could scarcely be called an "Administration," but it worked, and there were no rebellions until Hussein Hilmi, thinking that he could centralize all authority in the person of the Governor-General or Vali, abolished the old methods, and thereby drew down upon himself the resentment of the Sheikhs, who under the new system found themselves deprived of many hereditary prerogatives, such as had been theirs for centuries.

In the early part of 1904 the Arabs took up arms and began to harass the Turkish troops, who at that time were under the command of Riza Pasha, a very capable soldier

who had received a military education in Germany, and in November of the same year laid siege to Sana'a, at that time garrisoned by 10,000 men. Of these 8,000 perished, the greater number from hunger and the effects of the climate. On the 20th March, 1905, Riza Pasha succeeded in relieving Sana'a with troops drawn from Syria, but the Arabs almost at once again surrounded the town, and large numbers of the Syrian troops went over to the enemy. All communications with the surrounding country were severed, and after experiencing the direst extremities of hunger the garrison was compelled to capitulate.

The rebel leader Mahmoud Ibn Yahya obtained camels at the expense of the Turkish Government, and the garrison, disarmed with the exception of one battalion, moved out of Sana'a on the backs of these camels, and on the 20th April, 1905, 300 Arabs entered Sana'a and took over possession of the city in such perfect order that an Aide-de-camp who was present describes the act to have resembled the mere changing of a guard. The Arabs allowed all women to leave, and gave permission for all wounded and sick to remain in the city till the end of June.

Mahmoud Yahya, who was not badly disposed towards the Sultan, but had been pushed into the conflict by Ahmed Kassim, Chief of the great Belad Kassim district, was anxious, in spite of his success, to come to terms with the Turks, and about the 18th May he sent an Italian named Caprotti, who had remained at Sana'a, with a letter to Hodeidah.

Unfortunately, Marshal Feizi Pasha had already started for the Yemen with orders to reconquer the country, and as soon as he reached Hodeidah, he concentrated such troops as were within reach, and with the assistance of some newly-arrived reinforcements succeeded in re-entering Sana'a on the 30th August, 1905.

After this success, Feizi sent home the Syrian troops and decided to quell the rebellion with Kurds, Albanians, Turks, and Trebizondians. Up to this time the Turks had lost from 25,000 to 30,000 men, the greater part from hunger and the effects of climate. Towards the end of 1905 he was in command of a force of not less than 80,000 men.

A lull in the operations took place up to the month of March 1906 whilst Feizi effected a concentration towards Menaha, and endeavoured to detach certain tribes from their allegiance to Mahmoud Yahya.

In March 1906 the Sultan convoked a Special Commission under the presidency of the late Abeddin Pasha, Governor of the Archipelago, with instructions to thoroughly study and report on the Yemen question, with special regard to the representations of Feizi Pasha, who continually called for reinforcements. Unfortunately the demands of Mahmoud Yahya—which included a sort of autonomy for the Yemen under his own authority as Imam, by which the ancient and renowned Immamet of the Yemen would have been re-established—did not in any way coincide with the Turkish ideas of the Caliphate, and the Commission decided that the war should be continued; and Feizi therefore recommenced his operations in the month of April with twenty-five fresh battalions in addition to those already in the Yemen, his task being to conquer a country which had virtually regained its independence.

Breaking up his camp at Menaha, he moved first against Beit es-Salaman, a district comprising a few scattered villages, the inhabitants of which consisted only of a handful of Bedouins.

After occupying these villages, Feizi was able to keep an eye on Sana'a, and the Arabs, for some unknown reason, not offering any serious resistance, was able to re-enter the city at the end of June without opposition.

Again, he found it necessary to demand reinforcements, medicaments, and all such stores as are necessary for an army engaged in such operations as his, and to enable him to strike a necessary and definite blow at the hostile country of Belad Kassim and its leader, Ayorz-ben-Kassim, grandson of the celebrated Chief of the Belad Kassim.

Unluckily, Feizi's demands met with no adequate response then, and only now in the summer of 1906 are there signs that his demands are to be complied with.

Instead of at once endeavouring to, at least to some extent, meet his wishes, a telegram was sent to Feizi immediately after the fall of Sana'a, ordering him to remain where he was and to content himself with his success, and the well-worn Turkish official expression "ménagez l'affaire" was once more employed, even at such a critical moment.

The Arabs, however, did not remain inactive, and towards October 1905, they recommenced their attacks, principally against small forts and isolated posts, approaching Sana'a itself, and by harassing the convoys plying between that place and Hodeidah, created a most serious scarcity in the already scanty supplies of provisions.

On the 9th October the small fort of Beit-al-Hashata was, after most desperate fighting, recaptured by the Turks, together with a large quantity of arms and ammunition which had previously fallen into the hands of the Arabs, and this success was followed up ten days later by a fresh one at Salfia, after which the Arabs took to the mountains.

On the 14th October the Turkish Government—which had intended, in accordance with the recommendations of the Special Commission, to publish in the press an official statement with regard to the affairs in the Yemen announcing the success of Feizi Pasha—suddenly decided to do so in the Egyptian journals known as "El Monayed" and "El Liwa." Here it is well to allude to the circumstances which, in the opinion of the Turks, have contributed to the revolt in the Yemen.

In the first place, the arms found on the Arab prisoners gave rise to the suspicion that they had been supplied by England. The Commanders of the fortified ports of Hodeidah–Confida, Mokha, and Loheia wrote to the Directorate-General of the Custom-houses (11th July, 1904), that the contraband trade in arms, carried on by means of sambooks was so large that the two or three armed revenue steamers at their disposal were insufficient to put a stop to it and they added that Italian agents from Massowah were purchasing arms from certain English dealers, who traded in old-fashioned weapons, and were forwarding to the Arabian Coast Martini, Remington, Winchester-Dickenson, and even Mauser rifles, their price ranging from 2 medjedichs (7*s.* 6*d.*) up to 1*l.* 10*s.* All these arms, bearing the English trade-marks, encouraged the idea that England was tacitly supporting the rebellion.

In consequence of these reports, four more revenue steamers were sent to the Red Sea (the 15th August).

Meanwhile, the Pan-Islamic party at the Palace of Yildiz was not idle, and in order to counteract the bad effect produced by the successes of the Arabs, instructed the Cairo journals "El Monayed" and "El Liwa" to publish articles recommending a conciliatory policy to the Arabs. Thus we found the "El Liwa" writing on the 2nd–3rd October, 1905:—

"The Arabs should understand that the hand which makes them dance works in its own interest. This hand is anxious for the ruin of the Arabs in order to ensure its own security. They ought also to understand that deeds of rebellion are disloyal acts which only play the game of others, and that the Imperial Ottoman Government alone is capable of restoring the ancient prestige of Islam.

"The success of Feizi Pasha is a mortal blow to the policy of Lord Curzon and his friends, a policy which, owing to the disapproval of the Foreign Office in London, led to the resignation of Lord Curzon and his replacement by Lord Minto. To-day the Turkish Government has by the might of the sword proved its power in the eyes of the world."

The "Monayed," the best known of the Arab journals, and the one which has the largest circulation, published long articles on the relationship between the Arabs and the Caliphate and endeavoured to prove the alleged intrigues of England, who, it said, in order to assure her position in Egypt, did not hesitate to intrigue in Arabia. By these means the Porte succeeded to some extent in persuading Mussulman opinion that it was England who, after intriguing in Roumania, had brought about the Macedonian question and was now playing the same game in the Yemen, and as the Akaba incident was contemporaneous with the difficulties in the Yemen, the fanatical Mussulman opinions held in the Palace acquired credence.

The most recent news is to the effect that Mahmoud Yahya and Feizi Pasha have for more than a month been facing each other, in a state of inactivity, but what seems really important is that Feizi has been obliged to treat his adversary as if he were an independent potentate and to conclude an armistice with him.

Feizi has once more demanded reinforcements and has categorically brought to the knowledge of the War Office that it is impossible for him to undertake the smallest operations without a thoroughly equipped army.

Nejd.

Whilst the Yemen was in a state of rebellion, affairs in the heart of Arabia were no less serious.

Bagdad (the head-quarters of the VIth Army Corps), like other Turkish centres, was at the mercy of the Ottoman officials.

Every year small columns have been sent into the Semawa and Diwanie districts for the purpose of levying taxes, and their progress has invariably been marked by the outbreak of small revolutions. About 1901, Ibn Sadoun, Chief of the tribes in the Nassirié district, threw off his allegiance and allied himself with Mubarek, the Sheikh of Koweit, whither the 4th Battalion of the 46th Regiment was immediately sent. It easily entered the town and the Turkish flag was hoisted, but two or three days later an order from Stamboul obliged the troops to retire some 15 kilom. to Hamissie, and the affair was diplomatically arranged—Mubarek being a protégé of England.

The battalion finally returned to Samawa, to the great discontent of the whole army corps, which was now occupied in preparing for an expedition into the Nejd.

Ibn Reschid—Emir of the Nejd—an ally of the Sultan, had exposed in a Memorandum to the latter the designs of England upon Koweit, whose Ruler Mubarek, he stated, was planning, in conjunction with Ibn Saoud, to gain possession of the entire Nejd and to come down even as far as the Red Sea, when they proposed to place themselves under British protection.

Ibn Reschid, calling himself the ancient ally of the Sultan, begged for the support of four battalions, offering, with their assistance, to wage a desperate warfare with Ibn Saoud, whose followers, he said, would be dispersed over the region lying between Bagdad and Medina.

In this way he contended the Medina-Bagdad Road would be opened and the Nejd conquered once for all; Ibn Saoud dead, and the Belad Kassim trembling before the might of Turkey.

This Memorandum, written in Arabic and embellished with the exaggerated phraseology of that language, had a considerable effect upon the mind of the Sultan, who, without considering possible results, ordered the dispatch of the four battalions asked for. These numbering 2,000 (peace effective) moved out of Semawa into the Great Desert in the month of April, 1904, and for thirty days marched under a tropical heat through the district of the Shammar Desert, finally arriving at Boreyda, some 430 to 450 kilom. distant from Medina.

Here on the 1st June, 1904, they were attacked by Ibn Saoud and utterly routed, together with some 5,000 Reschidies (followers of Ibn Reschid), who had allied themselves with the Turks.

The chief consequence of this disaster was that the Wahabite question again forced itself to the front.

The tribesmen of Assyr, who had already revolted in 1902, and who, after the commencement of the Hedjaz Railway, had hesitated between an alliance with the Hedjaz tribes, or with Ibn Saoud, now decided for the latter, who announced his intention of seizing the Nejd from the hands of Ibn Reschid, the ally of Turkey. The latter, after his defeat, did not venture to demand further assistance from the Sultan, and the Sheikh, Abou Houda, and other Arabs who had been hospitably received at Yildiz, fell into disfavour, as the Sultan now understood that the power and ability of Ibn Reschid had been largely over-estimated.

Meanwhile Ibn Reschid appeared to be at the mercy of Sheikh Mubarek and Ibn Saoud, but the former of these being occupied in the disputes with the Sadonnites of the Nassirié sandjak, left Ibn Reschid alone to fight it out with Ibn Saoud.

About August 1905, Ibn Reschid made overtures to Ibn Saoud, and negotiations ensued which somewhat disturbed the Sultan who promised assistance to the former. This policy succeeded so well that Ibn Reschid broke off the negotiations, but—in doing so—thoroughly exasperated Ibn Saoud, who betook himself to arrange plans of conquest of the Nejd and vengeance against Ibn Reschid for the latter's hypocritical dealings.

This state of things continued till April 1906. There were several small skirmishes, many of which were magnified by report into serious affairs—but that this was done with the object of entangling Turkey still further in intertribal disputes—seems to have been pretty well understood at Bagdad.

Towards the end of April, Ibn Reschid advanced in strength against Ibn Saoud, but this time with only 200 Turks, who took little part in the engagement which ensued, and in which Ibn Reschid was killed.

The news of this disaster was very unwelcome at Yildiz, where little confidence is placed in his son, who has succeeded him.

However, when shortly afterwards Ibn Saoud endeavoured to come to terms with him, the latter applied to Constantinople for advice, and was told that he should not make friends with the Wahabites, and that a force would be sent to his assistance.

In June last a Turkish force of 300 soldiers under Bimbashi Hussein Bey, two

Captains, two Lieutenants, and an Armenian Surgeon were sent into the Nejd, where they are still awaiting instructions.

According to the most recent and trustworthy information, the Turkish War Office, relying upon the reports furnished by the Governor of Bagdad, believes that Ibn Saoud is making slow but sure progress, and fears that he may consolidate an alliance with Mubarek, when communications between Bagdad and the Nejd would be interrupted.

The Armenian Surgeon has written from Nejd to his family here that the soldiers of the expedition have been deprived of all comforts and provisions sent to them, and have received no pay, and the Mutessarif of Nejd, Abdul Talib Pasha, appears to have been either unable or unwilling to render the necessary assistance.

It was also proposed that the VIth Army Corps should undertake another movement against Ibn Saoud, from the side of Hail. (This was decided upon when Mubarek demonstrated his preference for the protection of England to that of Turkey.) The intention being to send five or six battalions to Hail, which was under the rule of Abdul Aziz Ibn Reschid, nephew of the great Emir of Hail, whose death has been mentioned above, but the project was abandoned.

The Vilayets of Bagdad and Bussorah are practically in a state of anarchy arising, according to those best qualified to judge, from the following causes:—

1. Feizi Pasha was the only man who could keep the troops and Arabs in order without paying them, and who could administer the Vilayets and collect taxes by force of arms without creating serious disorders.

2. After the departure of Feizi for the Yemen, his successor was not capable of continuing his line of policy as regarded the administration of the army and was in addition most unpopular.

3. The Vali of Bagdad, Medjid Pasha, is described as being a "Wolf," a "Creature of the Palace," he collects taxes by force, and sends the money to Yildiz, and spends more time in espionage than on the duties of the administration.

Last March he sent an armed force into the Sanjak of Nassirié, but the Sadonnites forced the soldiers off the road into the desert, where after a few days they found themselves without provisions, and so commenced to make friends with the Arabs.

On news of this being received a force was sent from Muntefik under the command of Hamid Pasha, a man well known for his carefulness, thrift, and ideas of justice. The troops under his command joined the mutineers, and Hamid Pasha found that the only course open was to insist upon provisions being sent from Bussorah. On the arrival of these, order was to some extent re-established, the Sadonnite Arabs retired into the desert, and the Turkish battalions succeeded in collecting a certain amount of taxes.

The Vali did not lose the opportunity of reporting Hamid Pasha's conduct to Constantinople, and the latter was summoned to Bagdad to explain it.

Portev Pasha—as has been said, has received instructions to reorganize the troops at Bagdad and at Bussorah, but the principal object of his Mission is to create some sort of order amongst the tribes, soldiers, and officials, who all join in pillaging Arabs in the country between Bagdad and Bussorah.

The following account seems to throw light upon the state of the VIth Army Corps:—

Some nine months ago the Porte sent four battalions of the VIth Army Corps into the Belad Kassim against Ibn Saoud, but, when these arrived in the Mutessarifik of Nejd there were no provisions available for feeding such a force.

The Palace authorities here (Constantinople) sent General Sami Pasha (formerly Military Attaché at Berlin) with a salary of £T. 200 per month to Belad Kassim with instructions to take over the command of these four battalions and to negotiate with the Chief—who had entered into alliances with Ibn Saoud and to distribute decorations to them—for which purpose he had with him a large chest containing decorations and medals of all sorts.

Sami started last February, and, on arriving at Medina, remained there, awaiting his pay for nearly four months. He telegraphed to the Palace, to the War Office, to the Ministry of Finance—but could not get his money! At last he telegraphed to Tewfik Pasha, the Foreign Minister whom he had known in his Berlin days and explained to him his own situation and the political one.

Tewfik Pasha thereupon wrote a sharp letter to Taksim Pasha the first Secretary, who showed it to the Sultan—and the latter ordered £T. 250 to be sent from the Imperial funds.

Sami, having received his money, left Medina early in June 1906, and after marching for fifteen days with only one officer and a few Arabs arrived at the Belad Kassim, where he found that whilst he was waiting for his money at Medina, two battalions out of the four had gone over to the Arabs of Ibn Saoud, and that the remaining two had joined the service of Mubarek of Koweit. (These battalions are said to have been composed chiefly of Syrians.)

Sami Pasha thus found himself—and still finds himself—alone in the Belad Kassim with no soldiers and only a box of decorations, and without any means of supporting the intended negotiations.

Since the commencement of July no letters have been received from him, and it is feared that the Arabs have taken him for a hostage.

It is believed, however, that whilst at Medina he held an inquiry, the result of which alleged that many of the Shereefs of Mecca received subsidies from certain Anglo-Indian Companies (*sic*).

(Signed) H. CONYERS SURTEES, *Colonel*,
Military Attaché.

Constantinople, August 9, 1906.

[30479] No. 72.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 10.)

(No. 609.)
Sir, *Therapia, September* 1, 1906.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 61 of the 7th February and to your despatch No. 96 of the 8th March last, I have the honour to report that the copies prepared at the Survey of India Department of the maps signed on the spot by the Commissioners for the Aden frontier delimitation were duly forwarded to the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs, and by him transmitted to the Turkish War Office, where they were compared in the General Staff Department with the original signed copies, and a number of "discrepancies" discovered by the Turkish officers. Mr. Fitzmaurice has carefully examined these alleged "discrepancies," which are, he states, in no way essential, and have reference mainly to places on the map where additional names and numbers have been inserted, and also to heights converted from feet on the original maps to metres on the copies.

The Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs has forwarded to me in a *note verbale* of the 21st ultimo, copy of which is herewith inclosed, a detailed list, in Turkish, of the discrepancies which staff officers claim to have discovered, but they are so numerous, so microscopic, and, at the same time, so unimportant, that I do not think it is necessary that I should trouble you with a copy or a translation of the document.

The covering *note verbale* from the Sublime Porte declares that the map signed by the respective Commissioners "is the only one which, in case of necessity, can be consulted as authentic," and I venture to think that this written declaration of the Ottoman Ministry for Foreign Affairs might, for the reasons given in my despatch No. 81 of the 7th February above referred to, be considered by His Majesty's Government as tantamount to a ratification by the Porte of the results of the labours of the Boundary Commission.

In the circumstances, I have the honour to recommend, subject to the approval of the Government of India and of the Home Government, that the most practical solution of the matter would be for me to be authorized to take act, by means of a responsive *note verbale*, of the above-quoted declaration of the Sublime Porte, employing some phrase to the following effect: "That the original maps signed by the respective Commissioners are the only ones which, in conjunction with the Protocol signed at Sheikh Said on the 20th April, 1905, can be consulted as authentic in case of difficulty arising on any part of the demarcated line."

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure in No. 72.

Note Verbale communicated by Sublime Porte.

EN réponse à la note verbale que l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté Britannique a bien voulu lui adresser le 30 Mars dernier, le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères a l'honneur de l'informer, sur une communication du Département Impérial de la Guerre, que les cartes qui étaient annexées à ladite note verbale ont été soigneusement comparées avec la carte se trouvant au dit Ministère, et qu'on y a relevé les erreurs et inexactitudes spécifiées dans la liste en Turc ci-annexée.*

Les erreurs et inexactitudes qu'on a constatées dans les cartes en question proviennent probablement du fait que celles-ci ont été lithographiées sur des copies de la carte originale, tandis que la carte qui se trouve au Ministère de la Guerre, étant obtenue par le procédé d'héliogravure, représente une reproduction tout à fait exacte de la carte signée par les Commissaires respectifs.

Le Ministère Impérial croit donc devoir déclarer qu'au besoin c'est la susdite carte seule qui devra être consultée comme authentique, toute copie imprimée ou lithographiée devant forcément être sujette à des erreurs plus ou moins importantes.

La Sublime Porte, le 21 *Août*, 1906.

[30488] No. 73.

Sir N. O'Conor to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 10.)

(No. 618. Confidential.)
Sir, *Therapia, September* 4, 1906.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 508 of the 24th July, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Acting Consul-General at Bagdad, inclosing copy of the diary of events of interest in his vilayet for the week ended on the 6th ultimo, which he has compiled for the use of the Government of India.

The report that the newly-instituted Hamburg-American line of steamers to the Persian Gulf has already agreed to reduce the usual freight charges of English vessels by 10*s.* a ton is an important matter for British trade, and paragraph No. 63 of the diary fully bears out what I stated in my despatch above referred to in regard to the serious character of the competition of the new German Company for the British India Steam Navigation Company, and of the necessity for the latter to improve their present methods of business.

Another item of interest in Major Ramsay's diary is the arrival of Talib Bey, an aide-de-camp of the Sultan of Bagdad, who is charged with a Mission and a decoration for Mitaab, the son of Ibn Reshid of Nejd, who was recently killed in an engagement with the forces of Ibn Saood. This action on the part of the Sultan, together with his decision, reported in my despatch No. 413, Secret and Confidential, of the 18th June, to continue to Mitaab the pay and allowances formerly granted to his father, shows the importance for the Turks of remaining in close relations with the adversary of the powerful Wahabi Emir.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure 1 in No. 73.

Acting Consul-General Ramsay to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 69.)
Sir, *Bagdad, August* 6, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to submit, for your Excellency's information, a copy of my diary of to-day's date to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RAMSAY, *Major.*

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* Not printed.

Inclosure 2 in No. 73.

Diary to Government of India for week ending August 6, 1906.

59. I HAVE had an interesting conversation with M. Cugnin, a French engineer, who has been employed to improve irrigation on the Euphrates. He was kind enough to explain his project and show me his plans. The gist of the conversation is given in a Memorandum written by me for the Board of Trade, of which a copy is being sent to the Government of India. I have telegraphed to London an outline of the proposal to buy pumps.

60. Last Sunday being the anniversary of the birthday of the Shah, the "Comet" was dressed, and I went in full uniform to pay the usual call on the Persian Consul-General. It has been the custom to pay these honours on a Sunday, otherwise I should have declined to do so. The other European nations keep their fête-days on a Sunday when it happens to fall on that date.

61. I have received a post copy of a telegram from the Foreign Department, dated Simla, the 12th July, about a Confidential Report submitted by me. I have not yet received the original, and nothing is known of it at the telegraph office here.

62. One of the leading merchants of Bussorah informs me that the Hamburg-American Line has begun to take cargo for Hamburg and Antwerp at 17*s.* 6*d.* a ton, being a reduction of 10*s.* a ton on the rates recently charged by English lines. The steamers of the Hamburg-American Line do not call at any English port. The merchant who gave me this information said that he thought that this was on account of some understanding with the English lines that the latter should not run to Continental ports. If there is any mutual understanding of this sort, it is difficult to see what need there was for such an immediate and large reduction of freight. It looks rather like an attempt to induce cargo for transhipment to leave London, *e.g.*, the liquorice root, which goes in large quantities to America. This suggestion is not based on any expert opinion (see paragraph 22).

63. As connected with the above paragraph, it may be interesting to note that last night I was talking to the Manager of the Turkish river steamers and to the captain of one of Lynch's steamers. They both said that there had lately been loud complaints of the damage done to cargo carried by the British India. I believe that an influential member of the Company is at Bussorah making inquiries.

64. I hear that it is proposed to send a regiment of Redifs to a place called Ahsa. Mr. Gaskin says that this is a common name for El Hassa.

65. The recent trouble among the Arabs on the Tigris has been caused by competition between two Sheikhs—Seyhud and Gazban—for a plot of land known as Kumait. The Vali is reported to have given the land to a nominee of Gazban's, who is said to have paid about £T. 7,000 or £T. 8,000 in bribes. The result has been that Seyhud attacked the El Azarij, who are partisans of Gazban's, and now Gazban and Seyhud are mobilizing their forces for a general engagement (see paragraph 41).

66. Talib Bey, the aide-de-camp of the Sultan, has brought a decoration for Mutiib, the son and successor of Abdul Aziz-bin-Reshid. A relative of Mutiib's has come to take Talib Bey to Kasim (see paragraph 56).

Baghdad, August 6, 1906.

[32061] No. 74.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 24.)

(No. 638.)

Sir, *Therapia, September 18, 1906.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 388 of the 4th instant and Sir N. O'Conor's despatch No. 582 of the 22nd ultimo, respecting the disturbed state of the Vilayet of Bussorah, I have the honour to inform you that the representations made at the Sublime Porte by His Majesty's Ambassador as to the need for a strong Vali have resulted in the appointment of Hassan Bey, formerly Vali of Kharput and at present member of the Council of State.

Hassan Bey did excellent work in the Vilayet of Kharput in the direction of increasing the public security, and on his departure His Majesty's Vice-Consul reported

that his administration had been characterized throughout by impartiality and firmness, and that, while making many enemies, he had inspired confidence and respect.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[32066] No. 75.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 24.)

(No. 643.)

Sir, *Therapia, September 18, 1906.*

WITH reference to Sir N. O'Conor's despatches No. 513 of the 30th July and No. 600 of the 28th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from the Acting British Consul at Jeddah, reporting the arrival of Sami Pasha in Kassim, and his negotiations with Abdul-Aziz-bin-Saood.

In a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah, Mr. Crow reports that there are some indications that the Turks intend to tighten their hold on the interior of Arabia, and that Sheikh Mubarek implied as much in a recent conversation with Captain Knox.

Mr. Crow states that it is rumoured in Bussorah that peace has been concluded between Meta'ab-el-Reshid and Bin Saood, through the intervention of Sheikh Mubarek. Even if this be true, Mr. Crow does not think that the two factions are likely to be on a very friendly footing, as it appears that a member of the Bin Saood family, who had been dispatched to carry the news of peace to the Sheikh of Koweit, was overtaken by a member of the El Reshid family, who killed him and cut off his head.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 75.

Acting Consul Mohammed Hussain to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 56.)

Sir, *Jeddah, August 22, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to report that news has arrived here that Sami Pasha, the Commander and Mutessarif of Kassim, arrived in Kassim about twenty days ago with about 500 to 600 troops. On his arrival at the Turkish camp in Kassim, he informed Abdulaziz-bin-Saood of his arrival, and invited him to come and see him.

Bin Saood refused to see him in the Turkish camp, and appointed a place midway between the Turkish camp and Bareda for their meeting, on the condition that Sami Pasha shall not bring with him more than one bolouk of soldiers.

Sami Pasha accepting this, Bin Saood collected all the Sheikhs of the surrounding district and camped in the appointed place with a following of several thousand men, and asked Sami Pasha to come and see him. As agreed upon, Sami Pasha went to see Bin Saood, who asked him what were the intentions of the Pasha. Sami Pasha informed Bin Saood that he had orders to build forts in Bareda and Aneza and to station soldiers there. He also asked for the release of Saleh-bin-Mohanna, the ex-Amir of Bareda, and his restoration to his former position. Sami Pasha also declared that the Turkish Government do not desire to interfere in the internal administration of Bareda or Aneza, but they wanted to restore *status quo* and to prevent intertribal strifes. To this the reply of Bin Saood was that he was not prepared to release Saleh-bin-Mohanna, and that the Amir of Bareda appointed by him must be recognized by the Turkish Government. He also said that the Turks can build barracks outside the towns of Bareda and Aneza, each to accommodate not more than 200 men, and that the head-quarters of the Turkish troops should not be moved from the place where it is now—a place about twenty miles from Bareda and Aneza.

Here the interview ended, and Sami Pasha, after returning to his head-quarters, his written letters and telegrams to Constantinople, and sent them to Medina to be forwarded from there. What the contents of these communications are has not leaked out yet. It is reported that the Turkish troops now under the command of Sami Pasha in Kassim do not exceed 2,500 to 3,000 men.

It is also reported that most of the people of Bareda are discontented with Bin Saood, but as they have very little liking for the Turks, and much less confidence in them, they have not made any friendly overtures to Sami Pasha.

I have, &c.
(Signed) MOHAMMED HUSSAIN.

[32608] No. 76.

M. Hagopian to Foreign Office.—(Received September 27.)

25, *Chesilton Road, Fulham, London,*
September 26, 1906.

My Lord,

IN continuation of the Report which I forwarded in my letter of the 18th ultimo, on the subject of the cruel and inhuman conduct of Husni, the Chief of the Police at Van, and of his friend the chief gaoler, towards the Armenian prisoners, and which Secretary Sir E. Grey did me the honour of acknowledging in a sympathetic letter on the 27th of the same month, I have now received a later report giving further details on the same subject, of which I herewith beg to inclose a translation.

The transfer of Husni from Van to Bash Kalé in a similar capacity hardly appears to be an adequate punishment for his unjustifiable conduct.

The further reports I have received from abroad, and of which I similarly forward a translation, show that the changes and ameliorations in the existing administration promised by the Ottoman Government to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, are still at the embryonic stage, while the local authorities, always in urgent need of funds, employ methods of collecting the taxes which they consider to be due, most cruel in character and ruinous in effect. The Armenian people, on the other hand, are looking forward for a time when the authorities, acting the part of a civilized Government, will make adequate provision for the protection of life, property, and honour.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. HAGOPIAN.

Inclosure in No. 76.

Report communicated by M. Hagopian respecting Ill-treatment of Armenian Prisoners at Van.

Van, July 17 (o. s.), 1906.

(Translation.)

ALL the prisoners, Armenian, Turkish, and Kurdish in common, despairing of the terrible condition of things prevailing in the prison, addressed incessant complaints to the Vali against the Chief of the Police, Husni, and against the chief gaoler Ismail. The Vali attached no importance to these remonstrances, and the tormentors decided upon revenging themselves on their victims. An opportunity presented itself on the night of the 30th June (o.s.), when a Turkish prisoner began to sing in contravention of the orders of the keeper. The consequence is already known. Husni, in order to extenuate his responsibility, calumniated the Armenian prisoners as the authors of a plot, and these prisoners were subjected to an awful castigation. Thirty-six individuals swooned under the blows, and one man named Mugrdich died. The Armenians in Van were indignant. The Bishop and some of the "Notables" requested the Vali to institute an inquiry; the latter appointed a Commission to visit the prison; the Turkish members would not serve, and Husni breathed threats against its Armenian members.

On the 3rd July the Vali visited the prison in person and summoned Vartkès and others into his presence, but sent them away without permitting them to speak. Vartkès remonstrated. Only one Turk was questioned, who threw the whole blame on the Armenians. In consequence of the commands of the Vali by signs with his eyes, the Bishop durst not make any remonstrance. The agitation in the town increased; the mothers of the prisoners went about the city in procession dishevelled and induced influential Armenians to complain. The Consuls intervened at length in the evening of the same day, and the Vali transferred Husni with the same office to Bash-kalé and dismissed the chief gaoler.

A later report, dated the 9th (22nd) August, states that the local Government has unexpectedly removed Vartkès and six other political prisoners under an escort of 170 soldiers to an unknown place, perhaps to Diarbekir.

Van, July 1 (14), 1906.

The tax-gatherers are showing an unusual zeal owing to which the condition of the people has grown worse. In order to gather the arrears of the taxes, they sell oxen, cows, sheep, &c. The Alur, Yererin, Kochank, Khejig, Janig, Gusnentz, Trnashèn, Khaventz, Marmèd, and other villages are full of policemen. At one place it is Aslan, who is Sultan, at another Shukri is the Governor, at another it is Nouri, who is the Bey, yonder it is an officer of the army, who is the Mushir; in different places each policeman has become a tyrant. Each of them with a few pieces of paper in his hands collects the taxes in the manner he thinks best. They are all of them usurers destroying the material condition of the peasants, the one more active than the other—and all of them insatiable.

Attempts at Pillage.—A few days ago three Kurdish horsemen drove off four cows from the Lezig village, in the presence of four armed Turkish officials, and notwithstanding the request of the peasants for their protection, the cattle, which were carried off in full daylight, have not yet been recovered. Similar incidents are expected everywhere. Kurdish horsemen have appeared within the boundaries of Adis, Norvantz, and Khjid, with their faces bandaged, and tried to drive off the sheep, but failed. It is supposed that these are Kémal Bey's men, because it is in his district that these incidents occur. Kémal Bey is a Kurdish Chief, and at the same time Caïmacam. Near the Bakhéchig a villager was assassinated; he was ploughing, and his two cows were carried off. The malefactors are unknown.

Hussein Pasha has returned from Arabia, obtaining the surname of Hadji for visiting the sacred tomb of Mohammed. Rewarded by the————of Yildiz, and encouraged by the Commander-in-chief of the IVth Army Corps, he has commenced his admirable deeds with new zeal. He has begun his pillages and murders, even upon his co-religionists. The condition of Archavagh is critical. The tyrant of Miagan passing out of his district has raided the Yégom village in the district of Boulanek, and has robbed about forty sheep belonging to an Armenian named Sako. He caused twenty cows to be carried off from Arehra, a village in the district of Archavagh, and eighty sheep from the Koratz village, all belonging to Armenians. Hussein Pasha has begun to appropriate the villages held by the Kurdish Aghas, and has declared war against the Ashirets tribes of Pélak Jélal, Zorvan, and Adam. In such circumstances it is again the Armenian who suffers. As for the Turkish authorities, they are indifferent, for is it not the fact that Hussein is their protégé?

Forced Labour.—In these busy days, when the poor Armenian peasant is scratching the little land he has to procure his daily bread, the police invade the villages and drive him under the lashes of the whip into the town to build roads and harbours for the Government. Hundreds of men come up to town daily. There is neither limit nor end to forced labour, and, in spite of all these sacrifices on the part of the people, there are as yet no proper roads on which one can walk without slipping or stumbling.

Emigration.—Ten families belonging to Boulaneg came to Passèn in order to cross into the Caucasus. Near the frontier one of the Kurdish guides attempted to criminally assault an Armenian bride. The woman resisted, and the other Armenians came to her assistance. Whereupon the guide, in order to revenge himself, began to shout and make a noise. The Turkish frontier guards came up; the rest can be imagined. They killed some of the young men, ill-treated the elderly ones, and violated the women, and after keeping them a few days sent them to the prison of Hassan Kalá, where, upon the request of the local priest, the women were taken out and distributed among the Armenian families.

[33074] No. 77.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 656.)

Sir, *Constantinople, September* 25, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Diarbekir forwarding the Budget of the Vilayet of Diarbekir for the year ended March 1906, together with a statement of the taxes paid by five villages lately visited by him, with his observations thereon.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 77.

Vice-Consul Shipley to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 31.)

Sir, *Diarbekir, August 28, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the Budget of this Vilayet for the year ending March last.

There is only one difference between this theoretical statement of the province's revenue and expenditure and that of last year.

Moneys which in 1904–5 were sent to Constantinople are this year stated as having been paid in direct to the head-quarters of the Army Corps. Salaries are in the usual state of arrears in all departments, the police and gendarmerie being as always the worst sufferers, through recouping themselves as they are intended to do indirectly.

I append a statement of the taxes paid by some villages which I traversed lately, hoping that it may prove of some interest to your Excellency. Of the five villages mentioned, the first three are Kurdish, the next Armenian, and the last mixed. The first two are on the mountain road from Haini to Palou, the last three on that between Palou and Diarbekir, and I see no reason why the taxation of these five villages should not be taken as typical of that obtaining in the Vilayet as a whole. Without having exact details of the yearly revenue of each village or of each house, it is, of course, not possible to arrive at an accurate idea of what percentage of their income the villagers pay in taxes. But from personal observation I am inclined to think that they have little cause for complaint.

Take, for example, the village of Khoun, the only one where I was able to obtain a separate account of the Emlak and Temettuat taxes.

Three hundred houses pay 7,000 piastres for Emlak. Taking the low average of 1,000 piastres as the value of each house. 1,500 piastres of the 7,000 piastres are paid on the buildings, leaving only 5,500 piastres for the payment of the ground taxes. The lands which pay this sum—if we reckon the 15,000 piastres paid for tithes as 12 per cent. of the total produce—produce 120,000 piastres. Moreover taking 5,500 piastres as 8 per cent. of the total value of the lands under cultivation, these latter are worth 700,000 piastres, and would seem to be producing year by year 17 per cent. of their value.

But if, as is probable, 300,000 piastres is an understatement of the value of the house property, then still less is paid for Emlak, and the profit on the produce is proportionately greater.

Or, again looking at the Temettuat tax levied on the village industries of pottery, cotton weaving, &c., we have each house paying 10 piastres. I watched one old woman at work at the former, and in two hours she had produced an earthenware jar worth 5 piastres in the Palou market. Admitting that only half the houses are engaged in "trade," I doubt the tax, amounting to more than one short day's work for each. (This is not considering the fact that the tax is still levied, I believe illegally, on farmers.)

Nor is Khoun favoured because it is Moslem. At Baghin, an Armenian village of 120 houses, perched up in the hills and surrounded by Kurd villages and Nomad Settlements, the taxes are if anything comparatively lower than at Khoun, if the military exemption tax be deducted, and its inhabitants, as those of all the villages, admitted paying considerably less than was due to Government in spite of the new register.

The two things from which the villagers have to suffer are the rapacity of the Aghas, which really affects them heavily, and the dishonesty of the minority in avoiding their share of taxation which thus falls on others.

One would think that the remedy for the latter at least of these evils lay in their own hands. But, as one Headman told me, Government through the Aghas and Beys so prevent any kind of cohesion among even the members of the same community that they cannot unite to force their co-villagers to pay the taxes due by them.

En passant I may mention that I was much struck by the thoroughness with which the Government puts through its policy of "divide."

The principal men of all the villages that I passed, and the Aghas and Beys of the towns are all "mahkoum" (condemned by default), but are allowed to live unmolested as long as they do not come, the ones into the provincial towns, the others into Diarbekir. Their influence is thus rendered nil and their powers for

intrigue curtailed. Nor are the larger Kurdish villages allowed to settle their differences, and in each of them there exist inter-family quarrels which put them one-half against the other and which are kept alive by the Government through the Aghas whom it supports, first one and then the other, to its great advantage and to the ruin of the Kurds, both Chiefs and people. The priest of Baghin told me that in old days, *i.e.*, before the massacres, his people were great carpenters, going out into the Kurdish villages and earning large sums. Now, he said, the Kurds have no work done; where before they had good ceilings and floors, they now put a few beams and fill them in with mud; where before they had doors now they use rough boards, uncleaned and unpainted. The reason he gave, and which Kurds have since confirmed to me, is that, with the Government in its present state, they do not know from one day to another what will happen to them, and they prefer to save what little money their Aghas leave them, in case of unforeseen events. There is no doubt that if the Armenians suffered in prosperity from the massacres the Kurds did so too. The Government, while unwilling to impose a regular administration on them, is ruining the Beys little by little, and depriving them of their power by corrupting them.

At Kassil I had occasion to observe the extraordinarily stupid obstinacy of the villagers when called upon to pay their taxes. It took a tahsildar and four zaptiehs five days to get the 1,180 piastres out of them. During this time they had, of course, to feed the five men and their horses, which cannot have cost less than 30 piastres a-day, besides being beaten. The latter form is always gone through. I understand, the peasants, fearing by tradition that if they pay without being beaten one year, the Government will ask more from them the next. I believe they are right. It is, I suppose, on the same principle that the Kurds of one village, on our asking for supplies and stating that we were willing to pay for them, replied: "For money we give you nothing; without money you may have anything"—meaning, "If you are not strong enough to take what you want we will not let you have anything."

Another thing that I observed at Kassil was the small percentage of the amount levied on the villagers that the Government gets. Of the 800 piastres paid for the tithes, only 500 goes to Government, the rest to the tithe-farmers. It is for this reason that in so many villages there exists the system so disadvantageous to the peasants, whereby the Aghas supply the latter with everything—land, house, cattle on loan, grain—and take 50 per cent. of the produce, out of which they pay the Government tithes.

On the whole, as I said, I do not think the peasants have much to complain of in the matter of direct Government taxation. The indirect taxation levied on them by the Beys and Aghas is heavy, and affects principally the Kurdish villages.

And that which is much worse than any petty tyranny on the part of the Government or the Beys, and affects only the Moslem villages, is the constant and prolonged draining off of the male population from the villages for service in the army, especially the reserves. Not only do the villages suffer materially through the loss of hands, but the decrease in the population is ascribed to it, not unreasonably, it seems to me, by the villagers. And I was surprised to find that in places where, for ordinary police work, no zaptieh would dare show his face, the Government had succeeded in calling out the Redifs.

Seeing then that, on the one hand, the officials are careful to attribute the evil to the disloyalty of the "Giaour," and that, on the other, the Moslems see the Armenian villagers increasing in numbers and prosperity, while they decrease in both, it is not surprising to find a certain anti-Christian feeling in the Kurdish villages, which occasionally finds practical vent.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AVALON SHIPLEY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 77.

BUDGET OF DIARBEKIR.

REVENUE.

Item.	Amount. 1904.	Amount. 1905.
	£ T.	£ T.
Tithes	46,000	48,700
Sheep tax	30,000	32,000
Military exemption tax	16,000	16,000
Water rate (for use in the rice-fields)	8,000	8,000
Property and income tax	55,000	55,000
Cattle tax	10,000	8,000
Fund for purchase of camels for Government ..	1,500	..
,, ,, horses	1,000	..
Payment of exiles (Municipalities)	1,000	1,000
Total	168,500	168,700

EXPENDITURE.

Item.			Amount. 1904.	Amount. 1905.
			£ T.	£ T.
Administrative (Mulkiyé)				24,165
Justice (Adliyé)				7,396
Pensions				5,215
Evkaf				1,500
Noufous				1,500
Agricultural bank				2,000
Roads and schools				4,000
Religious Courts (Sheri'a)				2,800
Woods and forests			55,000	150
Fais-ul-bedjet—		£ T.		
Palou		1,500		
Kharpout		400		
Diarbekir		800		
Silivan		500		
Mardin		600		
			..	4,100
Gendarmerie salaries		19,091		
Police salaries		3,075	27,000	
Rations		5,000		
			..	27,166
Army—				
To Erzinghian		60,000	44,000	
War Office		3,000	8,000	
5th Army Corps		1,500	2,000	
6th Army Corps		..	1,500	
			..	60,500
Ministry of Finance			25,000	14,200
Ministry of Marine			1,000	..
Civil List			1,000	..
Allowances to exiles			6,000	6,000
Total			168,500	166,692

Inclosure 3 in No. 77.

TAXES paid by certain Five Villages in the District of Diarbekir.

Villages.		Amount.
		Piastres.
Ekreg, Kurdish, 150 houses—		
A'shar		4,000
Emlak and Temettuat		3,609
Agnam		2,200
Total		9,809
Khoun, Kurdish, 300 houses—		
A'shar		15,000
Emlak		7,000
Temettuat		3,000
Agnam		4,000
Total		29,000
Kassil, Kurdish, 8 houses—		
A'shar		800
Emlak and Temettuat		300
Agnam		80
Total		1,180
Baghin, Armenian, 120 houses—		
A'shar		5,800
Emlak and Temettuat		3,940
Agnam		2,000
Cattle tax		1,250
	Piastres.	
Military exemption tax	15,441	
Additional 6 per cent.	708	
Receipt stamps	34	
		16,183
Total		28,973
Pirun, Kurdish, 530; Christian, 70 houses—		
A'shar, Agnam, Emlak and Temettuat } paid by the Moslems		15,000 / 7,000 / 12,000
Military exemption tax, &c., paid by the Christians		10,000
Total		44,500

[33077] No. 78.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 1.)

(No. 659.)

Sir, *Therapia, September* 25, 1906.

WITH reference to Sir N. O'Conor's despatch No. 522, Confidential, of the 31st July, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from Mr. Gilbertson, the British Vice-Consul at Broussa, on the subject of the prevalence of brigandage in that district.

Mr. Gilbertson has already made representations regarding the insecure state of the country to the Vali, who professed never to have heard of any of the cases mentioned to him, but promised to make inquiries.

I propose to draw the attention of the Grand Vizier to the facts reported by Mr. Gilbertson, reminding him at the same time of the promises which he made to His Majesty's Ambassador with regard to the measures to be taken for restoring order in the country round Smyrna.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 78.

Vice-Consul Gilbertson to Consul-General Eyres.

(No. 9.)

Broussa, September 10, 1906.

Sir,

I BEG to report that, during my thirty-three years' residence at Broussa, I have never known so many acts of brigandage to have occurred within the Vilayet of Hudavendighiar as have taken place within the last few months; and I regret to have to state that the province is far from being safe, for it is, even now, overrun with brigands and footpads.

For some months past a band of Albanian bandits have been, and are still, committing depredations in the districts of Bazarkeui and Ghuemlek, and their first act, which occurred about four months ago, was to enter at night-fall the house of a certain Panayiotti Lilé, at Arnaoutkeui, a village situated on the littoral and about six hours' distance from Ghuemlek. They found in the house a sum of £ T. 200, which they took, but not satisfied with that, they carried Lilé's son off to the mountains with the hope of obtaining a ransom. The young man, however, convinced the brigands that there was no hope of any more money being obtained from his father, and they, after severely castigating the young fellow, released him.

In July last four persons were robbed and wounded and three others killed, after being robbed, in the vicinity of Gunen, in the Sanjak of Balikesser (Karassi); and the Singer Manufacturing Company's representatives, who were proceeding from Gunen to Elpizli, were also attacked by footpads, but they succeeded in escaping, thanks to the fleetness of their horses.

On the 14th July the agent of the Singer Manufacturing Company at Ghuemlek, while proceeding from Katirli to Arnaoutkeui, perceiving a band of brigands seated near the sea-shore, returned as fast as he could to Katirli, and on the 24th the same individual and Ardash Simonian, while riding from Tchenghiller to Bazarkeui, were fired upon several times by the very band the said agent had perceived some few days before near the sea-shore between Katirli and Arnaoutkeui. They retraced their steps in all haste to Tchenghiller village, which they reached safely at 2 P.M. Homero Stratios, another sale agent of the said Company, was, during his journey to Coumlà, also attacked by highwaymen, who fired upon him, but without effect.

On the 28th July the said Company's agent and Simonian, while returning from Tchenghiller, were again attacked by brigands between that village and Bazarkeui. The latter fired about twenty shots at them, but as the Company's employés were mounted on good horses, they effected their escape. Other travellers have also been assaulted by these bandits at the same spot, and some of them robbed.

On the 2nd August (20th July, O.S.) an Armenian youth from Tchenghiller was proceeding on horseback to a neighbouring forest to cut wood, when these brigands, mistaking him for a peasant returning home with the proceeds of the sale of his cocoons, stopped him and searched him for money, but as the poor fellow had none about him, the ruffians cut his throat in cold blood, and putting the body into a sack, tied it on the horse, which returned with it to Tchenghiller. The inhabitants of the village were horror-struck on opening the sack, and their fright may easily be imagined.

A similar fate befell a Greek peasant from Korou, who was on his way back from Coumlà with his meagre savings. He was seized by the brigands, who took his little treasure, and then killed him.

About three weeks ago the Persian Acting Vice-Consul at Afion-Karahissar was attacked by brigands while travelling between Dinar and Tchivril. The bandits fired several shots at the Vice-Consul and his party, but, happily, they escaped unhurt, though his cavass's sunshade was pierced by several bullets.

Within the last fifteen days, several acts of brigandage have occurred on the Broussa-Ghuemlek highway; some of the travellers succeeded in escaping, but most of them—and it is alleged there were about seventy in number—were stopped and deprived of whatever cash and other valuables they had with them. These bandits even took sleeve-links.

Barely a week ago a carriage coming from Moudania was stopped between Tépé-Dervent and Bademly. The brigands, however, did not get much booty from the driver—only 26 piastres; but they had better luck with his client, for they relieved him of £ T. 30.

The day before yesterday six villagers, returning to Philladar, were stopped by footpads not far from the said village and robbed.

I have just been informed that a rich Turk named Edrémidli Ali Bey and the zaptiehs who were accompanying him have been killed by the brigands that infest the Sanjak of Balikesser (Karassi); no particulars to hand as to the place where this incident occurred.

From what I have been able to ascertain, it would appear that there are two bands of brigands operating in the Sanjak of Balikesser, the one being composed of deserters from the Turkish army, and the other of fifteen "coljies" of the "Régie des Tabacs Ottomane."

With regard to the latter band, it is alleged that some time back these "coljies" had a serious affray with a band of "contrebandiers," during which they killed several smugglers. This having been brought to the knowledge of the local authorities, zaptiehs were sent to arrest the "coljies," but the latter having refused to surrender, a fray took place between them, and several gendarmes were killed and wounded; the "coljies" then took to the hills.

As to the brigands that exist in the Sanjak of Afion-Karahissar, these are professional footpads who entered this province some time back from the Vilayet of Aïdin. When seriously pressed by the authorities of this vilayet, they then return into that of Aïdin, and *vice versâ*.

With respect to the band of brigands that infest the Kazas of Bazarkeui and Ghuemlek, it is evident from their acts and truculence that they are not professional bandits; and, inasmuch as these footpads have committed several acts of brigandage and murder, one after the other, on the same road, Tchenghiller-Bazarkeui, and at the same spot, and all within a week, there is not the slightest doubt that these acts were committed with the connivance of the local authorities.

That they are not professional brigands is clear, for persons who take to brigandage as a profession are, as a rule, not only crack shots, but to enact the object they have in view, they choose a natural stronghold, and then so place themselves that it is almost utterly impossible for any one who has once entered their circle to escape alive, unless they surrender and give up all the cash and valuables they may have with them; and even then they are forbidden, under pain of death, to leave the place and to proceed on their journey before the pre-stated time has elapsed, and to see that this is carried out, a guard, generally a trusted man of the band, is left behind. This guard is pre-informed as to what direction the band will take, and also of the place where they intend staying, and thus he is enabled to rejoin his comrades later on. By acting thus, if it does not give the brigands time to clear out of the vilayet altogether, it at least permits them to obtain a good lead before the authorities can be informed of what has occurred; and they seldom, if ever, return and waylay the same spot that year.

Such, however, is not the case with the actual brigands that committed, and are still committing, depredations in the Kazas of Bazarkeui and Ghuemlek, and who appear to be inexperienced footpads and exceedingly bad shots, for not only did they miss their quarry on several occasions, but they have stuck to the same ground for over four months, and are, as aforestated, still at large, which is another proof that their acts are connived at by the local authorities; otherwise, if the latter had done their duty, these brigands ought either to have been caught or exterminated ere this.

It would also appear that the country round about Panderma, Michalitch, &c., is not safe, for not only was Singer's agent stopped on his way to Panderma, and who had a certain sum of money on him, by a single footpad (Mouhaghir), who decamped on seeing other travellers approaching, but Messrs. Sykes and Co., an English firm who have a woollen factory at Beykeui, a village situated between Michalitch and Panderma, applied, some time back, to the Caïmmeam of Michalitch for an Ombashi and two zaptiehs for protection. Their application was forwarded to the Vali by the Governor of Michalitch, and on the 6th instant, owing to my representations, telegraphic instructions were transmitted to the Caïmmeam directing him to accord Messrs. Sykes and Co. the number of zaptiehs for which they had applied.

I have also to report that I called on the Governor-General, his Excellency Tewfik Bey, at his house, and I need hardly state that, after treating other matters, I did not fail to draw his most serious attention to the facts contained in this report, and likewise to the actual insecure state of the country.

Moreover, with regard to the acts of depredation and murder that have been committed in the Kazas of Bazarkeui and Ghuemlek, I pointed out to the Vali that this band of brigands could never have committed the numerous acts of brigandage they had if their acts had not been connived at by the local authorities.

His Excellency, in reply, told me that the only professional brigands that were

in the vilayet, and of which he had any knowledge, were those operating in the Sanjak of Afion-Karahissar; and that this band had entered that Sanjak from the Vilayet of Aidin; that with regard to the numerous acts of brigandage that had occurred in other parts of the vilayet, and to which I had drawn his most serious attention, the Governor-General earnestly stated that he had never been informed of any of them, and therefore begged of me to give him a *note verbale* of all the cases that had been brought to my knowledge. This, his Excellency said, would greatly assist him in the inquiries he would make, and it would also enable him to ascertain the reason why the respective Caïmacams had not reported the acts of brigandage and murder that had occurred in their respective districts.

I beg to add that I acceded to Tewfik Bey's request, and sent his Excellency the solicited *note verbale*.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWIN GILBERTSON.

[33080] No. 79.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 662.)
Sir, *Therapia, September 24, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Erzeroum, inclosing an interesting Report by Captain Mark Sykes, Honorary Attaché to this Embassy, on the military organization of the troops at Erzindjan under Zekki Pasha. The Report also deals with the Government cloth factory and other works set up by Zekki Pasha for clothing and feeding the troops and for the improvement of the town.

I have communicated to the British Chamber of Commerce and to Mr. Mountain of Constantinople the information given by Captain Sykes as to the possibility of an installation of electric plant at Erzindjan, and as to the introduction of bicycles for the use of the Turkish army. I have also informed the Chamber of Commerce of Captain Sykes' remarks respecting the clothing factory.

You will observe that Captain Sykes was asked by both the Director of the factory and the Marshal's Aide-de-camp whether he could obtain for them a copy of the regulations in force in English factories for the protection of workmen from accidents. I should be glad to be furnished with any information on the subject which could be usefully placed at the disposal of Zekki Pasha.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 79.

Consul Shipley to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 19.)
Sir, *Erzeroum, September 10, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Excellency herewith, for the information of Colonel Surtees, an interesting Report which has been drawn up and handed to me by Captain Mark Sykes on the military organization of the troops at Erzindjan, the head-quarters of the IVth Army Corps; as also on the Government cloth factory and flour mill set up by the Marshal Zekki Pasha for clothing and feeding the troops.

Captain Sykes further incloses with his Report samples of the wool used in the factory above referred to, as also of the cloth turned out and, as your Excellency will notice, remarks, with regard to the bicycle corps formed by Zekki Pasha, that the question whether bicycles may not eventually be introduced into other Turkish army corps, is worth considering from the point of view of British trade. Captain Sykes also mentioned to me that there might be a possibility of the installation by Zekki Pasha of an electric plant at Erzindjan. He could, however, make no definite statement on the matter, but it is possible that information respecting such intention, if it exists, may have reached Mr. Mountain of Constantinople who, as Captain Sykes states, has already acted as Zekki Pasha's agent for the machinery used in the cloth factory above alluded to.

With regard to the military part of Captain Sykes' Report, the activity and general smartness of the Erzeroum garrison is, as is perhaps only to be expected, far from being equal to that maintained among the troops at Erzindjan. Zekki Pasha obviously disposes of greater resources for the proper equipment of his men than those at the command of Munir Pasha, the Erzeroum Commandant, while above all the Erzindjan troops, I gathered from Captain Sykes, receive their pay regularly, which is not the case with those at Erzeroum. The discipline, however, among the latter is good, and it says much both for officers and men that no complaints whatever have reached me of improper behaviour on the part of the latter towards the townspeople, whether Mussulman or Christian.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. S. SHIPLEY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 79.

Report by Captain Sykes respecting the Troops at Erzindjan.

UNLUCKILY on the very day I arrived at Erzindjan the Marshal Zekki Pasha left the town to take up his summer quarters on the Dumanli Dagh, some 50 miles away, making it impossible for me to see him. However, his Excellency, on hearing of my arrival, dispatched a telegram, instructing his Aide-de-camp to show me everything of interest from a military point of view.

Garrison. 1. There are at present stationed at Erzindjan four batteries of field artillery and two batteries of mountain guns. As regards infantry, I gathered that there were about 3,000 men under canvas in the vicinity, and that some 2,500 were scattered in detachments along the Dersim border. But as regards names and strengths of the various units, I can give absolutely nothing definite, as I could not in decency ask the Aide-de-camp for answers to such detailed questions and no one else could give correct answers. The troops quartered in Erzindjan all belong to the IVth Division, which is, I presume, the best in the IVth Army Corps.

Health. The men during the summer months are kept under canvas in wholesome camps, well away from the rivers and marshes, consequently there is little sickness of a malarial type among them; syphilis is also less common, owing to the distance the men are kept from the bazaars and the strict supervision maintained over the granting of passes or permits to visit the town.

Dress. The infantry quartered at Erzindjan are, on the whole, as well clothed and equipped as the Russian troops I have seen on the other side of the Caucasus frontier. The summer kit, which had been issued to all the men excepting some 200 recruits, seems good and practical and is popular.

Head-dress. The head-dress consists of the real tarbush and a white hazian or Georgian hood, the latter is a convenient covering for the head either in winter or in summer, in shape it closely resembles the hood generally worn in Europe at the commencement of the fifteenth century, being composed of a flannel cowl with two long pendant bands. In summer these bands may be twisted round the brows and form a turban. In winter the hood only is worn on the head and the bands are twisted around the mouth and throat; for troops accustomed from childhood to the wearing of turbans, I cannot conceive a better protection from cold or heat. The only objection is its conspicuous white colour, which, however, is considerably mitigated when the bands are twisted round the head, as the numerous dark shadows of the folds blur the image and render the head-dress surprisingly indistinct at 200 yards distance.*

Clothing (infantry). The men's jumpers are of a light material something between serge and woollen, of a yellowish cream colour, with polished brass buttons of the usual Turkish type. The trousers are loose and made of a light blue cotton similar to that used in making French workmen's blouses. The infantry have mostly two pairs of boots, the one being for parade, the other for rough mountain work; (1) the first are brown leather Wellingtons, into which the trousers may be tucked, they are made at Erzindjan by the boys of the Military Orphanage and School of Arts and Crafts (tailoring and bootmaking). The uppers of these boots are well made, but the soles are nailed on and are apt in dry climate to fall off, the toes are also too smart and pointed, and are said to give much pain to the wearers, who are accustomed to loose slippers; (2) the service boots are in reality native slippers made of tanned leather with raw hide soles,

Trousers (infantry).

Boots (infantry).

* It will be remembered that in South Africa the high-domed helmet was always more noticeable than a crumpled felt hat of less protective colour, on account of the vivid high light thrown off the unindented surface of the helmet.

they are hand-sewn, very light, and durable, and popular with the men. I understand the Marshal would prefer to abandon the high boots entirely, but cannot obtain permission from Constantinople. All infantry at and depending directly on Erzindjan are provided with valises, braces, and pouches, but, except when changing quarters, make no use of them, and probably would not carry them on active service, wearing instead an overcoat "en banderole" and three brown leather bandoliers (one round the waist and one over each shoulder), tin water-bottle (uncovered and very bright and conspicuous), a plain leather belt for the bayonet, and one small flask of oil for the rifle.

Equipment (infantry).

As the men were all under canvas, I took the opportunity of inspecting the tents, which were of thick cotton without ventilators; the tents were of the same kind sent with the IVth Army Corps battalions to Evbil, and were equally good; from the quantity of tents I saw, I surmise that the IVth Army Corps is not deficient in this respect.

Tents (infantry).

This year the whole infantry of the IVth Division was put through a course of musketry.

Musketry (infantry).

The course consisted in practising the "attack" at a dummy enemy without ammunition for three weeks, and on the last day going through the same "attack" with thirty rounds of ball. The Aide-de-camp who accompanied me deplored the scantiness of the ball practice, but said that economy absolutely forbid a more extended scale. From the observations of civilians and others who watched the field firing, I gathered the performance was by no means contemptible. There were, however, serious complaints from all ranks as to the general badness of the Mauser rifle, several having burst owing to the heated barrels, which caused the cartridges in the spiral-spring magazine to explode.

Marshal Zekki Pasha has made a totally new departure in furnishing ten cyclist scouts to ten battalions. This effort has met with great success, and the men take readily to the machines.

Cyclists.

The 100 bicycles already purchased were bought for £ T. 10 each—I presume out of the Marshal's private income. The Aide-de-camp who got the machines bought them as English-made bicycles; they were stamped "Mars, London," but on the front was enamelled the word "Modell," which suggests that they are of German manufacture, an idea which is made more probable by the flimsy appearance of the bicycles and the cheapness of the cost, though as a matter of fact the Aide-de-camp admitted that they were so little durable that he would willingly pay more for a better article. I think that if Messrs. Mountain were informed they might bring some more reliable machines to Zekki Pasha's notice. The question as to whether bicycles may be introduced into the other Turkish Army Corps is also worth considering from the point of view of English trade.

While I was at Erzindjan I had the advantage of seeing four horse batteries and one mountain-battery practice at the new artillery range.

Artillery.

The range is about 3,500 yards in length, and the targets consist of the following objects:—

A large earthwork fort containing dummy guns and gunners, magazines, &c., a village of canvas houses containing dummy enemies dispersed among them; a dummy field battery in action, with limbers and horses behind; and a battalion disposed as in attack, viz., two companies of heads and shoulders extended to five paces; two companies in rear in single rank kneeling, and proportionate reserves in a denser formation.

I first saw the mountain battery (six guns) come into action at 2,000 yards, where they fired four rounds per gun, and then at 1,500 yards, where they repeated the practice; the target was the dummy village, and the ammunition black powder and common shell. The guns were unpacked smartly and served rapidly, but the shooting seemed to me poor, but it was very difficult to judge, owing to the high wind blowing at the time, which raised a dust so great as to somewhat obscure the view.

Practice: mountain battery.

The mountain battery was carried by a superb train of mules, which animals, as a frequent buyer, I would value at £ T. 40 a-piece.

Mountain battery: mules.

I saw all four field batteries at practice; the guns were the ordinary Krupp, corresponding with our old B.L. 15-pr.; there was no spade attachment for lessening the recoil, and the officers told me that the German carriages were too feebly built to bear the shock and strain of such a contrivance, although they said they had heard

Field Artillery: Material.

that the strength of our English carriages made the adoption of the paliative possible.

The officers were loud in their complaints against the guns from every point of view, being particularly bitter in their invectives against the wheels, which they said were evidently made for well-kept highways, and not for rough cross-country work.

The batteries on the whole may be said to be well horsed, six per gun, and two spare horses led behind. The animals were large Hungarians, very underbred and common, a few are very old, say 17 or 18 years of age, but all seemed up to their work, and could take the guns two and three miles across stubble and plough at the trot. However, there were no reserve horses, and in time of war deficiencies and casualties would have to be made up either with local mules, which are poor, or local carriage horses, which are worse.

Horses.

As regards handling of the guns the officers and men were both exceedingly slow in getting into action, there was a great deal of bellowing and unnecessary shouting which prepared one for a ridiculous fiasco. It was therefore a matter of great surprise to me that the first two shots established with common shell the "Fourchette" on a dummy battery 3,000 yards distant, and opened the way for shrapnel fire; of the steadiness and accuracy of the "shrapnel" fire I cannot speak too highly; of the first twenty-four rounds fired (viz., four per gun) two shells burst low, three were burst beyond the targets, while the remainder were perfect shots, excepting one which failed on account of a defective shell. In getting the battery forward to open fire on a line of skirmishers at 2,500 yards, there was the same exhibition of slowness and clumsiness as when the battery first came into action, but once the guns opened fire the practice was superb.

Field Artillery: Practice.

What I have said of the first battery applies in an equal degree to two others, but not to the fourth, which was extremely bad, only scoring four hits in twenty-four shots; however, I was told that the battery in question was composed entirely of recruits.

As far as I could ascertain the four batteries went through a course of twenty-five days' field practice during which period I estimate each gun fires about twenty rounds. At the end of the course the Marshal intends to make a general artillery demonstration against the whole of the targets—during which each gun will fire ten rounds.

Course.

Next year it is hoped to combine the field firing of the infantry and artillery, and to experiment in advancing troops under cover of the guns.

I might note that all practices are conducted during the hottest part of the day with the object of hardening the men.

The next point of interest is the cloth factory which Zekki Pasha has set up at Erzindjan. This is a fairly large establishment employing about eighty hands—the men all being soldiers, except three Armenian blacksmiths, who work in the repairing shed. The factory is one for converting mixed native wool into cloth for military coats, blankets, and overcoats. The wool is washed and dried on the premises, it is then passed through processes to clear it of burrs with which all Anatolian and Kurdish wools are filled. It is then subjected to a variety of complicated treatments reducing it to threads, which are subsequently woven into cloth on machine looms and a few hand looms.

Clothing, factory of.

The machinery is all in excellent order, being of the latest kind, and made in England by the following firms:—

John Haighes (Huddersfield);
Tomlinson (Leeds); and
Briggs (Huddersfield).

The whole imported, I think, by Messrs. Mountain. The motive power of the factory is derived from three large water-wheels.

As regards the quality of the stuffs made I inclose three samples, as also a sample of the dirty raw wool. Concerning the output I could not obtain any statistics, but understood that there was produced a quantity nearly sufficient to clothe the troops with the colours in the IVth Army Corps. From an economic point of view the factory cloth costs nearly as much as that contracted, but is far more durable, and so gives a margin of profit. In the factory there is a department for making shoddy felt out of rags and cast-off clothing, and another for knitting socks and gaiters by machinery.

The Turkish Director as well as the Aide-de-camp asked me if I could send them

a copy in Turkish of the Regulations in force in English factories for the protection of workmen, as the machinery was all unguarded, and there had already been one bad accident.

Zekki Pasha has also built a fine school for orphans, where fifty boys are employed in tailoring and bootmaking; the work done is quite equal, if not superior to, that turned out by American Missionary Orphanages; the sewing machines are by Messrs. Singer.

As time did not permit I was unable to inspect the large flour mills built and opened this year by Zekki Pasha; the machinery is said to be Belgian.

Zekki Pasha besides starting these various enterprises has also built a large infantry barrack, capable of holding some 4,000 men, constructed a splendid drive 9 miles long, planted 80,000 trees by the banks of the river to shield the town from fever, established a school of field engineering, and a school of telegraphy where instruction is given in the use of the heliograph.

As regards the officers my opinion was generally unfavourable, the juniors who were products of Constantinople schools, seemed to have been completely corrupted by a bad education, and were obviously only kept brisk and clean by the ruthless and personal discipline of the Marshal himself; the seniors and Commanders were also evidently made to work against their wills and longed to return to their former slovenly habits; indeed, I should judge that the officers really detested the Marshal as much as the men liked him.

(Signed) MARK SYKES, *Captain,*
3/ P. W. O. Yorks. Regiment.

September 4, 1906.

[33884] No. 80.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 666.)

Sir, *Constantinople, September* 28, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Damascus reporting the inauguration of the Tebûk section of the Hedjaz Railway.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 80.

Consul Devey to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 24.)

Sir, *Damascus, September* 4, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that the Hedjaz Railway construction work, with the exception of ballasts on few sections, has been completely carried out as far as Tebûk on the 700th kilometre from Damascus. On the 28th ultimo a Commission, composed of the Ferik Rahmi Pasha and the Major Naji Bey, arrived here from Constantinople viâ Beyrout, and was received with all kinds of pomp and respect by the Vali and the other officials of the vilayet, who went out on a special train to meet the Committee at Ryak, 75 kilom. from Damascus.

On the morning of the next day the Commission, accompanied by his Excellency Kyazim Pasha, Nazir of the Hedjaz line, the Mufti of Damascus, the Haj Muhafizi, and many others of the high officials of Damascus and Beyrout, proceeded on a Hedjaz train for Tebûk to hold there the ceremonies of inaugurating that section of the line on the 1st September, which is the anniversary of the Accession Day of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan. They arrived at their destination on the evening of the 31st ultimo and celebrated the fête on the 1st instant with all zeal and enthusiasm, encouraging the workmen, distributing medals, and disbanding those of the troops employed on the line who had completed their terms of service. On the 2nd they returned to Dera'a, and the majority of them took Haifa line to see Rahmi Pasha and Naji Bey off to Constantinople.

In this connection I beg to sum up the progress made in the construction of the Hedjaz Railway up to this memorable occasion. Including Dera'a–Haifa branch of 160 kilom., the trains now run over 860 kilom. built during the last five years, with the exception of good many stations and ballast still to be laid on about 100 kilom. between Mudevrera and Tebûk. Earthworks are now going on energetically on about 250 kilom. between Tebûk and Medain Salih, out of which 30 kilom. immediately after Tebûk are now nearly completed.

The moving stock in possession of the Railway Commission consists of 25 locomotives, 40 covered wagons, 250 platforms, 50 third-class, 10 first-class, and 2 "de luxe" passenger carriages, and 19 water tanks. Many others had been ordered from German and Belgian firms.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. P. DEVEY.

[33885] No. 81.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 666.)

Sir, *Constantinople, September* 28, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Acting Consul at Jeddah, relating to the return of the Commission sent by the Grand Shereef of Mecca to the Imam of Yemen.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 81.

Acting Consul Hussein to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 59.)

Sir, *Jeddah, September* 8, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 31st August steam-ship "Rahmanieh" brought back from Hodeidah the Commission which was sent by the Grand Shereef of Mecca to the Imam of Yemen.

About two months ago this Commission, consisting of Hamza-el-Feer (Kaimakam of Grand Shereef at Mecca in the time of the late Grand Shereef Husain Pasha), his son, Shereef Aaid, and Abdur Rahman Ilias, one of the most distinguished Ulemas of Medina, was sent overland with a guard of fifteen Shereefian soldiers to Yemen, with instructions to see the Imam of Yemen, without having any communication with Ahmed Faizi Pasha, or any other authorities in Yemen.

The Commission proceeded to Sauda and informed the Imam of their object, and was received by the Imam with great courtesy and politeness. The members of the Commission had more than one interview with the Imam, and conveyed the message of the Grand Shereef with the object of persuading him to come to terms with the Turkish Government and to desist from further hostilities, and to ask him to return to the authorities all the military stores that had fallen in the hands of the Arabs at Sanaa and other places.

It is said the Imam's reply was that he himself had no desire to continue hostilities against the Turks, and was anxious to put an end to all bloodshed and be a faithful friend of the Turkish Government; but he was not free to exercise his own will in matters like that, and had to be guided by the wish of the community who had selected him Imam; and the slightest inclination on his part to depart from the edict of the community would be a signal for his fall, disgrace, and the election of another Imam. As to restoring the military stores, the Imam knowing well the inability of the Commission to carry away the heavy pieces of artillery, said the pieces of artillery were of no use to him and he can hand them over to the Commission if they can carry them back, but the rifles and rifle ammunition were distributed among the tribes and it was beyond his power to get them back. The Commission, as expected by the Imam, did not accept the offer.

The Imam has sent a sealed letter with the Commission to the Grand Shereef, and its contents have not transpired.

Abdur Rahman Ilias has mentioned to people here that Ahmed Faizi Pasha has asked the Porte for 80,000 troops to relieve the discontented troops now in Yemen and

to carry out his design of besieging Shahara, the stronghold of the Imam. Abdur Rahman Ilias seems confident that the Imam and his followers would not be able to show much resistance after this.

I have, &c.
(Signed) MUHAMMAD HUSSEIN.

[33886] No. 82.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 607.)
Sir, *Constantinople, September 28, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah on the subject of the Hedjaz Railway.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 82.

Consul Crow to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 61.)
Sir, *Bussorah, August 30, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose a translation of an extract from the "Bussorah Gazette" regarding the Sheikh of Koweit's subscription to the Hedjaz Railway.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. E. CROW.

Inclosure 2 in No. 82.

Extract from the "Bussorah Gazette" of August 10 (23), 1906.

(Translation.)

IN reply to communications addressed to his Excellency Mubarek-es-Sabah Pasha, Kaimakam of Koweit, asking him to contribute 200 liras towards the sums ordered to be collected for the Hedjaz Railway, and the repairs of the water canals to Mecca, we learn that, instead of 200 liras, 500 liras has been sent. This amount has been received by the Treasury of the vilayet.

We much appreciate the zeal and religious ardour displayed in this matter by Mubarek Pasha, who is proud of his fidelity and obedience to the Imperial Throne and the country.

[33887] No. 83.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 670.)
Sir, *Therapia, September 20, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I have received a telegram from the Acting British Consul-General at Bagdad reporting that, owing to a renewal of efforts on the part of the Turkish authorities at Kerbela to exact from Persian subjects payment of certain taxes which have been long in dispute, 550 Persians have gone to the British Vice-Consulate and encamped in the adjacent streets.

Major Ramsay has instructed the Vice-Consul by telegram to maintain absolute neutrality and to inform the Persians that he has no authority to interfere. Major Ramsay has himself replied in similar terms to petitioners at Bagdad.

I brought the matter to the notice of the Persian Ambassador, and I learn that, at his Highness' request, the Grand Vizier has instructed the Vali to suspend coercive measures against the Persians at Kerbela.

I have meanwhile approved Major Ramsay's attitude.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[34041] No. 84.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 8.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 6th instant, relative to the Muscat Arbitration Award.

India Office, October 8, 1906.

Inclosure in No. 84.

Government of India to Mr. Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *October 6, 1906.*

MUSCAT arbitration: Your telegram of the 29th August.

It is feared by Resident in Persian Gulf that communication as to negotiations with French Government regarding flag-holders may be made in distorted form by M. Goguyer, who is returning. We trust that M. Goguyer has not been given any information on the subject, and that care will be taken by the French Government, in any case, that there is no premature disclosure of proposals.

[34419] No. 85.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 12.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of the correspondence relative to the future policy in regard to the Aden hinterland.

India Office, October 11, 1906.

Inclosure 1 in No. 85.

Government of India to Mr. Morley.

(Secret.)
Sir, *Simla, August 9, 1906.*

IN your Secret despatch dated the 4th May, 1906, you acquainted us with the views of His Majesty's Government on the main questions arising in connection with the tribes of the Aden hinterland, and you intimated to us the methods by which effect should be given to those views. In your telegram of the 19th June permission was given to us to express our opinion on points of detail involved in carrying out the policy so laid down, and on any questions affecting the administration of Aden. Of this permission we now venture to avail ourselves, and at the same time we forward a copy of the correspondence with the Government of Bombay and the Resident at Aden on the subject.

2. The propositions advanced in your despatch are that the demarcation of the frontier has not affected our policy as regards the tribes in the hinterland, and that there is no desire to interfere with the internal and domestic affairs of those tribes, though the interference of any other Power with them will not be tolerated. You add, as a further explanation of the policy which should be pursued, that while the strength of Aden must always be a standing object in national policy, that strength will obviously be impaired by quarrels with the tribes, intervention in their disputes, multiplication of Agreements with them, the location of troops far from the fortifications of Aden, or an excessive readiness to resort to expeditions out of proportion to any advantage to be gained by them. You conclude that trespasses across the Turkish frontier should not be exaggerated, and should be dealt with, if necessary, at Constantinople; that, save in a small strip immediately adjoining British territory, internal disturbances should be disregarded, and no step taken without your express sanction that might lead to

military or political entanglements; neither a railway to Dthala nor a cantonment or sanatorium there should be contemplated; the troops now at Dthala should retire, leaving only a small escort for the Political Agent, who should be withdrawn as soon as may be, and should thereafter only visit the place temporarily and for special purposes. The dispatch of postal runners or agents of Government into the interior should be avoided. Any project for disarming the tribes should be dismissed from consideration. Punitive expeditions for offences committed during the demarcation should not be undertaken. No demonstration along the frontier is needed, and no attempts should be made to conclude fresh Treaties without previous reference to you. It is stated that any other policy might draw us into a repetition on another scene of the recent transactions in Somaliland.

3. We notice that these instructions have been formulated in connection with the appointment of a new Resident at Aden, and on consideration of the correspondence forwarded to you by the Governor of Bombay on the 12th March, 1906. The proposals put forward by Major-General Mason, the late Resident at Aden, and the opinions of the Bombay Government, as expressed in those papers, were receiving our anxious consideration, as in some respects they involved important departures in the direction of an extension of the existing tribal levy system, of a scheme for managing the tribes adjoining the Turkish frontier through subsidized superior Chiefs, and of more energetic measures for the suppression of the arms traffic, the importance of which has been so frequently impressed upon us by His Majesty's Government. Simultaneously we had under consideration the question of the railway proposed by the Sultan of Lahej through Lahej territory to Nobat Dakim, at the point of junction of the main trade routes to Aden, and of the admission of the line to Aden itself. On some of these matters we had almost arrived at a decision. Thus, we were prepared to support the proposal of the Bombay Government that Ras-al-Arah, which is now one of the principal centres of the arms traffic, should be occupied by a small force, in order to enable us to maintain a closer watch over the conduct of the trade with the hinterland and a more effective patrol of the coast-line, while at the same time protecting ourselves against the possibility of a port not directly under our control springing up on this very important section of the coast. Recent reports show that the export of arms from Jibuti to the hinterland is in active progress, and if it is to be checked otherwise than by its effective prohibition at Jibuti itself, as suggested by us, we cannot devise any other remedy in our own territory than such an occupation and patrol.

4. At the same time we most cordially subscribe to the policy of non-interference with the internal and domestic policy of the tribes, while not tolerating the interposition of any foreign Power, which was enunciated by Lord Lansdowne, and in which His Majesty's present Government in the fullest sense concur. Our whole administrative policy has been directed to prevent the necessity for such interference, and we shared the objections of the Bombay Government to the punitive expeditions proposed by the late Resident, even though these were designed on the smallest scale compatible with the object of securing redress for the murder of a British postal runner within British territory proper at Aden, and for the discontinuance of a deliberate violation by the Turks of the demarcated frontier at Ad Doka, which, if unchecked, might well become serious. These are objects which, within the tenour of your present instructions, would justify active interference, and we are addressing you in a separate communication on the subject of the continued infraction of the frontier by the levy of dues by the Turks at Ad Doka, while the question of securing redress for the outrage within British territory at Aden will be further considered in the light of the present situation. As to the Lahej Railway, it is hardly necessary for us to remind you that the scheme was not in any way due to British suggestion in connection with the presence of troops at Dthala or otherwise, but originated entirely with the Sultan himself, who granted a concession in 1904 to the firm of Cowasji Dinshaw. This concession did not appear to be altogether suitable in the interests either of the Sultan or British territory, and since then we have been trying to make more satisfactory arrangements to enable the Sultan to give effect to his laudable desire to develop his territory, which we could hardly prohibit, while abstaining as far as possible from interference in his internal affairs. The matter will be reported to you in due course, and we need not do more here than remark that, if the Turks do take steps to carry out their project of constructing a railway from Hodeida or Mocha to Taiz with the assistance of foreign engineers and capitalists, some improvements in communications with the hinterland will probably be necessary unless Aden is to lose the whole of the inland trade and to sacrifice her strategical security on the landward side.

5. On the subject of the general control of the tribes, the late Resident inclined

to direct dealings with the smaller Sheikhs and a possible extension of the levy system to watch the demarcated frontier. The Bombay Government, on the other hand, as is shown in paragraph 9 of their letter of the 13th July, which forms an inclosure of this despatch, favour a system of granting subsidies to the important Chiefs. On the merits of these alternative policies we had not yet arrived at a decision. The controversy has cropped up in various portions of the Indian land frontier; each case can only be decided on its merits; and the matter must now await the final settlement of the main question of policy. We would only indicate that, if the proposals of the Bombay Government are adopted and the Chiefs are able to hold their own, there may be a risk of serious collisions between the forces of the subsidized Chiefs and the Turkish troops, which it would be impossible to ignore, unless the Chief, as might easily happen at Dthala, came to terms with the Turks, with the result that the objects of the demarcation of the frontier would be entirely frustrated. At the same time we venture to doubt if any reasonable subsidy would enable either of the Chiefs, or at any rate the Amir of Dthala, to hold his own either against the tribes or the Turks, for such success as has hitherto attended the policy of consolidating the waning authority of the Amir of Dthala has been mainly due to the moral and material support which is afforded to him by the presence of our Political Agent and the British force at that place.

6. His Majesty's Government deprecate the dispatch of postal runners or agents into the interior, and probably have in view the unfortunate case of the postal runner who was recently murdered as he was leaving Aden for the hinterland. The maintenance of a political establishment and a military force at Dthala no doubt necessitates the up-keep of communications, and the frequent passage of posts and supplies. The recent outrage, however, occurred not in tribal territory, but within the limits of British administration; and, even if our post were withdrawn from Dthala at once, it would be impracticable to avoid the need for maintaining communications with the Sultan of Lahej and other Chiefs of the hinterland. If we did so, it would create the impression among our protégés that we had determined to abandon them to the aggression of the turbulent trans-frontier tribes under nominal Turkish rule. We desire to emphasize strongly the total loss of confidence in our will or capacity to protect them which must follow such a belief, and the disastrous effect which this would necessarily have not only on our relations with the tribes themselves, but also on our dealings with the local Turkish officials.

7. We have noted the opinion that any protest against Turkish aggression should be by way of action at Constantinople, and recognize fully that in the ultimate resort this is the only means of bringing pressure to bear upon the Porte. At the same time we desire to draw attention to the fact that the relations of our Political Agent at Dthala with the local Turkish officials at Kataba have been most cordial and friendly. He has recently obtained the payment of the sum of 400*l.* due to the Amir of Dthala for damages caused during the forcible occupation of his villages, and he has been able to secure a friendly settlement of frontier cases which might otherwise have led to serious trouble, besides taking direct action through the tribes, which promises to be successful, for the restoration of damaged and destroyed boundary pillars. But for his presence at Dthala, and the influence that he there exerts, these objects could not have been attained without difficult negotiations at Constantinople, which, in view of the habitual procrastination of the Porte, might have involved serious measures. We would, therefore, deprecate the entire stoppage of such friendly relations with the local Turkish officials.

8. Having thus explained that we have no desire to extend our responsibilities and entangle ourselves in purely tribal affairs, we proceed to the examination of a question to which we attach vital importance, and which it appears to us may have been prejudged, under the idea that we are associated with a policy that we in no way desire to support. We refer to the decision that the troops and the Political Agent should be withdrawn from Dthala. If His Majesty's Government were led to that decision by a fear that our Agents at Dthala would use their position there as a vantage-ground for undue interference with the tribes, their views may be materially modified by the strong opinion of the Bombay Government, which at first viewed the establishment of the Political Agency there with distrust, and by the assurances to the contrary which we have now given. And the facts that there is no accommodation for the Dthala troops at Aden, and that the arrangements necessary for their return to India or England must involve some delay, give us an opportunity of submitting the matter for reconsideration both on strategical and general grounds.

9. His Majesty's Government hold that the strength of Aden as a fortress will obviously be impaired by the location of troops at a distance from its fortifications, and

that, as the recent delimitation has fixed a line beyond which Turkish troops or Agents cannot advance, the retention of British troops, or the permanent maintenance of a Political Agent at Dthala, is both unprofitable and a source of weakness. We desire respectfully to question these conclusions. Regarded from a purely strategic point of view, the situation of the post at Dthala, only 96 miles from Aden, is, in the opinion of our military advisers, such as to augment the strength of that fortress. For, dominating as Dthala does the principal points on the newly-demarcated frontier, and commanding the main trade routes which lead to Aden from the hinterland, it enables us with a small body of troops, and at no great expense, owing to the comparatively small extent of country concerned (far smaller than that of Somaliland), to enforce our will at any time, and promptly to repress at its start any movement which promises to be dangerous. If we were to withdraw from this advantageous position we should leave the initiative to the tribes, who by choosing the time most inconvenient to us could give much trouble and lock up a considerable body of troops. It must be remembered, moreover, that Dthala occupies an important position on the line of communications between Aden and Yemen, and that there is a prospect that the Hedjaz Railway will at a near date be continued to the Yemen, or that an independent line linking up with the Hedjaz system will be constructed. It is, in fact, only a few months since the British Ambassadors at Constantinople and Paris informed Sir Edward Grey of schemes seriously put forward for a line from Hodeida through Sana to Taiz, in the direction of Aden, which would be linked up with the Hedjaz line. With a Turkish rail-head at Taiz, close to our recently-delimitated border, and linked up with Constantinople, and no point occupied in the hinterland from which British influence could be effectively exerted to retain the allegiance of the tribes, it would be possible seriously to threaten Aden from the land side, and the whole strategic position of that fortress would be changed.

10. The sanctioned garrison of the Aden fortress consists of the following troops:—

3 companies Royal Garrison Artillery.
600 British infantry.
1 company Sappers.
1 battalion native infantry.
The Aden troop.

Barrack accommodation does not exist for more than this strength, and it is impossible to keep troops in camp at Aden. The former practice was to retain the remainder of the British regiment in India, which was in every way undesirable. The necessity for producing visible arguments on the spot, in the shape of ships of war at Hodeida and a stronger military force at Dthala, in order to overcome the reluctance of the Turks to carry out their own proposals for demarcation, led to the dispatch of the remainder of the British battalion and of an extra native infantry regiment to Aden; and these troops, owing to the troubles in the Yemen after the conclusion of the demarcation of the frontier, have been located at Dthala with the happiest results on our influence with the tribes. The present policy of concentrating our naval forces in European waters might easily leave the command of the Arabian Sea in the hands of a foreign Power for a considerable time, in which case it would be most desirable to have our communications with the hinterland and its supplies fully open. More than this, the sanctioned garrison of Aden is not sufficient to man the defences, even if the deteriorating effect of the climate can be overlooked, and in the event of war with a naval Power an immediate increase would be necessary, and this it might not be possible then to send by sea. The climate of Aden is such as to tax severely the health of the troops stationed there. Owing to the nature of the country very little military training can be done, while no other occupation or amusements are available for the men. This combination of a most trying climate with enforced idleness has a disastrous effect on their health. On the other hand, the uplands of Dthala form an admirable training-ground, while the climate admits of men working in the open air all day long. They thus retain excellent health, and their efficiency as soldiers is very different from that of men confined to the limits of the fortress of Aden. Even if the other weighty reasons adduced by the Resident and the Bombay Government for retaining troops there can be ignored, we consider that, on the score of humanity as well as of efficiency, the withdrawal of the troops from Dthala to Aden is to be deprecated.

On military and strategical considerations, therefore, our military advisers regard the withdrawal of the force at Dthala as open to serious objection, and we entirely concur in their view, which will, we trust, receive full consideration.

11. From a political point of view, we are no less opposed to a withdrawal from Dthala. The mere delimitation of the frontier line seems to us to be little security against the advance, if not of Turkish troops, at least of Turkish agents, as the Ad Doka incident shows; and a Political Officer stationed at Aden, and only occasionally visiting Dthala, would have small opportunity of checking or reporting the existence of Turkish intrigues in the protected territory. It must be remembered that, after such a withdrawal as is now contemplated, he could probably only pay such visits with a considerable escort, which might give rise to trouble, and certainly would not conduce to the ready collection of secret information or the spread of friendly influence. The result of this ignorance and impotence might well be a spread of disaffection in the country behind Aden, which, in the event of difficulties with Turkey or some other Power, would greatly weaken the position of the fortress. It is, moreover, undoubted that we are bound to check raids or encroachments from the British side upon Turkish territory; and this obligation has been repeatedly recognized by His Majesty's Government, and enjoined upon us by them at the instance of the Turkish Government. For this purpose no instrument can be so effective and inexpensive as a small body of troops maintained in a central position at Dthala.

12. Another political consideration is the effect which our withdrawal would have upon our reputation among the Arabs, a matter of the first importance, especially at present, when it is doubtful whether the Turks will be able to restore their rule in Yemen, or whether they will be succeeded by independent Arab tribes owing possibly a nominal allegiance to the Imam of Sana. In this connection the case of the Amir of Dthala seems to call first for examination. The position of this Chief is mainly the creation of the delimitation proceedings. Before those operations the Turks had gradually encroached upon the area which was nominally his, and had reduced his possessions to a fraction of the territory in which he has now been reinstated. The Amir's prestige had diminished along with his dominions, and if the reports received during the past few years from our officers in the hinterland can be relied on, he believes that he owes his present position to British intervention; he welcomes the presence of the Political Agent and the British force, and he is convinced that he would suffer from the proposed withdrawal. Only eighteen months ago the Amir entered into a Treaty by which he was assured that the British Government would extend to the territory of Dthala "the gracious favour and protection of His Majesty the King-Emperor"; and two years ago the Resident expressed his conviction that our vacation of Dthala would immediately result in the Amir leaving the district and taking refuge in Aden or Lahej, as his position would become untenable. Such a result would lay us open to the charge of a breach of faith and of our Treaty obligations. The comments of the Bombay Government on this opinion, contained in a letter dated the 28th August, 1904, were as follows:—

"The Governor in Council cannot but feel that it would be an incalculable advantage if the Resident were placed in a position to reassure the Amir regarding our intentions. Such reassurance would in all probability not only strengthen the Amir's position, but would have a pacifying effect on the whole countryside. It is natural that so long as the tribes have reason to believe that our influence will be withdrawn in the very near future, they should maintain an attitude of expectancy, and take up a position which will enable them to secure every possible advantage in the event of our withdrawal. The Amir's position has been strengthened, and it will remain secure so long as we remain at Dthala."

In this connection we invite attention to the strongly expressed opinions of the Bombay Government and of the Resident, with whom we desire fully to associate ourselves.

The cases of the Haushabi Sultan, of the Upper Yafai, and of the Nawa, Rubeaten, and Dhabiani tribes are, as the Resident shows in paragraph 5 of his letter, not widely different from that of the Amir of Dthala; and to abandon those who have cast in their lot with us, and to whom we have promised our countenance and protection, appears to us unwise, even if it can be regarded as consistent with pledges we may fairly be considered to have given. There is thus a real danger that, if we now withdraw, we may be confronted in a few years with an independent Arabia which will have lost faith in our ability or willingness to keep our promises to our friends, and which will therefore be contemptuous of or hostile to us. We submit that, at least until the issue of the present struggle between the Turks and Arabs is known, it would be impolitic in the highest degree for us to abandon our important post of observation and control at Dthala.

13. We have now attempted to show that the withdrawal of our troops, and of the Political Agent from Dthala will, both from a strategic and political point of view, gravely impair the strength of the fortress of Aden; while the disadvantages expected by His Majesty's Government to result from a retention of our position should, with the exercise of discretion and a loyal adoption of the policy of non-interference, be easily avoided. On the general question we view with grave concern the policy of withdrawal from the responsibilities and obligations which we have deliberately undertaken in the Aden hinterland as likely to cause us future trouble of a serious nature in that region. If Turkish intrigue and Mahommedan fanaticism are in the future to be left uncontrolled in that country, we fear that we shall before long be involved in operations that might have been avoided by a firm and consistent attitude towards the tribes, and we would therefore deprecate the proposed change in policy as being, in our opinion, likely to bring about the very result that His Majesty's Government desire to avert. At the same time we fully recognize that the shaping of a foreign policy, especially in a matter affecting the European Powers, must rest with His Majesty's Government, but we earnestly trust that the decision of His Majesty's Government upon this point may be reconsidered in the light of the facts and arguments which we have now ventured to place before you. In any case, we would suggest that the present opportunity may perhaps appear favourable for further examination of the question of the transfer of Aden to the direct control of His Majesty's Government, as presented in our despatch dated the 14th May, 1903, to which we have received no answer. In that communication we pointed out the desirability of uniting financial and political responsibility in the same hands. Our opinion then given is fully confirmed by the subsequent course of events; and, with the greatest respect for the views of His Majesty's Government, we now venture to express a hope that we may be relieved of the administration of the Settlement and hinterland, as we feel considerable doubt whether this can be effectively conducted from India if the step contemplated is finally taken

We have, &c.

(Signed) MINTO.
KITCHENER.
A. T. ARUNDEL.
DENZIL IBBETSON.
H. ERLE RICHARDS
E. N. BAKER.
C. H. SCOTT.
C. L. TUPPER.

Inclosure 2 in No. 85.

Government of India to Government of Bombay.

Sir, *Simla, June* 12, 1906.

I AM directed to refer to the Secret despatch from His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated the 4th May last, forwarding, for the information of his Excellency the Governor in Council, a copy of Secret despatch, dated the 4th May last, addressed to the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in Council, intimating the views of His Majesty's Government on the main questions arising in connection with the tribes of the Aden Protectorate.

2. I am desired to request that the Government of India may be furnished with a full statement of the views, both of the Resident at Aden and of his Excellency the Governor in Council, on the policy which the Secretary of State has desired should be pursued in future in the Aden hinterland, special attention being paid to the following points:—

(1.) Our obligations to the Amir of Dthala, and the manner in which this Chief would regard withdrawal from his territories;

(2.) The probable effect of such a policy on other parts of the hinterland, and on our power to command the respect of the tribes, especially those whose good behaviour is of special concern, on account of their position relatively either to the recently demarcated border, or to the principal trade routes from the interior to Aden; and

(3.) The manner in which the proposed change would effect our relations with our neighbours beyond the delimited border, whether those neighbours should be the Turks, in conjunction with whom the demarcation was carried out, or a body of independent

tribes, should the Porte fail in their present endeavours to reduce the country. In this conclusion, regard must be had, not merely to the rights, but also to the obligations which we have acquired in consequence of the demarcation proceedings;

(4.) How far these instructions would effect our capacity to carry out a policy of restricting the import of arms and ammunition into the hinterland, and the re-export of these to Somaliland and other countries.

Inclosure 3 in No. 85.

Government of Bombay to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Bombay Castle, July* 13, 1906.

I AM directed to reply to your letter, dated the 12th June last, requesting that the Government of India may be furnished with a full statement of the views both of the Resident at Aden and his Excellency the Governor in Council on the policy which the Secretary of State has desired to be pursued in future in the Aden hinterland, with special attention to the points detailed in that letter. I am to append a copy of the Resident's letter of the 1st July last and to offer the following remarks:—

In the first place his Excellency the Governor in Council thinks it desirable very briefly to recapitulate some salient points of the correspondence on the subject in recent years. In March 1902 the Government of India, in their letter dated the 7th March, raised the question of the desirability, after the delimitation of the frontier of the Protectorate had been concluded, of amending and revising the arrangements then in force with some of the tribes or clans, and asked this Government for any general recommendations they might desire to make in view of the altered circumstances which were likely to arise on the demarcation of the frontier. That letter was answered by this Government in their letter of the 14th July, 1902, in which the internal independence of the tribes and their liberty to manage their own affairs was strongly insisted upon, and his Excellency the Governor in Council expressed the view that it was undesirable to formulate any fresh policy in dealing with the tribes near Aden, but that the growth of our friendship and the consolidation of our interests should be left to those natural forces which must naturally tend to that end. That view of the policy and aims of the British Government was accepted in the Government of India's letter dated the 9th September, 1902. The question of our liabilities in the hinterland was further discussed in my letter dated the 12th January, 1904, and the policy recommended in letter of the 14th July, 1902, was again pressed, namely, that the possibility of tribal co-operation and responsibility should be exhaustively tested and proved inadequate before any other policy was adopted, and I am to point out that it was clearly stated as the opinion of this Government that if the more active proposals then being suggested were adopted, it would not be possible in the circumstances of the hinterland to draw back from what might be done. The views put forward in these letters were indorsed and enforced by the despatch of His Majesty's Secretary of State of the 1st April, 1904. The Secretary of State wrote:—

"I recognize the obligation which the delimitation may involve of performing certain friendly offices for the Turkish officers, and in particular of restraining the tribes within the British Protectorate from committing offences beyond the border. In this view it may be necessary to impose upon the Amir of Dthala and other tribal Chiefs by fresh agreements international responsibilities which they have hitherto evaded."

And he went on to demur to any extension of our interference with the tribes themselves, or any weakening the defence of Aden itself by exciting opposition in the interior, and taking part in tribal disputes which do not affect external relations. In the letter of this Government dated the 18th April, 1904, which was written before the above despatch could be considered in Bombay, his Excellency the Governor in Council again pressed the desirability of avoiding any imputation of a premature and unnecessary interference with the internal independence of the tribes. His Excellency the Governor in Council therefore feels that he is at liberty to submit his views at the present moment without the risk of any imputation that this Government has been in favour of a forward policy in disregard to the wishes of superior authority.

3. In May 1904 his Excellency Lord Curzon took the step of posting a Political Officer at Dthala, where he has since remained, and I am to state that while his Excellency the Governor in Council was not wholly in favour of that step at the time

it was taken, yet there can be no reason whatever to doubt that the Political Agent's presence at Dthala, and also the presence of the British troops who are there in consequence, is entirely acceptable to the Amir of Dthala and to the inhabitants of the Amiri territory. I am to invite attention to the Government of India's telegram dated the 17th September, 1904, which gives eloquent expression to the views of the Amir of Dthala on the subject. I am also in the same connection to point out that when the question arose of the policy to be followed by the Political Officer stationed at Dthala, his Excellency the Governor in Council, in his letter dated the 20th June, 1905, expressed strong preference for the policy of building up and supporting the authority of the Amir of Dthala, and enabling him to govern the territory, rather than of interfering directly and dealing with the subordinate Sheikhs ourselves. The policy there recommended of strictly confining the Political Officer's activities to friendly advice and beneficent assistance was accepted by the Government of India and the Secretary of State in the communications marginally noted,* and I am now to record the deliberate opinion of his Excellency the Governor in Council that as a result British policy in the hinterland of Aden is not only one of non-aggression, but one which has been pursued hitherto with the full acceptance and good-will of the Amir of Dthala within whose territories the Political Officer has been posted. So far as the north-east portion of the hinterland goes, that represents the present position.

4. In the south-western part of the hinterland, from Nobat Dakhin to Sheikh Said, there has been latterly a somewhat abnormal recrudescence of inter-tribal disputes, and these have affected us in two ways—partly as resulting in outrages within that limited area of the Protectorate, similar to that formerly known on the Somali Coast as the 10-mile limit, in which, as the Secretary of State lays down, disturbances call for interposition, and partly by raids across the frontier into Turkish territory which, in the words of the Secretary of State's despatch of the 1st April, 1904, it has become one of our obligations to prevent. There has also been in the same region, ever since the tower of Auja difficulty, fear of encroachment of local Turkish officials, and this manifested itself recently at Mafalis in the manner already reported to the Government of India. The accommodation of all these matters led his Excellency the Governor in Council to consider that some exercise of steadying influence was necessary, and to make the proposals in my letter of the 5th March last. I am to say that those proposals did not contemplate any violent action, but merely a deputation of officers to the country affected with sufficient authority to make an expression of the Government wishes through their medium respected, and to cause the tribes to understand that the Representative of British authority at Aden was able to enforce the language of admonition which he from time to time uses when occasion demands.

5. Passing now to the questions in your letter under reply, it is only necessary to refer to your telegram dated the 17th September, 1904, to the Secretary of State, to his reply thereto, and to the Treaty subsequently concluded with the Amir in consequence on the 28th November, 1904, and to the subsequent course of events, to make it clear that the Amir of Dthala will in all probability regard our withdrawal as a breach of faith and as a grave misfortune. I am to point out that, in 1905, Lord Lansdowne, whose views of 1903 are quoted, agreed with the then Secretary of State for India in making the appointment at Dthala permanent, and the Political Agent's presence at Dthala, so far from being likely to lead either to political or military entanglements, is likely, in the opinion of his Excellency the Governor in Council, to prevent such entanglements arising. Already it has been necessary to send orders to repair three of the boundary pillars recently erected in that neighbourhood, and it is certain that the withdrawal of our officer will lead to very great difficulties for the Amir of Dthala, and be a great encouragement to all promoters of mischief, both within and beyond the frontier recently demarcated—obviously the Resident will be in a very much less advantageous position to protect the frontier and to checkmate encroachments. In brief, the withdrawal of the Political Agent, now established at Dthala, will, in his Excellency the Governor in Council's opinion, prove the most expensive policy in the long run which it is possible for us to adopt. With regard to the question of the effect of withdrawal on the power of control of the arms traffic, I am to say that the result is inevitably to confine our power of control to a sea patrol, and I am to invite attention to paragraphs 9 and 11 of my letter of the 5th March, 1906, in which the ineffectiveness of this method of dealing with the question is discussed. In that matter the Resident will still have the benefit of the recent order of the Government of India in their letter dated the 14th May, 1906, placing him, with the help of the Aden arsenal, in a position

* Government of India, Secret, August 31; Secretary of State, Secret, November 10, 1905.

to compete with illicit trade from Jibouti, but obviously his position will be very much weakened by the absence of touch with tribes outside Aden.

6. I am to say that his Excellency the Governor in Council considers it scarcely necessary to discuss the question of the effect of the orders on the health of the troops. The Resident and General Officer Commanding has commented thereon in paragraph 7 of his letter, and it is well known to the Government of India that the confinement of British troops to the limits of Aden itself has always been the cause of a heavy death rate, and extremely prejudicial to the efficiency of regiments posted to Aden. There is no doubt that a garrison which had been allowed to retain its strength and efficiency in a sanatorium on the highlands of Dthala would be infinitely more fresh and efficient in point of health for the defence of Aden on necessity arising, than one that had spent all its time in Aden itself. From a military point of view, his Excellency imagines that arrangements whereby the troops as a body are kept in health and good training at the inland end of a short railway, while a skeleton garrison constantly relieved, watches over the forts themselves, is not only an efficient policy, but also a humane one.

7. In connection with this subject, I am to invite orders on the subject of the Sultan of Lahej's project for a railway in his territory. The matter was last placed before the Government of India in my letter of the 24th February, 1906, and I am to invite special attention to the fact that the Sultan has actually already given a Concession for making such a railway in his own territory. With the hope of making the undertaking somewhat more useful, Government intervened to delay action thereon, and have considered the possibility of giving the line entrance into Aden on certain conditions. If, however, the British Government decline to further interest themselves in the matter, the question will certainly rearise whether the British Government have any right to interfere with the Sultan's administration of his own territories in such sense as to prevent him from going on with his original enterprise. There is no doubt the Sultan will regard our withdrawal from co-operation as an unfriendly act which has put him to loss.

8. Turning from the past to the future, I am now to discuss the question upon the assumption that the Secretary of State's despatch represents, in the words of his telegram of the 19th June, the definite intentions and purposes of His Majesty's present Government. In that case I am to suggest, for the consideration of the Government of India, that when the head-quarters of the Political Officer at Dthala are removed to Aden it should be distinctly on the understanding that he can and should, in accordance with a right given by our Treaties, visit Lahej and Dthala freely and somewhat frequently. It is essential that the Resident should maintain a means of obtaining information as to the position of affairs on the frontier, as to the condition of the boundary pillars, and as to the progress of the Amir of Dthala, whom we have launched on a course of rule from which there is, so far as he is concerned, no turning back without complete disaster. The position, I am to suggest, should be very much that recommended in the letter of the 18th April, 1904, from this Government.

9. Concurrently I am directed to press strongly on the attention of the Government of India the absolute necessity of the adoption of the policy advocated in the closing paragraphs of my letter dated the 5th March, 1906, and of extending that policy so as to include the Amir of Dthala. To counterpoise the results of the withdrawal of our presence and moral assistance, the subsidies to both these Chiefs should be very considerably enhanced—that to the Sultan of Lahej should be so increased that he may be in a position at all times to assert unaided that supremacy in the south-west of the hinterland which we have recognized as his prerogative ever since 1881; that to the Amir of Dthala should be so increased that he may be compensated be (so far as we possibly can arrange) for the withdrawal of our assistance and support, and enabled to exert freely the influence which money carries in the polities of the hinterland.

10. By some such means as these it might be possible, in spite of the withdrawal, to gradually reach the position of influence exercised through the Chiefs, which was the object of the policy placed before the Government of India by this Government up to April 1904. The success of such proposals will, of course, have been prejudiced by the subsequent posting of an officer at Dthala and his later withdrawal. But it is, perhaps, permissible still to hope that our officers may be able to consolidate a position with these two Chiefs which will enable us sufficiently to discharge the obligations which the delimitation may involve.

I have, &c.
(Signed) S. W. EDGERLEY,
Chief Secretary to Government.

Inclosure 4 in No. 85.

Political Resident, Aden, to Government of Bombay.

(Secret.)

Sir, *Aden Residency, July* 1, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 16th June, 1906, giving cover to the letter dated the 12th June, 1906, from the Government of India, and to Secret despatch dated the 4th May, 1906, in which my opinion is asked on the subject of our withdrawal from the Aden hinterland.

2. The matter must be considered from two points of view—(*a*) political and (*b*) military. Dealing with the political aspect first, our complete withdrawal from the hinterland would, in my opinion, be shortly followed by a recrudescence of tribal fighting, lawlessness, and acts of violence on the trade routes; by an increase in the illicit traffic in arms; and by an era of intrigue on the part of Turkish frontier officials. Those Chiefs who have thrown in their lot with us would lose all confidence in our policy, and once having lost it would never recover their faith in us. A decrease in the volume of inland trade with this port would at once follow as a natural consequence of the insecurity of the roads, and of our inability to supervise and control the levy of transit dues.

3. But if His Majesty's Government do not regard these matters as important, and are prepared to withdraw from the protected tribes the benefits and assistance that they unquestionably derive from our presence, limiting the visits of the Political Agent to those occasions on which Turkish encroachment may render his presence necessary, then there is something to be said in favour of our complete and permanent withdrawal from the hinterland and its affairs. This Residency would be relieved of an infinity of labour and correspondence with the tribes, and from a certain responsibility which now attaches to the assistance we afford to the Chiefs, while some saving may result in the grant for Durbar presents.

4. But between this course and that which we now pursue I see no middle road. By means of constant personal intercourse with the Chiefs and people, the Political Agent, Dthala, and to a lesser degree the Resident, is able to win their confidence and regard. The Chiefs constantly appeal to us for friendly advice in the settlement of tribal disputes, and we instruct them as opportunity offers in the principles of good government, and encourage them to develop the resources of their States. They readily draw comparisons between our methods and the malpractices and extortion practised by the Turks, and the comparison is altogether in our favour, and will continue to be so as long as they have no reason to doubt our good faith, and the genuineness of our support. By these means we have legitimately extended and consolidated our influence and civilizing power in the hinterland. Both Chiefs and people are fully aware that we have no intention of absorbing territory or of assuming control of affairs within tribal limits. Our withdrawal from the hinterland would undoubtedly undo all the good work that we have done there during the past three years.

5. In regard to the railway through Lahej territory, which the Abdali Sultan is anxious to construct, I see no reason why we should check his spirit of enterprise provided it will not affect Turkish susceptibilities. The railway would certainly prove a civilizing influence, and would promote trade and security. There is no need that it should be made beyond the limits of Abdali territory, and difficulties of construction alone would, I think, preclude its being taken into the Dthala hills.

6. Having stated my opinion generally, I now propose to consider in greater detail the effect of such a policy on—

(i.) The Amir of Dthala;

(ii.) The hinterland tribes on the frontier and those through whose territory main caravan routes pass;

(iii.) The Turks and the Imam of Yemen;

(iv.) Our ability to restrict the illicit arms traffic, and on their re-export to Somaliland, and elsewhere.

(i.) With regard to the Amir of Dthala, it is certain that he would view with little less than consternation the withdrawal of our troops from Dthala. As a result of thirty years of Turkish encroachment and intrigue, his tribesmen have learned an independence and a waywardness that have estranged them from him. The moral support which the Amir derives from the actual presence of our troops in his country has done much to correct this, and will in time overcome the reluctance to accept his suzerainty which

constitutes his prime weakness at present. Save for our presence in his country he would be unable to fulfil his Treaty obligations *qua* keeping open the roads and protecting the traffic they carry. He is well aware that our presence in his country does not predicate any desire on our part to administer his territory, but the time when he will be able and willing to dispense with our support is yet too far distant to determine. Withdrawal at this juncture would be disastrous to the Amir.

(ii.) The same applies in a different degree to the frontier tribes, and to those through whose territory run the main trade routes. As an example I may cite the case of the Haushabi Sultan. This Chief is a young and inexperienced Ruler of two years' standing, who has no better example to follow than that of his uncle of infamous memory, who habitually coquetted with the Turks and alienated the sympathies of his tribesmen by his tyrannical rule. The realization of Sultan Ali Mani's hopes depend upon our presence in the country. He has an extensive territory coterminous with the Turkish border, and some of the principal trade routes pass through his country. He has frequently complained of revenue aggressions by Turkish Arabs. These aggressions, though not serious in themselves while we are at hand to support him, would soon become so if we withdrew from the country. It should be recollected that even though the Turkish Government may desire they have not the ability to restrain their Arab subjects, and intrigue and aggression will become chronic.

Again, the case of the Upper Yaffai may be instanced. There is here no actual demarcation of the border, nor may such be desirable just now. But the Yaffai require the constant and close attention of the Political Agent. On our withdrawal Turkish political ascendency would follow on Turkish intrigue. The same may be said of the confederacy which comprises Juban, Nawa, and Dubiani, which are all closely united in Arab politics with Upper Yaffai. Juban, it has been allowed, is within the sphere of Turkish influence, while the rest are within our own. Juban resents this decision and accuses us of bad faith, and threatens to bring about the defection of the other three. If we withdraw, we shall everywhere be accused of surrendering Arab interests to the Turks, and our prestige will suffer proportionately.

(iii.) As to the effect of our withdrawal on the Turks and the Imam of Yemen, it is not difficult to predict that the Turks would view our departure with unqualified satisfaction. It would afford them unlimited opportunities for intrigue and for the furtherance of their Pan-Islamic programme. The Imam himself is no negligible quantity. The success that has attended his arms constitutes a serious menace to Turkish pre-eminence in the province of the Hedjaz and the two sacred cities. The Arab world on this side of the border is watching with keen interest the conflict in the Yemen. The Imam may yet rule the territories contiguous to our frontier. It is well known that he has addressed some of our Chiefs, and their attitude is as yet uncertain. Those best able to gauge local feeling correctly are not prepared to indorse the opinion that the Arab Sunni and Shiah are hopelessly irreconcilable. It must be recollected that the whole of Yemen up to the port of Aden was once ruled by the Imam, and that some of the present Chiefs within our sphere are descendants from Viceroys of the Imams of Yemen.

(iv.) In regard to the effect of our withdrawal on our ability to restrict the illicit traffic in arms and ammunition, there is no doubt that with a recrudescence of disorder will spring up an increased demand for cheap arms. If we are not on the spot we shall be unable to watch it or check its development, and we shall be in even a worse position than we are now to prevent the re-exportation of arms to Somaliland and elsewhere.

7. So much for the political side of the question. From a military point of view, our withdrawal from Dthala must be regarded as wholly disadvantageous. The station of Aden tends to become more and more crowded year by year, notwithstanding our efforts to prevent it. The isthmus barracks have been abandoned on account of their unhealthiness, and those at the crater should be given up for the same reason. The climate and surroundings are such that no military training is possible, while opportunities for recreation are almost non-existent. The British troops there are simply rotting. Dthala, on the other hand, has a good climate and is exceptionally healthy, the men can be worked there all the year round, and their presence is acceptable not only to the Amir but to his people. We shall shortly be able to draw the supplies required for the troops largely from the country itself, with corresponding benefit to the people of Dthala and with economy to ourselves. I should like to see the regiment of native troops now there withdrawn and replaced by two companies of British troops. This would have the effect of reducing the garrison by six companies, and at the same time would enable us to withdraw all British troops from the crater.

8. In conclusion, I venture to deprecate any multiplication of our responsibilities and any interference in tribal affairs in the hinterland. But our presence there has, so far, been productive of nothing but good to the Chiefs and tribes under our protection, and this being so, having put our hand to the plough we should not turn back.

Inclosure 5 in No. 85.

Mr. Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, September* 12, 1906.

ADEN hinterland: Your letter of the 9th August.

I am unable, after careful consideration of your representations, substantially to modify conclusions set forth in my despatch of the 4th May. Despatch will follow as soon as possible containing full examination of your views. Meanwhile, spirit of strict non-intervention, and understanding that retention of Political Officer, Dthala, is strictly temporary, should continue to regulate action of that officer and of Resident at Aden. Affairs should therefore be so conducted by them that when withdrawal of Political Officer takes place its effect may be minimized, and any extension of responsibilities with the Upper Yafai or other Sheikhs should be carefully avoided by them.

Inclosure 6 in No. 85.

Mr. Morley to Government of India.

(Secret.)

My Lord, *India Office, October* 5, 1906.

I HAVE given careful consideration to your Excellency's Secret despatch of the 9th August, as well as to the inclosures with which you favour me containing the correspondence with the Government of Bombay and the Resident at Aden. I am obliged to your Excellency for thus placing me in complete possession of the opinions held both at Simla and by the local authorities upon the points of detail involved in the policy laid down in my Secret despatch of the 4th May.

2. The discussion throws light upon the views that have influenced the course pursued since the delimitation of the external frontier of the Aden Protectorate, and it marks the difference of opinion that exists as to the objects sought by the local authorities and His Majesty's Government respectively. The retention of a part of the Aden garrison at Dthala, and the permanent presence there of a British Agent, are advocated by the Government of India as developing the policy of the delimitation by the extended establishment of British authority among the tribes on our side of the border. To accomplish this end, it appears to be considered necessary to overcome the reluctance of the tribesmen to accept the suzerainty of the Amir of Dthala; to carry our influence into the territory of other tribes with whom we had practically no dealings till, during the delimitation, Treaties were concluded with representatives of the Upper Yafai, who are now discovered to be persons of no real authority; to secure for the Chiefs of the protected tribes ready and friendly advice in the settlement of tribal disputes; to check the spread of the Pan-Islamic programme in Yemen; and to maintain our reputation with the Arabs.

In the opinion of His Majesty's Government, on the other hand, British interests at Aden are mainly centred in the British territory and fortress at Aden, and the primary object of recent arrangements with the Ottoman Porte was to reduce the risk of international complications by arriving at a definite understanding as to the outer boundary of the tribal country in political relations with the British Settlement. Turkish infractions of a serious character since the notification made to the Porte in 1873 have been mainly due to the want of a map recognized as correct by both the Turkish and the British Governments. Within the Protectorate of the nine cantons, since the occupation of Aden in 1839, there has usually been some degree of disturbance, and the precise authority of the leading Chiefs has changed so much from time to time that our policy in direct negotiations with the tribesmen has necessarily followed the varying exigencies of the day. For instance, the Subaihis were, by the engagement of the 5th May, 1881, recognized as under the "sovereign authority" of the Abdali Sultan, but after five years it became necessary to treat that arrangement as inoperative, and the Subaihis resumed their former independent relations with the Aden Residency. The guiding fact is that during the last half century these inter-tribal disputes have, to a large

extent, regulated themselves, and admitted of peaceful settlement by the Resident at Aden, without the continual presence of either troops or Political Agents in the interior. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government the recent Treaties of demarcation and protectorate ought to strengthen the hands of the political authorities at Aden in resuming the long-standing policy of inactivity, and call for no departure from it. It may be perfectly true that the Arabs expect British troops to remain in their country, and that some Chiefs and some sections of tribes might be glad of their support. But His Majesty's Government never authorized any action calculated to commit them to this extension of their responsibilities, involving, as it must, an augmentation of the Aden garrison, and an increase of expenditure. The protection formally extended to the tribes is a protection against foreign aggression, and had particular reference to the proceedings of the Turkish Government, in respect of which the situation has been fundamentally altered by the settlement of the frontier agreed to by the Porte. The presence of a British garrison at Dthala is only too likely to be regarded as inimical to Turkish interests, and as indicating an intention to interfere more than formerly in matters of tribal administration. It is inconsistent with a policy of reliance on the effect of diplomatic representations at Constantinople in the event of violations of the frontier or serious disputes, and for the reasons stated in paragraph 2 of my despatch dated the 4th May, 1906, is open to other serious objections.

3. With much satisfaction I observe that the general principle now decisively adopted by His Majesty's Government commands the cheerful adherence of your Excellency in Council. You inform me (paragraph 4) that you "most cordially subscribe to the policy of non-interference with the internal and domestic policy of the tribes." This cardinal principle, then, we hold in common. The suggested applications of that principle, however, disclose a view of its practical meaning which I am unable to share. For example, your Excellency discusses the use of a subsidy in enabling the Amir of Dthala to hold his own either against the tribes or the Turks; and the point is emphasized that "such success as has hitherto attended the policy of consolidating the waning authority of the Amir of Dthala, has been mainly due to the moral and material support which is afforded to him by the presence of our Political Agent and the British force at that place." Or, as the Aden Resident puts it, the moral support of our troops "will in time overcome the reluctance (of the tribesmen) to accept the Amir's suzerainty." Surely here is an unexpected version of the policy of non-interference with the domestic affairs of the tribes, and studious non-entanglement in purely tribal affairs (paragraph 8). It seems to reduce cordial adhesion to the much less hopeful level of pious opinion. This rather perplexing interpretation of the policy of non-interference and freedom from entanglement undergoes in later paragraphs a still more formidable extension. "If Turkish intrigue and Mahommedan fanaticism are to be left uncontrolled in that country [the Aden hinterland]," so the Government of India assure me, "we fear that we shall before long be involved in operations that might have been avoided by a firm and consistent attitude towards the tribes" (paragraph 13). But what is this attitude to be? Interference or non-interference? We are to take in hand from Aden the control of Turkish intrigue and Mahommedan fanaticism. "It [our withdrawal]," says the Resident at Aden, "would afford them [the Turks] unlimited opportunities for . . . . the furtherance of the Pan-Islamic programme." Can we hope to exercise this control over such subtle and pervasive forces as fanaticism and intrigue without meddling in any of the internal and domestic doings of the tribes? We are urged to look even further than this. "There is a real danger," your Excellency warns us, "that, if we now withdraw, in a few years we may be confronted with an independent Arabia." These apprehensions, if I understand them aright, point to an indefinite period of such observation and control as would either be meaningless and ineffectual, or else would inevitably draw us into that active, perpetual, and costly interference, to the mischiefs of which we all with entire sincerity profess ourselves alive.

4. Here I find myself compelled to draw attention to the Indian aspect of this discussion, that being the only aspect with which the Government of India is immediately concerned. We are, it would seem, to extend the military and financial liabilities of India, not merely to help or defend the fortress at Aden, but to "stem a religious tide in Yemen," though, by the way, the stemming of religious tides is a delicate operation, and has never hitherto been regarded as a desirable, or even tolerable, element in Indian policy. Next, I would ask whether this is a case in which we should be guided by precedents from the North-West and other frontiers of the Indian Empire. The Aden hinterland is not a frontier province in any natural sense. Aden is an outlying post administratively connected with Bombay, and wholly different in its character from the boundaries that have been reached upon our vast border-line to-day after

twenty years of conflict both in council and in arms. The position of Aden, in short, in the ordering of Indian territories and policy is peculiar, and arguments overlooking this circumstance may easily fall wide of any true mark of Indian statesmanship.

5. Whether the rise of an independent Arabia be a near or a remote contingency, there can at least be no doubt that the advent of such a question upon the international horizon, whatever part a British Government might choose to take in respect of it, would assuredly be a subject of Imperial policy, not to be decided by considerations of Indian interest alone, or even primarily. Lord Salisbury, as Secretary of State for India, pointed out, in the year 1874, the marked change that has been effected in the military, political, and commercial value to Great Britain of our position at Aden, since it came into our possession as a decayed Settlement of comparatively small importance nearly seventy years ago. The Suez Canal wholly transformed its place in any system of Indian interests, making it the key to the great commercial highway to the East, used by great fleets of merchant-ships of all the nations of the world. "We are thus involved," said Lord Salisbury, "in diplomatic action in which India has no direct voice, and over which she has no practical control." The occupation of Aden, in short, derives its principal importance "from its relation to the general foreign policy of the Empire, in which it holds a position analogous to that of Malta and Gibraltar." This proposition is beyond dispute. In view of it, any enlargement of Indian obligations in regard to Aden is wholly unjustifiable, and all operations tending in any degree towards such an enlargement are to be sedulously and vigilantly avoided.

6. From these larger considerations of general policy I pass to what may be regarded as the secondary arguments in your Excellency's despatch. It is stated that Aden is unhealthy, and that troops cannot be trained at Aden. Neither the Aden Administration Reports nor the Army Medical Reports accessible to me tend to prove that the climate has become of late more injurious either to native or European troops. Compared even with the Returns for Poona, Aden seems to be not particularly unhealthy. Indeed, it would appear that the native troops have suffered more severely than before, since they were required to serve in the interior. As regards training, I understand that the position is not affected by anything that has occurred of late, and so long as our military and naval requirements demand the presence of a garrison on this distant portion of the Presidency of Bombay, the situation must be alleviated otherwise than by the maintenance of a sanatorium in the interior. If in the opinion of your Government any special measures are required at Aden itself for the comfort of the garrison or for their proper training, I shall be ready to consider them, but His Majesty's Government are not prepared to withdraw the troops which are required for other purposes at Aden to Dthala, which is nearly 100 miles from the coast. I shall therefore be glad to learn when your Excellency in Council has withdrawn to Aden, or, if you think fit, to India, the detachment now stationed at Dthala, which can be most conveniently effected in the course of the present relief season.

I may notice one other argument which is brought forward as a reason for remaining in the Amiri country—namely, the control of the arms traffic. So long as arms can be landed on the coast, no troops that we can employ in the interior will prevent the passage of arms, and I am unable to agree that the Europeans stationed at Dthala can be of any material service in stopping that traffic.

8. The question has also to be considered in its financial aspect. The latest Aden Administration Report received (for 1904–05) shows the expenditure under the heads respectively of "Political," "Territorial and Political Pensions," and "Military," as 3,02,014 rupees, 73,775 rupees, and 38,54,091 rupees. Doubtless this scale of expenditure has since been reduced in consequence of the termination of the delimitation proceedings, but the figures I have quoted are very greatly in excess of those for the year 1899–1900, when the cost under "Political" was 1,97,826 rupees, under "Territorial and Political Pensions" 73,383 rupees, and under "Military" 17,62,816 rupees.

9. As regards the Political Officer at Dthala, it was recognized in my despatch of the 4th May that, in existing circumstances, his immediate withdrawal might be impracticable. This view is confirmed by the despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople of the 7th August last. But His Majesty's Government continue of opinion that his retention should be strictly temporary; and the Political Officer should conduct affairs on that understanding, so as to minimize the effect of his departure when it takes place. In the meantime there is no objection to his discussing, as suggested by Sir N. O'Conor, affairs of secondary importance with the local Turkish authorities when necessary. He should, however, be circumspect in dealing with complaints, and careful not to exaggerate such incidents as may occur. The need for caution is shown by the precipitancy of the action taken on the occasion of the alleged violation of Amiri

territory reported in the correspondence terminating with the Government of India's letter of the 29th December, 1904.

10. I must request that no sort of permission or encouragement be given to the extension of any line of railway into the British territory at Aden without my express sanction, and I should like to be informed what steps have been taken by the Abdali Sultan towards giving any Concession for railway enterprise in his own country. I notice that the commerce of Aden by land has fallen off in recent years, and I should wish to know what estimates have been framed of the cost of a railway in the Abdali territory and of its probable profits.

11. Your Excellency revives the question of the detachment of Aden from the Presidency of Bombay. That question, last raised by the Governor-General in Council in 1903, in the despatch mentioned by your Excellency,* is of great importance, and deserves the full consideration that you may be disposed to give to it. It will, however, be more freely discussed when the Administration of Aden has resumed its normal lines. Meanwhile, if your Excellency should approve of any suggestions made by the Government of Bombay for strengthening the Administration of that portion of the Presidency of Bombay I will give them my prompt attention. Since the Resident must be largely occupied in his military duties, I am disposed to believe that the appointment of a specially qualified First Assistant to co-operate in tribal and frontier affairs would be altogether advantageous, and I should be glad if an arrangement with that object could be made without delay.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JOHN MORLEY.

[34496] No. 86.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 12.)

(No. 198.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, October 12, 1906.*

A TELEGRAM from Major Ramsay at Bagdad states that the number of people taking refuge outside the Vice-Consulate at Kerbela, referred to in my despatch No. 670 of the 30th ultimo, is becoming greater, and that the refugees fear to disperse now lest they should be punished.

A Petition to the Vali has been advised by Major Ramsay to ask for an undertaking that those taking part in this demonstration should not be subjected to punishment, and the Vali has been authorized, upon my suggestion, to give an assurance in this sense.

[34697] No. 87.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 679.)
Sir, *Therapia, October 8, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the Hama–Aleppo section of the Beyrout–Aleppo line was inaugurated on the 4th instant, and opened to traffic on the following day.

As Sir R. Drummond-Hay pointed out in his Trade Report for 1905, the opening of this section will probably have a considerable effect on the commercial importance of Beyrout.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[35182] No. 88.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 19.)

(No. 688.)
Sir, *Therapia, October 12, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to report that I received a telegram yesterday from His Majesty's Consul at Damascus, according to which serious fighting has taken place

* Secret, May 14, 1903.

between Hauran Druses and Arabs, the former mustering 3,000 and the latter 2,000. The Vali considers that the former are the aggressors.

Two squadrons of cavalry with some gendarmes have been sent to intervene.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[35097] No. 89.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 689.)
Sir, *Constantinople, October 13, 1906.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 198 of the 12th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a telegram from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bagdad relating to the Persian refugees at the British Vice-Consulate at Kerbela.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 89.

Consul-General Ramsay to Mr. G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Bagdad, October 11, 1906.*

MORE shops are being closed at Kerbela, and the number of refugees outside the Vice-Consulate is increasing. The British Vice-Consul reports, and many Persians I have seen say, that eventualities are being keenly watched by some of the local tribes, who incline to join the demand for British protection. I hope the Vali, whom I have seen, was persuaded that the matter was one in which only Persian politics are concerned. I spoke plainly to the Persian Consul-General regarding the grievances against Persian officials, and informed him of my refusal to interfere. I have recommended a petition to the Vali asking for assurance that demonstrators will not be punished by the Turkish officials if they disperse, which they are now afraid to do, and stating that the demonstration is not anti-Turkish. I asked Vali unofficially whether such a petition would be acceptable. The Turks tried to take the Shabrié tax, which the Persians had been told not to pay by their Consular officials, by force on the 26th September, and the Persians were told to go away when they appealed to the Persian Representatives. The Kazi is said to have cursed and spat upon one Shia Seyed, no protest being made by the Persian Consular Representative, and the flight to the Vice-Consulate is the result. The Persians are very obstinate, and Shia religious feeling is in a dangerous state of excitement. I daily see and hear some Persians patiently but firmly decline to intervene, and advise careful consideration of Turkish feelings and moderation. I have not mentioned the matter to the Vali, who has a character for Sunni fanaticism, but the resumption of normal conditions would be rendered easier if a more conciliatory man could be substituted for the Kazi at Kerbela. A great interest is being taken in the movement by the Russian Consul-General.

[35175] No. 90.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 190.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, October 18, 1906.*

PERSIANS at Kerbela.

With reference to my telegram No. 198 of the 12th instant, I received a telegram dated the 14th instant from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bagdad reporting that the sole obstacle to ending the incident was the Vali, who was making difficulties about giving an assurance of impunity to the demonstrators if they dispersed. Major Ramsay also stated that he was being forced more and more to the front and that the situation was critical.

On my further representations precise instructions were sent on the 16th instant to the Vali by the Grand Vizier ordering him to give the assurance desired.

I explained to the Russian Ambassador how anxious we are to be rid of the demonstrators, and I told his Excellency what I have done in the matter.

[34373] No. 91.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 568.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October 18, 1906.*

THE French Minister called at this Office on the 10th instant, and, with reference to my note to him of the 22nd August last on the subject of the Muscat dhows (see my despatch to your Excellency No. 455 of that date), made a communication to the following effect:—

M. Léon Bourgeois had instructed him to inform me that he appreciated the conciliatory character of the proposals of His Majesty's Government. Some time would be required for the examination of these proposals, but he would do his utmost to send me as soon as possible a definitive reply, which he earnestly hoped would result in a direct agreement.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD GREY.

[35458] No. 92.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 693.)
Sir, *Therapia, October 15, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Van reporting on the state of that vilayet. In accordance with the request contained at the end of Captain Dickson's despatch, I have authorized him to make the tour in his district which he proposes at a cost not exceeding 100*l*.

I shall be glad to receive your instructions as to the payment of the remuneration due to Mr. Shordone, who, with your approval, has been Acting British Vice-Consul since the departure of Captain Tyrrell.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 92.

Vice-Consul Dickson to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 4.)
Sir, *Van, September 24, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose a report on the state of the Van Vilayet and of the Armenians in the vilayet; I also inclose a copy of my letter to the American Embassy, which I trust you will approve. I had no difficulty in obtaining a teskereh for Mr. Wigram, of the Archbishop's mission, to travel in the same district where he now is. I also inclose some notes on the country I passed through on my way here in case they may interest you.

From the time of Captain Tyrrell's departure from Van in December 1905 till my arrival on the 6th September, 1906, the dragoman, Mr. Shordone, has been performing the duties of Acting Vice-Consul, but has received no extra remuneration; from Chapter VII, paragraph 6, Consular Regulations, I take it he is entitled to remuneration, if you will sanction it.

The vilayet is quiet, and I see no apparent cause for disturbance while the Vali remains here. He has asked for leave to go to Constantinople to be operated upon for a tumour on his throat, but this has been refused, and he now purposes to have a surgeon brought here to perform it.

The economic outlook in the vilayet is not altogether good. The harvests have been good in most districts, but in the districts of Havasor, Hawash, Karchikan, Van, Timar, and Archag, all within the vicinity of Van, the harvest has been bad, this they attribute to heavy rains in the spring and dry weather since, with northerly winds and a blight. I fear there will be some suffering in these districts in the winter, and the Vali has taken steps to obtain grain from the Bitlis Vilayet in anticipation. The principal sufferers will be the Armenians, as the Kurds can afford to buy grain. There are no complaints at present from the mountainous districts about the crops.

I will be glad if you will grant me the permission to make a journey to Shattak, Julamerk, Gavvar, Suj Bulak, Urmia, and Khoi, on the Persian frontier, and back to Van. This embraces some of the most important districts in my vilayet—those of the Shekak Kurds and the Nestorian Christians; and, while allowing me to become acquainted with the country and the various Chiefs, it will enable me to do some work the Intelligence Office wish me to do. You may rely on my doing this work without raising the suspicions of the Turkish officials. As it is late in the year the weather may prevent my completing the whole tour, but I calculate that it should take me about six weeks, and that the total cost would be about 100*l.*

My colleague, the Russian Consul, has just completed this same tour, and is now setting off on another tour in the Hakiari district.

I am expecting Captain Sykes and his wife to arrive here to-morrow evening from Bitlis.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BERTRAM DICKSON, *Captain, R.F.A.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 92.

Report on the Armenian Position in Van Vilayet.

THE Armenians in the villages of the vilayet are quiet and industrious, but lie between two disturbing forces, the revolutionary Armenians and the Kurds.

The revolutionary Armenians—better educated men, and a great number of them men who have been in Europe or America—are well armed, well clothed, and well fed. They are supplied with money from America, Russia, and England (mostly from the latter); they come over from Persia and Russia in bands, and hide in the mountains; they come down to the Armenian villages (much against the will of the villagers), and by force of arms and other persuasions extract money and food from the villagers, and then go back to the hills—in fact, they live a comfortable brigand life, with the only disadvantage that they are sometimes caught and shot. They only prey on the Armenians, and only by accident come to blows with the gendarmes.

The Kurds, all well armed and mostly well-to-do, live among the Armenians, and treat them in various ways.

Some Kurds (the Ryats) live in the same villages with the Armenians, and make them work for them by force; also when the tax-gatherers arrive, and the Armenians cannot pay them, the Kurds lend them money at huge interest, which they collect in kind the following harvest. Another method is to give the Armenians the seed in the spring, and then take 50 per cent. of the crop, standing by the threshing-floor to take it. But these are the amiable Kurds, and the Armenians do not complain of these.

The other Kurds (the Ashirets), generally Hamidié, and led by their officers, make raids on the villages, ill-treat the people, take their cattle and sheep and crops, often killing an odd Armenian as well. These Kurds give as excuse for these raids—if excuse is needed—that the villagers are revolutionaries, or are harbouring revolutionaries, the latter excuse being often true, though quite against the wish of the Armenians. Thus the villager is bullied and robbed, first by the revolutionaries, and again by the Kurds for having dealings with the revolutionaries. One usually hears of any act of aggression by Kurds, but those by the revolutionaries one does not hear of so easily, as the villagers are frightened of being found telling tales by the revolutionaries; and also, if they give information to the Turks they are probably accused of having dealings with them, so they keep quiet.

At the present moment there are a good many revolutionaries in the vilayet, but as they only prey on the villagers and keep to the hills, they do not trouble the Government, the policy of the present Vali being a peaceful one. But should this Vali leave and the Military Commandant take charge, the opinion is that very strong measures would at once be taken, and, in fact, massacres would occur, as the Military Commandant has very pronounced anti-revolutionary, anti-Armenian ideas, and wishes to be given a free hand to enter and search any house for revolutionaries or literature, &c. But the Vali rightly will not permit this, as one shot fired by an angry Armenian at a zaptieh would precipitate a massacre.

There is no doubt that the revolutionaries have a large organization both here and abroad. From what I can gather, they are split up into two factions, the Armenia and the Tashnak.

The Armenia, who are the smaller faction, have their chief in Van, and an under-chief at Alakéni, and wish to gain their end by European intervention and not by arms. These intrigue in the villages unarmed.

The Tashnak, who are more numerous, aim at armed insurrection among all the Armenians, and in some cases even go so far as to force villagers to buy arms from them. They have two Chiefs, one at Van and one in the mountains at Gargar, near Mukus. These are the armed bandits who worry the villagers.

At the present moment several Kurdish Chiefs are discontented with the Government, amongst them those in the districts of Shamdinan, Karchikan, Mukus, and Abagha. These Kurds favour the Tashnaks, and, in fact, supply them with arms and ammunition. Many of these Kurds belong to the Hamidié. On the other hand, the Kurds round Sephan and Bashkala are bitter against the Armenians, with the result that there are no revolutionaries about Sephan.

The Turkish Government suspect the American missions and schools of aiding the revolutionaries, not possibly knowingly, but aiding them, nevertheless, by harbouring revolutionaries and the workers in their schools, as, in some instances of revolutionaries captured, they have been found to be protégés of the Americans, and in one case a leader caught recently was an ex-professor at Van mission, with a diploma of Dr. Raynolds in his pocket; also several mission Armenians have been found with revolutionary papers and letters on them.

The Americans themselves admit that some of their pupils leave the schools and become revolutionaries, though they do all in their power to prevent it, and to make them good Turkish citizens. Still, the fact remains the Government look on them as hotbeds of intrigue, and this is the reason of the attitude taken by them in refusing permission to American missionaries to travel.

Inclosure 3 in No. 92.

Vice-Consul Dickson to Mr. Leishman.

Van, September 23, 1906.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency, in support of my telegram of the 22nd instant, that Mr. McDowell, of the American Mission here, asked me to obtain for him a teskereh to enable him to travel to Gavvar, Urmia, Amadia, Jezireh, and Bitlis, starting on the 9th October. The Vali had already refused this teskereh.

I called on the Vali and asked for this teskereh. The Vali informed me that he could give him one to go to Urmia, but was forbidden from Constantinople to allow the American missionaries to travel in the vilayet. I asked if this prohibition was for all foreigners; he said for Americans only. I asked if for all Americans; he said only for the missionaries. He said the country was quiet; the prohibition is from Constantinople. I informed Mr. McDowell of the result, and sent you my telegram.

In view of any steps you take in this matter, I presume that you are aware that the Government look on the American schools as hotbeds of intrigue, and having captured revolutionaries who are ex-pupils of these schools, and in one case a leader who is an ex-professor of the Van school, they have some slight ground for their suspicions, though I do not for an instant suggest that they attribute any wilful intent to the Americans; yet the fact remains that some of the Armenian revolutionaries have certainly used the missions and schools for their own ends. Hence the action of the Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BERTRAM DICKSON, *Captain, R.F.A.*

Inclosure 4 in No. 92.

Notes on Country between Erzeroum and Van.

FROM Erzeroum there is a metalled road up the Palenduken Dagh as far as the two forts at the summit. This was built for military purposes, but it is being

extended to Khinis and the south, though very slowly, yet there are a few road-makers' camps here and there at work.

On descending from the Palenduken into the Tekman district, inhabited by the Zirikanli Kurds, at first one passes across miles of grassy downland, with here and there large flocks of sheep and goats, but little cultivation and no villages. This is the summer grazing ground. These Kurds only cultivate enough for their own needs. In this district bad hailstorms in the spring spoilt their crops, but the hay and sheep have been good. The villages all seem very flourishing and quiet, and they have no complaints.

Passing on down to the Aras Valley, which is very fertile, and there are many Kurdish villages in and around it, I was impressed with the good harvests and general prosperous look of the place, and also the air of peacefulness. This valley has not suffered from hail.

In the Khinis district, too, the harvests have been good, and all the Kurdish villagers seem very satisfied; not so the Armenian, of which there are several along the Khinis Su Valley—viz., Kharos, Elpis, Parmakriz, Kilissa, Derisi, &c. In nearly every one of these villages are resident three or four Kurd families, who make the Armenians work for them and lend them money to pay their taxes, exacting 50 per cent. or more interest, and taking it generally in kind when the harvest comes in, thus leaving the Armenian little, if any, to pay his taxes and live out the winter on. This, however, is considered nothing. What the Armenians do complain of is the raids of the Hassananli Kurds from the Khamur Dagh and Bulmuk districts. These come down in bands in their Hamidié uniforms, armed to the teeth, and after stripping and beating the Armenians they come across, go off with their cattle; several cases of actual murder were mentioned to me. These Armenians complain to the Mutessarif at Khinis, but stated to me that in no case was any redress made, and certainly the Kurds were never punished.

At Charbahur and Tapa are colonies of Circassians. Here they are content, the Kurds dare not trouble them, and their harvests and cattle and sheep have done remarkably well.

Up the Murad Su Valley, from Charbahur to Gop, a wild, rough, hilly country, where the Murad, one of the arms of the Euphrates, runs through a succession of gorges, the Hassananli Kurds have it all their own way, and there are many of their villages on the high hillsides, and very well selected they are, in well-sheltered, productive ravines. The Government does not interfere with them, but they fight a good deal amongst themselves here. Their harvests this year have been excellent, and their flocks also, including the increases from the Armenians in the Khinis Valley and Gop Plain.

Leaving the highlands by the Goli Baba Dagh, and descending into the plain at Akrag and Shaberat, come alternate Armenian and Kurd villages. The Kurds are always content, as far as it is in their nature to be, and the Armenians here do not seem to be doing so badly.

Further on, around Gop and in the Gop Plain, Tirhoot, Onjalu, &c., all Armenian villages, and very large ones, they complain of having had too much rain in the spring, and the ground does not stand much, and the result is bad crops, and they all fear hardships this winter. The Mutessarif of Moush, who was at Gop, told me that the Armenians about Bulanik were lazy, and it was their fault that the harvest was bad. I am inclined to believe that the rain was bad, and also that the Armenians do not see the use of working to get larger crops for the tax-gatherers or Kurds to benefit by; certainly they all present a wretched appearance.

Between Gop and Akhlat, on Lake Van, are several Circassian villages all doing well. The Haideranli Kurds are in this region, and have a bad reputation as unprincipled brigands; the few Armenian villages—Piran, Pirkhus, Kharmunj, &c.—all complain bitterly of their ravages. The crops in this region were spoiled by hot winds, so the Armenians told me, but to me they looked very good.

The various Armenian villages along the shore of Lake Van, Zigag, Gizvag, Tadvan, &c., complained of the harvest, and the price of corn and fodder was very dear, but I think this is in a great measure due to their not cultivating more than they actually have to.

The villages on the southern shore of the lake have nothing to grumble at as regards crops, everywhere it is admitted it has been a good year for cattle and sheep.

The district of Kharchikan, a large basin, whose only outlet is through a small natural tunnel in the side of a hill. Owing to the heavy spring rains, the whole of this

plain was flooded for several weeks, while the water drained through this small tunnel, with the result that it greatly handicapped the villages (*i.e.*, Guella, Kindrandz, and Pogha) which were in the plain (all these villages are Armenian), whilst the Kurd villages in the same basin hold the higher and better ground and did not suffer.

[35460] No. 93.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 695.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October 16, 1906.*

WITH reference to Sir N. O'Conor's despatch No. 542 of the 8th August, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch, from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Hodeidah, reporting his arrival at Sana'a, and giving an account of the country and of the inhabitants, as well as his impressions of the Vali, Marshal Fezi Pasha.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 93.

Vice-Consul Richardson to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 76. Confidential.)

Sir, *Sana'a, September 5, 1906.*

I AM in receipt of your Excellency's despatch of the 10th August, that reached me here yesterday, approving of my proposed tour in the Yemen and my annual summer visit to Sana'a.

Unfortunately, owing to pressure of work at Hodeidah and being single-handed, I was unable to leave Hodeidah at the end of July as intended. I started out on my journey on the 21st ultimo as telegraphed to Constantinople, and after spending two days *en route* reached the capital safely on the 31st.

The Adjoint of the Governor-General, Mahmoud Nedim Bey, who has been officiating as Mutessarif of Hodeidah during the past three months, and was about to rejoin his appointment, accompanied me on the journey and afforded me every assistance and facility.

An adequate escort was provided as usual, and thanks to the courtesy of the Vali, Marshal Fezi Pasha, orders had been sent to the civil and military officials in all the towns through which I passed, to accord me a fitting welcome and to receive me hospitably.

On arrival I paid the usual official visits to the Vali and Commander-in-chief, Ahmed Fezi Pasha, the Inspector-General of the vilayet, and President of the Yemen Reforms Commission, Ferid Pasha, and to the Adjoint of the Vali respectively, which were duly returned.

I was present by invitation on the 1st instant at the celebration of the anniversary of the accession to the throne of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, which took the form of a ceremonial parade of all troops in garrison, followed by a reception, at which I attended and offered my congratulations officially.

This being my fourth visit to Sana'a, I am inclined to think that the local authorities have to a certain extent abandoned their former idea that such are undertaken with some secret motives bearing a political signification. It is most obvious that they should do so, considering the suspicious nature of the Turk generally, the fact that no foreign Consul has ever resided at or visited Sana'a, and in the face of the important and occasionally conflicting interests possessed by the British Government on the south-eastern frontier of this Ottoman Province. The majority of officials have now come to regard my annual visit here as one resorted to with the view of escaping from the trying and enervating climate of Hodeidah.

I do not think that the Porte would raise much objection to the establishment of a Consulate here at any future period should His Majesty's Government so desire, since the vilayet has received me officially, consented to receive official correspondence sent to it from here, and accepted to treat with me on business affecting British interests and questions raised by the Vice-Consulate at Hodeidah.

Owing to the delay in starting, and proximity of the Indian pilgrimage

necessitating my presence at Cunnaun soon after the 15th October, I find that I shall have to abandon the proposed trip to Ta'iz and Mokha, relegating same to some future occasion. In returning, I hope to pass through Kuttai and Marawar, which places I have never visited before.

I shall reserve my report on the places traversed *en route* till I return to Hodeidah, but take the liberty to make certain observations on the country and its inhabitants from a political point of view.

The line of communication between Hodeidah and Sana'a along the caravan route is secure and adequately garrisoned, some six or seven battalions being utilized for the purpose. Four other battalions are distributed along the Sanfur route, viz., between Obal, Aniz, and Mefaq. There are about a dozen guns altogether, mounted on the prominent heights between Hajjeila and Sana'a, where military posts have been established.

Twelve battalions of infantry, in all 3,000 men strong, two batteries of field artillery consisting of four guns each, and two mountain batteries, with two squadrons of regular and one of irregular cavalry, comprise the Sana'a garrison. The capital has a large fort, and five guard-stations situated on the surrounding hills that overlook and command the city, where big guns are mounted.

There is a force of two infantry battalions at Rauda, 4 miles north of this, with two field guns. Amran and Hajje are also strongly fortified and garrisoned.

It is expected that twelve battalions of redifs, that mutinied a few months ago, will be shortly sent home when fresh drafts arrive.

News received points to a fairly quiet state of affairs in the vilayet just now, no activity on the part of the Imam or the rebels being reported from any quarter since my arrival.

At Suk-el-Khamis on the 28th ultimo, I learnt that Liwa Yussif Pasha had surprised the insurgents near Dhafir about a week previous and had succeeded in killing and capturing nearly 200 of them.

A number of Sheiks throughout the disturbed area have tendered their submission to the Commander-in-chief recently and continue to do so, but the good faith of these Chiefs is questionable, in view of past experience. This submission is not so voluntary as it may appear to be, being induced by the offer of sums of money from the local treasury.

The surrender of arms is also proceeding, but a considerable stock must still be remaining in the hands of the Imam.

Both the civil and military officials generally are now dissatisfied with their lot in the Yemen, and I have been informed by an official in high authority that the local authorities would be glad, under present circumstances, to abandon the mountainous part of this province, which is held under great difficulties and at considerable expense and trouble.

The Field-Marshal, Ahmed Fezi Pasha, who has served, at various intervals, over thirty years in the Yemen, has hinted to me the hopelessness of the situation in the vilayet, unless the Imperial authorities remit funds regularly and the Sultan decides to build the proposed railway between Hodeidah, Sana'a, and Amran.

The Commander-in-chief, who must be quite 80 years of age—though a kind, hospitable old man, is unfortunately a very avaricious official, who left the Yemen some eight years ago, it is said with nearly a million sterling, having enriched himself at the expense of the public revenues.

It is an open secret here that he has not abandoned his corrupt practices, and that he has helped himself liberally to the large remittances from Constantinople with the same lavish hand that he dispensed presents to the different Arab Sheikhs and tribesmen surrendering to him.

It would give the impression to one in conversation with him, and from the opinion of those who should know, that, being quite disgusted with the state of affairs here, he would be glad to sell the country to any Power strong enough to hold it.

Brilliant military services under arduous circumstances, rendered to his country in the past in the time of urgent need, have now begun to tell on his advanced years and iron constitution, and signs of impaired mental ability are quite visible in the old Field-Marshal.

The population of the hilly districts has to a great extent disappeared, and whole villages remain deserted and desolate as the result of the prolonged drought and rebellion.

Sana'a has lost many of its charms, and now presents a dismal appearance, with its gardens and houses partially destroyed, and the latter to a considerable extent uninhabited.

It is believed that more than half the population has been wiped out through famine and the siege last year.

The Jews in particular have suffered terribly. Barely 800 now remain at Sana'a out of a total population formerly of 7,000. Of the latter nearly 1,000 have emigrated to Hodeidah and other places; the remainder have died within the past two years.

This sect, unlike their fraternity throughout the world, do not practise usury, but follow manual and other pursuits, and are artisans, porters, domestic servants, and goldsmiths in this city. A good many are also merchants and tradesmen.

They have been fairly fortunate here under the Turks, who do not particularly persecute them, but merely exact a fixed sum annually from the community for exemption from military service.

The Arabs in the mountains (though quiet, are discontented with Turkish administration, and it is believed generally that they will rise again and join the Imam when a suitable opportunity presents.

There has been a very good rainfall throughout the Turkish sphere of Yemen. The dhurra crops in the Tehama, and the coffee and barley in the mountains near Menakha are flourishing, but rain is still wanted in the capital itself. It is very noticeable that a large area of arable ground near Sana'a, formerly under cultivation, has been abandoned by its agricultural proprietors, who must either have died or run away.

Living is very expensive at present in the capital owing to high transport rates between this and Hodeidah. Trade appears to be in a very depressed condition: cattle and oxen are scarce in the mountains, and have to be imported from the plains. Farmers are at the same time very reluctant to sell their animals or slaughter them for food, as there are not sufficient to meet local agricultural requirements.

About a month ago Sherif Hamza, a nephew of the Grand Shereef of Mecca, arrived at Hodeidah viâ Zaidyia from Kuflet-Izhar, the Imam's capital, where he had been on a visit to the latter. This journey was undertaken at the request of the Grand Shereef apparently, but in reality at the express command of the Sultan, with a view to causing the Imam to come to some arrangement with the Turks and to abandon his hostile attitude.

Sherif Hamza returned shortly afterwards to Mecca, but the result of his mission is kept dark, although I believe that the Imam refused to come to an understanding, profiting, no doubt, from his experience of the good faith of the Turks in the execution of the terms of the Treaty signed at the capitulation of Sana'a in April, 1905.

With truth and great respect, I have, &c.

(Signed) G. A. RICHARDSON.

[35464] No. 94.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 699.)

Sir, *Therapia, October 17, 1906.*

ON receipt of your despatch No. 370 of the 27th August, Sir N. O'Conor instructed His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Van to furnish a report on the alleged ill-treatment of Armenian prisoners on the occasion of the burning of the prison.

I now have the honour to forward a copy of his reply, which shows that the account given to Mr. Hagopian was exaggerated.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 94.

Vice-Consul Dickson to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 5.)

Sir, *Van, September 30, 1906.*

WITH reference to your despatch of the 8th instant requesting me to make investigations concerning the statements contained in Mr. Hagopian's letter and inclosure forwarded to me in the Foreign Office No. 370 of the 27th ultimo, I have the honour to report that I have made inquiries concerning the alleged brutal treatment of Armenian prisoners, and find that many of the allegations made are exaggerated, and that others are false.

As far as I can ascertain the following is the correct version of the affair:—

On the night of the 11th July last the prisoners confined in No. 5 ward of the central prison in this city were unable to sleep on account of the vermin, and began singing. The gaolers ordered the men to cease making a disturbance, whereupon a Kurdish prisoner confined in the ward is reported to have said, "We cannot sleep, and we may not sing, so we will burn the insects," and dashed a petroleum lamp against the door, which caught fire. The burning of the door of No. 5 ward was the sole extent of the fire, but the alarm caused a general panic among the prisoners, and in the confusion the gaolers, conceiving that an organized attempt at escape was being made, attacked the prisoners with the butts of their rifles. However, no shots were fired, and none of the prisoners were at any time in danger of being burned. Subsequently troops were ordered to surround the prison to prevent any attempt to escape being made. After the fire had been extinguished and order restored, Husni and the head gaoler, who still believed, or pretended to believe, that an organized attempt at escape had been made, ordered many of the principal prisoners (some of whom were quartered in parts of the prison remote from the fire) to be brought before them and caused them to be beaten. As the result of this action thirty-three men were injured, though how seriously is hard to say, and one man was killed.

The man Vartkes was brought out later and brutally ill-used. This action was probably prompted by the fact that Husni had a personal grudge against Vartkes, by whom he had been shot in the leg in the scuffle when Vartkes was originally captured last year. No evidence of any kind is forthcoming as to the use of bayonets or swords by either police, gaolers, or military.

Subsequently the Consular Corps made representations to the Vali on the subject of Husni's conduct, and the latter and the head gaoler were immediately dismissed, and are now without employment.

From these facts it will be seen that the account given by Mr. Hagopian's correspondent is exaggerated, even where it happens to coincide with the actual events.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BERTRAM DICKSON,
Captain, R.F.A.

[35466] No. 95.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 701.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October 17, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Aleppo, furnishing a report upon the condition of affairs in that vilayet and on the events of importance which have occurred there within the last six months.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 95.

Consul Longworth to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 23.)

Sir, *Aleppo, October 1, 1906.*

THE Ambassador's despatch of the 30th August reached me on the 22nd ultimo.

I would comply with his Excellency's instructions by recording here the more important events and affairs of the last six months. Such notes and figures as I am in course of collecting on the economic and administrative condition of the vilayet must necessarily be reserved for a future report.

The Authorities.—Incompetence coupled with corruption characterized the generality of the officials. A laxity prevailed that kept in no check the unscrupulous. Trivial offences were punished with undue severity, and on the flimsiest evidence men were incarcerated untried for months, if not for years. Happily for the people, both the Vali Nazim Pasha and the Fairik Bekir Pasha are open to good advice, and as a consequence some progress is being made now towards a better and more orderly government.

Brigandage.—Vigorous measures were latterly taken to establish a greater degree

of public security in the province. Up to the end of July there existed but little safety to life and property. The band of the notorious Kurdish brigand Attouni reappeared after a year and waylaid travellers on the Alexandretta–Aleppo road. Pursued closely by detachments of troops and gendarmes, the chief escaped beyond the limits of this vilayet and that of Adana. Three of the men, however, were shot and 10 arrested, among the latter being his father, who is now in gaol at Aleppo. The lawless took advantage of Attouni's presence in the province to commit in his name acts of robbery and murder, which, occurring at all points of the compass, taxed the vigilance and baffled the efforts of the authorities. The night attack, for instance, on a caravan encampment near Alexandretta was not, as at first believed, by a band of brigands, but by a gang of navvies proceeding from Adana to Hama.

Englishman Robbed.—Dr. and Mrs. Griffith, of the medical mission at Mosul, were travelling in June to Aleppo. Reaching Beridjik, they pitched their tents on the bank of the Euphrates at a village named Kafir, where, whilst asleep during the night, they were plundered of almost all their effects and clothing. The Zabtieh was suspected of connivance, for he refused to sleep near the tent, and when the alarm was given he was seen returning to the camp. Several arrests were made, but the real thieves are still at large, and the stolen articles have not been found. The Vali has promised to compensate the victims in full, and he is accordingly claiming from the Beridjik authorities the sum of £T. 55.

Kurd and Arab Raids.—Tribal predatory incursions kept the eastern districts in a disturbed condition, to the no little detriment of trade. The Kurd Ibrahim Pasha of Viranshehir attacked early in May the Shammar Arab tribe near Nisibin. He was repulsed, losing in drowned and killed some 500 men, besides the animals captured, numbering 600 camels and 400 mares. This was not all, for during his absence the Anazeh tribe raided his encampment and carried off 1,500 camels, 10,000 sheep, and 900 oxen. He appealed to the authorities for succour, but when troops arrived from Deir and Mardin, consisting of 300 mule mounted soldiers, he presented the Commanding Officer with a pile of useless rifles for transmission to Constantinople as trophies of his victory over lawless marauders. Some 200 Anazeh horsemen were bold enough on the 27th July to dare Ibrahim Pasha in his own haunts; but hard riding exhausted man and horse, and they fell an easy prey to the enemy. The expedition cost the Arabs seventeen lives, besides the loss of about 100 mules. A similar exploit with as insufficient a force was latterly attempted by Ibrahim Pasha against the Anazeh tribe, but in the fight sixty of his men were killed and thirty wounded, a defeat which enriched his foes by at least forty good sound mounts.

Ministerial instructions were last week received by the Vali to end these internecine wars. He is accordingly having the Kurdish Chiefs and Arab Sheiks duly warned through the Governors of Ourfa and Rakka, that Imperial troops will in future be employed in the suppression of raids.

Immigrants.—The Circassian immigrants, since their arrival in November, have shown themselves to be rather ungrateful, clamorous, and exacting. Twenty of the more turbulent men were in May locked up for three weeks. It had the salutary effect of making them all less refractory and more reasonable. They number 1,450 all told. About half are still homeless and dependent for subsistence on bread rations. They will be all housed by winter, for fifty of the eighty huts at Hanafir, and twenty of the forty at Rakka are ready, and the rest are being built rapidly at an average cost of £T. 38. Each family is to have a cottage of two rooms, a stable and a yard, with 1,000 donoums of land, a pair of bullocks, a plough, and twelve okes of seed-grain. The funds will suffice, for besides the Government grant of £T. 8,000, the contributions raised locally amount to at least £T. 1,000. Nazim Pasha is also interesting himself in the Cretan immigrants of 1897. These people have hitherto received bread only out of the handsome grant of £T. 19,300, of which there still remains happily £T. 1,300. His Excellency has decided to make no invidious distinctions, and he is therefore having fifty-four of the more indigent families established near Alexandretta, Antioch, and Killis in Settlements similar to those provided for the Circassians.

Revenue.—The items of this year's provincial Budget are not yet fully known. The revenue, however, is likely to show an increase. It will, it is believed, exceed £T. 400,000, and this notwithstanding the failure of the crops owing to the severity of the winter. The tithes indeed have already reached the sum of £T. 183,300 as against £T. 177,000 in 1905, a fact which exposes to light considerable defalcations. The expenditure of the vilayet, both civil and military, amounts to annually £T. 310,000, besides £T. 32,000 and £T. 81,700 assigned respectively to the

service of the Russian War Indemnity, and to the service of the Asiatic Guaranteed Railways. The deficit is evidently covered by the non-payment of pensions and salaries.

Public Works.—Nazim Pasha is having some activity displayed in the construction of roads and edifices. The route to Alexandretta is being shortened from 127 to 96 kilom. by a new branch viâ Turmanin. A carriage road of 12½ kilom. with twelve bridges is being built from Alexandretta to Payas. The road from Aleppo to Biredjik and Ourfa is being repaired, enlarged and macadamized. Sums have been allotted for the works amounting to respectively £T. 6,000, £T. 4,000, £T. 900. A Government house at Bab, and two solid police stations at Aleppo have been erected. The construction here of a large town hall has been started, while the main street, 3 kilom. in length, is being flagged at 10 piastres per each of its 40,000 square metres to render the much used thoroughfare less dirty and dusty.

Railway.—The first engine of the Damascus, Hama and Prolongation Railway reached Aleppo the 2nd August, and since then a few favoured travellers were allowed to use the line for a consideration. The time and tariff table issued by the Company give the following particulars:—

Aleppo to Beirut: time, 18 hours 45 minutes; fares, first-class 242·75 piastres, second-class 167·500 piastres, third-class 91·00 piastres; transport rates per 1,000 kilogs., 131·25 piastres to 203·75 piastres.

Aleppo to Damascus: time, 18 hours 35 minutes; fares, first-class 250·25 piastres, second-class 172·50 piastres, third-class 94·50 piastres; transport rates from 136·00 piastres to 211·75 piastres.

The new road-way will require time to attain firmness and stability. As it is, accidents occur of a nature to make people prefer a coach journey to Hama. The Rowali tribe of Arabs are to protect the section within the Aleppo Vilayet. Four of their Sheikhs have jointly and severally so engaged themselves with the authorities for a monthly stipend £T. 2½ each.

Alexandretta Marshes.—Attempts have been made for now over thirty years to reclaim the fever-breeding swamps of Alexandretta. During the last decade the work was entrusted to a Commission, which latterly misappropriated the funds raised for the purpose, namely, tolls on animals and vehicles amounting yearly to more than £T. 3,000. The Vali when at Alexandretta early in May, inquired into these frauds, and as a consequence the Governor, the Engineer, and the Director of Customs lost their posts. The enterprise is now under the supervision of a mixed Commission, and under the direction of a German engineer in the Turkish Service. The appliances are more modern, and the work is progressing with greater celerity.

Dr. Martin's School.—Some twenty-five years' ago Dr. Martin, of the Irish and Scotch Reformed Presbyterian Mission, bought a piece of land at Antioch and built thereon a dwelling-house and a school. Insufficiency of accommodation being experienced lately, additional class-rooms were opened in a hired house beyond the Mission premises. The one site was unfortunately confounded with the other in the building permit obtained last year, and as a consequence Dr. Martin's new constructions were suddenly stopped in April. Protestations led to the question being referred to the Grand Vizier, and finally, as no answers were vouchsafed to the reiterated telegrams of the Vali, the Consulate, with the concurrence of his Excellency, invited Dr. Martin to recommence building without fear of punishment being inflicted on any of the workmen. It is gratifying to find that I had in this anticipated the instructions of His Majesty's Ambassador.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. Z. LONGWORTH.

[35613] No. 96.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 704.)
Sir, *Therapia, October 18, 1906.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 689 of the 12th instant, I have the honour to transmit a paraphrase of a further telegram from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bagdad on the subject of the situation at Kerbela.

I have drawn the attention of the Sublime Porte to the attitude of the Vali in this matter, making it quite clear that I am in no way concerned as regards the question whether or not the Persians were liable to the tax.

The Grand Vizier has now repeated the instructions to which I referred in my telegram No. 198 of the 12th instant, and has directed the Vali to give assurances that no action will be taken against the demonstrators.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 96.

Consul-General Ramsay to Mr. G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Bagdad, October 14, 1906.*
KERBELA.

I arranged yesterday with the representatives of the Persian refugees to disperse if they received a promise that they would not afterwards be punished from the Vali and their Consul-General. The latter agreed, and the Vali said he would answer to-day after reading a telegram which he had just received in cypher. He now says that this telegram which was from the Grand Vizier is not fully intelligible. I do not believe him, but in the meantime he will not give the required promise until he has had a repetition of the telegram. The incident might be ended but for the Vali, whose attitude in the matter presents the only obstacle. He pretends that the matter is quite an ordinary one, and is extremely unwilling to have a further interview with me as to the measures to be taken. The condition of affairs is critical, and the longer it lasts the more I am forced to come to the front, consequently it is advisable that imperative orders be sent to the Vali.

[36292] No. 97.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 713.)
Sir, *Pera, October 24, 1906.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 636 of the 14th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the "Convention-Annexe" which was signed on the 6th instant between the Minister of Public Works and Mr. H. E. Pears, as representing the Smyrna–Aidin Railway Company, and by which the latter obtains a prolongation of its Concession for a further term of fifteen years, together with extensions of its lines to the lakes of Eghirdir and Bourdour.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY

Inclosure in No. 97.

Convention-Annexe.

ENTRE son Excellence le Ministre du Commerce et des Travaux Publics, agissant au nom du Gouvernement Impérial, d'une part, et M. Henry Pears, agissant au nom de la Compagnie du Chemin de Fer d'Aïdin, placée sous le haut patronage de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, d'autre part;

Il a été convenu ce qui suit:—

ARTICLE Ier.

Le Gouvernement Impérial accorde à la Compagnie du Chemin de Fer d'Aïdin:

1. La prolongation de quinze années de la durée de la Concession des lignes actuellement en exploitation par la dite Compagnie à partir du 15 Octobre, 1935 (N.S.), c'est-à-dire, jusqu'au 15 Octobre, 1950 (N.S.).

2. La Concession de la construction et de l'exploitation d'un prolongement de la

ligne principale, d'une longueur approximative de 91 kilom., à partir de Dinar jusqu'au rivage sud-ouest du Lac d'Eghirdir, situé à environ 10 milles de la ville d'Eghirdir.

3. La Concession de la construction et de l'exploitation d'un embranchement d'environ 13 kilom., partant d'un point de la ligne qui sera ainsi prolongée et aboutissant au Lac de Bourdour.

Les lignes concédées par la présente Convention font partie intégrante du réseau actuellement exploité par la Compagnie et leur Concession prendra fin également, en même temps que la Concession principale, à la date ci-dessus fixée du 15 Octobre, 1950 (v.s.).

ARTICLE II.

Le Gouvernement Impérial s'interdit d'accorder, sans le consentement de la Compagnie, à tout autre personne ou Société : la Concession de la construction de toutes lignes de chemin de fer, pouvant faire concurrence aux lignes concédées à la Compagnie dans un rayon de 40 kilom., c'est-à-dire, 25 milles en tous sens des deux lignes indiquées à l'Article Ier de la présente Convention, ainsi que la Concession de la construction d'une ligne partant d'Adalia et aboutissant soit aux lignes de la Compagnie d'Aïdin, soit à celles d'Anatolie ou de Bagdad.

ARTICLE III.

Le Gouvernement Impérial s'engage à maintenir et à conserver, comme par le passé, le *statu quo*, c'est-à-dire, l'état actuel, en ce qui concerne les transports sur les lacs d'Eghirdir et de Bourdour.

ARTICLE IV.

La Compagnie devra construire et exploiter les lignes dont la Concession est accordée par la présente Convention conformément aux conditions prévues à l'Article III de la Convention du 18 (30) Avril, 1888, c'est-à-dire, à ses frais, risques, et périls. La réception définitive de ces lignes aura lieu un an après leur réception provisoire.

Pour assurer l'exercice régulier du droit de contrôle général et de surveillance appartenant au Gouvernement Impérial, la Compagnie paiera chaque année mensuellement, à l'ordre du Ministère des Travaux Publics, à titre de frais de contrôle des lignes dont la Concession est accordée par la présente Convention, la somme de £T. 3, pour chaque kilomètre de ligne construite et exploitée, et ce à partir de la signature de la présente Convention jusqu'à l'expiration du délai de la Concession.

ARTICLE V.

Le prix du rachat des lignes dont la Concession est accordée par la présente Convention est de 4,600*l.* par kilomètre.

Le Gouvernement Impérial s'achètera ces lignes, aussi bien que les lignes existantes, conformément aux dispositions des Articles IV, V, et VI de la Convention de 1888 ; toutefois, la date du 15 Octobre, 1935, prévue aux Articles ci-dessus, sera remplacée par celle du 15 Octobre, 1950.

ARTICLE VI.

Les dispositions de la Convention susvisée de 1888 non modifiées par la présente Convention seront aussi intégralement applicables aux lignes dont la Concession est accordée par la présente Convention.

La présente Convention-Annexe a été, à la suite d'un Iradé Impérial, signée et échangée, en double exemplaire, à Constantinople, le 18 Chaban 1324 (23 Septembre, 1322 ; 6 Octobre, 1906).

(Pour Ottoman (Aïdin) Railway),
(Signé) HENRY PEARS.

(Signé) ZIHMI.
(Sceau du Ministère du Commerce et des Travaux Publics.)

[36504] No. 98.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 204.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Constantinople, October 29, 1906.*

[PERSIANS at Kerbela.] Following from Bagdad: —

"Telegram received from Vice-Consulate, Kerbela:

"'To-day, 27th instant, about fifteen minutes before sunrise, a party of zaptiehs and Redif soldiers with district watchmen and officers of the Zaptieh and Redif Departments came to disperse Persians. Great confusion and panic prevailed for about a quarter of an hour. Guns were fired in the air. The majority of Persians fled away. Some of them, however, came to the door of the British Vice-Consulate, which was locked and bolted. They battered it with iron, and, breaking the lock and bolt, entered. Of those who were wounded, three or four threw themselves in the Vice-Consulate. One of these wounded has died, and the rest are in their previous condition. At present about forty Persians are sitting on the roof of the Vice-Consulate. I have been successful in again closing the door in order to stop the ingress of others. Reported for information.'"

I hear that seven Redifs and thirteen zaptiehs were wounded in the affray, but have not heard the number of Persian casualties. No other details yet received. The Vali maintains silence.

[36540] No. 99.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 205.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, October 29, 1906.*

PERSIAN demonstration at Kerbela. Major Ramsay's telegram of the 28th instant.

To-day I shall make a complaint to the Grand Vizier of the apparent failure of the Vali of Bagdad to carry out the instructions which I reported in my telegram No. 199 of the 18th October had been sent to him.

I propose, subject to your approval, to refuse to give up the Persians in the Vice-Consulate at Kerbela, who would appear to have resisted the authorities, unless their impunity or safe return to Persia is guaranteed, in the event of the Sublime Porte demanding their surrender.

[36587] No. 100.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 30.)

(No. 718.)
Sir, *Pera, October 25, 1906.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 284 of the 27th April last, I have the honour to report that, according to telegrams received from His Majesty's Consul at Erzeroum, there has been a recrudescence of disturbance in that city.

About 2 o'clock on the morning of the 23rd the Government had the Mufti and two Moslems, who were suspected of taking a leading part in the events of last March, arrested and sent into exile. At daybreak a large crowd of furious Moslems surrounded the Vali's house, demanding the return of the exiles.

The Vali escaped to a private house, but was captured and kept a prisoner. Later, at about 11 A.M. of the same day, the mob seized the Chief of Police, although accompanied by a military guard, and beat him to death, and shortly afterwards they murdered his son in the same way, the soldiers not attempting to interfere. They then went in search of the Commandant of Gendarmerie, and caused serious damage both to his house and to that of the Chief of Police. Another police official was killed later. No excesses were committed against private persons or their property, and there was no panic among the Christians, who seemed to have looked upon the affair as one only concerning the Moslems and the Government.

Later in the same day the Mufti and his two companions were brought back to

Erzeroum, the Vali having been compelled under threat of death to give orders for their return. His Excellency was then allowed to go back to his residence. Throughout the day no action was taken by the troops, who apparently sympathized with the populace, but the Commandant was in active telegraphic communication with the Mushir at Erzinjan.

Yesterday, by order of the Mufti, the shops were reopened, but civil authority remained completely in abeyance, the Government offices being closed and guarded by strong detachments of troops. Soldiers were also posted near the Consulates, it is believed on the initiative of the Commandant.

The town was quiet, and the Moslems, who seemed to be waiting to see what action the Government would take, gave us the sole cause of the rising the illegal and unjustifiable arrest of the Mufti and the other two Moslems.

Mr. Shipley was to be received by the Vali to-day.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[36540] No. 101.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Barclay.

(No. 180.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, October 30, 1906.*

PERSIAN refugees at Kerbela.

I concur in the action proposed in your telegram No. 205 of yesterday.

[36772] No. 102.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 207.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, October 31, 1906.*

HIS Majesty's Acting Consul-General at Bagdad reports in connection with the disturbances at Kerbela that the street in front of the Vice-Consulate is empty, and that the refugees have vacated the Vice-Consulate. The estimate of the number of Persians killed according to the British Vice-Consul is forty persons.

[37177] No. 103.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 731.)
Sir, *Constantinople, October 30, 1906.*

IN continuation of my telegram No. 204 of yesterday respecting the troubles at Kerbela, I have the honour to report that when Mr. Lamb went to the Porte yesterday to complain of the conduct of the Vali of Bagdad he found that the Grand Vizier, who had only heard of what had occurred through Major Ramsay's telegram, which had been sent *en clair*, had already telegraphed in very severe terms to the Vali demanding the fullest information and ordering an inquiry with a view to establishing the responsibility for what had happened.

This morning I have received a further telegram from His Majesty's Consul-General (paraphrase inclosed) which gives no fresh news on the present situation, but shows that in ordering the use of force the Vali broke faith with Major Ramsay. I brought this to the notice of the Grand Vizier and the Minister of Foreign Affairs this afternoon, at the same time pointing out that the Vali had also disobeyed the instructions sent him by the Grand Vizier, and I stated that though it was the Persians who had violated the Vice-Consulate, yet it appeared to be the Vali who was responsible. It was his fault that what was in the first instance merely a demonstration against the collection of an obnoxious tax had become a serious complication, and I expressed the hope that the Government would take steps to mark in the clearest manner its displeasure with his behaviour. The Grand Vizier said that the Persian Consul-General was to a certain extent responsible in that he had incited the Persians to refuse payment of a tax which they had paid for many years, but his Highness admitted that the Vali was much to blame for the manner in

which he had handled the matter throughout. His Highness had reported what had occurred to the Palace, and, when the information which he had demanded reached him, he would do all that was called for in the matter.

I have the honour to inclose copy of a despatch which has just reached me from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bagdad giving details of the earlier stages of these troubles at Kerbela.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

P.S.—*October 31.* I have this morning received a further telegram from His Majesty's Consul-General in Bagdad, reporting that all the Persians who had taken refuge in the Vice-Consulate at Kerbela had vacated the premises and that the street in front of the Vice-Consulate was empty. The Vice-Consul at Kerbela, he says, estimates the number of Persians killed at forty, and states that the Persians were not armed. According to Major Ramsay, the Vali is reported to have said that the Persians fired from the Vice-Consulate, and the Vice-Consul reports that the story is being spread that he and his staff themselves fired. Major Ramsay adds that if British prestige in those regions is to be kept up at all we must show that we strongly resent shots being fired at the Vice-Consulate. In his previous telegram inclosed in this despatch Major Ramsay suggested himself going to Kerbela, but in the telegram received this morning he suggests that it would be better to postpone his visit until it is decided that effective action will be taken in case he reports the Vice-Consul's statements fully verified.

I have replied instructing him to proceed to Kerbela, adding that I have already made a serious complaint against the Vali, and that if the Vice-Consul's reports are confirmed I shall press for the Vali's dismissal.

I trust that the line of action thus indicated will meet with your approval. Whether the Persians are really liable to the tax against which they protested is, of course, no concern of ours; but the slaughter under the very walls of our Vice-Consulate of a number of persons, who no doubt regarded themselves as under our protection, could not but lessen our prestige unless reparation is obtained. There is, it is true, as yet no indication that the Vice-Consulate was intentionally fired upon, but, in any case, the premises were invaded by force; and it was the Vali who, according to present advices, was solely to blame for the circumstances which led to this violation of our Vice-Consulate.

G. B.

Inclosure 1 in No. 103.

Major Ramsay to Mr. G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Bagdad, October 29, 1906.*

I WAS most clearly given to understand by the Vali on the 8th instant that he would consult me before having recourse to force. But on the 26th the Vice-Consul informed me that the Mutessarif had told him that he had orders from the Vali to use force; while on the following day my native agent was assured by the Vali that the use of fire-arms and soldiers had not been, and would not be, authorized by him. The leaders of the movement at Karbala received a notice from me, in writing on the 26th instant, stating that I could not grant their claim to British protection or nationality. I have just received a letter from Vice-Consul reporting that six bullets had been fired at the door and two at the sign-board of the Vice-Consulate. If questioned, the Vali will deny everything, and meanwhile he maintains silence. Unless I hear from you I shall start for Karbala on Wednesday to inquire into the truth of the Vice-Consul's report. Cannot the Vali's dismissal be brought about?

Inclosure 2 in No. 103.

Major Ramsay to Government of India.

Sir, *Bagdad, September 29, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a report on the conduct of Persian subjects of Karbala.

2. On the 26th August, 1906, I received a telegram from the Vice-Consul at

Karbala, that, in accordance with orders received from Bagdad, active steps were being taken by the Karbala authorities to make Persian subjects pay a tax known as the "Shahria tax." The telegram went on to say that a large body of Persian subjects had gone to the Persian (is this an intentional alteration by the Turkish telegraph officials?) Consulate, and that the British Vice-Consul had asked the Mutessarif of Karbala and the Persian Vice-Consul to disperse the gathering. A second telegram, received on the 27th, informed me that the crowd had increased to about 500, that they had pitched tents in the streets, and that they refused to listen to all advice of the British Vice-Consul. About the same time I received a petition, signed by a number of persons, asking for my protection, and I then learned that the crowd had gone, not to the Persian Vice-Consulate, but to the British Vice-Consulate. I therefore telegraphed to the Vice-Consul as follows:—

"Please inform Persians that you have no authority to interfere in disputes between Persian subjects and Turkish officials, and that you cannot therefore do so. You should be absolutely neutral and refuse to take any action."

On the 28th September I received another telegram from the Vice-Consul saying that the people were sleeping in the streets.

On the 29th September I received a petition, signed with a great number of seals, asking that the petitioners might be accepted as British subjects.

In continuation of my telegram, I have written to the Vice-Consul telling him that he should confine himself to saying that the matter is one in which he has no authority to act either on one side or the other. I have also asked him to explain to the Persians that there is a vast difference between Tehran and Karbala. At Tehran no third Government was concerned, and the British Government was represented by a high and responsible officer; while at Karbala the Turks are most intimately concerned, and the British Government is only represented by a Vice-Consul who has not even got a cypher code.

I have telegraphed the information received to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople and to His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran. The Embassy has informed me that my instructions to the Vice-Consul are "entirely approved," and the Minister informs me that the matter has been reported to the Persian Government.

3. The persons who brought me the two petitions above referred to were ordinary messengers of no intelligence; but I understood from what they said, and from what others say, that the leader of the present movement is Sheikh Ali, Yezdi of Shehr-i-Nawi Karbala. He is a Posh-imam, and should not be confused with the Mujtahid of the same name.

I have seen Haji Hassan, a Persian merchant of Bagdad, who appears to be a man of intelligence and reason, and he says that the levy of the Shahria tax is merely the incident which has brought things to a head. He says that the Persian subjects residing at Karbala are badly treated by every one, and that what they really want is to come under British protection. He says that no one dares to interfere with a British subject, but that a Persian is considered fair game by all.

4. I am sorry that I am unable to submit a report showing the history and object of the present movement. I doubt if the Persians at Karbala have any very clear ideas themselves. Generally, I think that they are disgusted with their own position and with their Government, and feel that they must do something as a protest against existing conditions.

5. It may perhaps be useful if I report, for the information of the Government, a certain amount of miscellaneous information about Persian affairs that has reached me.

It is said that the Mu'in-ul-Tujjar at Tehran wrote to Kadhimain to say that there had been great rejoicings at Tehran on the granting of the new Constitution. On receipt of this information Sheikh Muhammad Taki, the leading Mujtahid of Kadhimain, is said to have telegraphed to the Persian Foreign Minister to say that, in his opinion, the people of Karbala and Kadhimain ought to hold funeral ceremonies to mark the death of the Mahommedan religion.

This information was given to Mr. Gaskin by a man who said that he had seen the telegram after it had been dispatched to Khanakin, which is the nearest Persian telegraph office. There is also a story going about here that the contempt of the Shah, and of the 'Ain-ul-Daula is so great in Tehran that a dog has been provided with long moustaches, which are said to be marked features both of the Shah and of the 'Ain-ul-Daula, and paraded through the town in a carriage.

It is curious that, during the recent excitement at Karbala, the Mujtahids appear to have taken no open part. One man tells me that the local Governor did ask them to reason with the Persians, but they refused to act, on the ground that when they had once before spoken for the people they had been told to confine themselves to religious matters. At the present moment at least five out of the ten recipients of the Oudh Bequest are away from Karbala. Several of them are in Kadhimain, but none of them have sent me any information about the present excitement.

6. As regards the demand on the Persians for the payment of the Shahria tax, I am by no means sure that there is any strong cause for complaint. As far as I can understand, the tax used to be paid by the Persians. About a year ago the Turks tried to make British subjects pay it. This they successfully declined to do, and since then the Persians have objected to paying it. Negotiations have been going on, and finally the Vali has ordered the tax to be collected, with arrears for eighteen months.

The Persians say that their Ambassador at Constantinople has obtained the removal of the tax, and that it ought not to be levied. As regards this, I do not know what is the truth. I am inclined to doubt the Persian story, and I believe that they are trying to obtain for themselves all the rights and privileges which are enjoyed by British subjects in Turkey, and to obtain more honest representatives to watch their interests. The present Consul-General, the Yamin-ul-Mumalik, does not enjoy a good reputation, nor does the Persian Karpardaz at Karbala. Information reaches me from sources which cannot, I think, have a common origin, that the Consul-General is as indifferent to justice as he is keen to obtain money. The British Vice-Consul, when he came to see me recently, was full of stories of the oppression practised on Persians by their own representatives, and a Turkish official told a friend of mine that the present crisis was largely due to the tyrannous conduct of the Persian Karpardaz at Karbala.

Without thinking that the Persians have wisely chosen the subject about which to make a demonstration, I cannot help feeling some personal sympathy for them. They are not protected by their own officials, their natural leaders seem too cowardly or too cautious to take any conspicuous part in their demonstrations, and they probably have to submit to a rigorous censorship of their telegrams. Probably one of the objects of their present demonstration is to force me to report their grievances. In fact, one man pressed me very much to promise to telegraph their complaints to London, and said he would be quite satisfied if I did so. I, of course, declined to inform them what I was going to do in the matter of reporting to my Government, but I thought that I might give them the consolation of an assurance that the Government did not expect its Representative to act as if he were blind, deaf, and dumb.

7. I am sending a copy of this letter to the Ambassador, and to the Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. RAMSAY, *Major, Officiating Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad.*

[37178] No. 104.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 732.)

Sir, *Pera, October 30, 1906.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 718 of the 26th instant, I have the honour to report that His Majesty's Consul at Erzeroum informs me that there has been no change in the situation there, civil authority remaining in abeyance and public business being at a standstill.

At an interview which I had with the Grand Vizier yesterday his Highness informed me that the Imperial Government had dismissed the Vali, Ata Bey, and had appointed in his place Nouri Bey, who has been for the last few months Vali successively of Diarbekir and Kharput, and up to May of this year was Vali of Mosul, where he was on good terms with Consul-General Newmarch. They were also

replacing the General, Munir Pasha, by a young and active General, Ahmet Abah, at present Imperial Commissioner on the Russian frontier.

The Grand Vizier stated that calm was being restored in the town.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[37179] No. 105.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 733. Confidential.)

Pera, October 30, 1906.

Sir,

WITH reference to Sir N. O'Conor's Secret and Confidential despatch No. 413 of the 18th June last, reporting the decision of the Sultan to continue the allowance granted by the Imperial Government to the late Ibn Raschid, Emir of Nejd, to his son and successor, Mitaab-er-Raschid, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a Confidential Memorandum communicated to His Majesty's Acting Consul-General at Bagdad by Mr. Gaskin, containing information on the condition of affairs in the Nejd and the position of the young Emir Mitaab-er-Raschid.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 105.

Memorandum of Information obtained by Mr. Gaskin.

(Confidential.)

WITH reference to the Turkish occupation,* he informed me that there were only about fifty Turkish soldiers under a Kulaghasy at Boreida, and a similar detachment at Aneza, and the main body, consisting of over 1,000 infantry, a few cavalry with four heavy field guns and five or six lighter pieces, stationed at Sheihiya, a village about five or six hours' ride west-north-west of Boreida, under the command of Sami Pasha.

The Turks are there on sufferance, and do not interfere in any way with the local affairs, and confine themselves to their quarters, only leaving them when going to purchase food or going to the mosque for prayers.

The troops are rationed by their own Government—the Amir does not provide them with anything. They are wretchedly off; many of the officers and men are continually deserting. If no fresh troops are sent to relieve the present garrison before long, no soldiers will be left in Kassim through the wastage by disease and desertions.

As regards the young Amir, he stated that the people of Jabal Shammar are very hopeful of him, and he has gained their affection through his straightforwardness, generosity, and habit of carrying out no undertaking without consulting all the Elders of the Al-Raschid clan and listening to the best advice. He has remitted the tribal taxes for the current year, and reinstituted the payment of annual allowances to the various tribal Chiefs, retainers, and charities on the same scale as that paid by his grandfather. These allowances had been reduced by his father.

After reducing to obedience the Heteim and Shararat tribes occupying the tract of country lying between Teima and Jowf, the Amir, on about the last week of August 1906, attacked the Muteir Arabs, adherents of Bin Sa'id, in Kassim, and carried away much plunder in the shape of camels, horses, cattle, and sheep.

Regarding the general feeling of the Arabs towards the Turks, my informant declared that there is a growing discontent and dislike towards them because of their unjust demands and harsh treatment; the life of the Arabs is becoming harder every year, and poverty is overshadowing them. Many of the Arab Chiefs, whose incomes amount to 400 or 500 lires—which would be sufficient under ordinary conditions for their needs—are reduced to beggary on account of the exactions of the Turkish officials. The Arabs are longing to throw off the Turks and become independent, or to come under the protection of the Great Powers, as in the case of Bulgaria and Roumelia.† With this view, recently a Hitein Chief, whose brother is imprisoned by

* See note by Major Ramsay.

† This has not been accomplished, but is what the Arab said.

the Turks and not yet released, though the amount of bribes demanded by the officials has been paid, has proposed to the Sheikh of the Muntafik Arabs the formation of a strong confederacy of all the tribes for the purpose of turning the Turks out of Arabia and applying subsequently to the Great Powers for protection. The Muntafik Sheikh did not fall in with the views of the Hitein Sheikh, as the Arabs consider the Hitein are of inferior blood, and a proposal coming from such a source would not be taken up by other Arabs.

My informant also informed me that cereals were very expensive in Jabal Shammar and Kassim, and prices ranged five or six times as high as those on the Euphrates owing to the limited produce available in the regions mentioned. He explained that the fields are irrigated by water drawn from wells by camels, and these animals cannot stand the work, and in two months they become useless and are sold for a fifth of their original price, and though there is plenty of water and arable land, for this reason they find it just as cheap to import their grain from the districts on the Euphrates. He has heard of the recent importations of pumps into Bagdad for purposes of irrigation, and he is very much interested in the matter, as he thinks that these appliances would meet with much favour in the regions indicated, as the whole of the cultivable land may be brought under cultivation by their employment. He understands that the price of Russian kerosene oil necessary for working the oil-engine which drives the pump is about 20 per cent. dearer in Jabal Shammar than at Koweit, from where it will have to be procured, and that proper mechanics will have to be engaged to work the engines, &c., from Bagdad at a higher rate of pay than they receive locally. He wishes to procure definite information as regards a pumping plant capable of raising a similar quantity of water as ten or eleven "bakras"* from a depth of 8 to 9 metres. When the details are forthcoming, he proposes to transmit them to the Amir of Jabal Shammar, and suggest to him the purchase of such a pumping plant for erection at Hayil as a trial. If the venture meets with success, he declares that over 200 plants will be required in the localities mentioned alone. He asked me whether I would assist him in obtaining the details of a suitable plant—a plant that can be carried in pieces, weighing from 2 cwt. to 2½ cwt. each, for transport by camel.

In respect of the appearance of several sections of the Aneza tribe of Arabs on the Euphrates between Musayib and Nedjef, he stated that it was nothing unusual. He explained that it was customary for these Arabs to camp in that neighbourhood during this season of the year so long as the grazing ground roundabout supported their camels, cattle, and flocks.

About fifteen years ago the Aneza fell out with the Amir of Jabal Shammar, and to avoid being raided by the Amir they kept aloof from the lower reaches of the Euphrates, but now that they have come to an understanding with the Amir, they need no longer take that precaution. There are several thousands of tents scattered in groups of 200 to 500 throughout the region mentioned.

(Signed) J. C. GASKIN.

September 24, 1906.

Note by Major Ramsay.

Mr. Gaskin's informant is in a position to have the latest and most accurate information of what is going on in the Ibn Raschid camp and counsels. The interview took place in the house of a Indian resident of Bagdad. I did not take part in it as my movements are carefully watched.

Mut'ib-ibn-Raschid is said to have received an order on the Karbala district for £T. 250 a-month. This is not regularly paid, and the local officials are trying to get a bribe to induce them to pay; this Mut'ib has refused to pay. From another source I hear that the Sultan's Aide-de-camp, who went to take a decoration to Mut'ib, had got as far as Hayil.

(Signed) J. RAMSAY, *Major.*

September 29, 1906.

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* Water-bags drawn by bullocks, known in India as "charas."

[37181] No. 106.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 735.)
Sir, *Constantinople, October* 30, 1906.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 679 of the 8th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Damascus respecting the opening of the Hama–Aleppo Railway.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 106.

Consul Devey to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 28.)
(Extract.) *Damascus, October* 13, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Inauguration of the Hama–Aleppo section of the "Damas-Hama et Prolongements" railway took place at its Aleppo terminus on the 14th instant (Shaaban 16), which was the anniversary of the Sultan's birthday.

This section of 146 kilom., added to the 183 kilom. of the Rayak–Hama section, makes a line of 329 kilom. of the broad-gauge type, having a width of 1·15 metres between the rails. This line of broad gauge was constructed by the "Régie Générale des chemins de fer."

The kilometric guarantee on the Ryak–Aleppo line is now reduced from 15,000 fr. to 13,600 fr., but it cannot be hoped that such high receipts will be realized, and the Turkish Government will be liable to an annual payment to the Company of not less than 80,000*l.* as long as the broad-gauge section is dependent on the narrow gauge of Beirut–Damascus; and unless the Company will make a serious attempt to build a broad-gauge line at least from Beirut to Ryak, there will be no hope of an advantageous traffic on the Ryak–Aleppo section. It has been calculated that the present trade of Aleppo with Alexandretta is 16 piastres per ton less expensive than the railway traffic between the former and Beirut, irrespective of the bad administration of the Company and the serious damage incurred through goods being delayed at the different stations along the line owing to the inadequacy of the narrow-gauge line to the trade of Aleppo and Damascus provinces with the port of Beirut. Even before Aleppo came into railway connection with Beirut, the narrow cog-wheel line proved helpless to cope with the great stock of cereals and grains to be transported from the plains of Homs and Hama to Beirut; and every day fruitless complaints for damages, claims for shortage and protests against irregularities were made against the Company. At the present moment the Company is trying to run twelve goods trains daily between Damascus and Beirut, just doubling the old number, and since the 5th instant three passenger trains are leaving daily at each end.

The rolling-stock now in possession of the Company for the narrow-gauge line consists of 16 cog-wheel engines, 18 level track engines, 300 trucks of 10 and 15 tons capacity, 45 passenger carriages and 8 luggage vans; while that of the broad-gauge line running between Ryak and Aleppo is 12 engines, 20 passenger carriages, 6 luggage vans and 290 trucks of 10 and 15 tons capacity. Nearly as much again has been ordered.

[37182] No. 107.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 736. Confidential.)
Sir, *Constantinople, October* 30, 1906.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 618 of the 4th September, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah respecting German trade in the Persian Gulf and the Hamburg–American Company's steam-ship service in the Persian Gulf.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 107.

Consul Crow to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 70. Confidential.)
Sir, *Bussorah, September* 29, 1906.

THE "Canadia," of the Hamburg–American Line, the first vessel of this line which has visited Bussorah, arrived in this port on the 5th September, and sailed for the bar to complete her cargo on the 18th September. She sailed from Hamburg on the 16th July with 240 cases of matches and 241 packages of general cargo, and took 220 bags of sugar and 850 packages of general cargo from Antwerp; and 206 packages of general cargo from Marseilles, and a few details from Suez; thus completing her full burden of 3,500 tons. Her general cargo consisted principally of glass, liquor, iron, chinaware, and wood. The "Canadia" took from Bussorah 1,300 tons of unhusked rice for Hamburg and Rotterdam, and about 1,600 tons of dates for transhipment at Hamburg to New York, and sundries. She sailed with a full cargo. The "Canadia" will be followed by the "Sicilia," which arrives shortly, and has, I hear, already booked a full return cargo. The service from Hamburg to Bussorah will be a monthly one, the vessels calling at Antwerp, Marseilles, Port Said, Suez, Port Sudan, Jibuti, Muscat (occasionally), Lingah, and Bushire. Outward freight is booked at present from 20*s.* to 22*s.* 6*d.* per ton, and homeward freight at 17*s.* 6*d.* per ton.

The agent of the line at Bussorah is Mr. Robert Winchhaus, who has resided in the Persian Gulf for the last fifteen years at Bushire, Bahrein, and Lingah. He speaks English fluently, and seems sanguine as regards the prospects of the new service. The following remarks, for which I am indebted to him, may be of interest: The Hamburg-American Line receives no subsidy from the German Government in any shape or form, although the general opinion in England is, I understand, to the contrary. The capital is exclusively German. The line is affiliated to no other. They formerly worked the mail services to the Far East in conjunction with the Nord Deutsche Lloyd, and received a postal subsidy for the operation. The connection has, however, been severed, and the Hamburg–American Line now works independently. They have a net tonnage of 810,000 tons register. By arrangement with British shipping Companies, or as a matter of expediency, it is proposed to leave the port of London severely alone, and not to interfere in any way with the British shipping interest, on condition that the British lines, as a *quid pro quo*, leave the northern ports to them. With this object in view, Mr. Winchhaus assures me he has declined to quote any rates of freight for London cargo, and limits his operations to the Continental ports, and has given Bagdad merchants notice of this. Moreover, they do not touch at any port in India. He also informs me that his line refused an advantageous offer from an American firm to put a steamer on the direct date run to America this year, in order not to interfere with British shipping, and states that he merely takes dates for transhipment at Hamburg to New York. He says that the Hamburg-American Line takes nothing away from the British lines, and that the field is large enough for them both. The freights secured enabled their Persian Gulf branch to work at a profit, and he characterized the high rates of freight demanded by the Anglo-Algerian, Bucknall and West Hartlepool combination as excessive and suicidal, and was of opinion that, if not reduced, they would give rise to competition in other quarters.

I questioned Mr. Winchhaus as to the probable effect of his line shipping Belgian sugar from Antwerp at 20*s.* a-ton, while Messrs. Bucknall Bros., who have made a contract with the San Louis sugar refinery at Marseilles for two years, now ships French sugar at 35*s.* a-ton, and he said he saw no reason, under these conditions, why Belgian sugar should not supplant the French product in the Turkish–Arabian markets.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. E. CROW.

[37767] No. 108.

Memorandum communicated by M. Cambon, November 8, 1906.

Question des Boutres Mascatais autorisés à arborer le Pavillon Français.

PAR un Mémorandum en date du 22 Août dernier, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique a bien voulu faire connaître ses vues au Gouvernement de la

République en ce qui touche le projet de Règlement élaboré par le Consul de France à Mascate pour l'application de la sentence de la Cour de La Haye relative aux boutriers Mascatais Francisés.

Après un examen approfondi des propositions qui lui ont été soumises, et inspiré par un sincère désir de résoudre, au moyen d'une entente directe, une question dont l'importance est singulièrement réduite à la suite de la décision des Arbitres, le Gouvernement de la République est heureux de constater que ses dispositions conciliantes sont pleinement partagées par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique.

S'il ne croit, toutefois, pas devoir adhérer sans réserve à l'interprétation juridique donnée dans la première partie du Mémorandum Britannique au texte de la sentence arbitrale du 8 Août, 1905, il lui paraît, d'autre part, possible d'accepter, sauf deux exceptions, les conditions mises à l'approbation de la liste établie par M. Laronce des boutriers et des boutres autorisés à arborer le pavillon Français.

Ces conditions, qui ne soulèvent pas d'objections du Gouvernement de la République et qui appellent seulement certains commentaires, ont été formulées comme suit par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique:

1. Que le Gouvernement Français soit convaincu du caractère de *bonâ fide* des titres produits, et à l'égard desquels M. Laronce devrait être invité à consulter les preuves recueillies par son collègue Britannique en vue d'une nouvelle revision.

2. Qu'il soit bien entendu que les propriétaires de boutres mentionnés dans la liste n'ont pas la faculté de transférer le droit qui leur est personnel, d'arborer le pavillon Français sur des boutres possédés par eux en totalité ou en partie, à quelqu'un d'autre, soit par dévolution ou autrement; que la mort d'un propriétaire quelconque de boutre fera disparaître le droit d'arborer le pavillon Français que ses associés, s'il en existe, pouvaient avoir, grâce à lui, durant sa vie, en vertu de l'autorisation personnelle qu'il possédait.

3. Que la liste des propriétaires de boutres et des boutres, une fois définitivement établie, ne puisse être modifiée par suite d'aucune circonstance.

4. Que le Consul de France notifie immédiatement au Sultan de Mascate chaque transfert du pavillon Français d'un boutre à un autre, quand ce transfert aurait été autorisé; qu'il remette annullement à Sa Hautesse une liste des boutres ayant le droit d'arborer le pavillon Français; qu'il soit invité à informer son collègue Anglais, à titre de courtoisie, des notifications qu'il ferait au Sultan à ce sujet.

5. Qu'on ajoute au projet de Règlement des Articles indiquant que toute infraction par un quelconque des sujets du Sultan au Règlement sera sévèrement punie, et que tout ayant droit au pavillon Français pourra renoncer à son privilège.

Convaincu de la bonne foi des titres produits par les boutriers à l'appui de leur revendication du pavillon tricolore et en raison des indications émanant des Gouverneurs des Colonies Françaises qu'il a transmises à son Représentant dans l'Oman, le Gouvernement de la République considère que la liste des boutriers communiquée le 4 Mars dernier par M. Laronce au Major Grey répond exactement à la réalité des faits. Il est néanmoins disposé, comme le désire le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, à prescrire à son Représentant dans l'Oman de prendre connaissance des renseignements qui ont été recueillis par le Consul Britannique à Mascate et de procéder, de concert avec le Major Grey, à un nouvel examen des boutriers douteux.

Il devrait, d'ailleurs, être bien entendu que l'opinion de M. Laronce, quelle qu'elle puisse être, devrait finalement prévaloir, étant donné que le Consul de France se prononcerait *bonâ fide*, et que ses instructions l'auraient invité à ne pas se livrer à un examen de pure forme.

En ce qui touche la condition inscrite sous le No. 3, le Gouvernement de la République prend acte de ce fait que le Gouvernement Britannique se déclare prêt à admettre que les papiers de tout boutre énuméré dans la liste Laronce et sortant de la possession de son propriétaire (continuant à jouir de son autorisation d'arborer le pavillon Français) peuvent être transférés à un autre boutre appartenant au même propriétaire, pourvu que le nombre total des boutres indiqués sur la liste ne soit en aucun cas augmenté.

Au surplus le Gouvernement de la République maintient son droit, consacré et reconnu par le Traité de 1844, d'accorder notre pavillon aux Mascatais au service de Français résidant dans l'Oman, droit dont l'exercice pourrait, dans certaines éventualités, porter le nombre des boutres naviguant sous pavillon Français au-dessus du chiffre de la liste de M. Laronce.

Les deux conditions auxquelles la France ne saurait, en aucun cas, souscrire ont trait:

1. A l'exercice de la juridiction pour les crimes, délits ou contraventions commis par un Mascatais autorisé à arborer le pavillon Français partout où le droit d'inviolabilité du boutre a été reconnu par la sentence arbitrale, c'est-à-dire en haute mer et dans les eaux territoriales de l'Oman.

2. A la remise en cause de l'accord Franco-Anglais du 13 Mai, 1904, relatif aux boutres Zanzibarites.

Pour le premier point, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique désirerait que le coupable d'un crime tombât immédiatement sous la juridiction du Sultan s'il descend à terre. Il admettrait néanmoins que le Sultan ne saurait se plaindre si le coupable n'est pas descendu à terre, et s'il a été transbordé pour être jugé à Obock ou dans tout autre lieu du territoire Français, ou s'il a été amené à terre dans l'unique but de permettre au Consul de prendre des dispositions en vue de l'envoyer pour être jugé devant un Tribunal en territoire Français.

Le Gouvernement de la République estime qu'il doit maintenir le principe de la juridiction de son Consul dans l'Oman vis-à-vis des boutriers Mascatais arborant son pavillon pour tous les faits commis en mer ou dans les eaux territoriales du Sultanat de Mascate. En outre, le transport éventuel des délinquants à Obock sur un navire de guerre serait pratiquement impossible.

Il considère, en conséquence, que la concession faite par l'Article 5 du projet Français de Règlement, à savoir, que si le crime ou le délit est établi le coupable sera remis au Sultan de Mascate, est suffisante, et ménage les susceptibilités du Souverain, puisque l'application de la peine prononcée par le Tribunal Consulaire lui est dévolue.

Quant au deuxième point relatif aux six boutriers fréquentant les eaux de l'Oman, et qui ont été reconnus à Zanzibar comme protégés Français en vertu de l'accord du 13 Mai, 1904, il y a lieu de constater que M. Laronce a agi conformément à ses instructions en les tenant en dehors du débat relatif aux boutriers Mascatais Francisés et en ne les faisant pas figurer sur la liste.

Ces six boutriers ne doivent pas, d'après l'avis du Gouvernement de la République, être assimilés à ceux qui sont visés dans la sentence arbitrale du 8 Août, 1905. Ils ont été reconnus comme protégés Français par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique plus d'un an avant la décision de la Cour de La Haye, et les revendications du Sultan de Mascate, à leur égard, ne peuvent être examinées. Comme tous les autres boutriers figurant sur la liste dressée en vertu de l'accord du 13 Mai, 1904, les six indigènes en question sont considérés par la France comme ses protégés; et le Gouvernement de la République, se basant sur les termes mêmes du Traité Franco-Mascatais du 17 Novembre, 1844, entend les faire bénéficier à terre, dans l'Oman, du principe de l'exterritorialité.

Ainsi que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique a pu le constater par le présent Mémorandum, l'entente peut être considérée comme établie avec le Gouvernement de la République pour l'application de la sentence arbitrale du 8 Août, 1905.

Dès que le Cabinet de Londres aura bien voulu la lui confirmer, le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères s'empressera d'adresser au Consul de France dans l'Oman les instructions nécessaires pour la mise en vigueur pratique de cette entente, d'accord avec le Représentant Britannique à Mascate.

Paris, le 5 Novembre, 1906.

[37812] No. 109.

Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to Foreign Office.—(Received November 10.)

3, *Salter's Hall Court, Cannon Street, London, November 9*, 1906.

Sir,

I AM directed by my Board to request your attention to the fact that an unusual amount of cargo is now lying at the port of Bussorah awaiting shipment to Bagdad. This Company has at present 3,500 tons of cargo stored in sheds and barges awaiting shipment. The two steamers and barges which the Company is at present permitted to run cannot deal adequately with the current traffic, and it will take months to forward this great accumulation of cargo. This means injury to British trade, delay

in the realization of values, increased insurance, and a heavy responsibility on those liable for the safety of the goods. In fact there is an all-round loss to merchants and shippers.

We therefore request His Majesty's Government to make urgent representations to the Porte to allow us to run a third steamer and barge to enable us to deal with the accumulation of goods.

Our local representatives advise us to suspend bookings. We think this would be bad policy, and are loth to give effect to their advice.

His Majesty's Government is aware of the fact that the Hamidieh Administration added two new and powerful steamers to their service in 1904. The intention of the Administration of the Sultan's Privy Purse to drive our steamers off the river is no secret. We are now informed that the said Administration have decided upon the ordering of two new steamers in Europe, and tenders have already been invited. We consider it all the more urgent, therefore, that our service should be strengthened whilst there is yet time, and whilst we can still complain of injury to British trade owing to the inadequacy of the river services.

Our third steamer and barge are ready at Bussorah, and could deal with the surplus of cargo at the shortest notice. They could be made ready in 24 hours for regular work.

It is surely a legitimate and proper request to make, namely, that we should be given the right to utilize immediately such transport as we have on the spot to carry forward this great accumulation of British goods. It is pertinent to add that the Hamidieh steamer service is at present unable to forward their goods, and that they also have a considerable accumulation awaiting transit.

We trust that His Majesty's Government will vigorously take up the question.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. W. MACLEAN, *Secretary.*

[37869] No. 110.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received November* 10.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, a paraphrase of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 9th instant, relative to the affairs of Nejd.

India Office, November 10, 1906.

Inclosure in No. 110.

Mr. Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, November* 9, 1906.

REFERENCE is invited to letter dated the 16th September from Resident, Persian Gulf, forwarded with Secretary's letter of the 11th October. Affairs in Nejd. View that our influence and interest should be restricted to coast is maintained by His Majesty's Government. My sanction should be obtained before any steps are taken to send agents into interior or to enter into relations with Nejd. See telegrams dated the 8th February and the 30th December from my predecessor.

[38519] No. 111.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received November* 16.)

India Office, November 15, 1906.

Sir,

WITH reference to the papers transmitted with my letters, noted in the margin,* on the subject of the collection by Turkish officials of certain dues at Al Doka in Subaihi territory, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Morley to inclose, to be laid before

* Dated February 5, March 21, April 19, May 14, June 14, August 16, 1906.

the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a copy of a letter from the Government of India, in which they recommend that action should be taken in the matter either locally or at Constantinople.

In view of the circumstances in which the whole of the Shab Valley was included in Subaihi limits by the Joint Delimitation Commission, Mr. Morley agrees with the Government of India that the maintenance of a post at Al Doka under Turkish control is an infringement of the Aden boundary settlement. The incidents reported, though undue importance need not be attached to them, indicate that the presence of authorized agents of the Turkish Government on the British side of the border must lead, step by step, to an increasing measure of interference and friction, which, in the interests of both the Contracting Parties, it is desirable to stop without further delay.

Mr. Morley is therefore of opinion that it is desirable, in the interests of peace, and in order to prevent disturbances in the future, that all connection of the Turkish authorities with Al Doka and the Shab Valley should cease.

If Sir E. Grey concurs in this view, Mr. Morley would suggest that His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople should be consulted on the subject and authorized to make the necessary representations to the Porte direct, unless he thinks that they had better be made by the Resident at Aden to the Mutessarif of Taiz.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 111.

Government of India to Mr. Morley.

(Secret.)

Sir, *Simla, October* 11, 1906.

WITH reference to the correspondence ending with your telegram of the 2nd May, 1906, we have the honour to forward herewith correspondence relative to the collection of dues at Al Doka on behalf of the Turkish Mudir of Mufalis.

2. It will be seen from the Political Resident's report, dated the 11th July, 1906, that taxes which are stated to be of the nature of transit dues are collected at Al Doka by Turkish employés in accordance with a practice which has obtained during the last fifteen or sixteen years.

From the evidence recorded by Colonel Wahab in March 1904, during the progress of the Boundary Commission, it appears that the post was established by some Turkish Arabs at Nobat Doka, above Shab, about the year 1885, after the withdrawal of the Sultan of Lahej from the Shab Valley. The entire valley was stated originally to have formed part of the Subaihi possessions, and it was occupied by the Sultan of Lahej as such between the years 1851 and 1885. As a result, however, of the establishment of the post at Nobat Doka, the portion of the valley above Lukema was gradually brought under the indirect control of the Turkish authorities, and, writing in March 1904, Colonel Wahab stated that, in his opinion, the British Government would be precluded, on the basis of the status of 1901, from claiming the upper two-thirds of Wadi Shab as a Subaihi possession unless the Turks proved unreasonable about a fair settlement. In June 1904 he nevertheless reported that the Turkish Commissioners had agreed that the whole of the Shab Valley with its cultivation should be included within Subaihi limits, and he regarded this settlement as most satisfactory, since any division of the Wadi Shab would not have provided a good border. The map which accompanied Colonel Wahab's Secret letter dated the 11th June, 1904, clearly indicates the position of Al Doka as on the British side of the boundary line.

There can be no doubt, therefore, that the continued existence of the Customs post under Turkish auspices is an infringement of the terms of the Aden boundary settlement, and the infringement can hardly be considered as other than deliberate, since the claims of both parties to Al Doka were particularly discussed at the time of the survey of the border, and the decision which was arrived at was the result of most careful consideration by the Commissioners on both sides.

3. This conclusion is confirmed by further reports which we have received from the Political Resident at Aden showing that the Turkish authorities, encouraged presumably by our omission to demand the withdrawal of the Al Doka post, have recently been taking active steps for the consolidation and extension of their influence in the Shab Valley. Early in April a party of Turkish and Arab soldiers appeared at Wadi Shab, announcing that they had come to collect the customs dues. They are stated to have

terrorized the inhabitants and to have done considerable damage to the cultivation. Shortly afterwards the Mutessarif of Taiz addressed a circular order to the Sheikh of the Shab Valley, as well as to neighbouring Sheikhs under Turkish influence, demanding, under pain of severe punishment, the immediate transmission of the dues of the Turkish Government. The Mutessarif also announced his intention of visiting the Shab Valley. In June 1906 the Mudir of Mafalis arrived in the Shab Valley with an escort composed of Turkish troops and of Arabs from the neighbouring tribes on the Turkish side of the border. The Mudir demanded the payment of the Turkish dues, and in order to stimulate compliance ordered the reconstruction of a ruined Customs post at a place within the southern limit of the Shab Valley. He also threatened to incite the neighbouring Turkish tribes to attack and plunder the people of Shab if they continued recalcitrant.

4. The case has therefore assumed a more serious aspect possibly owing to our inaction, and we consider that the action taken by the local Turkish authorities constitutes open disregard of their obligations under the boundary settlement, and any failure on our part to insist upon the removal of the post at Al Doka after the case has been decided in our favour can only tend to shake the belief of the tribes in our intention or ability to exclude Turkish influence from the area which has been recognized formally as subject to the protectorate of Great Britain. If you concur in this opinion, we would again recommend either that a formal representation may be made to the Porte regarding the violation of the frontier, or that the Resident at Aden may be instructed to address a protest on the subject to the Mutessarif of Taiz. We would advocate the adoption of the latter alternative in the first place, as likely to lead to an early understanding between the local authorities with regard to the point at issue.

We have, &c.
(Signed) MINTO.
KITCHENER.
A. T. ARUNDEL.
DENZIL IBBETSON.
H. ERLE RICHARDS.
J. P. HEWETT.
E. N. BAKER.
C. H. SCOTT.

Inclosure 2 in No. 111.

Government of Bombay to Government of India.

January 28, 1906.

(Telegraphic.)
RESIDENT at Aden telegraphs, 27th January :—

"Turkish Revenue officer has arrived at Mafalis with some troops with intention of collecting revenue from certain Shujaifa tribesmen.

"Some of the Shujaifa reside within Mansuri limits in British sphere. Please refer to 3rd paragraph of Boundary Commissioner's despatch to Government of India, dated the 11th June, 1904. Mansuri Sheikh has moved force up to frontier to prevent revenue collection from his subjects. Subaihi in the vicinity are generally restless. I am writing to Mansuri Sheikh to forbid any form of hostility."

Inclosure 3 in No. 111.

Government of Bombay to Government of India.

Bombay Castle, February 9, 1906.

(Confidential.)
IN continuation of my telegram dated the 28th January, 1906, I am directed to forward herewith, for the information of the Government of India, copy of a letter from the Political Resident, Aden, dated the 28th idem, and of its inclosures, regarding the arrival at Mafalis of a Turkish Revenue official and the consequent unrest caused amongst the members of the Shujaifa tribe who reside on the British side of the border and within Mansuri limits. From a subsequent telegram, dated the 3rd February,

1906, from the Political Resident, Aden, copy of which is inclosed, it will be observed that the uneasiness of the tribes has subsided for the present. I am also to send a copy of my reply to the letter.

Inclosure 4 in No. 111.

Major-General Mason to Government of Bombay.

Aden Residency, January 28, 1906.

(Confidential.)
WITH reference to correspondence ending with your letter dated the 11th September last, and to my telegram of the 27th instant, concerning the presence of a Turkish Revenue officer at Mafalis and the subsequent unrest amongst certain of the Subaihis who reside in that vicinity, I have the honour to report that, upon receipt of your letter in last September, the Abdali Sultan was addressed, with a view to verifying the complaint of Turkish encroachment upon Shabi lands, and of the wrongful collection of dues at the Al Doka custom-house.

2. On the 23rd October a reply was received from the Abdali Sultan, a copy of which, and of its accompaniment, is attached, and it was not till the 8th instant that any further communication was received from him on the subject. The Abdali Sultan then forwarded a letter which he had received from the Sheikh Abdul Kawi-bin-Muhamed of Shab, of which, and of my reply to which, copies are also attached.

3. Upon the strength of this communication the Abdali Sultan took it upon himself to address a letter to Kayed No'man, an Arab subordinate of the Turkish Revenue Department at Mafalis, and he also wrote to the Akils of the Shabi country counselling patience. Copies of these letters, and of the Abdali Sultan's letter dated the 17th instant, are attached.

4. On the 25th instant another letter was received from the Abdali Sultan, inclosing a letter received by him from Kayed No'man, and about the same time further letters were received from certain Sheikhs of the Jurabi, the Mansab of the Sanawi, and also Sheikh Shahir-bin-Sef of the Mansuri tribe, which tend to show that the arrival of the Turkish Revenue official at Mafalis has led to a certain amount of local excitement. I attach copies of the letters here referred to, and also of the replies issued to them yesterday.

5. A further letter has this morning been received from Sheikh Abdul Kawi-bin-Mahomed of Shab, from which it appears that, so far as Shab is concerned, the excitement has for the present subsided. It will be observed from the attached copy that the custom-house at Al Doka is still complained of.

6. It may be hoped that the Mansuri Sheikh will, upon receipt of my last letter to him, also allay excitement over this affair amongst his own tribesmen, and that the Turkish officials will exercise sufficient discretion in the matter of the collection of their dues to avoid any serious complications.

7. The Shujaifa sub-tribe from whom the Turkish official is anxious to collect revenue reside partly on the Turkish side of the border and partly in the Wadi Shab, and at Shaban, in the Mansuri limits. The whole sub-tribe really recognize a simple petty Sheikh named Ahmed Moman, who at present, I am informed, is residing at Shab, and upon the arrival of the Turkish Mudir at Mafalis it seems that certain of the Shujaifa have appealed to the Jurabi and the Mansuri Sheikhs to protect them against any undue exactions.

8. I am informed that the number of Turkish troops in the vicinity is approximately eighty with two guns, but I am not in a position to vouch for the absolute accuracy of this statement. From the same source I am informed that, with the Jurabis and the Mansuris, there are approximately 300 Arabs and a few petty Sheikhs, such as the Sheikh of Doka, &c.

9. I trust that no friction will now arise, and I will report again on the subject of the Al Doka custom-house when I receive more information concerning it.

10. The Abdali Sultan is a fairly convenient intermediary in the affair, and if I sent a Political Officer to the spot to hold an independent inquiry it would be necessary to furnish him with a fairly strong escort, both as a set-off, *vis-à-vis* the Turks, and as a sedative to local Subaihi excitement.

Inclosure 5 in No. 111.

Sultan Sir Ahmed Fadthl to Major-General Mason.

(After compliments.) 22 *Sha'ban*, 1323 (*October* 21, 1905).

We have received your letter dated the 17th October, 1905, and, in reply, we inform your Honour that we have written a letter to Sheikh Salim Abdul Wahab, copy of which we herewith forward to you. We also wrote a similar letter to the Shujaifa, and expect their reply. As soon as we receive their reply we will let you know of the facts.

May you know of this.

Inclosure 6 in No. 111.

Sultan Sir Ahmed Fadthl to Sheikh Salim Abdul Wahab.

(After compliments.) 20 *Sha'ban*, 1323 (*October* 19, 1905).

WE inform you, O lad, that Shab, its population and limits, have been included in the British Government's limits. We have heard that the Kotabees are troubling them by stealing from their fields and cattle, and encroach upon their lands in an unlawful manner. They also precluded them from the bazaars. Moreover, the Mudir of Mafalis is keeping some soldiers at the post at Doka, who levy taxes from the Yusifyen and A'abus. We have now written this letter, and request that you will inform us of the name of the soldiers posted at Doka, their number, and of what tribe they belong to. Please also let us know what is the reason for precluding the people of Shab from entering your markets, the cause of incursion, and plunder made by your people upon their cultivation and cattle, and what is the reason which prevents your uncle and others, who unlawfully lay their hands on Wadi Shab, from getting the matter settled by the Shari'a (Mahommedan law). Your reply, with all the particulars asked for, is requested. We send you this by a special messenger, and request your reply by his hand without fail. Please do not detain him, and salutation.

Inclosure 7 in No. 111.

Sultan Sir Ahmed Fadthl to Major-General Mason.

(After compliments.) 11 *Al K'da*, 1323 (*January* 6, 1906).

WE inform your Honour that Sheikh Abdul Kawi-bin-Mohamed-el-Shabi has received a letter from his relatives at Shab informing him that they received news from the Kobati to the effect that the Mudir named Hasan Sabri, the Mudir of the Hifar district, is threatening to bring the camp (soldiers) to them, and cause their houses to be pulled down. We send you the letter which was received by Sheikh Abdul Kawi, herein inclosed, by the hand of the messenger who was dispatched by the people of Shab for your perusal. If you will write any letters on the subject, they may be addressed to the Kaimakam of the Hojaria, Sheikh Ahmed-bin-Kasim, and to the above Mudir Hasan Sabri, and these letters might be sent with the bearer.

May you be preserved.

Inclosure 8 in No. 111.

Sheikh Sa'id Abd-Ahmed, Sheikh Alwan Abdulla, Ali-bin-Kadri, Sa'id Nasir, and all the People of Shab to Sheikh Abdul Kawi.

(After compliments.) 11 *Al K'da*, 1323 (*January* 6, 1906).

WE have received your letter, in which you wrote that you wanted fifty loads of fire-wood to be kept ready below your house. Keep your mind at ease; we shall do so, and if the wood is scarce we would remove the woods of the house, but there is any amount of wood.

O father, we inform you that the Turkish troops are at Lahjar, in the company of Hasan Effendi, the Mudir of Hifar. We received news from the Kobati and the

Shujaifas of threatening and alarming nature, to the effect that the Mudir is swearing by the name of God that he shall not leave a stone upon a stone at Shab undemolished. We asked about the reasons of this, and the offence which we have committed, and we have been told that Sheikh Abdul Kawi is speaking ill of the Turks, and condemning their acts, whereas he, on the other hand, speaks well of the British Government, their justice, clemency, and good care they take of their subjects, and the protection they afford to those who place themselves under their protection, and he illustrates the Turks to the reverse of these qualifications. According to the story of the Kobatis and Shujaifas, the Mudir intends to put Shab to destruction and plunder the population, and that he states, "Let the British Government be useful to Abdul Kawi and protect him." Some people advise us to fly, and others tell us to ward ourselves of this danger by inviting the Mudir to our hospitality, and save our lives and children and property. We replied, "We cannot give any decisive reply, as we have an Akil." You may come to us immediately, as we are much alarmed, and do not sleep, but keep awake and count the stars in the sky, on account of this fearful news reported to us by the people. Had not your son, Abdul Latif, been with us, you will not find us at Shab, but we are taking shelter under your son, Abdul Latif, against the many stories imported by the people.

Inclosure 9 in No. 111.

Major-General Mason to Sultan Sir Ahmed Fadthl.

(After compliments.) *Aden Residency, January* 13, 1906.

WE have, O friend, received your letter dated the 11th Al K'ida, 1323 (6th January, 1906), concerning the affairs of Shab, and forwarding to us a letter received by Sheikh Abdul Kawi-bin-Mohamed from certain of his relatives.

We feel sure that these persons are alarming themselves unnecessarily, and that no such action as they write of is likely to be committed by the officials of the Turkish Government, with which we are in friendly alliance, and in conjunction with whom we have only recently demarcated the boundary between their territories and those under our protection. Please advise Sheikh Abdul Kawi to warn his relations not to listen to idle tales told them by the Kobatis.

In this connection we would remind you, O friend, that we wrote to you in August and October last about Shabi affairs, and that in our letter dated the 17th October, 1905, we asked you to find for us more in detail what was really taking place at Al Doka and the district of Shab.

Will you please refer to that letter, and now be so good as to arrange, if possible, to secure us really trustworthy information in the matter.

If you cannot arrange this, please let us know at once, and we will inform the Government and suggest some other arrangement.

Inclosure 10 in No. 111.

Sultan Sir Ahmed Fadthl to Major-General Mason.

(After compliments.) 22 *Al K'da*, 1323 (*January* 17, 1906).

WE have received your letter dated the 13th January, 1906, and in reply we inform your Honour that we have perused a letter that was received by Sheikh Abdul Kawi-el-Shabi from Shab, purporting that the Turkish authorities have not done anything in regard to Shab. The Arabs amongst themselves are creating disturbances, and, on the contrary, the Turks have already proclaimed that Shab is "Hijra"—that is to say, exempted from taxation. Under the above circumstance, O friend, we have dispatched two letters (copies attached for your information) to some of the Akils of that country.

As to your Honour, we do not consider it befitting for you to communicate with low and unworthy persons of Shab. It will be better if you would address the Mutessarif or the Kaimakam of the Hojaria—viz., Ahmed-bin-Kasim Hason.

May you be preserved.

Inclosure 11 in No. 111.

Sultan Sir Ahmed Fadthl to Kayed No'man.

22 *Al Ki'da*, 1323 (*January* 17, 1906).

We inform you that Shab and all its inhabitants are part of the Subaihi limits, which are included within the British protection. Its limits were surveyed with the Subaihi country. You, the Makadums of the Sublime Government, should be careful not to make transgression on the limits of Shab and its inhabitants, and be the cause of trouble between the Turkish and British Governments, and the responsibility will eventually rest on you. As to No'man Ahmed Asshujaifi, he has left Shab, and the subjects of the Shujaifis are living with you at Mafalis, Sahar, and Haijat-el-Ashar. If you want to arrest them you are able to do so, because they are in your limits. You may let all the Akils of the tribes know individually regarding Wadi Shab, and that they should not make any interference with it. You should prevent them from such interference before any difficulty arises.

Inclosure 12 in No. 111.

SULTAN Sir Ahmed Fadthl to Sheikh Abdulla, Sheikh Saeed Abdulla, Mahomed-bin-Ali, Sheikh Abdulla, Sharif Mahomed, Ali Bazban Abd Alwai, Saif Mahomed Kadir Abdo, Mahomed Saif Khader Ali, Kahtan Fadthl Ali Bekadin, Saeed Nassir Azelati, Mahomed Salim, Salim Annom, Hason Salim-el-Ajaj, Ali-el-Caryani, Ahmed Obeid, and Ghalib Alatab, and all the inhabitants of Shab (may they be preserved).

(After compliments to you all.) 22 *Al Ki'da*, 1323 (*January* 17, 1906).

WE inform you that you should live in your houses, and do not interfere with the Turks nor their subjects, and you should not associate with their tribesmen. If any of the Turkish subjects or soldiers interfere with you unjustly, you may refer your complaints to us first, and we shall submit them to the Political Resident at Aden. Every one must let his relations know about this; mind any contradiction.

Inclosure 13 in No. 111.

Sultan Sir Ahmed Fadthl to Major-General Mason.

(After compliments.) 28 *Al Ki'da*, 1323 (*January* 23, 1906).

WITH reference to our previous letter regarding Shab, we inform your Honour that we have now received a letter from Sheikh Kayed No'man, herewith inclosed, for your perusal. Please let us know of the answer we should give him. At present we have asked him to excuse us as we are busy. We shall send him a reply as soon as you let us know of what you desire and propose.

May you be preserved.

Inclosure 14 in No. 111.

Sheikh Kayed No'man to Sultan Sir Ahmed Fadthl.

(After compliments.) 27 *Al Ki'da*, 1323 (*January* 22, 1906).

WE have received your letter—kind and honoured letter—in which you state that Shab and its inhabitants are within the Subaihi country, under the protection of the British Government, and was already surveyed and included in the Subaihi limit, and that we, the Mokadums of the Sublime Government, should be careful not to make any encroachment on the limit of Shab. We understood the above to the last. Be it not hidden from you that we are now in our place "Uzlat" (district) Mafalis. Two days ago our Sublime Government's (may God preserve it for ever) Mudir of the district arrived here. We have not heard him mentioning Shab at all; but he intends to go after No'man Ahmed

the Shujaifi and his people, who are the subjects of the Great Sultan. These people inhabit "Uzlat Ash-Shujaifa" above mentioned. He (Mudir) intends to recover the dues of Government.

The Subaihis are now concentrating on the frontier with the intention of unnecessarily creating disturbance. It is advisable that some sensible men should be present, so that the limit of Shab and the Shujaifis may be distinguished before any disturbance takes place as before. The Subaihis intend to prevent the Mudir from interfering with the Shujaifis; whereas the Mudir is determined not to return or leave the place without orders from his superior officers. This is a reply to your Honour's letter.

May you be protected and overwhelmed with salaams and blessings.

Inclosure 15 in No. 111.

Sayad Ahmed-bin-Ahmed Saeed-al-Hashmi and Sheikh Saeed-al-Jurabi to Major-General Mason and his Assistant.

(After compliments.) [*No date.*]

WE inform your Honour that the Turkish Government are on the extreme border of Mafalis, and we are staying on the edge of the border; that is, every one of us is on the extreme end of his own limit. We come to know that the Shujaifa are in communication with the Turks, and that the Turks allege that they (Shujaifa) are their subjects, and intend to exact dues from them, but they are not willing to pay the same. We further learn that Sheikh Saleh-bin-Ahmed the Mansuri went up to the border of the limit of the Shujaifa with his force, and also Saeed-al-Jurabi is at the border, in the "Husn" (fortlet) of Mafalis, in the place called Al Mowkib, near Sukal Joma'a. He is staying there, while we are staying on our own border.

We send this for your information, and salutation.

Inclosure 16 in No. 111.

Sheikh Shahir-bin-Saif to Major-General Mason.

3 *Zil Ki'da*, 1323 (*January* 1906).

WE inform you that the Turks have reached Mafalis. We prevented them from interfering with Shab, but they are not willing, and want to impose duty. This is our information to you. We are now encamping there, till we receive your reply. Please send us an early reply about Shab. We are awaiting your reply there.

Inclosure 17 in No. 111.

Syed Ahmed Saeed to Major-General Mason.

(After compliments.) 14 *Al Ki'da*, 1323 (*January* 9, 1906).

WE inform you that the Turkish troops of the Sublime Government are now encamping at Mafalis.

Inclosure 18 in No. 111.

Captain Hancock to Sultan Sir Ahmed Fadthl.

(After compliments.) *Aden Residency, January* 26, 1906.

WE have, O friend, received your letter, dated the 22nd Al Ki'da, 1323 (17th January, 1906), and its accompaniments, concerning the affairs of Shab. From that we gather that recent rumours of Turkish encroachment there are really without foundation.

From your further letter, dated the 28th Al Ki'da, 1323 (23rd January, 1906), and its accompaniments, we gather that the Turkish authorities only desire to collect certain revenues from their own Shujaifa subjects, and that this measure has somewhat alarmed the Shujaifa who are under our protection, and other Subaihi tribes in the vicinity.

It would be well, O friend, if you would write to the Akils of these tribes and tell them to disperse and not to be alarmed.

They have only to address us in the event of any dues being improperly claimed from them; and they can depend upon our, in due course, protecting their interests and effecting any restitution that may be rightful.

As to Kayid No'man, he will, of course, be well advised to counsel the Mudir of the Turkish Government to exercise the greatest care to avoid any sort of infringement of the rights decided by the recent Boundary Commission.

We thank you for the information you have sent us in this matter. We should further be interested to hear from you whether the Turkish officials are now actually collecting any dues at Al Doka.

May you be preserved.

Inclosure 19 in No. 111.

Captain Hancock to Sheikh Shakir-bin-Saif.

(After compliments.) *Aden Residency, January* 26, 1906.

WE have, O friend, received your letter, dated Zil Ki'da (January), concerning the visit of the Mudir of the Turkish Government at Mafalis. We understand that it is only his intention to collect certain rifle dues for that portion of the Shujaifa who reside within Turkish limits, and that he has no intention to demand dues from the Shujaifa who by the recent Boundary Commission were decided to be within your limits under our protection.

Anyhow, O friend, there is no reason for you to be alarmed or to keep forces, &c., on near the border.

In the event of any dues being wrongfully demanded or ever recovered from any of the Shujaifa under our protection, you have only to refer the matter to us, and we will see that their interests are protected and that restitution is made in due course if necessary.

You should, therefore, O friend, dismiss armed men to their homes, and merely inform us of any wrongful claims which may be made. We do not think any will be made.

It is most desirable that there should be no sort of breach of the peace over the matter.

May you be preserved.

Inclosure 20 in No. 111.

Captain Hancock to Sayed Ahmed-bin-Ahmed Saeed-al-Hashmi and Sheikh Saeed-al-Jorabi.

(After compliments.) *Aden Residency, January* 26, 1906.

WE have received your letter concerning the visit of the Turkish Mudir to Mafalis. Some of the Shujaifa are within Turkish limits, and some are under our protection. We feel sure that the Mudir will make no wrongful claim upon those under our protection. If they do, you should simply inform us; we will take the necessary measures to safeguard their interests.

Meanwhile there is no cause for alarm or any excitement.

May you be preserved.

Inclosure 21 in No. 111.

Captain Hancock to Sayed Ahmed Saeed.

(After compliments.) [*Undated.*]

WE have received your letter, dated 14th Al Ki'da 1323 (9th January, 1906); we gather that the Turkish officials have some revenue collections to make from the Shujaifa who are in their territory, and we feel sure that they will make no wrongful claims on the Shujaifa who are under our protection.

Should any wrongful claims be made, it is only necessary to inform us, and we will take necessary measures. Meanwhile there is no cause for alarm or excitement.

May you be preserved.

Inclosure 22 in No. 111.

Sheikh Abdul Kawi-bin-Mahomed-al-Shabi to Ali Jaffer.

(After compliments.) [*Undated.*]

WE inform you that the fear entertained by the people of Shab has now passed away by the favour of God and the five descendants of the Prophet. There remains now only the mischievous Customs post.

We inform you that we are involved in debts at Lahej; the Id is approaching, but we have no enjoyment. We are sending you our cousin, who intends to marry in the Id days. We have sent him to you in order that you may get him something from Government.

Inclosure 23 in No. 111.

Major-General Mason to Government of Bombay.

(Telegraphic.) *Aden, February* 3, 1906.

PLEASE refer to your telegram of the 30th January last, regarding the Shujaifi. The Turkish Revenue officer and the Subaihi Sheikh have consented to refrain from trespassing, and to refer dispute to their respective Governments. Consequently the Mansuri and other Subaihis have withdrawn from the frontier, and it is reported that the Turkish officials have also withdrawn. But it is reported that trouble may again arise after the Muhammadan festival known as the Id.

Inclosure 24 in No. 111.

Government of Bombay to Major-General Mason.

(Confidential.) *Bombay Castle, February* 9, 1906.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 28th January, 1906, regarding the arrival at Mufalis of a Turkish Revenue official, and the consequent unrest caused amongst the members of the Shujaifi tribe who reside on the British side of the border and within Mansuri limits, and to state that Government approve of your action in communicating with the people on the British side of the border in terms calculated to allay their apprehensions.

Inclosure 25 in No. 111.

Government of Bombay to Government of India.

(Confidential.) *Bombay Castle, February* 15, 1906.

IN continuation of my letter dated the 9th February, 1906, I am directed to forward herewith, for the information of the Government of India, copy of a letter from the Political Resident, Aden, dated the 4th February, 1906, and of its inclosures, regarding the arrival at Mufalis of a Turkish Revenue official, and the consequent unrest caused amongst the members of the Shujaifi tribe who reside on the British side of the border and within Mansuri limits.

2. I am at the same time to state that any remarks which the Bombay Government may desire to make on these papers will be communicated to the Government of India hereafter.

Inclosure 26 in No. 111.

Major-General Mason to Government of Bombay.

(Confidential.) *Aden Residency, February* 4, 1906.

WITH reference to my letter dated the 28th ultimo, I have the honour to forward, for the further information of Government, copies of letters received in the course of the week from the Abdali Sultan, the Mansuri Sheikh, the Shabi Sheikh, Sheikh Darwish Battash, the Duheni, and Sheikh Said-al-Jorabi.

2. From these it will appear that local excitement in the vicinity of Mufalis has, for the time being, subsided, and that there has been a mutual withdrawal of both parties from the border. It would at the same time appear that there is a possibility of trouble again arising after the forthcoming Id. And it seems that dues are actually still collected at the post of Al Doka by certain Arabs nominally, if not actually, on behalf of the Turks.

3. Under these circumstances it may be held desirable to address the Turkish authorities with a view to the withdrawal of their subjects from the post of Al Doka, and the careful avoidance of any form of encroachment on Shujaifa and Shabi lands situated on the British side of the border. If desired I can of course myself make the necessary communication to the Mutessarif of Taiz, through the Vice-Consul of Hodeida, and this would, in such cases, seem a convenient course to follow.

4. In regard to the small border disputes, which occasionally arise on the Amiri border, it has hitherto been the practice for the Political Officer at Dthala to occasionally correspond direct with the Kaimakam of Kataba, and direct correspondence between local officials may frequently prove the most expeditious and the most convenient way of settling disputes of this nature.

5. If desired, intimation can of course be conveyed to the Shabi Sheikh that he should himself take steps to effectively occupy the post of Al Doka and to prevent the collection of dues there, but the peaceable withdrawal of Turkish subjects from that post would seem a desirable preliminary.

6. Of course, should Government decide that the Subehi country should be toured in by a Political Officer, as has been previously suggested, the settlement of the affairs of Shab could be made one of his first objectives.

Inclosure 27 in No. 111.

Sheikh Abdul Kawi-bin-Mohamed to Major-General Mason.

(After compliments.) [*Undated.*]

I BEG to represent to your Majesty's exalted Government that, after the intimidation and alarm to which the people of Shab were subjected by the Kobati and Absi, a letter was received from Ahmed Fadthl informing them (people of Shab) to remain in their houses, not to interfere with the Turkish soldiers or their subjects, that they are admitted under the protection of the British Government, and that, if any one should interfere with them, they might let him know, and he would represent the case to the Resident of Aden. They consequently were pacified, and enthusiastically prayed for your Government; they praised God and thanked Him for the same.

As to myself, personally, by the grace of God, all the people from Taiz to the gate of Aden, including the Kaimakam of the Hojaria, and all the Sayads and Sheikhs, are my friends. I have been speaking unfavourably of the Turks, and eulogizing the British Government. I have no enemy except three men—two are Kobati, and an Absi, who is the Akil of the Taarita. He and the Arari were the cause of the Dareja incident. He wrote to them (Dareja people) to proclaim religious war, which they did. I went to the Kaimakam in connection with this matter; therefore I incurred the displeasure of Mohamed Nasir and Fari Ayedth, who conspired against the Shabis, and caused the seizure of forty loads of bees belonging to them, for the redemption of which we had to pay 1,000 dollars. Eventually Mohamed Nasir was taken to Sanaa.

This was the cause of the enmity between the Absi, Kubati, and myself; the rest of the people, however, always come to me for advice, and are anxious to find out if there is any way of getting them admitted to the protection of the British Government. I am telling them to be patient.

When the survey party arrived at Wadi Maadin I informed Mr. Fitzmaurice and his friends that Wadi Shab was within the Subehi country. Mustafa Renzi and the military Lieutenant-Colonel then asked me to show proofs to that effect, and I had produced documentary proofs. These incidents had intensified the hostility of the Kobati against me. He went to the Mudir of the district and complained against me, so I was locked up for three months and 115 dollars were recovered from Shab. While I was in prison the Kobatis and Absis were informed that Shab was within the British limit, nevertheless they ironically sent word to me to say bring the Rohillas (meaning Aden troop sowars) to remove us from Shab.

The Kotabi has been illegally using my lands, which he still retained in spite of the order issued from Taiz forbidding him from encroaching on my lands.

I now beseech the illustrious British Government to adopt some measures regarding the Kobati or that I might be allowed to fight for my right.

The Customs post question may not be forgotten, as it is the cause of trouble to the people of Shab daily.

We request, from the generosity and boundless liberality of Government, to assist me with what you can conveniently spare, even if it was on credit, as I have to celebrate a marriage during the Id. I was in the habit of getting presents from Saleh Jaffer and (Colonel) Hunter without any request.

Inclosure 28 in No. 111.

Sultan Sir Ahmed Fadthl to Major-General Mason.

(After compliments.) 4 *Al Hijja*, 1323 (*January* 31, 1906).

WE inform your Honour that we have received your letter dated the 26th January, 1906, and in reply we inform you, O friend, firstly, that we shall write to the Akils of Shab as you have proposed and shall advise Kayed No'man as hinted in your letter above referred to.

As regards Doka, the Turkish officials are still stationed there, and they have a little Customs post. The people are much aggrieved for the same.

If you, O friend, can possibly address the Mutessarif of Taiz to order the removal of the Customs post from Doka, please do so and send it to us for transmission.

As for the soldiers, who are at the Doka Customs post, they are Abdulla Alwan-al Attawari, Saeed Mohammed-al-Attwari, and Salim-al-Masri, the Zaidi. The last mentioned is a Subehi, and is not a Turkish subject.

We herewith send you the inclosed letter from all the people of Shab stating their grievances. Please return us the same, as well as the letter of Kayed No'man.

May you be preserved.

Inclosure 29 in No. 111.

SHEIKH ABD AHMED, Alwan Abdan, Ali-bin-Farhan, Ahmed Saeed, Mohydin-bin-Ali Abdulla, Kadthan Ali, Khatan Fadthl, Sharif Mohamed, Abdulla Abdu, Ali Salama, Ali Kadri, Salim-at-Toum, Saeed Imad, Ali Kartan, Fara-al-Wata, Sho'a, Ahmed, Ubaid Saeed Nasir, and all those present, to Sultan Sir Ahmed Fadthl.

(After compliments.) [*Undated.*]

WE have received your letter in which you instructed us to remain in our houses. We hear, obey, and follow the order of a slave of the family of Sultan Fadthl Mohsin Fadthl, leave alone the order of the good Master. By God and by God! since the withdrawal of the survey party, and Sheikh Abdul Kawi was imprisoned, we and the Shabis have expended nearly 2,000 dollars up to date, and paid it to the Absi, Kobati, and others. The ornaments of our wives and our arms are mortgaged with the Absi up to the present day.

You have intimated to us that you will represent to the Resident what is happening to us. We ask you, by the one who caused you to be a Ruler, to communicate our thousand of thousands salaams to him (Resident), and tell him that as long as the Customs post is established at Doka and the bad character and mischievous people and thieves of the Turkish subjects and Subehis congregate there, and as long as the Kobati is occupying lands at Shab and recover revenues from the Shabi limit without right, we have no peace.

Sheikh Abdul Kawi had proceeded to Taiz to refer his complaint, and the Mutessarif had already decided that the Kobati should not encroach upon his neighbours, the subjects of Shab, and that he should give over the lands which he had misappropriated from them. The Kobati consented and agreed to abide by the decision, but when he arrived in his country he repudiated the order, and said, "Tell Abdul Kawi to bring the Rohillas (Aden troop) from Khor Maksar and the slave of his father Ahmed (Abdali) to raise my hand from Shab."

O our lord and master, please inform the Resident that as long as the Kobati and the Customs post are still existing Shab does not belong to its people, nor is it under the British protection. The people at the Customs post have consumed privately and openly all our animals. Daily there is a row between them and our young men.

The Kobati on the 28th Sha'aban of the current year raided Shab, and a fight took place between them and us. The whole time there was firing from both sides, and the party in the Customs post have supported them. The other tribes had also assisted in stopping us from going into their markets and interrupted us on the road. O Master Sultan Ahmed, we feel sure that all the tribesmen from Taiz to Aden do not fear either of the two Governments as they fear you. If you will look severely on the Kobati, &c., as your predecessor the late Sultan Fadthl-bin-Ali used to do by writing them, they would not have ventured to trespass on Shab. We pray to God to prolong your life and give you victory against your enemies. We cannot reward you except to say prayers for you.

The Zaidi is assisting the Kobati. Either by day or night they at times raid on us, and other times rob from Shab. We shall now remain in our houses, and the condition of the country is as you see and hear.

Inclosure 30 in No. 111.

Sheikh Shahir-bin Sef to Major-General Mason.

(After compliments.) 22 *Al Ki'da*, 1323 (*January* 17, 1906).

WE had addressed you in the month of Ramadthan regarding our children (subjects), who are under the British Government, and who had been wrongly encroached upon by the Sublime Government. They were treated in a harsh manner that makes the body shudder, so they came crying to us. We had referred the matter to you, and received a special intimation from you that Shab was under the protection of the great Government.

Verily, O master, these are conspicuous places, of which 'Uslat (country) of Mufalis and its dependencies and Sahar are under one Akil, who is of our children (subjects). These people came crying on the advent of Government, knowing that these places have been decided by the Boundary Commission of the Powers as a British limit, which fact you are well aware of. We have summoned the Akils of the Subehis on the arrival of the Sublime Porte on the border with a view of recovering dues from the people above referred to. We have encamped on the border of the frontier. Bin Khodam and the sons of Kasim Mokbil the Dubeni, as well as all the Jorabis, have joined us; every one had garrisoned his own border. Nasir Imad and Shouter did not fail to render assistance and service. About 300 men of our people were with us, and we have sustained considerable expenses for the sake of the great Government. We have met Ahmed No'man, the official of the Sublime Porte, and discussed the matter with him. We have finally arrived at an understanding that each party should abstain from trespassing, and that we should refer the matter to the British Government, while he would represent the same to the Turkish Government. This is what had happened. Your wisdom is sufficient. Please expedite your reply with particulars.

May you be preserved.

Inclosure 31 in No. 111.

Sultan Sir Ahmed Fadthl to Major-General Mason.

(After compliments.) 29 *Al Ki'da*, 1323 (*January* 25, 1906).

WE inform your Honour that we have heard that Saleh-bin-Ahmed, the Mansuri, had collected fifty men of the Mansuri tribesmen and took them to the Shujaili country in direction of Shab with the intention of fighting the Turkish soldiers. On hearing this report we did not approve of it, as we are perfectly sure that if all the Subehis will assemble they cannot resist the Turks. It is better that if any encroachment is made by the Turkish soldiers the matter of checking them should be conducted through you either by amicable understanding or by force, and not through the Mansuri, unless you approve of the same.

May you be preserved.

Inclosure 32 in No. 111.

Sheikh Darwish Battash to Major-General Mason.

(After compliments.) *Al Hijja*, 1323 (*January* 1906).

WE wish to inform your Honour that Sheikh Saleh-bin-Ahmed-al-Mansuri and his tribesmen came to Shab and summoned the Sheikh of the Subehis, of whom I was one. We proceeded thence and inquired about the cause of the invitation. He replied that whoever was a friend and helper to the British Government, he must garrison and defend the frontier of the said Government. We said we cannot do so without order from Government. He therefore showed us a letter from you addressed to Sheikh Shahir in the month of Ramadthan, purporting that Shab was under the protection of the great Government. We thereupon acquiesced, and garrisoned the borders of the frontier. Sheikh Ahmed No'man arrived on the 28th Al Ki'da on behalf of the Sublime Porte, and we have mutually come to an understanding that each of us should represent the matter to his own Government. In conclusion, we do not know the limit of the Government. We know only the extent of our own territory, so we were afraid to venture at a thing which might not be satisfactory to Government. Hence we represent the matter to you lest we should get into trouble. We request your answer on which we may rely.

Salutation.

Inclosure 33 in No. 111.

Sheikh Saeed-al-Jorabi to Major-General Mason.

(After compliments.) [*Undated.*]

WE inform your Honour, in connection with the previous news regarding the Turkish Government on the border, that their (?) has on Sunday last been withdrawn to the Upper Mufalis, after the interview which was held.

All the tribes, who were encamped on the edge of the border, have also returned to their respective homes, and we likewise returned to our home on Tuesday, the 5th Al Hijja (30th January), 1906. Sheikh Saleh-bin-Ahmed, the Mansuri, has also gone back to his house.

It is alleged by the people that the Turks will come again after the "Id."

Inclosure 34 in No. 111.

Government of Bombay to Government of India.

(Confidential.) *Bombay Castle, March* 19, 1906.

WITH reference to the correspondence ending with Mr. Heaton's letter dated the 15th February, 1906, I am directed to state that the Political Resident, Aden, reports that there appears to be no doubt that dues are still being collected at Al Doka on behalf of the Mudir of Mufalis. A reference to the map which accompanied Colonel Wahab's letter dated the 11th June, 1904, to your address shows that the place lies on the British side of the boundary line as then demarcated, and, under these circumstances, I am to suggest that the attention of the Turkish authorities should be drawn to the matter, and to inquire whether the Government of India will cause a representation to be made to the Porte, through the Foreign Office, regarding the violation of the frontier involved in the levy of these dues at Al Doka, or whether the Government of India would prefer that the Political Resident at Aden should first make a protest to the Mutessarif of Taiz as suggested by the Sultan of Lahej.

Inclosure 35 in No. 111.

Government of India to Government of Bombay.

Simla, May 5, 1906.

(Telegraphic.)

YOUR letter, dated the 19th March, 1906. Aden. El Doka. Following telegram sent to Secretary of State, 25th April:—

"Please see reports . . . . letter alternative if you approve."

Following reply received the 2nd May:—

"I am not sufficiently informed as to nature or mode . . . . before the Turkish authorities are addressed."

Please report further as to when post was established, whether the Customs Collectors are Turks or Turkish subjects, if not whether proceeds are handed over to Turkish Government or disposed of in some other manner, and any further particulars obtainable.

Inclosure 36 in No. 111.

Government of Bombay to Government of India.

Bombay Castle, May 10, 1906.

IN continuation of my letter dated the 19th March, 1906, I am directed to forward herewith, for the information of the Government of India, copy of a letter from the Political Resident, Aden, dated the 27th instant, on the subject of the encroachment on Shabi lands of Turkish officials and others in the vicinity of Mafalis.

Inclosure 37 in No. 111.

Major-General De Brath to Government of Bombay.

Aden Residency, April 27, 1906.

IN continuation of previous correspondence on the subject ending with this Office letter dated the 4th March, 1906, I have the honour to now forward translation of a letter recently received from Sheikh Abdul Kawi-bin-Mahomed Nasir, the Shabi, in which he complains of an apparently somewhat mischievous incursion of Turkish officials and subjects which took place on the 6th instant.

2. From other native sources I gather that some damage was caused to the Shabi crops by the Turkish officials riding through them, and also allowing their animals to graze upon them. But I am asking the Sheikh to inform me more specifically of the amount of damage actually caused.

3. It would appear desirable that some notice should be taken of this occurrence, which, from the Sheikh's reference to Bin Nasir, would seem to have taken place with the connivance or at the instance of Sheikh Mahomed Nasir Mukbil.

Inclosure 38 in No. 111.

Sheikh Abdul Kawi-bin-Mahomed Nasir to Major-General Mason.

20 *Safar*, 1324 (*April* 14, 1906).

(After compliments.)

WE beg to represent to your Honour's offices that we had and still continue to complain of the sudden intrusion of Mahomed Kahtan, the Kotaibi, upon our cultivations, of the misdoing and encroachment of the soldiers stationed at the Customs post at Doka upon the inhabitants of Shab, of the support given by the Kotaibi to the soldiers at Doka, and of their disavowal of Shab being under the British protection.

On the 12th Safar (6th April, 1906) at 12 o'clock noon, a party of upwards of twenty men, consisting of Turkish and Arab soldiers, had unexpectedly appeared at Wadi Shab, some riding on horses and mules, and others on foot. The inhabitants of Shab, the shepherds and keepers of the fields, were dismayed and alarmed at their

appearance. They (soldiers) destroyed the cultivations and set free their horses and mules amongst the cultivations. We sent some one to ask them where they came from and who was their leader? They replied that their leader was a Turk, the Superintendent of Customs, and that they had come from Mavia on behalf of Bin Nasir to collect the customs dues. Half of them stayed with the man in charge of the Customs at (Doka) and then departed. They deliberately rode across the fields and allowed their horses and mules to trample the cultivation. They inspired terror into the minds of the people of Shab of the Karari and Kobati, and declared that whoever mentions the name of the English Government or follows Sheikh Abdul Kawi shall have only himself to blame. The poor people are wailing and crying out for assistance against the misdoing of the Kotaibi and the Customs officer.

Inclosure 39 in No. 111.

Government of Bombay to Government of India.

Bombay Castle, June 13, 1906.

IN continuation of my letter dated the 10th May, 1906, I am directed to forward herewith, for the information of the Government of India, copy of a further letter from the Political Resident, Aden, dated the 20th May, 1906, and of its inclosure, on the subject of the incursion on Shabi lands of Turkish officials and others in the vicinity of Mafalis.

2. The Governor in Council considers it desirable that all the Arab Chiefs along the whole of the frontier of the Aden hinterland should clearly understand the boundary line dividing the Turkish from the British sphere of influence, and his Excellency in Council would therefore, if the Government of India see no objection, give to each leading Sheikh a detailed description of the portion of the frontier within his limits, with a warning not to transgress it himself, and a request to report at once any transgression from the other side.

Inclosure 40 in No. 111.

Major-General De Brath to Government of Bombay.

Aden Residency, May 20, 1906.

IN continuation of my letter dated the 27th April, 1906, inclosing translation of a letter dated the 20th Safar, 1324 (14th April, 1906) from Sheikh Abdul Kawi-bin-Mohamed Nasir, the Shabi, on the subject of an incursion of Turkish officials and subjects which took place on the 6th idem, I have the honour to forward herewith translation of a letter received from No'man Ahmed Ash-Shijaifi, of Shab, dated the 16th Rabi Awal, 1324 (10th May, 1906) for the information of Government.

2. Notes of the interview which No'man Ahmed refers to as having taken place in the month of Al Hijja (February last) have already been communicated to you with this Office letter dated the 25th February, 1906; and I now informing the Sheikh that, as promised at the interview, I am furnishing the Mansuri Sheikh with a description of the boundary recently demarcated by the British and Turkish Governments, and that it will be time enough for complaint when the boundary line is infringed.

3. As already mentioned in paragraph 7 of General Mason's letter, the Shujaifi sub-tribe reside partly on the Turkish side of the border and partly in the Wadi Shab, and No'man* Ahmed is their head. So long as he holds this position the Turkish authorities will presumably continue to hold him responsible for the dues to which the section of his following residing within Turkish territory are liable.

Inclosure 41 in No. 111.

No'man Ahmed-ash-Shujaifi to Major-General De Brath.

16 *Rabi Awal*, 1324 (*May* 10, 1906).

(After compliments.)

WE had come to you in the sacred month of Al Hijja, seeking your protection against the encroachment of the Turkish Government and their officials, and you told us

* Not Ahmed Noman, as stated in the letter just alluded to.

that Shab was included in the territory under the protection of the Great British Government. We had been convinced of the same, but we have received an order from the Mutessarif of Ta'iz district and the Mudir, named Hasan Sabri, on Tuesday, the 15th Rabi Awal, at 10 A.M., by the hand of one of the slaves of the Government, directing us to expedite the immediate transmission of the property (dues) of Government, failing which we shall suffer severe punishment. The Mutessarif wrote us that he intends to visit that part of the country. We are therefore alarmed of this tiding. The order was a general order addressed to all the Sheikhs of the Kotaibi, Absi, Athwari, Ghariki, Aghbari, and the other Sheikhs subordinate to the district. We have been included amongst those Sheikhs.

We had taken the order with a view to send it to you, but the names of the other Sheikhs mentioned therein debarred us from retaining it, so we have left it alone.

Sheikh Abdul Kawi and we had written you a letter on the 20th Safar (14th April, 1906), that the Turkish officials, accompanied by their soldiers and the Athwaris, had traversed Wadi Shab and terrified our women and children, and destroyed our cultivation with their horses. They went as far as Nobat-al-Absi at Doka, *i.e.*, the Customs post. They remained there for two hours, and returned back to the said Wadi in the same manner as they came.

We awaited your reply, but we have received no letter from you as yet.

Please write soon and expeditiously, and give us an assuring reply about all the matters we mentioned, and write also to Mutessarif and the Mudir explaining to them clearly about the place, and telling them that our children and women should be unmolested.

May you be preserved.

This is a second evidence (intimation) that the Kobatis have come to Shab with the intention of fighting the people of the country and to create disturbances.

The order lies with you.

Inclosure 42 in No. 111.

Government of Bombay to Government of India.

Bombay Castle, July 21, 1906.

WITH reference to your telegram dated the 5th May, 1906, I am directed to forward herewith, for the information of the Government of India, copy of a letter, dated the 11th July, 1906, from the Political Resident, Aden, regarding the collection of dues at Al Doka.

Inclosure 43 in No. 111.

Major-General De Brath to Government of Bombay.

Aden Residency, July 11, 1906.

WITH reference to your letter dated the 10th May, forwarding copy of a telegram from the Government of India regarding the collection of dues at Al Doka, I have the honour to submit the following additional information on the points mentioned:—

1. The Turkish post at Al Doka was established some fifteen or sixteen years ago, not long after the withdrawal of the Abdali from the Subaihi country.

2. The Customs Collectors at Al Doka consist of a Subaihi in Turkish employ and two Athwaris who are Turkish subjects.

3. The dues collected are remitted to the Turkish Mudir at Mafalis, the Collectors at Al Doka being paid their salaries from the custom-house at Mafalis.

4. As to the nature of those imposts, they are stated to be transit dues varying from 1 dollar to 3 dollars per camel load according to the nature of the merchandize.

Inclosure 44 in No. 111.

Government of Bombay to Government of India.

Bombay Castle, August 3, 1906.

WITH reference to the correspondence ending with my letter dated the 21st July, 1906, I am directed to forward herewith, for the information of the Government of India, copy of a letter from the Political Resident, Aden, dated the 19th July, 1906, and of its inclosures, regarding complaints of aggressive action on the part of Turkish officials on the British side of the border.

Inclosure 45 in No. 111.

Major-General De Brath to Government of Bombay.

Aden, July 19, 1906.

WITH reference to your indorsement dated the 10th May, 1906, below copy of telegram dated the 5th May, 1906, from Government of India, Foreign Department, and in continuation of my letter of the 11th February, 1906, I have the honour to forward translation of two letters lately received (without date) purporting to emanate from Sheikh Abdul Kawi-bin-Mahomed and all the people of Shab and from one Sayyed Kadri Yasin respectively, complaining of further aggressive action on the part of Turkish officials on the British side of the border.

2. I have written to the Abdali Sultan asking him to verify the report, if possible, and on receipt of his reply will address you further in the matter.

Inclosure 46 in No. 111.

Sheikh Abdul Kawi-bin-Mahomed Naser and all the People of Shab to Captain Hancock.

[*Undated.*]

(After compliments.)

I INFORM you that on the 25th Rabi Akher, 1324 (17th June, 1906), a party of Turkish soldiers arrived at Shab, asserting that they are in possession of an order from Sheikh Ahmed-bin-Cassim Hasan, the Kaimakam of the Hojariya, authorizing them to occupy the Customs post at Doka. They were, however, prevented by the men who were previously in charge of the Customs post. They then lived in a hamlet of Shab, and commenced to annoy the inhabitants of Shab. Subsequently a party comprising [*sic*] of the sons of the Sheikhs of the Kobatis and some Athwaris followed, and declared that they had an order from the Mudir to the effect that they were to occupy the post, and they intended to create a fight at Shab with one another, as each party pretended to possess an order to occupy the post and take charge of the Customs.

On the 2nd Jumad (24th June, 1906), the Turkish Mudir at Mafalis arrived with a large force of troops and encamped at the Customs, whereupon the people of Shab were excessively terrified. On the 3rd of the said month (25th June), after the agriculturists and peasants had gone away and every person went to mind his business, I heard shouts and yells from the direction of the hills and the valley, and the people were fleeing with their animals promiscuously, and the confusion and excitement was to such an extent that no one could hear what was the matter. The people and children were in a state of panic. Then I set forth from my dwelling and went out asking what was the cause of the excitement, whereupon I was told that some Turks and Arabs, partly riding and partly on foot, were on the hills, and some were in the Wadi. Thereupon I rode a swift donkey and hastened and confronted the sowars. I asked what they wanted and why they had alarmed the peasants and children of the country. They responded that they had come in the company of Hasan Sabri, the Mudir. I asked as to where he was, and when he was pointed out to me I went and caught the bridle of the horse and said: "Woe be to you! Why did you come suddenly and unexpectedly that all population were startled and frightened? Your wishes would be attained, but order the men on the hills to descend and peace to be proclaimed to the people that they may be pacified and be tranquillized." They said that they came to see us, pay a pilgrimage to the saints at Shab, and be our guests for the day. I welcomed them, and at the same time remarking that they ought not to have come with such a large force before giving previous notice.

I proceeded in advance until we came to the station at the hostelry belonging to the Syeds, and they requested to have forage and grain for their horses and mules, as well as dinner, coffee, and other necessaries for themselves. I recognized the Arabs who were with them to be some Sheikhs of the Athwaris, Arikis, Abus, Aghabira, Kobatis, and all the other Sheikhs of the district save the Shujaifi of Shab, who hid themselves, and did not venture to appear.

After dinner the Mudir of the district asked me as to where was Jabal Rakaiza. I told him it was on the north of Shab, pointing it to him. He then asked where Najd Jaima was, and I pointed it to him. He further asked where Najd Shab was, and I said it was in the east of Shab, and pointed it to him. Thereafter he inquired from the Sheikhs of the Abus and Kobatis if my statement was correct. They replied that that was not Rakaiza, but another place. Much argument then took place between them and us. He afterwards asked me where was Nobat-al-Absi, which is situate within the Shab limit. I replied that I was not aware of any Noba (post) bearing the name of Nobat Absi in Shab, or its limit, but there are two posts on the south of Shab, one of which is Nobat-al-Mikrad and the other is Nobat Najd-al-Ahmar, which belonged to the watchmen who look after the fields of Shab. The Sheikhs of the Kobatis and the Abus declared that Nobat Najd-al-Mikrad in the south of Shab was identical with that of Nobat-al-Absi. I replied that in reality Nobat-al-Absi was the summit of Nakil Duman, belonging to Hatem, the grandfather of Kassem Saeed, the Absi, and I disputed the point with them. He then asked me about the two villages situated near Marabeha on the side of Rakaiza. I replied they were existing on the north of Rakaiza. He asked about Ar Rafd, and I pointed out to the hill yonder. He asked me about Nabat, and I said both Nabat and Ar Rafd were on the north of Wadi Shab. He asked me concerning the Harshi, Hummat-al-Mukhzuj, and Kobbat Othman on the south of Mabak, and I described them to him. I was alone, and there was no one of the Subaihis present to support me. Sef Diban was present, and he was accompanying them (Turks) as a soldier. He (Sef Diban) witnessed that the Noba situated on the south of Shab was Nobat-al-Absi. In conclusion, whenever any argument arose between the Abus, Kobatis, and myself on any point Sef Diban gave evidence in their favour in the presence of the Mudir. Kadri Yasin was also present with them, but as he did not know the limits of Shab nor the names of the places, he was holding his peace, and did not speak in favour of either of us. He, at any rate, was a witness to our conversation, and reported to me of things that took place in my absence.

The Mudir told me: "O Sheikh Abdul Kawi, you are a Mahommedan and a learned man, how was it that you gave evidence to the effect that Shab was encroached upon, and preferred the British to the Sublime Government?" I replied that I spoke the truth. The Abus and Kobatis asked if Shab was not paying the revenues due to Government. I replied that they, as tribesmen, were using force against the people of Shab, and compelled them to pay dues whether it be for the Turks or otherwise, and that they had interrupted the road against the people of Shab and debarred them from the markets. I also said that we had already produced to them documents showing that Shab was a non-paying place of any tribute, and lies within the Subaihi country. The Mudir and all Sheikhs then returned and warned the people of Shab that whoever should listen to Abdul Kawi (*i.e.*, writer), or assist him, he shall blame but himself, and intimidated and threatened them with the severest punishment. They also told them that whoever declares that he was under the British protection shall be imprisoned and his properties plundered. All the Sheikhs of the district asked the Mudir to permit them to use force, in case the Ahl Shab would not submit, and go to Haifan to pay him the dues. The Mudir said that they (Shabis) are allowed a period up to the end of the current month. The Kobatis and the Abus claimed some rights due by the people of Shab, which they intend to recover from them, and the Mudir replied that they can recover their dues from Shabis either willingly or by force. I declare that nothing is due to them by the Shabis, but they (Turks, &c.), intend to exhaust and try their patience so that they may renounce the protection of the British Government.

The Mudir left, but kept some garrison of the Kobatis in one of the houses of the Shabis, besides those already in charge of the Customs post. The Mudir also ordered for rebuilding a post which was dilapidated within the southern limit of Shab, about 1 mile or more distance below Rakaiza. I did not consider it safe to place some garrison opposite to their men, but kept about ten men in a house close to the post which they intended to reconstruct, and I have prevented the mason and labourers from proceeding with the work. Now, the people are very much afraid of the permission granted by the Mudir to the tribesmen to recover from them whatever they wished. The Mudir directed the Sheikh of Athwaris to rebuild the houses belonging to Abd Muhammad which

were demolished by the Boundary Commission, and to post the Customs authority at Mufalis there.

All the Kobatis, Sheikhs, and others have taken solemn oath that they shall not behave or pay one "para" (cent) unless the people of Shab pay up (the dues) and surrender, or that the Sublime Government may authorize them to combine against the Shabis and exact dues from them for three years at once. Finally, I have been saying too much. The Sheikhs of the Kobatis and Abus have said to some of the people of Shab that they shall not escape danger unless they killed Sheikh Abdul Kawi (*i.e.*, writer). The Mudir told some of the tribesmen that whoever kills me will be paid by him 500 dollars.

This is what I write you about, and just as I am writing this letter three "Khadims" (low caste) came with a message to all the people of Shab that they have two weeks' time within which they must allow the Kobatis and the Customs authority to build the post and to pay up the dues, otherwise they shall have no peace either in the country or other places. You may consider and make haste to adopt such measures as may save the people of Shab from being plundered and killed by the Kobatis and Abus, &c. There is nothing to prevent the tribesmen after they are told by Mudir that if they plundered and killed the Shabis the English cannot send an expedition against them as several countries have followed the English and were plundered and captured by the Turks while no one had done them any good. The tribe would not be kept under restraint from doing aggression unless it should be proclaimed by beat of tom-tom at Aden, Sheikh Othman, and Lahej that Shab is included under the British protection, and that if any of the tribes should interfere with Shab their sons would be arrested at those places. If any aggression is made they (tribesmen) should not say that they were not warned. If the people will hear of this they will be afraid, because they are all in need for their requirements from Aden and Lahej and are unable to cease from visiting those places.

This is what we inform you, and your opinion is sufficient. We request the Great Government to send up our present as well as four bags of jowari and four bags of rice, as we are put to too much loss at Shab owing to the boundary affair. Every year the Amir (Sultan) Ahmed Fadthl assists us with jowari and rice, but this year we ask the generosity of the Great Government for the same.

Inclosure 47 in No. 111.

Sayyed Kudri Yasin to Major-General De Brath.

(After compliments.) [*Undated.*]

I INFORM you that I had visited the Mafalis for some business I had there and found the Mudir of the Kobati district with many Turks and Arabs collected there. They left for Shab and I went along with them.

When they arrived at the southern part of Shab they summoned the Shujaifi Sheikhs, but none of them appeared.

While the horsemen and footmen were proceeding the agriculturists and peasants were frightened and much alarmed. Sheikh Abdul Kawi, the Shabi, told them not to be afraid, and went to the Mudir and expostulated with him and the Sheikhs of the district for coming so suddenly and unexpectedly that the citizens were terrified. He told them that it would have been better if they had sent an intimation of their intended visit. The Mudir replied that he had come to see them (Abdul Kawi and others) and pay a pilgrimage to the saints at Shab, and he was their guest. Abdul Kawi welcomed and ordered for them dinner and coffee.

The Mudir then commenced to ask Abdul Kawi as to where the hill of Rakaiza, Najd Jaima, Najd Shab, Nobat Absi, Rafd, Nobat, &c., were, and Sheikh Abdul Kawi explained to him all the above places. The Kobati and the Abus of the Zakkera repudiated his statement, and much argument took place between them. Sheikh Abdul Kawi declared that he was not aware of Nobat Absi being in existence in Shab or its limits. They (Sheikhs) pointed out that the Noba existing there was called Nobat Absi. Sheikh Abdul Kawi replied that the name of the Noba under reference was Nobat-al-Mikrad. The Mudir then ordered the Customs authority to occupy and build it. Sheikh Abdul Kawi protested against the building of it.

The Noba is situate to the south of Shab and the south of the hills of Shab. There was much discussion between the Mudir and the Sheikhs while Sheikh Abdul Kawi was alone, and there was no one of the Subaihis at Wadi Mudir or others to back him up

except myself, who did not know the name of the places, nor had I been to the limits of Shab before this time. Sef Diban was amongst the companions of the Mudir who came along with him from Haifan. Sef Diban was with the survey party, but he did not support Sheikh Abdul Kawi. On the contrary, he sided the Abus, and falsified Sheikh Abdul Kawi in many things. The Mudir asked Sheikh Abdul Kawi regarding Jabal Asla, Farw Sahr, Sukni, and Tukar. I observe that the Sheikhs and the Mudir bear ill-feeling towards Sheikh Abdul Kawi, and they (Sheikhs) had taken solemn oath in the presence of the Mudir that they would never act submissively, or pay even a "para" (cent) while Shab was under the British protection. They (Sheikhs) had talked a great deal about Shab and Sheikh Abdul Kawi, and told the Mudir that Abdul Kawi was the trustee on behalf of the English, who fixed for him monthly pay.

May you be preserved.

Inclosure 48 in No. 111.

Government of Bombay to Government of India.

Bombay Castle, August 17, 1906.

IN continuation of my letter dated the 3rd August, 1906, I am directed to forward herewith, for the information of the Government of India, copy of a letter from the Political Resident, Aden, dated the 4th idem, and of its inclosure, regarding the aggressive action of Turkish officials on the British side of the border at Wadi Shab.

Inclosure 49 in No. 111.

Major-General De Brath to Government of Bombay.

Aden Residency, August 1, 1906.

IN continuation of this Office letter dated the 19th July, 1906, regarding the further aggressive action by Turkish officials in Wadi Shab, I have the honour to forward herewith translation of a letter dated the 22nd July, 1906, received from the Abdali Sultan, for the information of Government.

Inclosure 50 in No. 111.

Sultan Sir Ahmed Fadhl to Major-General De Brath.

(After compliments.) 29 *Jumad Awal*, 1324 (*July* 22, 1906).

WE have received your letter dated 19th July, 1906, and in reply we inform your Honour that some days ago we have heard that the Mutessarif of Taiz had issued an order to the effect that the customary dues recoverable from the Turkish subjects at Doka and people of Shab should be collected with the exception of the inhabitants of Wadi Tukar, who are considered to have been included in the limit of Aden. They (Turks) do not recognize the rest to have been included in the British Government's limit, but that they (people) are their subjects. This information we communicate to you as we have heard it.

May you be preserved.

Inclosure 51 in No. 111.

Government of Bombay to Government of India.

Bombay Castle, September 11, 1906.

IN continuation of the correspondence ending with my letter dated the 17th August, 1906, I am directed to forward herewith, for the information of the Government of India, copy of a letter from the Political Resident, Aden, dated the 2nd September, 1906, and of its inclosures, regarding the contemplated erection of another Customs post at Al Doka by the Turkish Mudir at Mafalis.

Inclosure 52 in No. 111.

Major-General De Brath to Government of Bombay.

Aden Residency, September 2, 1906.

WITH reference to correspondence ending with this Office letter dated the 4th August, 1906, I have the honour to report that further letters have been received from Sheikh Abdul Kawi-bin-Mahomed, of Shab, in which he states that the Turkish Mudir, Husen Sabri, now contemplates the erection of another Customs post near Al Doka, which he has at present succeeded in preventing him from doing, and again complains of the aggressive conduct and the unwarranted demands of one Salim Abdul Wahab, the Kobati at the village of the Kawaidtha, which is believed to be situated within the limits of this Protectorate.

2. I forward, for the information of Government, copies of two letters received and of the reply sent to the Sheikh, as well as of a letter which I have addressed to the Abdali Sultan on the subject.

3. It would appear desirable that no fresh Customs post should be established in the close vicinity of Al Doka, and that, if possible, arrangements for the collection of customs should be confined to Mafalis itself.

Inclosure 53 in No. 111.

Sheikh Abdul Kawi-bin-Mahomed Nasir to Major-General De Brath.

(After compliments.) [*Undated.*]

WE beg to represent to the Great Government that after the Mudir, Husen Sabri, had visited Shab we have been compelled to maintain a garrison near the Customs post, because the Mudir has directed that a new post should be built, and selected a place for its construction on the southern side of the hill of Shab, whereas the old post was on the northern side of the hill. We have been preventing their attempts whenever they sent labourers.

2. Sheikh Salim Abdul Wahab, the Kobati, during the month of Rajab last year went to a village belonging to the people of Shab near the Kobati limit, carried away their cattle and goats, and recovered 80 dollars from the subjects of Shab, and imprisoned two men. When we came to know about it we had represented the matter to the Great Government, but as no steps were taken, and Sheikh Salim Abdul Wahab observed that none of either Governments called upon him to account for his action, he again this year visited the same village with a large force while we were in the Mansuri country, garrisoned and imposed taxes, and also took away the cattle of the inhabitants of the village above alluded to. He, moreover, made the people to sign a bond to the effect that they are residing within and under the Kobati country. He kept garrison in two "Dars" (houses), as he is afraid that we might punish the villagers who acquiesced to that.

3. Hajee Shahir, the Absi, has been negotiating with us with a view that we might persuade the people of Shab to pay the dues to Government. We herewith send you one of his letters. We hope that the Great Government will not be regardless of this matter, and to put a stop to the doings of Sheikh Salim Abdul Wahab, the Kobati, and Hajee Shahir, and to consider as to what may be good. We have already sustained great losses and expense, and we do not know what we might do.

Inclosure 54 in No. 111.

Hajee Shahir to Sheikh Abdul Kawi-bin-Mahomed Nasir.

[*Undated.*]

WE have received your letter. We were expecting you to come personally, but since you offered your excuse there is no matter. We get news to the effect that you are preventing the people of Shab from coming and paying the dues of Government, and that (you state) that they are exempted by the Sublime Government from such payment. This news has reached Sheikh Ahmed Kasim. We were surprised to hear it, in spite of what we had written you before that you should refrain from acting contrary to the wishes of Government, inasmuch as the people of Shab and their dependence to the

Government is concerned. Hitherto they had neither paid a dollar nor showed their obedience. We trust that they will pay the dues for the present and last year; their excuse for non-payment is your prevention.

As to the documents we know nothing about them, as at that time Sheikh Ismail Abdul Karim was in authority, and they (documents) were not with us. We swear that we have no knowledge of them. Had they been with us we would have sent them to you, as we have no interest in retaining them. Human beings are answerable for their deeds, and by their character they show their honesty.

(Signed) HAJEE SHAHIR, *the Absi.*

Inclosure 55 in No. 111.

Sheikh Abdul Kawi-bin-Mahomed Nasir-al-Shabi to Major-General De Brath.

(After compliments.) [*Undated.*]

I INFORM you that two days after my letter of the 15th Jemad Akhar, 1324 (August 1906), was dispatched to you Sheikh Salim Abdul Wahab had imprisoned two of the subjects of Shab, and up to now they are confined.

Be it known to you that there are three men of the Shabis intriguing with the Shabis, endeavouring to kill me, and are paid by the Customs soldier and Salim Abdul Wahab to do so. These men were paying tribute to my grandfathers. They are circulating reports amongst the people that I am trying to give the suzerainty to the infidels over them, while they (inhabitants of Shab) were Moslems; that I am fond of the English and disliking the Islamic power, and many things of this nature. It was these men who passed a document testifying that the village of the Kawaidtha, which is in the mouth of Shab, is within the Kobati limit. I had secured the arrest and imprisoned one of these men, but he had jumped from the top of the house and escaped to the Kowatis. He was the biggest pig and mischief-maker, who promulgated rumours in Shab and all other places to the effect that Sheikh Abdul Kawi's (the writer's) proclivities are towards the British religion, and that he propitiates their Government. He had heard that I wish to arrest and confine him, so he fled away to Aden.

On a former occasion he had caused a report to be circulated that the Turks had driven the British Government from many places, and turned them away from Egypt in the course of one hour; that the Turks had taken possession of all the British war materials on land and sea; and that the British Government had taken one year's time for the evacuation of Aden and handing it over to Turkey. He said: "O people of Shab, be not misled by Abdul Kawi that you are included in the protection of the British Government. The British Government itself is going to withdraw from Aden."

When I heard of these stories I apprehended him; but many people intervened, and I released him after taking solemn undertaking from him that he was repentant. He after that had resorted to these fabulous stories. Now the mischievous and son of mischievous man, and in whose family the intrigues and seditions are well established since time immemorial, is coming to you. I am complaining to the Great Government against him; but if the Government would take no notice of his misdeeds, I claim my rights against him. When he comes to you, you might threaten him by imprisonment, so that he might leave your place terrified. This fact should be made known to the people, inasmuch as that he had run away to save himself. This act may become an example to others; otherwise you may detain him in custody until my agent appears before you. From this procedure every one will learn a lesson, and refrain from exciting Jehad (religious war) or speaking baselessly concerning matters of religion or affecting the powers. Our dear Ali Jaffer knows him.* His name is Yehia-bn-Sef-al-Kawaidthi, a subject of the Shabis. Should he return from Aden this time uncensured or unintimidated, he would declare Jehad on us. There is no bigger liar or more cursed man than him throughout the world. A hint is sufficient to the wise. The matter is left at your disposal.

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* No, I do not know him, nor have I ever seen him.—A. J.

Inclosure 56 in No. 111.

Major-General De Brath to Sheikh Abdul Kawi-bin-Mahomed-ash-Shaabi.

(After compliments.) *Aden Residency, September 2, 1906.*

WE have, O friend, recently perused three letters written by you in Jumad Akhar (August 1906), concerning affairs in the Wady Shab.

We understand that the Mudir Hasan Sabri contemplates the erection of a new Customs post near Shab, but that at present he has not done so. You must, of course, be careful to confine the actions of your own garrison, of which you write, to your own side of the boundary. We are informing Government of the Mudir's intention.

We are also informing Government of Sheikh Salim Abdul Wahab's actions in the village of Kawaidtha. British subjects need, of course, pay no dues to Turkish officials; but, on the other hand, any people who may be living at Kawaidtha, and at the same time cultivating lands within Turkish limits, must, of course, pay their proper dues for such lands.

We understand that one Yehia-bin-Sef-al-Kawaidthi has a foolish tongue. He is not now in Aden, we are informed. No doubt you will be able to persuade him of his folly in due course.

Meanwhile you should not exaggerate your difficulties, and you should do what is possible to arrange things quietly and in a friendly spirit.

Out of friendship we send you by the bearer of this letter a present of 50 rupees. We have no French ammunition to send you.

Inclosure 57 in No. 111.

Major-General De Brath to Sultan Sir Ahmed Fadhl.

(After compliments.) *Aden Residency, September 2, 1906.*

WE have, O friend, recently received further letters from Sheikh Abdul Kawi-bin-Mahomed of Shab, in which he again complains of the encroachments of the Kobati in the village of Al Kawaidtha, and also informs us that the Mudir Husen Sabri contemplates the erection of another Customs post near Al Doka.

We should be obliged if you would inform us what you know concerning the above complaint, and if you would do all that may be possible to effect a quiet and suitable settlement of these small disputes.

We inclose an Arabic translation of the description of the boundary in this vicinity which was drawn up by the Boundary Commission, which will assist you in giving good advice to Sheikh Abdul Kawi, and we send you for your perusal a copy of a letter which we are sending him.

And greetings.

[37812]

No. 112.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 503.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November 16, 1906.*

WITH reference to Sir N. O'Conor's despatch No. 362 of the 27th May, I transmit to you herewith copy of a letter from the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company,* requesting that representations may be made to the Porte with a view to obtaining permission for the Company to run a third steamer and barge.

It seems improbable that the Porte will agree to this; but they might, perhaps, grant the permission temporarily, in view of the accumulation of goods waiting for shipment at Bussorah.

I have to request, therefore, that you will consider the question, and furnish me with your opinion as to whether you can raise it with any prospect of success in obtaining even a temporary concession.

At the same time I would point out that His Majesty's Government do not wish you to take any action in the matter if you consider it would lead to no useful result.

I am, &c.

(Signed) EDWARD GREY.

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* No. 109.

[38768] No. 113.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 743.)

Constantinople, November 9, 1906.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 731 of the 30th ultimo, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Acting Consul-General at Bagdad relative to the Persian demonstration at Kerbela.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 113.

Major Ramsay to Government of India.

Bagdad, October 8, 1906.

Sir,

IN continuation of my letter dated the 29th September last, I have the honour to submit a further report on affairs at Kerbela.

2. I daily received petitions, signed by large numbers of persons, demanding to be accepted as British subjects. At first these were brought by persons of no position; and as there was no acknowledged head of the Persians at Kerbela to whom I could send a written reply, I could only tell the bearers of the petitions that I could not interfere on behalf of the Persians, and that it was quite impossible for them to become British subjects while living at Kerbela. To make sure that there should be no doubt about the line I was adopting, I spoke quite openly to all visitors who came to see me.

On the 3rd October the Persian Consul-General came to call on me, to thank me for having given his subjects no support. He complained that the British Vice-Consul was secretly supporting the malcontents, and begged me to reiterate my orders to him. I therefore sent another telegram to the Vice-Consul, telling him once more to assure the Persians that they were asking for a thing that could not be granted.

Since then I have received numerously signed petitions stating that my orders have been made known in Kerbela, but that the Persians cannot accept them, because their present condition is so wretched that they would submit to anything rather than give up their claim to the protection of the British Government. The petition received this morning was presented by two men of greater intelligence, and apparently better position; unfortunately it is mail day, and I had an appointment with the Vali, so I could not discuss the Persian affair at any length, and I told the bearers of the letter to see me again to-morrow. I understood, however, that the demonstrators are now afraid to leave the British Consulate because they fear that both the Turkish and Persian officials will make them pay for having appealed to the British authorities.

3. My object in going to see his Excellency the Vali was to find out what view he took of the demonstration, and to try to prevent it causing any friction between myself and the local officials. I found his Excellency most polite and agreeable. He also told me that his information was that the British Vice-Consul showed an unduly open sympathy with the Persians; he said that the Shahriya tax was taken from the Persians in accordance with an agreement between the two Governments. He also informed me that he had received orders from the Sublime Porte not to press for the collection of the tax until something had been settled between the Governments of Turkey and Persia. I asked him if he wished the crowd dispersed, and he said that he would be glad to see an end of the present excitement. I then said that the Persians declined to believe the information given to them by the Consular officials of their own nation, and that perhaps they would resume their business if I told them that orders had come from Constantinople, that they were not to be pressed for payment of the Shahriya tax pending further negotiations. I said that before taking such a step I should have to consult the Embassy. His Excellency asked me to wait three days before telegraphing, because he said that he hoped that the people would disperse within that time. He said that he was going to threaten to disperse them by force. I said that I should be very sorry indeed if force was used, and he said that he had no intention of carrying out the threat, and would

consult with me again after three days, if the excitement had not quieted down by that time. The Government of India has fortunately kept me well posted in the history of the recent disturbances at Tehran, and I was therefore, I hope, able to persuade his Excellency that the movement at Kerbela was merely the result of what is going on all over Persia. I think his Excellency was inclined to treat it as a matter which little concerned the Turkish officials. He promised to write to the Mutessarif of Kerbela and instruct him to take this view of the case, and to forbid him to visit with any marks of his displeasure the people who have been demonstrating.

4. Writing on the 2nd October the Vice-Consul informs me that the Persians disregard threats of the use of force, that the objection to the Shahriya tax was merely a pretext, that nothing will satisfy them but British protection, and that they refuse to listen to the peaceful persuasions of one Syed Muhammad Mehdi, a brother of Syed Muhammad Bakir Tabatabahi, the man who used to get the whole of the Kerbela share of the Oudh bequest.

Writing on the 6th October the Vice-Consul says that the shops are still closed, that the Persians have declined to listen to the arguments of a special messenger sent to Kerbela by the Persian Consul-General, and that they are determined to spare no effort to be taken under British protection.

5. Nothing definite has been said to me, but I am inclined to think that Syed Muhammad Bakir Tabatabahi, who is now residing at Kadhimain, is taking an active, though secret, part in the present agitation. A reference to the papers forwarded to you with my letter dated the 7th July, will show that he has no reason to have any friendly feelings towards the present Consul-General of Persia.

6. I am sending a copy of this letter to his Excellency the Ambassador, and to the British Minister at Tehran. I am also keeping both officers informed by telegram.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. RAMSAY, *Major, Officiating Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad.*

[38774] No. 114.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 751.)

Constantinople, November 13, 1906.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 743 of the 9th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bagdad addressed to the Government of India, relating to the conduct of Persian subjects at Kerbala.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 114.

Major Ramsay to Government of India.

Bagdad, October 15, 1906.

Sir,

IN continuation of my letter dated the 8th instant, I have the honour to submit a further report on affairs at Karbala.

2. I inclose a Memorandum,* written up from day to day, showing what has taken place since my last letter.

3. Briefly the facts may be stated somewhat as follows: I have done my best to avoid being forced into taking any official part in the matter, I have written nothing to any of the refugees, and I have not admitted that any particular person is entitled to speak for them. On the other hand, I have received a number of largely signed Petitions, and I have heard what the bearers of the same wished to say. With each successive Petition a more intelligent and influential person appeared. I have on every occasion said that it is not possible for the Persians to become British subjects, or

* Not printed.

for them to become British-protected subjects, and I have advised them to disperse. The only semi-official action that I have taken is to suggest to the Persian Consul-General and the Vali of Bagdad that they should induce the people to disperse by dispelling their fears that they will be pounced upon immediately they leave the neighbourhood of the British Vice-Consulate. The Persian Consul-General has agreed to do this, but I cannot get the Vali to do so, although he has been authorized by the Grand Vizier to give an assurance of the nature suggested.

On the 11th instant I telegraphed at some length to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador informing him of the then state of the case, and I sent a copy to Tehran for information. On the 14th I again telegraphed to the Embassy suggesting that the Vali should be peremptorily ordered to give the Persians an assurance that they will not be molested if they will disperse. I inclose what is practically a copy of my telegrams (they were sent in cypher).*

4. If the Vali would only do as I suggest, the present incident could be brought to a close, as I have succeeded in getting the Persians to show a reasonable spirit. As long as the present state of things exists I am afraid that the position must be considered as dangerous. The Persians have suffered from oppression for years, and are actuated by feelings of the bitterest resentment; their religious feelings have been roused by the abuse of their Sayads and their religion by Turkish officials, without protest on the part of the Persian officials; the discontent and disorder in Irak are general; and the Arab tribes are anxiously watching the course of events. In spite of this, his Excellency the Vali, when speaking to me or to my native agent, is inclined to pooh-pooh the whole affair and make out that it is nothing out of the usual.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. RAMSAY, *Major,*
Officiating Political Resident in Turkish Arabia and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Baydad.

[38776]

No. 115.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 754.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November 13, 1906.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 732 of the 30th ultimo, respecting the disturbances at Erzeroum, I have the honour to forward copy of a full report of the circumstances from His Majesty's Consul at Erzeroum.

I would observe that, as was the case during the poll-tax disturbances at Erzeroum in March last (see Sir N. O'Conor's despatch No. 284 of 27th April), the affair was one solely between the Moslem population and the authorities, and that the Christians were not molested.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 115.

Consul Shipley to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 25. Confidential.)

Sir, *Erzeroum, October 27, 1906.*

IN my telegrams of the 23rd instant I had the honour to report to you briefly the events which occurred on that day consequent upon the arrest and despatch into exile by the authorities of the Mufti of Erzeroum, Hadji Lutfullah Effendi, with two other persons named Tahsin and Yusuf Effendis respectively. These events were the attack by a Mussulman crowd upon the house of the Governor-General, Ata Bey; the subsequent imprisonment of the latter in a mosque until the return to Erzeroum in the evening of the Mufti and his companions; and, finally, the murders by the mob of the Chief of Police, Tewfik Bey, the latter's son, Tahir Bey, who was himself also a police official; and Gani Bey, Second Commissary of Police. I have now the honour to submit to you the following further account of the affair, which I have reason to believe is substantially correct.

* See Inclosures in Nos. 89 and 96.

As stated in my first telegram, the arrest of the Mufti and his companions was effected about two o'clock in the morning, or possibly a little later, that particular hour, I am told, having been chosen on account of the fact that most of the Mussulmans—the month being Ramazan—would then have retired for a short rest previous to the repast preceding the fast on the following day. The Chief of Police himself, his son, and Gani Bey, were, it appears, intrusted with the duty of effecting the arrest of the Mufti and his companions, which would seem to have been carried out without much difficulty, the prisoners being hurried off in a carriage with a small escort of zaptiehs. The arrest of the two other persons had also been ordered, but these latter managed to escape, the one by menacing the police with his revolver, and the other by barricading his house and refusing to obey their summons to open.

It was not long before the news of what had happened was circulated through the town, with the result that at daybreak a large and infuriated crowd of Mussulmans assembled in front of the Vali's house, broke down the doors and windows, and forced their way in, the Vali himself with his family escaping to a neighbouring house. This, however, afforded his Excellency only a short respite, for the mob, soon discovering his whereabouts, forced him to accompany them to a mosque in the vicinity.

A telegram to Ash Kaleh, the nearest stopping-place on the road to Trebizond, ordering the return of the Mufti was then extorted from him under threats that, in case of refusal, not only his own life but that of his family would be forfeited. While in the mosque his Excellency was not further molested, being allowed interviews with certain Notables of the town, while he was also visited at intervals by Munir Pasha, the Commandant of the troops. The gates of the mosque were, however, closely watched all day by the crowd, until at sunset the arrival of the Mufti with his two companions put an end to the suspense, and his Excellency was allowed to return to his residence. I should, however, mention that in the scuffle which took place during the passage to the mosque the Vali received a wound on the head from a stone thrown by somebody whose identity is not known and from the effects of which he is still suffering. It was, in fact, a moment of imminent danger, and his Excellency has himself since said that he considered it fortunate that he found two or three persons who seemed to have some authority over the mob willing to listen to his representations that to take his—the Vali's—life would neither profit themselves nor the Government, nor any one else.

In the meantime a report had spread among the crowd that the Mufti had been treated with gross indignity by the police officials charged with the duty of arresting him, such as that he had been dragged from his bed to the carriage by the beard, and that a gag had been forced into his mouth. This report, whether true or not, seems to have excited the mob to a pitch of ungovernable fury, for first wrecking the houses of the Commandant of Gendarmerie and the Chief of Police, they then rushed, I am told, to the Government buildings in search of the latter, and finding that they had taken refuge in a guard-house close by, made their way thither, and on seeing at the entrance the Chief of Police, who, relying on the presence of the soldiers, had not thought it necessary to conceal himself, and who, I am told, even addressed the crowd in a peremptory manner, seized him and beat him to death with clubs, his dead body being dragged by the heels through the streets and thrown into a ditch, the uniform having first been stripped off; the time being about 10 o'clock in the morning, not 11, as stated in my telegram. About an hour and a-half later the guard-house, which all the time had been closely watched by the crowd, was again entered by the mob, and on the son of the Chief of Police, Tahir Bey, a young man of about 22 or 23, being discovered in an inner room, dealt with him in the same way as they had previously dealt with his father. The circumstances of this second murder were, I have it from an eye-witness, even more horrible than in the case of the first one, for Tahir Bey, after having been rendered insensible by the repeated blows which he received in the guard-house, was thrown from the balcony to the mob, by whom the work of doing him to death was finished outside, his dead body being treated in the same way as that of his father. Later in the day, about an hour before sunset, Gani Bey, the third of the officials concerned in the arrest of the Mufti, shared amid, I am told, the scoffing of the crowd, a similar fate at the same guard-house, his death being accompanied by the further barbarity of his body being subsequently dragged to his house and in that state shown to his wife. There were, I am glad to be able to report, no further victims; but notwithstanding the return of the Mufti in the evening, a very sharp look-out was kept by the crowd during the following night and next day for the Commandant of Gendarmerie, Ahmet Pasha, against whom they seemed to entertain

a particular grudge. Fortunately for himself his hiding-place was not discovered; and he was, as stated in my telegram of the 25th instant, finally conveyed out of the town in the dead of the night under an escort of cavalry.

In the case of none of the three murders above related was there any attempt on the part of the military present to interfere, though the Major in command of the guard-house, Muharrem Bey, disposed, I am told by the same eye-witness, of a fairly strong contingent of men under arms. The soldiers, in fact, looked on with indifference, while the Major in question, when asked why he allowed such proceedings to go on under his very eyes, replied that he was without orders. As no attempt had up to then been made by the military to stop this riot in other parts of the town, it is probable that this reply of the Major was in accordance with the facts, and that he himself may have been unwilling to take the responsibility of precipitating a conflict with the mob. It is pointed out, however, that even from a military point of view, and apart entirely from questions of humanity, the fact remains that he allowed, without offering any resistance, what was practically a forcible entry by the crowd into a guard-house committed to his charge. The general inaction of the military throughout the whole affair to which I alluded in my second telegram of the 23rd instant is, indeed, hardly explicable, except on the supposition that Munir Pasha, the Commandant of the Erzeroum garrison, did not venture to act until he had received instructions to do so from his superior officer, the Marshal Zekki Pasha, at Erzindjan; and, I am told, though I cannot vouch for the accuracy of the statement, that though he sent frequent telegrams to the latter, no reply was forthcoming until long after the affair was over. Be this, however, as it may, it is certain that the mob were at no time interfered with by the soldiers.

Great sympathy, even among the Mussulmans, is felt for the Vali Ata Bey, who, in view of his age and the enfeebled state of his health, was peculiarly ill-fitted to undergo the harsh treatment to which he was subjected. It is, nevertheless, very generally felt that in attempting to arrest a personage so important as the religious Chief of the Erzeroum Mussulman community without first assuring himself of the support of the military, he committed a grave error of judgment, more especially as it is not forgotten that the Erzeroum Mussulmans had been allowed to successfully defy the Government only some seven months previously without in any way having been made to feel the consequences of their insubordination, as stated in my telegram of the 24th instant; the view which the Mussulmans appear to take of the matter is that the rising was solely due to the illegal manner in which the arrest of the Mufti was effected by the Vali, by which, they contend, no opportunity was afforded them of ascertaining whether the arrest in question was the direct order of His Imperial Majesty or not, and that their resistance was therefore justifiable. This view, I need hardly say, is not likely to commend itself to the central authority at Constantinople; but it is significant as showing that—apart from the murder which no one among them has attempted to excuse or defend, and which I understand have been severely condemned by the Mufti himself since his return—the Mussulmans, while sorry for the Vali, personally entertain the opinion that the blame for what has occurred rests on him rather than on themselves.

From the first the affair was one solely between the Mussulmans and the authorities, and this was so well understood by the Christians that not only was there no panic but the latter mingled freely with the crowd, even while the murders were being perpetrated.

It is a redeeming feature in the business that, although the Erzeroum Mussulmans must bear the responsibility of the crimes above referred to, plunder at no time formed part of their programme, the lives and property of private persons being scrupulously respected. Throughout the affair, indeed, the Christian quarter remained so quiet that it was hardly possible to perceive that anything unusual was going on in other parts of the town. The detachments subsequently told off to guard the Consulates were placed there by Munir Pasha as a precautionary measure only at the instance, I now learn, of the Vali. They were, however, not applied for either by myself or my colleagues, the course of events giving no reason to fear either for our own safety or that of the Europeans under our charge. The town, further up to the time of writing my present despatch, has remained perfectly quiet, the ordinary traffic, with some few exceptions, being carried on as usual, though the Christian schools have been temporarily closed and Government business is of course at a standstill; while, in the complete absence of civil authority, the duty of preserving order has devolved on the military.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. S. SHIPLEY.

[38777]

No. 116.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 755. Confidential.)

Constantinople, November 13, 1906.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 733, Confidential, of the 30th ultimo, relative to the affairs of the Nejd, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy from His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah, forwarding copy of a confidential letter addressed to His Majesty's Resident at Bushire by the Political Agent at Koweit, recording a conversation which he had with Sheikh Mubarek on the subject of the allowances paid by the Turkish authorities to Ibn Saoud and Ibn Reshid.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 116.

Consul Crow to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 73. Confidential.)

Bussorah, October 18, 1906.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 62, Secret and Confidential, of the 31st August last, in regard to affairs in Central Arabia, I have the honour to inclose copy of a letter received from the Resident at Bushire on the subject of the allowances paid to Ibn Saoud and Ibn Reshid by the Turkish authorities.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. E. CROW.

Inclosure 2 in No. 116.

Captain Knox to Major Cox.

(Confidential.)

Koweit, September 30, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 15th instant on the subject of the allowances paid to Ibn Saoud and Ibn Reshid by the Turkish Government. In reply, I have the honour to inform you that Sheikh Mubarek informs me that the allowances are fixed as follows:—

For Abdur Rahman-bin-Feysul-bin-Saoud, 90 Turkish liras per mensem.

For Meta'b-bin-Reshid, 200 taghars (about 300 tons) of rice per annum, and 200 Turkish liras per mensem. In addition to the above, Meta'b's predecessors used to receive presents of arms and ammunition.

Sheikh Mubarek says that the allowances to Bin Reshid are paid through the Bagdad authorities, and that Yusuf Pasha Mendil, a Bussorah merchant, draws the Saoud allowances from the Bussorah authorities and remits them by cheque to Abdullah Nafisi, a Koweit shopkeeper, who hands the money to Bin Saoud's emissaries.

At the same time, inquiries I have made in another direction confirm this Consul's statement that the allowances are paid through Sheikh Mubarek in the way indicated; but, at the same time, my informant said that there was no regular channel, and that the payments were made in whatever manner was most convenient.

While I was discussing this matter with Sheikh Mubarek, he suddenly turned to me and said: "You have been asking me about Bin Reshid's and Bin Saoud's pay, but you don't ask me any question about my pay!" I said "Surely you don't draw any pay!" He replied, "No, I do not, but the Turkish authorities at Bussorah are for ever pressing me to accept it. Instead of that, I pay them, and when they ask me for £T. 200 I send them £T. 600. I told them, in reply to their insistence, that the receipt of pay from the Turkish Government had ceased to be a source of honour, and had therefore no longer any attraction for me, and that, thanks be to God, I had plenty of money."

[38779] No. 117.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 757.)

Constantinople, November 13, 1906.

Sir,

I HAVE deferred till now my reply to your despatch No. 399 of the 11th September in order that I may give it the form of a general Report on the situation in the Armenian provinces during the year.

The Memorandum by the editors of the "Droschak," on which you did me the honour to ask my observations, is, of course, a somewhat highly-coloured document, and no doubt, in order to expand their list of atrocities, they have been rather prone to include incidents which would, or might, have occurred, had circumstances been other than they were. Moreover, the most striking incident of all, the massacre at Alvarinj, which is described under the date of the 25th January as having taken place on "Samedi, dès l'aube," has almost certainly been post-dated for the purposes of the Memorandum. I can find no trace whatever of any such incident during this year, and the writers no doubt refer to one which really took place in the previous October.

Sir Nicholas O'Conor did not report the matter to you at the time, I believe, because reliable details were wanting; but from what Mr. Vice-Consul Heathcote gathered at the time from Bitlis, and from what Mr. Vice-Consul Dickson now hears at Van, it seems certain that serious fighting took place at Alvarinj in October between revolutionaries and Turkish troops. Eleven revolutionaries, it is said, were killed, and the fighting was followed by a massacre, in which 130 villagers were killed and 80 women outraged. You will observe that these figures greatly exceed even those given by the editors of the "Droschak," and I have very little evidence to support their accuracy.

Of the other leading incidents mentioned, the ill-treatment of Armenian prisoners alleged to be implicated in a bomb outrage at Cesarea, formed the subject of Sir N. R. O'Conor's despatches No. 155 of the 9th March, and Nos. 235 and 239 of the 7th and 9th April, and the Van prison incident was the subject of a Report by Mr. Dickson, which I forwarded in my despatch No. 699 of the 17th October.

Sir Nicholas O'Conor also reported to you in his despatch No. 372 of the 29th May that, in consequence of the gloomy accounts which he had received from various quarters of the increasing misery and impoverishment of the people of the Armenian provinces, he had made strong representations to the Grand Vizier. His Highness had promised, among other things, that the Valis of Van, Bitlis, Sivas, and Trebizond, and the new Vali of Erzeroum should make tours of their respective provinces and remove from their posts all functionaries who had been guilty of malpractices.

I regret to say that since that time, matters, far from improving, appear to have actually become worse. Mr. Shipley reported on the 17th ultimo that the condition of the Diarbekir Vilayet was worse than at any time during the past twelve months, and with the return of the Hamidieh from Vezneh would probably become still more serious. He speaks of the Administration as rotten from top to bottom, the whole system being based on the principle that the Kurd is, and is to remain, master of the province, so long as he pays a fair percentage of the taxes and keeps within certain limits. I cannot, however, help being struck by the discrepancy between these statements and those made in Mr. Shipley's despatch No. 31 of the 23rd August, which was forwarded to you in my despatch No. 656 of the 25th September, and in which Mr. Shipley gave the impression that it was chiefly the Kurds who suffered in the Diarbekir Vilayet. The earlier despatch ended by the statement that it was natural that a certain anti-Christian feeling should exist among the Kurds in view of the increasing numbers and prosperity of the Armenian villagers.

On the other hand, the statements of the Jewish agent, whose letter formed the inclosure in a letter to your Department from the Board of Trade of the 12th October, bear out the view that it is the Kurds who are all-powerful in the Diarbekir district, and the remarks attributed by the agent to the Inspector of Agriculture are remarkably instructive.

As I have reported elsewhere, Nouri Bey, who had been for a few months Vali of Diarbekir, exchanged places in August with Fehmi Bey, the Vali of Kharpout, and the exchange was, no doubt, for the worse, as regards Diarbekir, since Fehmi Bey is a weak man, and Nouri Bey, who has now been transferred again to Erzeroum, is

considered a man of some character. There is, however, nothing in his record which leads me to expect from him either any substantial reform.

Unlike Mr. A. Shipley, Mr. Vice-Consul Geary has given consistently gloomy accounts of the condition of the Bitlis Vilayet and particularly in the Moush district, although he reminds me that his information is based on the statements of Armenian villagers. I have the honour to inclose a copy of an interesting Report in which he dwells on the increasing destitution of the Armenian population, whose land is, he says, gradually passing into the hands of Turks and Kurds. In another despatch of the 7th August, Mr. Geary reports that the Vali of Bitlis had made no tour of the vilayet, and that no official had been dismissed, in pursuance of the instructions from the Porte of May last. Writing later, on the 2nd October, Mr. Geary states that a military force has been traversing the Moush plain in search of revolutionaries, and that in the course of their proceedings the village of Khanjerut was burned down, the inhabitants having previously fled. A further source of misery in this vilayet has been the introduction of Moslem refugees from Russia, whose arrival naturally tends to make the scarcity of food-stuffs more severely felt.

A copy of Mr. Dickson's report on the Vilayet of Van was inclosed in my despatch No. 693 of the 15th October last. With regard to Erzeroum, I have not yet received a general Report, but His Majesty's Consul states that the Vali had taken no action in the sense of the Porte's instructions before his abrupt dismissal. He mentions that no complaints of ill-treatment or of want of protection on the part of the authorities have reached him from Christians.

Apart from the Consular Reports which I have received, I have not heard much of actual ill-treatment of Armenians lately, and I understand that the chief preoccupation of the Patriarch at present is the danger of famine in the Van and Bitlis districts, with regard to which he is now in communication with the Grand Vizier. I believe, too, that financial authorities here incline to the first view put forward by Mr. Avalon Shipley, namely, that it is the Armenians rather than the Moslems of the Armenian provinces whose prosperity is just now on the increase.

It is difficult to arrive at any just conclusion from the varying reports which are given about the country; but there can, at any rate, be little doubt that the administration of all these vilayets, but particularly, perhaps, of Erzeroum and Bitlis, has been thoroughly bad. That discontent prevails among Moslems as well as Christians is shown by recent events; what is more doubtful is how far the Armenians are suffering from special oppression just now. On the whole, I am inclined to think that they are not. The three main incidents recorded by the "Droschak" Memorandum—those of Alvarinj, Cesarea, and Van prison—are rather exceptional cases, and it is not certain either that the details are at all accurate or that there was no foundation for the suspicions of the authorities in the two latter cases, while at Alvarinj a revolutionary band was actually engaged in the fight.

The attitude of the Armenian Patriarch and the views which I have mentioned as to Armenian prosperity seem to confirm the idea that what suffering there is among the Armenians is part of the general misery caused by maladministration. If this be the case, the Turkish Government are of course none the less to blame; but the attitude of His Majesty's Embassy should, I think, be to press for the removal of incompetent Valis, and to give their support to those who are competent, if they can be found, rather than to dwell on the special sufferings of the Armenian population.

The inclosure in your despatch No. 399 is returned herewith.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 117.

Vice-Consul Geary to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 40.)

Bitlis, September 18, 1906.

Sir,

IN accordance with your Excellency's request, I have the honour to forward the following résumé of the state of affairs which I found prevalent in the Moush plain when, acting under your Excellency's instructions, I recently visited several villages in that district.

I cannot emphasize too strongly the fact that all my information is necessarily based upon the statements of Armenian villagers, who are always prone to exaggeration;

but even when sufficient allowance for this has been made, the state of affairs is sufficiently serious.

The one indubitable fact is the yearly increasing destitution, which is chiefly due to the oppressive taxation, aggravated by the conduct of the gendarmerie employed in the task of collection. I found many evidences of the growing destitution in villages where there was comparative prosperity a few years ago. The immediate result of this is the prevalence of debt. The creditors are almost without exception Turks or Kurds who, in many cases, are gradually becoming proprietors of land formerly in Armenian hands. The system known locally by the name of "sclef" contributes largely to this result. By this system money is borrowed on the security of future crops and repayment made in kind, the interest often amounting to 300 or 400 per cent. The employment of zaptiehs in the collection of taxes is the source of oppression of the population and loss to the Treasury. As a body they are paid with extreme irregularity, and regard their employment as tax-gatherers as an excellent opportunity for enriching themselves. Extortion and bribery appear to be the order of the day, and many tales of brutality were poured into my ears. Complaints are framed in the form of petitions to the Government from time to time, but as a rule no attention is paid to these. If no system of effective control over the proceedings of the gendarmes is established the present abuses are bound to continue. Possibly some system might be devised by which the natives might be explicitly informed of the amount due and allowed if they wished to pay their taxes direct to the Government. It is notorious that in the present circumstances the Government fails to obtain large sums which remain in the hands of the collectors. A further grievance lies in the farming of the tithes, which displays all the abuses usually attached to the system. In this district the farmer of the tithes often acts in concert with the tax-gatherer, and the latter compels the villager to borrow back at high interest the tithes which he has just paid to the former.

The state of affairs described has induced many villagers to fly from their villages, and I heard of several instances of Armenians being reduced to framing contracts with the more favoured Kurds by which they undertake to serve for bare lodging and sustenance. It is to be feared that the Kurds often take advantage of the licence permitted to them to oppress their less favoured fellow-subjects. The Kurds are usually armed, while no Armenian is allowed to bear arms of any description. The result can easily be imagined. The Armenian themselves believe that their race is doomed to gradual extermination; but this is, of course, an extreme view. It would appear, however, that if the present régime continues, gradual depopulation and ever-increasing destitution are inevitable.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. B. GEARY.

[38982] No. 118.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received November* 20.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 18th October, relative to the aggressive action of Turkish officials on the British side of the border at Wadi Shaab.

India Office, November 19, 1906.

Inclosure 1 in No. 118.

Government of Bombay to Government of India.

Sir, *Bombay Castle, October* 4, 1906.

IN continuation of my letter, dated the 11th September last, I am directed to forward herewith, for the information of the Government of India, copy of a letter from the Political Resident, Aden, dated the 23rd idem, and of its inclosure, regarding the aggressive action of Turkish officials on the British side of the border at Wadi Shaab.

I have, &c.
(Signed) S. W. EDGERLEY,
Chief Secretary to Government.

Inclosure 2 in No. 118.

Major-General De Brath to Government of Bombay.

Sir, *Aden Residency, September* 23, 1906.

WITH reference to previous correspondence ending with this Office letter, dated the 2nd September last, relative to complaints of Turkish aggression in the Wadi Shaab, I have the honour to attach copy of a further letter which I have recently received from Sheikh Abdul Kawi-bin-Mahomed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. DE BRATH.

Inclosure 3 in No. 118.

Sheikh Abdul Kawi-bin-Mahamad-al-Shaabi to Major-General De Brath.

(After compliments.) *4th Rajab*, 1324 (*August* 24, 1906).

WE have received your letter and understood its contents, and we hasten to reply to it.

You wrote advising us to state the full particulars concerning the time, the place, and name of person. We represent that for one complete year we have been complaining, but derived no benefit except that we had suffered more harm. Firstly, Abdan Nokbil and his sons were recovering 2 annas per camel, and this amount has been increased to 8 annas. Secondly, we had made a particular complaint of the encroachment and forcible possession upon certain lands belonging to us by Mohammed Kahtan and Salim Abdul Wahab, the Kobatis, and on the 25th Jomad Awal they had occupied a town within Shaab district, exacted dues from the population, imprisoned and plundered them. The town above referred to, situate at the mouth of Wadi Shaab, named Al Hijab, and the people who occupy it are called Al Kawaidtha. They are subjects of Shaab. Thirdly, we had complained against some of the Kawaidtha subjects who gave evidence in regard to the boundary before the Mudir, repudiating our statement and declaring that their town formed a part of the Kobati country. They enlisted themselves to assassinate us on payment, and on our hearing this we had secured the arrest of one of them, whom we imprisoned, and the others have escaped to the Kobatis, gone off to Aden and rescued themselves. These men are Yehia Ba Sef, his brother Mohammed, and Ali Ba Kasim. The man imprisoned by us is Salim Fadthl. These people had sold their town to the Kobatis. If the Great Government is unable to help us while they are in Aden, then there is no use of referring our grievance to others. We hope that your Government will relieve us from looking after the limit, as we have suffered pecuniarily and badly and incurred the enmity of the Turkish officials. We had expected pleasing results from the information conveyed in letter, dated the 26th April, of the courageous hero, Captain Hancock, but now the ink has become dry and the pens have been worn out, and we complain to the only one Omniscient Being. We pray that you will forgive and pardon the many complaints and references made by us.

[38519] No. 119.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 507.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 20, 1906.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 367 of the 23rd August last, I transmit to you herewith copy of a letter from the India Office,* inclosing correspondence relative to the collection of revenue by Turkish officials at Al Doka in Subaihi territory.

You are authorized to make representations to the Ottoman Government on this question, unless you consider it preferable that the Resident at Aden should deal with the matter.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD GREY.

[39339] No. 120.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received November 23.)

Sir, *India Office, November* 22, 1906.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 10th instant, forwarding for observations a Memorandum, dated the 5th instant, received from the French Ambassador in reply to the British Memorandum of the 22nd August last as to the questions which have to be settled in order to give effect to the Arbitral Award of The Hague Tribunal in regard to dhows flying the French flag at Muscat.

2. Paragraphs 4 to 8 of the French Memorandum agree, subject to certain provisos, to the conditions on which the British Government, in the Memorandum of the 22nd August, stated their willingness to accept M. Laronce's list of dhows and flagholders. Paragraph 4 of the French Memorandum states that M. Laronce's opinion is to be final after he has made a fresh examination, in conjunction with Major Grey, of the doubtful cases. It would be more satisfactory if, as proposed in the British Memorandum, the French Government had undertaken to satisfy themselves as to the claims in question; but Mr. Morley does not think it of essential importance to resist the French proposal in this respect. But he is strongly of opinion that the claim in paragraph 8 of the French Memorandum, that Omanis in the service of French residents in Muscat territory are entitled, under the Treaty of 1844, to fly the French flag, should be resisted. The acceptance of this principle would make it possible for the French Consul to issue the flag to any person who could be colourably represented as the employé of a French resident; and thereby the settlement effected by the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal would lose its finality. The questions of international law involved by this claim are, it is understood, under consideration of the Legal Advisers to the Foreign Office.

3. Paragraphs 9 to 14 of the French Memorandum make certain reservations as to:—

(1.) The case of crimes, &c., committed by an Omani on the high seas, while sailing in a dhow flying the French flag;

(2.) The case of the six dhow-owners in Zanzibar covered by the Agreement of the 13th May, 1904.

As regards the second of these cases, it is observed that the French Memorandum claims that these six persons are French protégés, and as such entitled, under the French Treaty with Muscat of 1844, to the benefits on land of the principle exterritoriality. Both these points appear to be of minor importance.

4. I am to add that Mr. Morley, before expressing a final opinion on the points raised in the French Memorandum, would be glad to be favoured with Sir E. Grey on the French proposals treated as a whole.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

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* No. 111.

[39487] No. 121.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received November 24.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, paraphrases of telegrams relative to a proposal that the Trucial Chiefs, and the Sheikhs of Bahrein and Koweit should be invited to make a tour in India, to include the meeting of the Viceroy with the Ameer of Afghanistan at Agra.

India Office, November 24, 1906.

Inclosure 1 in No. 121.

Government of India to Mr. Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *November* 15, 1906.

A SUGGESTION has been received from Resident in Persian Gulf that invitation to pay a short visit to India, Agra meeting being included in the tour, should be sent to Sheikhs of Koweit and Bahrein, and Trucial Chiefs. The two first might not be able to come, but would, perhaps, depute their eldest sons. The total cost is estimated at 50,000 rupees, *i.e.*, 5,000 rupees for each Trucial Chief, and 10,000 rupees each for the two others.

As regards Koweit, Resident thinks he might be hurt if invitation sent to others was not extended to him. Effect here, politically, of proposed visit would, I think, be good; but I should be glad to know before moving in the matter if it would be cause of embarrassment in Europe.

Inclosure 2 in No. 121.

Mr. Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *November* 20, 1906.

YOUR telegram dated the 15th November: Ameer's visit.

I am unable to favour suggestion of Major Cox. It is not apparent what is advantage of inviting Trucial Chiefs and Bahrein, while there are political objections to invitation of Koweit.

Please see my telegram dated the 12th September as regards further objection that exists on grounds of expense.

[39619] No. 122.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 758.)
Sir, *Constantinople, November* 17, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith an interesting Memorandum prepared by Mr. G. A. Lloyd, Honorary Attaché to this Embassy, on the progress of the Hedjaz Railway, and its influence on Arabian politics. While progress on the Bagdad Railway has been arrested owing to the difficulty in finding security for the loan necessary for the construction of the sections beyond Eregli, the Hedjaz Railway has been steadily advancing until the railhead is now at Tebouk, some 190 kilom. south of Ma'an. Next year it is expected to reach Meda'in Saleh, which, as Mr. Lloyd points out, is within about five post marches of Hail, and may serve as a military base, from which to conduct operations in Central Arabia, and the Nejd.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY

Inclosure 1 in No. 122.

Memorandum by Mr. Lloyd on some more recent aspects of the Hedjaz Railway, and its Importance and Influence on Arabian Politics.

SOME rather remarkable ceremonies have recently been taking place on the Hedjaz Railway in connection with the completion of the line as far as Tebouk, a town situated some 190 kilom. from Ma'an.

A good deal of space in the Turkish newspapers, and public attention generally, has recently been devoted to these ceremonies, and to the progress of the line in general; and inasmuch as the difficulties that are being met with in the construction of this line as well as the immense future importance which the line must have in the near future are not easily or generally appreciated, I venture to draw attention to a few points of interest that are beginning to display themselves since the line has left Ma'an and entered into the little known province of the Hedjaz.

The ultimate completion of the Hedjaz Railway depends upon the successful solution of what may be called for the purpose of rapid review three problems (1) the constructional problem; (2) the financial problem; and (3) the political problem, by which latter term is implied the solution of difficulties that relate to the country and the people through which the railway must pass, and the opposition that may be encountered from popular prejudice and the disturbance of local trade methods.

1. *The Constructional Problem.*

The difficulties of construction of a railway through country which is for the most part absolutely sterile and destitute of water are very great. The question of water supply has so far been far the greatest difficulty. Up to Ma'an it had been overcome fairly well; a large reservoir that had been made and used by the pilgrims in the old days was found at Katraneh, which though shallow, and thus subject to great wastage of water from evaporation, proved to be a valuable supply and capable of improvement by being roofed in, &c. From Katraneh to Ma'an water has had to be carried in trucks provided each with two large tanks, and though the cost of haulage of the water in this way has proved to be very costly, the finding of water at Ma'an at a reasonable depth, and the construction of wells there giving a large supply had fairly satisfactorily solved the water difficulty so far.

Since leaving Ma'an, however, the water problem has become increasingly difficult, no surface water being found, and generally speaking all attempts to sink wells has been a failure, water being only found at very great depths, and then in completely insufficient quantities. The discovery of water at Mudowere and Tebouk has assisted matters considerably though not relieving the necessity of a considerable intermediate transport of water. Added to the great difficulties which the scarcity of water has occasioned comes the question of fuel. The country being innocent of any kind of fuel, coal, oil, or wood, the transport of the same over the long line of rail that separates Haifa from the ever-advancing railhead, becomes a costly and difficult question necessitating an equally ever-increasing supply of rolling-stock and service, the organization of which on a single line of rail is in itself no mean task; and the additional duty of providing food and other supplies sufficient for the 5,500 men that are engaged in the construction in varying zones results in great difficulties and hardships for both the engineers and troops. The punctual daily arrival of the trains from Ma'an to the railhead has so far been fairly satisfactorily effected, but in many places the line of rail has had to be temporarily carried down into the beds of wadis, until the stone bridges across them shall have been built, and so there is a risk that in the wet seasons the lines may be washed away and communication interrupted. The scarcity in the supply of masons has led to this course being adopted for the purpose of expedition, and the hope of being able to carry out the Sultan's order that the line should reach Medā'in Saleh next year. The country south of Tebouk as far as Medā'in Saleh has been already surveyed by Moukhtar Bey, who reports favourably on the country, but holds out little hopes of finding water. There is some prospect of difficulty as regards the construction of the line over a certain district where there appear to be sand drifts, but this is less a difficulty of engineering than of avoiding increased expenditure per kilometre.

The details of construction are well given in a report published recently in German by Auler Pasha, a German officer in Turkish employ, which I have, therefore, had a translation made of the most interesting portion, of which I inclose herewith a copy.

The only other point that need be mentioned in reference to the question of construction is that of labour supply. According to Auler Pasha there is no prospect that the Bedouin Arab will ever be got to work or to assist in the construction of the line, but since the inauguration ceremonies, to which I shall refer later, a considerable change has occurred in this respect. The Shiekhs having become reconciled to the advent of the line, the Arabs appear to have realized a unique opportunity of earning money and are now offering themselves in large numbers for employment. This new state of things will probably not reduce in any large degree the cost of construction, but it has to a small extent solved the difficulties of food and supplies. The number of troops employed on the construction will be able to be diminished, and the Arabs who are self-supporting will replace them.

2. *The Financial Problem.*

Perhaps one of the most striking features in the conception and realization of the Hedjaz Railway is the successful way in which money has been raised by means as ingenious as they are various. Inclosed herewith will be found a translation from the Turkish of the balance-sheet for 1905. In this balance-sheet is shown a surplus of 27,524,274 piastres, or very approximately 230,000*l*. The total receipts shown are 252,237,621 piastres, and the expenditure 224,713,347 piastres. Of the total receipts 92,054,773 piastres are derived from various revenues attributed to the line, 88,448,161 piastres from subscriptions, 30,399,301 piastres from subsidies allotted by Imperial order by the "Banque Agricole," and 36,999,127 piastres are profits realized by conversion of moneys collected in the provinces. The traffic returns of completed sections, mainly that of the Haifa branch, have yielded 6,190,336 piastres (almost entirely traffic of material for the building of the railway) and taxes on the districts covered by the railroad, 1,467,505 piastres. The total expenditure is given as £ T. 2,211,080, but of that sum it is said that £ T. 97,200 must be deducted as the value of 5,000 tons of sleepers, and 11,000 tons of rails not yet used, and £ T. 79,436 placed to expense account, but which should be properly placed to the cost of running expenses.

It is quite impossible to check or to estimate the value of the figures given but in all probability it would be unwise to place too much reliance on the details. But their main interest and importance is that they broadly show the immense sums of money that are both being raised and expended on the line. In addition to continual demand for "subscriptions" as a religious duty, money is raised in a large number of various ways, of which it is very difficult to get a complete list. I may, however, cite a few examples which may safely on the same lines be amplified tenfold in imagination:—

1. All Concessions and copies of them, poussolas and petitions, must be stamped with the Hedjaz Railway stamp.
2. All forms of leases, "permis de construction," "permis de réparation," for houses and property of all kinds are subject to a special Hedjaz Railway duty and applications for and copies of same must also be stamped with the Hedjaz Railway stamp.
3. The receipt of all Government salaries and wages must also be so stamped.
4. By arrangement with the Shirket Company of steamers up the Bosphorus, all fares from Stamboul are increased and the increase given to the Hedjaz Railway.
5. The profit derived from the sale of skins of sheep sacrificed for the Kourban Bairam throughout the Empire are also devoted to Hedjaz Railway.

There are countless other ways in which the imposition of the Hedjaz Railway stamp is used to extract money from all classes and creeds under Moslem rule in Turkey, but although it is a very serious burden on the people, yet whether it be from a feeling of the religious importance of the work, or the usual patient obedience to authority, there seems no prospect of any refusal from the people or any cessation of payment. Between the time the line was commenced and September 1905 46·7 million francs were raised, and there seems no doubt that as long as this Sultan lives at any rate the railway will not be allowed to want for funds. Doubts have been expressed as to whether funds sufficient for the maintenance of the line will be found, once the interest which the construction of the line has aroused has died down. Auler Pasha's views on this subject and the estimates that he gives seem somewhat unduly optimistic, a fact that is scarcely surprising when it is understood that his

facts and information emanated almost entirely from Izzet Pasha, the Sultan's Secretary and organiser of the whole work, and may therefore be expected not to err on the side of depreciation, but his statements as to the earning capacity of the line as far as Ma'an, and the probable future development of the Hauran and its mineral and agricultural wealth, are probably to be taken seriously, and it must be remembered that the upkeep per kilometre of a narrow gauge railway with one train a week running at slow speeds is not great, and a very small proportion of the taxation now imposed, plus certain revenues already assigned to the line would be sufficient to maintain the line. Auler Pasha suggests that the pilgrims will travel free to Mecca, but it is probable that they will be called upon to pay in one way or another some portion of the cost of their transport.

The third problem in connection with the undertaking is the attitude of the Arabs and people of Mecca and Medina towards the ingress of a railway to the Hedjaz, and the consequent interference with their trade and camel traffic, that has held a monopoly of the pilgrim traffic from time immemorial. When the line recently reached Tebouk, an inauguration ceremony of an imposing character was arranged to coincide with the birthday of the Sultan. A few days previous to this the most important Sheikhs and officials of Tebouk and Meda'in Saleh were gathered together at Tebouk, and special trains took them over the whole extent of the line as far as Damascus, where they were entertained by the Vali and other officials specially sent there for the purpose. On their return to Tebouk they all took part in the inauguration ceremony (of which I inclose translation of official accounts), when the religious character of the undertaking was specially brought out and special prayers made for the Sultan. The object of these ceremonies seems to have been attained, and the question of hostility from the Arabs becomes for the present practically negligible, though the question may come up again when the rail from Jeddah to Mecca is commenced. The question of building this branch is daily becoming more urgent; the difficulties of construction so far from a seaport, under special conditions, will have to be solved either by a branch from Mudewere to the Gulf of Akaba or from Jeddah to Mecca. The harbour at Haiffa needs a considerable further expenditure of money to make it practicable in bad weather, and even so it is too distant a base. The delay in building the much-needed Jeddah branch is due probably to the fear of interfering with the camel traffic there, which is in the hands of the Shereef of Mecca, who, if deprived of this profitable source of income, might be likely to use his influence more in opposition to than in aid of the Hedjaz Railway. The Sultan is also said to have an obstinate dislike to bringing the railway into touch with the sea, and thus putting it within reach of naval hostility. However this may be, the necessity for joining up the main line to the Red Sea is so urgent that it seems fairly certain that before very long the line will be built, and the financial difficulties to which Auler Pasha alludes as the cause for delay need probably not be seriously considered, as the cost of building a line from Jeddah to Mecca would be very slight, whereas both traffic and receipts should be very considerable. If the branch line is constructed, it is estimated that the main line will be completed in about three years; if not constructed, in about five years.

It becomes, then, very important to realize clearly the fact that we shall be face to face not only with an entirely new situation in Arabia, but with an entirely new force, the measure of whose influence, though not easy to gauge, is very easy to underestimate; but there can be no doubt whatever that the change will be one which will increase immensely the power and prestige of the Sultan in those parts of his dominions. I venture to submit that it is of the very greatest importance that we should realize clearly that this railway will have, even before its completion, an immense and far-reaching effect on the whole situation in the Nedj; that it will also be liable to affect in no small degree our political position and influence on the western shores of the Persian Gulf. Further, it would seem to be of the most urgent importance that sufficient attention should be paid to the masterly methods and deeply-thought-out policy that is finding an expression in the ways above indicated; but one fact stands out clearly from the vista of conjecture, and that is, that the re-establishment of effective Turkish control over the Nedj must come either from Bussorah and Bagdad or from Meda'in Saleh. From the Hauran south to Jauf there is no central point whence the operations that should be effective in Hail or Boreyda can be based. The Hedjaz Railway will reach Meda'in Saleh before the Bagdad Railway has succeeded in crossing the Taurus—perhaps before it has attempted it—and it is fair to conclude that on the Hedjaz Railway we shall see before long a strong military base, from which Turkey may hope to recover in Central Arabia and the Nedj a large portion of the prestige that it may be her destiny to lose, or to maintain only in an impaired condition, in Southern

Arabia and Yemen. When the Hedjaz Railway reaches Meda'in Saleh next year, it will be only distant from Hail some five post-marches, and an indication that the Turks realize the significance of this may be seen in the otherwise somewhat inexplicable decision which they took on the death of Ibn Raschid, namely, to continue giving their support to the shattered remnants of this fallen dynasty against that of the victorious Ibn Saoud.

If the ability or determination of Turkey to finish this great undertaking be ever doubted, it should be remembered that she has recently given us a striking example of the risks she is prepared to take to achieve her ideal. Pan-Islamism was not the cause of the Akaba dispute, but the weapon; but it was with eyes fixed upon the Hedjaz Railway that she then made her attempt to gain territory that was of great importance to the furtherance of that scheme. In that dispute she made a final attempt to gain territory on the west shore of the Gulf of Akaba, whither she might bring the Ma'an branch of the railway and avoid the difficulties that are presented in the steep descent to Kalaat-el-Akaba from the high table-land above. There she failed, but she was ready to risk a serious situation for the chance of gaining that end. It is not generally known that an Iradé for the building of a railway from Syria to Mecca was actually issued twenty years ago, but various circumstances prevented its execution; but the determination to build the railway has never been lost sight of, and will not fail now in its execution. The amount of interest that is being taken by all classes of Turks in the progress of the railway is very remarkable, and among the more educated of them there is a strong but quiet conviction of the success, as well as a thorough realization and appreciation, of the additional political and military strength that this railway means for them. I venture to reiterate that it is of importance to realize both this feeling as well as the intentions that exist for the use of the railway.

(Signed) G. A. LLOYD.

Inclosure 2 in No. 122.

Report by Auler Pasha respecting the Hedjaz Railway.

PART III.—*History of the Construction.*

(Translation.)

ON the 1st May, 1900, appeared the Imperial Iradé for the building of the line, and preparations were at once set on foot. As the railway was for a religious object, the money for building it was raised by voluntary contributions from the whole of the Mahommedan world. Besides this money, certain Government revenues—for instance, certain stamp duties, and the proceeds of the sale of the skins of sheep slaughtered at Bairam—were devoted to the Hedjaz Railway. Further revenues for the future are the proceeds of the phosphate beds near Es Salt, on the Hedjaz line, and the sulphur springs near Hamma, on the branch line Haifa-Der'â, the exploitation of which has been handed over to the Hedjaz Railway.

Up to the 1st September, 1905, the total income amounted to 46·7 million francs—about 7·5 million francs per annum. On this date, after the payment of all expenses, the railway still had the sum of 8·25 million francs at its disposal.

At the same time as the preparation of the money, the following preliminaries were arranged for:—

1. The organization of the building authorities and of the Directors.
2. The introduction of negotiations for the acquisition of territory.
3. A survey of the whole line for the purpose of making a general plan of building.
4. The procuring of instruments and railway material.

1. For the direction of the construction the following Commissions were formed:—

(*a.*) The General Commission for the construction of the Hedjaz Railway, established at Constantinople. The Grand Vizier is the President. Members: the influential and indefatigable Izzet Pasha; the Minister of Public Works; and the Director of the Factories of the Marine Arsenal. Besides these, some officials of the Ministry of Public Works have been appointed as technical advisers. The Commission is charged with the care of finding the moneys required, and decides upon the applica-

tion of the same. It carries on diplomatic negotiations in acquiring land, appoints engineers and officials, and makes contracts for supplies.

As it is only twenty-two years since Turkey has had an engineering school for civil engineers, and these, through the lack of Government railways, have hitherto had but little opportunity for practical work, there was at first a dearth of experienced engineers. The Commission has therefore for the present imported engineers from abroad, especially from Germany, and bound them by contract. By degrees, however, during the building of the railway, a number of pupils from the engineering schools have become efficient engineers, and are equal to all demands made upon them. At the present moment there are ten foreign and twenty-five Turkish engineers at work on the railway, not taking into account the officers of the engineers.

(*b.*) The Local Commission for the construction of the Hedjaz Railway, with its seat in Damascus.

The President is the Vali of Damascus; the members are the Director-General of the Hedjaz Railway, Kiasim Pasha; the Commanding-General of the 5th Army Corps; and a Notable of Damascus. The technical members are Chief Engineer Meissner Pasha, Director of the Engineering Works of the Railway Construction, and several Turkish railway engineers.

The Commission examines the plans and proposals of the Director-General and lays them before the Constantinople Commission for decision. It also arranges for payment of salaries and wages. At the head of the railway construction was placed the aforementioned Field-Marshal Kiasim Pasha, who has hitherto distinguished himself not only by his talent for organization, but also by his caution and energy. In addition to the troops, the whole of the engineering staff, the contractors and labourers, are under his orders, and it is particularly to his credit that he has managed to avoid friction between the military and civil elements, so that both parties work heartily together to attain this end.

The technical management of the construction was intrusted to Chief Engineer Meissner Pasha, and the choice has proved especially happy, as Meissner has collected much experience during his many years' work on the railways of European Turkey, and to this experience adds an iron energy.

The building of the bridges, &c., was given mostly to Austrian and Italian contractors, and the work was for the greater part carried out by natives, as foreign labour was difficult to get.

The further into the desert the railway advanced, the more difficult became the question of labour. On this account, and for reasons of economy, Turkish troops were largely employed in the work of construction.

There are now working there :—

Railway Battalion, No. 1, with	1,200 men	since September 1, 1900 (till April 1, 1900, only on the survey).
" " No. 2, with	1,200	since May 1900 (from spring 1904 till September 1905 on the Haifa Railway).
The Sappers Company, 5th Army Corps	200	men since May 1900.
Detachment of the Telegraph Company, 5th Army Corps	50	" September 1, 1901.
Two battalions infantry regiment, 33rd Army Corps ..	1,000	" " 1½ "
Three " " 39th " ..	1,000	" " 1½ "
Four " " 39th " ..	1,000	" " 1½ "
Total	5,650 men.	

The infantry battalions did the earthwork, while the railway troops made the bedding, laid the lines, and did some of the minor masonry work, such as building bridges and culverts. They also supplied the men for the preliminary surveying and surveying companies. (c. Construction, Part IX.)

The sappers were chiefly employed in the railway workshops as mechanicians, locksmiths, smiths, and carpenters. The telegraph detachment laid down the railway telegraph for the Hedjaz and Haifa Railways, and were then placed at the stations as telegraph operators.

2. The most important negotiations which the General Commissions in Constantinople had to carry on were those with the French Company, Beyrout–Damascus–Muserib; and with an English Company on account of the line Haifa–Damascus, which has just been begun, and for which the Company had received the Concession.

It was important that the Company should obtain possession of the line Damascus–Muserib, as they would have then begun the railway direct from Muserib and not

Damascus, thus saving the laying down of 120 kilom. of rail for the Hedjaz line. But their efforts were not crowned with success, and the apparently liberal compensation of 7,000,000 fr. was not accepted. Negotiations with the English Company were more satisfactory, which may be attributed to the facts that they were in money difficulties, and that the whole line consisted of the substructure from Haifa to Reisan and 8 kilom. of rail. The Commission bought the Concession from the English Company for 925,000 marks.

With the exception of these two, no other negotiations were necessary for the acquisition of land. The Sultan, as absolute Sovereign, can dispose freely of all the land of his kingdom, and whatever is necessary for Government purposes is requisitioned without permission of the owner. As the construction of the Hedjaz Railway is a religious work, every Mussulman give up his property with joy in order to contribute to the success of the undertaking.

3. In order to make a provisional trace of the Hedjaz Railway a survey of the whole line was necessary. This was undertaken by the Turkish Engineer, Hajji Moukhtar Bey, soon after the Imperial Iradé for the commencement of the work had been given.

To this end Moukhtar Bey joined a caravan of pilgrims going from Damascus to Mecca, and during the journey he made his observations and took measurements. The results of his survey he has given in a report (see Annex) and in the accompanying map with sectional profile. His sketch of the line has been corrected as far as Mudewwere (572 kilom.) after the completion of the railway up to this point at the end of 1905 made it possible to take exact measurements. The trace of the line Haifa–Muserib is also the result of exact measurements after its completion.

4. Owing to the lack of native factories, the Hedjaz Railway was forced to get from abroad all necessary material (rails and rolling-stock) with the exception of a few of the carriages which were made in the marine arsenal. Rails and sleepers have been supplied by German, Belgian, and American firms, rolling-stock by German and Belgian firms only.

On account of the transport, the cost of material is, of course, much augmented, but this disadvantage is partially rectified by the fact that, with the exception of lime and cement, the material required for the construction of stone bridges and bedding are to be found of good quality on the spot, and may be taken from the quarries free of cost.

The real work of the Hedjaz Railway begun with the laying of the railway telegraph some years after the laying of a Government telegraph line from Damascus, viâ Es Salt and Ma'an to Medina. Shortly afterwards the construction of the Hedjaz Railway itself was commenced, on the section Muserib-Der'à, as the negotiations with respect to the line Damascus-Muserib had not yet been definitely concluded. The work progressed but slowly, so a provisional contract of three years was made with Chief Engineer Meissner in January 1901.

Meissner Pasha's first step was to find suitable assistants and to get the necessary tools, especially measuring instruments. He then began with the military and civil personnel at his disposal, the construction of the line between Muserib Der'à and Damascus Der'à, as in the meantime the negotiations between the General Commission and the French Company had come to naught, and the former had decided to build a line Damascus-Der'à, parallel to the French line Damascus-Muserib. When later on these negotiations were again resumed, unfortunately without result, the work between Damascus-Der'à was again interrupted for a whole year, so that this part of the line could only be opened to traffic in September 1903.

However, the work on the line Muserib-Der'à was continued without interruption, so that the following sections could be opened :—

Muserib-Der'à (12·8 kilom.) on the 1st September, 1901.
Der'à Serka (79·75 kilom.) on the 1st September, 1902.
Serka Katrané (123·45 kilom.) on the 1st September, 1903.
Katrné Ma'an (132·60 kilom.) on the 1st September, 1904.

On this day, the anniversary of the Sultan's accession, took place the solemn inauguration of the whole line Damascus-Ma'ân, by a special Imperial Mission under leadership of the Minister Turkhan Pasha.

In connection with the year's pilgrimage to Mecca, the opening of the section Ma'ân Mudewwere (113·2 kilom.) has been planned.

Note.—In the course of this summer, 1906, the section Mudewwere Sat-ul-Hadj

has been completed, and it may be expected that at the end of this year the lines will be laid at the station Tebak.)

It is easy to understand that the Hedjaz Railway wished to get an outlet to the sea as soon as possible, as the transport of the immense quantities of building material over the French line, Damascus-Beyrout, proved very expensive. Therefore the construction of the branch line Haifa Der'à was commenced from Haifa immediately on conclusion of the aforementioned negotiations with the English Company. The original English project by which the line was intended to run from Haifa straight through the valley of the Jordan to Damascus, was changed, so that the railway crossed the Jordan of the town of Beisan, then touching the Sea of Gennegaret near Jamach, took its way through the deep romantic valley of the Jarmuk on to Muserib. Already on the 1st September, 1904, the section Haifa Jordan was opened to traffic. On the 1st September, 1905, the section Jordan Muserib was inaugurated and thereby was created for the first time a Turkish railway communication with the Mediterranean.

Through its natural position Haifa possesses all the conditions for a good harbour. But in consequence of the strong currents from the west, the sand is banked up and ships are forced to anchor outside the harbour. A jetty 350 metres long, has not yet improved matters. In order to make a usable harbour it would be necessary to build a breakwater 500 metres long, and a quay of about 600 metres.

Part IV.—*Description of the Completed Section between Damascus and Mudewwere.*

For the reader's assistance I append a list of the Stations, with their characteristics.

No.	Names of Stations.	Distances of Stations from—		Height above Sea Level.
		Damascus.	One another.	
		Kilom.	Kilom.	Metres.
1	Damascus (station Kadem-i-Scherif, on the Barada, capital of the vilayet, Syria), head-quarters of the VIth Army Corps, has about 180,000 inhabitants and a garrison of 12,000. The greater portion of the population (about 150,000) are Mahommedans (Turks and Arabs). The remainder are divided with the various Christian confessions: Greek Orthodox, Greek Uniates, Armenians, Armenian Minister, Syrian Minister, Syrian Orthodox, Maronites, Roman Catholics, Protestants, and Chaldean Uniates; Jews and Druse. Well water is here to be had in plenty	..	30·8	696·3
2	Kisrin, important fellaheen village on the Nahrel-A'Wady (from Jut. Hermon), about 1,200 inhabitants. Well water at station	20·8	9·7	738·7
3	Der Ali, Druse village, about 500 inhabitants. A spring waters part of the very fertile ground	30·5	10·2	697·0
4	Mesaije, old Roman town, with field of ruins 2 kilom. broad and 3 kilom. long. Key of the Lidja which serves as place of retreat for brigand bands. Now an Arab village; about 700 inhabitants—half Mahommedans, half Greek Orthodox	39·7	12·9	619·5
5	Djibab, Moslem Arab fellaheen village, about 300 inhabitants	62·6	6·5	643·2
6	Hubab, Christian Arab fellaheen village, on the Ledja; 600 inhabitants. Springs and cisterns	69·1	8·7	625·2
7	Malhalja, Moslem Arab fellaheen village, ancient Roman city; 1,200 inhabitants. Well	77·8	5·8	602·7
8	Sekeka, Moslem Arab fellaheen village, ancient Roman city; 800 inhabitants. Wells	84·6	6·6	600·5
9	Ezra (ancient Bosra), on the border of the Ledja. Mainly Christian Arab population, which a short time ago numbered 1,500. The place is now almost deserted, the inhabitants have gone over to the Druses, under whose protection they placed themselves. Little water. Numerous ruins, especially three well preserved old Christian churches	91·2	14·9	568·7
10	Khirbit-el-Ghazali, Moslem Arab fellaheen village; 1,500 inhabitants	106·1	16·9	576·2

No.	Names of Stations.	Distances of Stations from—		Height above Sea Level.
		Damascus.	One another.	
		Kilom	Kilom.	Metres.
11	Der'à (ancient Edrâe). Seat of a Kaimakam. Small town with 4,000 to 5,000 Mahommedan inhabitants. Junction of the Haifa Railway. Ruins with inscriptions from Hellenistic times (Necropolis) and Nabataic times. Large old mosque, with Cufic inscriptions from the time of Khalif Omar, repaired by Sultan Saladeddin. Wells.	123·0	12·7	529·0
12	Nasaib, fellaheen village; about 700 inhabitants. Cisterns only	135·7	26·0	574·6
13	Mafrak, ruins of an Arab Kalat (fort and a Roman castrum on the great Roman road, Bostra Amman). Three tunnels. Small cisterns of about 4,000 cubic metres. Fertile soil but no inhabitants. Only Bedouins of the Beni Sakhr tribe pitch their tents here	161·7	32·6	711·4
14	Khirbet-us-Smem, ruin of a Roman castle on the great Roman road, Bostra Amman. Fertile soil. Real head-quarters of the Bedouin tribe Beni Sakhr, which numbers 20,000 people living in 2,000 tents	185·3	17·4	559·6
15	Serka (Kalat-u-Serka), on the Wadi Serka, which never runs dry. Ruins of a Roman castle on the Roman road, Bostra Amman. Arabian castle, colony of Circassians, Muhadjirs from Daghestan (Caucasus). Very fertile soil. Inhabitants partly Circassians, partly Beni Sakhr Bedouins	202·7	19·7	618·0
16	Ammân, ancient Rabbath Ammon or Philadelphia, on the Nahr Amman, the largest and most beautiful ruined town of the east Jordan country. Especially remarkable for the old Greek theatre, the therma, and the necropolis. Now 700 to 800 houses, mostly inhabited by Circassians	222·4	11·6	737·8
17	Kasar (Es-Sahl), ruin of a Greek Temple (probably a mausoleum). No water or inhabitants. Only in winter a few Bedouin tribes pitch their tents here	234·0	14·8	942·0
18	Lubên, ruins of an old town on two hills and the ridge joining them, with capacious cisterns. Ruins partly inhabited by Bedouins (700 tents) of the Beni Sakhr tribe. The Sheikh of the tribe, Remith-bin-Fais, also lives here as a rule. Cisterns	248·8	10·9	773·6
19	Djiza (Kal'at Zîza), extensive ruins, partly of Arab origin. Especially remarkable are the great Roman cisterns of 70,000 cubic metres, a well-preserved Arab castle, and a Saracen castle built of old material. Inhabited by fellaheen from the Beni Sakhr tribe. Cisterns ..	259·7	19·0	722·1
20	Deb'a (Kal-at-id-Deb'a), an old castle restored in 1767 by Utamn Pasha, leader of the Sacred Caravan. Close by large cisterns. The Belka Bedouins, living in tents near the ruins, cultivate the ground	278·7	16·5	751·7
21	Khân-as-Sebîl, ruins of a large caravanserai from Saracen times, which, to judge by the flank towers found in the foundation, was capable of being put into a state of defence. At no great distance smaller caravanserai from Roman or Byzantine times, and the ruins of a Byzantine church. Many old cisterns in the neighbourhood. No water. Some of the Beni Sakhr Bedouins occasionally pitch their tents here	295·2	14·1	782·6
22	Siding. No water..	309·3	10·9	759·1
23	Kurâne (Kal'at-il-Kurâne), Turkish castle on the pilgrim road, with three smooth-bore cannons. Beside it a large old cistern of 36,000 cubic metres, with well-arranged receivers. Not suitable for cultivation. Bedouins of the tribe of Ibn-i-Hedaya	326·2	22·2	788·3
24	Siding. No water..	348·4	18·7	810·0
25	Siding. No water..	367·1	10·7	893·0
26	El Hâssa (Kal'at-el-Hâssa), large two-storeyed Turkish castle, partly ruined. Built by Sultan Mustafa about 1760. A spring in the interior. East of the castle an ancient cistern, which is fed from a well in the court-yard by means of a "noria" (water-raising machine). The station, too, has a well with good water. Fertile soil. Here begins the country of the Huweitât Bedouins from the land of Midian	377·8	10·6	822·0

No.	Names of Stations.	Distances of Stations from—		Height above Sea Level.
		Damascus.	One another.	
		Kilom.	Kilom.	Metres.
27	Dipuf-id-Derwisch ("Graves of Dervishes"), Roman castle, 35 square metres large, with walls 1·70 metre thick. On the hill south-east of the castle large watch-tower. Wells visited by Anweitat Bedouins. About 160 Bedouins have settled down here	397·4	25·3	958·1
28	Anese (Kal'at Anese), modern Turkish castle. Close by a ruined cistern. North-west of it the Roman castle Sa'dijnije, with square foundations of 100 metres. Near the station (distant 3 kilom.) the extinct volcano "El Halla," with clearly-defined crater. Fertile soil, but no water. Inhabitants, Huweitat Bedouins in tents ..	422·7	17·8	1,051·2
29	Siding. No water..	440·5	13·3	1,030·0
30	Ma'ân, an oasis in the desert, consists of two villages about 1 kilom. apart, Ma'ân Shamije and Ma'ân-el-Hedjasije. The latter larger village has about 500, the former about 130, male inhabitants. Seat of a Kaïmakom. Small clay huts; narrow valleys; plenty of spring water; good vegetation; palms, figs, pomegranates. Inhabitants fellaheens, who earn their living by trading with the pilgrims. In Ma'ân-est-Schamidje a Roman castle. Water good and plentiful; also at the station, which is 2 kilom. distant from Ma'ân-el-Hedjasije	458·8	16·2	1,074·2
31	Siding. No water..	475·0	12·0	1,000·0
32	Siding. No water..	487·0	27·2	996·1
33	Akaba-el-Hedsâlje, 2½ kilom. distant from the pilgrim caravan station of the same name. Cisterns for about 12,000 cubic metres. Old castle. Huwâtât Bedouins pitch their tents here	511·2	5·5	1,150·5
34	Batu-ul-Ghul ("Belly of the Monster"), steep descent on a mountain side. Magnificent view of broken sandstone mountains, with remarkable colour effects. No water and no rain for four years..	519·7	10·3	1,125·0
35	Siding. Water to supply trains in walled reservoir, which is filled from water trains (see Part VIII) ..	530·0	15·0	851·5
36	Siding. No water..	545·0	9·0	851·5
37	Siding. No water..	554·0	18·0	806·3
38	Mudewwere (Kal'at-ul-Mudewwere) Station, 3½ kilom. distant from Kal'at. Water from wells. Frequented by Bedouins living in the mountains to the west, especially by the Huwêitât Bedouins. The Beni Atige Bedouins also pitch their tents here..	572·9	..	732·4

The principal stations lying between Mudewwere and Medâm Sâlih which have been more exactly surveyed are: Sût-ul-Hadj, Tebuk, Akhdar (Kal'at Akhdar), El Mu'assam (Kal'at-el-Mu'assam), Dar-ul-Hamra, Medâm Sâlih.

Sût-ul-Hadj.—Old castle with small palm grove. Sandy ground. Water in cisterns. Head-quarters of the Bedouin tribe, Beni Artéje (200 tents).

Tebûk.—Old castle with small palm grove (about 1,000 date trees). The fruit is gathered by the Beni Artége and brought to Ma'ân every year. Flowing water, good soil in the oasis region. Near the castle a village, which had fallen into ruins and was uninhabited, but which is being reconstructed since the beginning of the building of the railway. Twenty-five Bedouin families have already settled in the houses.

Akhdar.—Desert. Ground unsuitable for cultivation. No water, though it is hoped to obtain some from the Wadi Akhdar close by by boring. Some of the Beni Artige, not more than seventy, pitch their tents here.

El Mu'assam.—Old castle, ground not suitable for cultivation. Water in an extremely well-preserved cistern of 12,000 cubic metres. One hundred Bedouins of the Abu Sahama tribe living in tents.

Dar-ul-Hamra.—Old castle. Wells and cisterns. A hundred and fifty Abu Schama Bedouins living in tents.

Medâm Sâleh (cities of the Prophet Saleh), of Hedjr, the old Egra of Ptolemy, according to tradition, an old Jewish capital. A rock town similar to Petra, rich in monuments cut into rock, with Nubataic and Himyaritic inscriptions. Spring water. Bedouins of the tribe El Fakir and Beda live in 300 tents.

The Hedjaz Railway is a narrow-gauge railway of 1·05 metres breadth. This was made necessary, in the first place, by the small amount of money collected mostly from voluntary contributions. Secondly, the construction of a narrow-gauge line is, from an engineering point of view, considerably easier than a broad gauge, and, thirdly, came the circumstance that the line Beyrout–Damascus, which upon the building of the line Haifa–Der'â formed the only connection between the Hedjaz Railway and the sea, is also narrow gauge. Lastly, it did not seem likely that there would ever be any great traffic on the prospective railway.

The gauge of 1·05 metres was chosen because it is the breadth of the line Beyrout–Damascus.

The railway line, the sectional profile of which may be seen from the accompanying drawing (Table 2), follows in the main the old pilgrim and caravan road from Damascus to Medina. Between Damascus and Serka it keeps to the east of the road, then follows it again from Serka to Madewwere, deviating only occasionally to the east or west to avoid hills or unfavourable ground.

The first important deviation from the straight pilgrim route was necessitated near Amman, where the rise from Serka to the plateau south of Amman, a rise of 340 metres, had to be effected. This has been done by a series of curves extending over a distance of 3 kilom., during which the steepest gradients are $\frac{30}{1000}$, with curves of 100 metres radius. On this part of the line several important pieces of masonry work had to be built, in particular, a viaduct of hewn stones, 20 metres high with 10 inches 12 metres wide, and a tunnel 140 metres in length, the only one on the whole of the main line.

Between Ma'ân and Batu-ul-Ghûl there is a similar change of level on the line, but the difference in height is only 150 metres, and so could be overcome by a gradient of $\frac{18}{1000}$ and curves in 100 in radius over a distance of 8 kilom.

Besides these two points, the railway had to cross only a few valleys (wadis) with low banks, and so a gradient of $\frac{18}{1000}$ was found sufficient on the straight. In the curves the gradient was even less.

Near Batu-ul-Ghûl the straight route of the pilgrims road had to be deviated from on account of the clay bed, which it was feared would cause a shifting of the embankment. Near Mudewwere a layer of drift-sand 2 metres deep had to be avoided.

The bedding consists of a firm mixture of lava, basalt, and flint rubble. On the foundation, as far as Serka, are laid wooden, and from there on, iron sleepers, to which the rails are attached.

The stone material for the bedding was found in plenty along the greater part of the route and of the necessary size, so that it seldom had to be broken up.

The wooden sleepers have proved unsuitable to the hot climate. The wood soon shrinks in the intense heat of the sun and then splits. In consequence, the nails holding the rails loosen and cease to hold the rails in their vertical position, so that a change in the gauge is unavoidable and the waggons oscillate when passing over the lines. After this experience only iron sleepers are now used.

The weight of the rail per metre is 21·5 kilog., that of the railway (rails, sleepers, and appurtenances) 103 kilog.

The groundwork of the railway has necessitated a great amount of masonry. The most important works, the tunnel and the large viaduct near Amman, have been already mentioned. On the section Damascus–Mudewwere, including the viaduct, there are, altogether, 462 bridges, 271 aqueducts, and 799 culverts, making a total of 1,532 engineering works. Only one, 15 metres long, bridge is of iron, all the other works were carried out in stone. The culverts are either arches, or covered with rails and beton.

The strength of the masonry in the construction of these works has been measured with a liberal margin, to allow for the poorer quality of workmen employed, and the pernicious effects of great heat and dryness on the mortar. The lime and sandstone, which were found over almost the whole route, provided excellent building material.

The heavy bridges are made with one or more arches, of breadths varying from 3 to 12 metres; the opening of the culverts are from 0·40 to 2 metres, according to the rainfall expected during the rainy season. In what surprising quantities the rain can appear in usually dry wadis, the Director of the Railway Construction was to learn in the winter of 1904–1905. Certainly there had been a rainfall on the east Jordan highlands, especially beyond Amman, such as had not been known within the memory of man. A wadi to the south of the station of Kusr, in which there was no perceptible watercourse, had been crossed by the railway by means of a dyke, which,

taking into consideration the expected rainfall, was provided with the following openings:—

1	bridge of	4	arches each,	3 metres broad.
1	,,	6	,,	,,
1	,,	2	,,	,,
1	,,	3	,,	,,

The openings were insufficient, in consequence, the water found no proper outlet, and tore down the bridges together with 20 metres of the dyke. Shortly afterwards, in pouring rain, a train going at 20 kilom. an hour drove straight towards the breach. The driver only discovered the danger when he was within 5 metres of the hole. It was too late to stop the engine and tender, followed by five open and closed waggons, dashed into the opening and only the five passenger waggons remained upon the dyke. Wonderful to relate in this accident, not one man was killed and no one was ever seriously hurt. The damage to the stock was also slight, and the Kraus locomotive had scarcely suffered at all.

Except for the break in the dyke, the heavy rains of the winter 1904–1905 did no damage on the main line, and one may say that it stood the first trial well.

Part V.—*Description of the Branch Line Haifa–Der'â.*

Appended, a list of Stations with characteristics as for the Main Line.

No.	Names of Stations.	Distances of Stations from—		Height above Sea Level.
		Haifa.	One another.	
		Kilom.	Kilom.	Metres.
1	Haifa, the ancient Sycaminum, at the foot of Mount Carmel, trading centre with about 12,000 inhabitants, seat of a Kaimakam, under the Mutessarif of Akka. Chief exports are wheat, maize, sesame, olive oil, and wine. The last named is cultivated especially by the German Templar Colonies on the slopes of Mount Carmel and by the Jewish Colonies. The inhabitants are half Mohammedans; the remainder are Orthodox Greeks, Jews, Roman Catholics, Maronites, and Greek Uniates. Amongst the Europeans the Germans, about 600, predominate. Few but good wells	..	23·7	+ 1·45
2	Tell-iusch-Schamam, fellaheen village; about 100 inhabitants. Good water in wells	21·7	14·6	+ 39
3	Afule, fellaheen village; about 1,500 inhabitants. About 15 kilom. south of it the ancient Megiddo (now El Ledjun), where extensive excavations are being carried out at the instigation of the German Government. Good water in wells	36·3	14·7	+ 62·4
4	Seluttu, fellaheen village; about 800 inhabitants. Water from Dadi Djabub	51·0	8·0	— 78·19
5	Beisan, the old Canaanite town Bethsean, later on, after the immigration of the Scythian settlers, Cally Scythopoli. Seat of a Midir; 3,000 inhabitants. Arabs belong to the civil list. The oldest part of the town is Tell-el-Hisn, which is like a fortress. Round these hills the ruins of the Hellenistic-Roman town, Roman theatre, arcade, hippodrome, bridges, &c. On the heights surrounding Tell walls of fortification. On the hill north of Tell extensive necropolis. There are also inscriptions and monuments from Byzantine times, when Beisan was the seat of a bishop. Too much irrigation has made the gardens marshy and engendered fever. Immediately beyond Beisan the railway leaves the Zezreel plain and enters the Valley of the Jordan ..	59·0	17·3	— 121·72
6	Djisr-el-Medjami, station close before the Jordan bridge; about 200 inhabitants (Arabs). Water from Jordan. Fruitful land	76·3	10·5	— 246·47
7	Samach, station at the southern end of the Sea of Genesaret acting at the same time as landing stage for steamer connection which it is proposed to establish here between Tiberias and Tupha. The inhabitants are Algerian emigrants; about 500 in number. Lake water	86·9	8·5	— 186·88

No.	Name of Stations.	Distances of Stations from—		Height above Sea Level.
		Haifa.	One another.	
		Kilom.	Kilom.	Metres.
8	Hamam, sulphur springs, given to the Hedjaz Railway for exploitation, were much celebrated at the time of the Romans. At a distance of 1½ hours lies the village Kukes (Roman Gadara), about 300 metres above the sea level, with two Roman amphitheatres and other ruins. Hamma also has a Roman amphitheatre and the ruins of a Roman bath. Inhabited by Bedouins (about thirty tents). Water from Jermak	95·3	21·1	— 146·05
9	Wadi Khalid.* Only station building; no houses. Springs occasionally visited by Bedouins	107·4	12·1	— 76·62
10	Sehedjere, distant about 4 kilom. from the fellaheen village of the same name which has 500 inhabitants. Close by many other small villages and farms. Water from the Jarmak 300 metres distant	119·5	5·1	+ 26·89
11	Makarin, means "junction of three valleys." No village, only station for the surrounding villages of Harta, Errufid, Sahem-el-Kafaret, Ekeir, &c. (S., sketch of Jarmak Valley, Table 1)	124·6	11·2	+ 71·14
12	Seisun, fellaheen village; about 200 inhabitants. Fertile soil, a tributary of the Jarmak waters the country. Waterfall	135·8	13·3	+ 260·19
13	Muserib, formerly meeting place for pilgrims' caravans. Large bazaar. Village with about 800, which consists of two parts. The island village Kom-el-Muserib is on the site of the old and more important town in the midst of a lake rich in fish. To the north lies the new village Dekakim with the ruin of a Turkish castle Kal'at-ed-Djedid. To the east is an old castle Kal'at-el-Alika, built by Sultan Selim I	149·1	11·8	+ 461·60
14	Der'a. See main line	160·9	..	+ 529·00

* Probably called so after the Arab General Khalid, who gained a decisive victory over the Byzantines near Jakusa, north of the Wadi, in 636 A.D.

The branch line, like the main line, is built with a narrow gauge of 1·05 metres.

The total length of the line is 161 kilom., of which 60 kilom. are on the Plain of Zezreel, 30 kilom. in the valley of the Jordan up to the Lake of Gennesaret, 60 kilom. in the Jarmuk Valley, and the remainder on the highlands of Hauran.

From Haifa (0 kilom.) the railway ascends to Afula (36 kilom.) 62 metres, and from there to the Jordan Bridge (station Djisr-el-Medjami 76 kilom.) it falls to — 246 metres. From here the railway rises again to — 187 metres at Samach (87 kilom.) on the sea of Gennesaret, and then enters the steep, deep cleft of the Jarmuk Valley, where it overcomes the difficulties in its way by numerous bridges and tunnels. Near the station Muserib (149 kilom.) it attains the margin of the Hauran Plain at a height of 462 metres, and finally, with a moderate rise, leads to Der'â (161 kilom.), the end of the railway, which is at a height of + 529 metres (see sectional profile).

It is natural that the carrying of the railway through the broken ground of the narrow Jarmuk Valley, in conjunction with the steep gradient, have added greatly to the cost and difficulty of building the line.

From Haifa to Jordan very little masonry work has been required, as the greater part of the route passes over the Plain of Jezreel, which is free of all obstacles. From Jordan on begin a great number of engineering works, which increase in number as the railway penetrates into the Jarmuk Valley. Bridges, tunnels, and aqueducts here follow each other in quick succession.

The Jordan itself is crossed by a massive arched stone bridge, which makes an excellent impression, in spite of its simplicity. Five arches of 12 metres width were necessary to span the river.

The maximum gradient had been fixed at $\frac{28}{1000}$ and the minimum radius for curves at 125 metres, save for some exceptional cases, when the radius might be reduced to 100 metres. In order to accomplish the ascent of the Jarmuk Valley under these conditions it was found necessary, in the neighbourhood of the station Seisun, to make two loops into tributary valleys of the Jarmuk, and to cross the valley at repeated

points. This has been done by means of two bridges of 50 metres long, four viaducts, with a middle arch of 50 metres, and two arches of 30 metres—these all constructed of iron—and a number of viaducts with six to ten arches of 16 metres' span, built of stone.

The last mentioned viaducts especially necessitated costly foundation works, and the pumping of the foundation trenches could only be carried on with the aid of locomobiles.

The reason of the more extensive use of iron in the bridges over the Jarmuk compared with those of the main line is to be found in the fact that they often had to be built at a considerable height above the bed of the valley, and for these buildings iron was the best and cheapest material.

The total number of bridges from Jordan to Muserib is eighty-three, and on the whole of the Haifa line 141.

It was also necessary to build eight tunnels, which have a total length of about 1,100 metres.

Special attention had to be given to the drainage in the Jarmuk Valley. There are therefore in the section Jordan–Muserib alone 246 aqueducts and culverts, while on the section Haifa to the valley of the Jordan there are only fifty-six culverts.

The experience gathered in winter 1904–1905, during the floods, also led to the building of the culverts in the Jarmuk Valley. A stream of water 4 metres deep rushed through the valley, tore down all the temporary bridges, and even carried off a petroleum motor and three pumps, and caused such damage to the buildings in course of construction as to throw the work back at least four weeks.

The branch line is built like the main line, with the exception that none but iron sleepers have been used.

Excellent stone and sand for the masonry and bedding were found everywhere; but all the material, especially for the iron bridges, had to be imported from abroad.

Platforms for the unloading of gun-carriages, &c., are not to be found at any of the stations either on the main or branch line. The unloading is carried out by means of improvised gangways.

Part VI.—*Management and Equipment of the Railway for Traffic.*

By the equipment of the railway are to be understood all the furnishings of the stations, as well as all arrangements necessary for the repairing and supervision of the line and rolling-stock.

As the Hedjaz Railway is the first railway built and run by Turks there was a great dearth of experienced and energetic officials amongst them; so that the General Commission in Constantinople, even more than in the case of the building, had to fall back on outside help.

In consequence, almost all the higher positions in the management of the traffic, workshops, &c., are filled by foreigners, Germans, French, and Austrians, belonging to foreign Companies. The fact that no money or trouble was spared to obtain only first-class men, is a proof of the sincerity and intelligence with which the whole enterprise of the Hedjaz Railway has been conducted.

The subordinate officials for the traffic, the station-masters, drivers, guards, stokers, and workmen on the line are mostly natives. At first there was much difficulty these [*sic*] latter the necessary care in the handling of the machinery, care which is especially called for on the Hedjaz Railway. The continual wind on the highlands soon causes the machinery to be clogged with dust and sand, thus necessitating more frequent cleaning than in other districts. Of late, however, there has been a distinct improvement in the natives' ideas of the treatment of rolling-stock.

As all the material for the Hedjaz Railway, rails, sleepers, rolling-stock, &c., arrives at Haifa, and is there loaded for its destination, this town has been chosen for the present as the seat of the goods manager. Since the opening of the branch line Der'â–Haifa, the exports from the interior are also sent to the port of Haifa. Later, on completion of the Hedjaz Railway, the goods office will probably be moved to Damascus, the capital of Syria, where the authorities of the vilayet live, as there is difficulty in communicating with them from Haifa. The intercourse with the administration of the Beyrout–Damascus–Aleppo line, and with Damascus commercial firms will also be considerably facilitated.

The assistant goods manager is stationed at Der'â, the junction of the two railways.

The works manager is stationed at Damascus, as the largest workshop for the repair of engines and waggons is to be found there.

Der'â is appointed as the permanent abode of the traffic manager, and of the administrator of the section.

The principal stations of the Hedjaz Railway are Damascus, Der'â, Amman, Katrane, and Ma'ân; those of the branch line: Haifa, Beisan, and Samach. As a rule they are provided with a large station building, engine-shed, turn-bridge, water-tank hydraulic crane, and a coal depôt, and in addition to the chief line, the necessary sidings for the shunting of engines and waggons.

There are workshops at Damascus, Der'â, Ma'ân, and Haifa, and others are in course of construction. At Der'â there is a moderate sized dwelling-house for the accommodation of officials. At all the other stations there is only a railway-house to accommodate six workmen, and an overseer who also acts in the capacity of station-master.

At intervals of 30–70 kilom. there are water stations. Only from Amman the intervals are greater on account of the scarcity of water. The manner in which the evil is overcome, will be seen in Part VIII.

The tanks are fed either from wells or cisterns. For this purpose are used either steam pumps or wind pumps the working of which is rarely interrupted on account of the continual wind on the highlands which are almost devoid of trees.

A peculiar feature of the railway is the lodging houses for passengers. They are intended to enable passengers to remain overnight at a station, as hotels are totally unknown in these regions.

All the station buildings are solidly built of hewn stone, mostly one storeyed. In and outside they are exceedingly simple. The roofs are tiled.

The stations are also provided with the necessary arrangements for a night service.

So long as the troops are at work at the various spots, repairing the line, a regular service of inspection will not be provided, and indeed it is not so necessary as in civilized lands. Railway crossings, cabins, and barriers are unknown here, and the few Bedouin caravans that wished to cross the line would do so where they pleased, without paying any attention to the official crossings.

The cavalry detachments at the various stations patrol the line from time to time and thus serve as guards.

Two companies of infantry mounted on camels, are appointed to guard the telegraph lines in the desert from Ma'ân to Medina and to Acaba. They patrol the line occasionally and examine the telegraph wires, and a few soldiers of the telegraph detachment, who are attached to the Company, carry out the necessary repairs on the way.

The great difficulty of the task of these two Companies may be realized if one remembers that Ma'ân and Medina are 700 kilom. apart, and that there are very few intermediate stations on the whole telegraph line to facilitate the work of inspection.

As long as the line is being constructed, and great numbers of people at the head of the railway have to be supplied with provisions, the traveller will always be able to find some food, but when the railway is finished and the workmen have been withdrawn, the Directors will be forced to run restaurant cars—of the simplest description—on their trains, as it will, as a rule, be impossible to make provision for travellers at the stations in the desert.

Part VII.—*Rolling-stock.*

[Omitted.]

Part VIII.—*Special difficulties, and how they were overcome.*

1. *Water.*

The greatest drawback of the Hedjaz Railway is the scarcity of water.

Some of the stations are provided with wells, others with cisterns. In these walled cisterns, some of which date back to Roman times, water is collected during

the rainy season, to serve in summer as drinking and cooking water for passing Bedouins with their herds. They hold a considerable quantity of water—the cistern in Katrane for instance can hold 36,000 cubic metres and that of Djise 70,000 cubic metres—but they are uncovered, have a large surface and are of no great depth. Consequently, the water soon evaporates from the heat of the sun, and for months the cisterns are empty. But even at these stations where there are wells there is scarcity of water, as the continuous heat makes it dry up. On the part of the railway which is completed sufficient water is only to be found with certainty in the wells at Damascus, Der'à Serka Amman, El Hassa, Ma'an and Mudewwere. The store of water is not sufficient to guarantee the regular working of the railway. Yet the further into the desert towards Medina the railway penetrates, the greater will become the scarcity of water.

Up to the present an attempt has been made to get over the difficulty by procuring locomotives with tenders of large capacity (8 to 12 cubic metres), and recently by ordering special cistern waggons for the transport of water. But the expedient is very costly, so that it has been decided to dig wells or make large covered cisterns of sufficient depth at intervals of 50 to 60 kilom. A necessary condition of the first proposal is, of course, the presence of springs, as for instance at Mesmije.

Cisterns will only be made in cases where it is impossible to dig wells. By making cisterns of a depth of 6 to 7 metres and covering them, the water would not only be better guarded against evaporation, but would also be protected against the harmful bacteria in the air. This water could then serve as drinking water.

Further, an effort will be made to improve the quality of drinking water by the use of filtering apparatus.

Lastly, an attempt was made to bore Artesian wells, in order to get more and better water. These borings were carried out by experts, but, although they were made to a depth of 110 metres in some places, no water was found, which may be ascribed to the fact that the plateau across which the railway runs is 80 to 100 metres above the bed of the Jordan, which drains this country. In consequence of the porous nature of the ground, the rainwater trickles through immediately, and is only carried down to the Jordan from a very low strata. It is possible that from the Medina Salih, where the ground begins to fall towards Medina, renewed borings might meet with a better result.

The water question becomes especially acute at the head of the railway. There, where larger quantities of water are needed daily for mixing the mortar for the building, as well as for drinking and cooking for thousands of workmen, it is impossible to transport it by camel. As the zone of construction then lay between Mudewwere (572 kilom.) and Sat-ul-Hadj (611 kilom.) and the nearest plentiful wells were in the Ma'an (458 kilom.) the camel transports would have had to cover a distance of 114 to 153 kilom., about three days' march to reach their destination; and what an enormous number of camels would have been necessary to supply all the water needed in the zone of construction.

As may be seen, the providing of water for the zone of construction must be done by the railway itself. For this purpose several waggons, each of which carries two tanks containing 8 cubic metres of water (see Part VII) leave Ma'an daily. The only difficulty in regard to this method of transport, is that, for reasons already mentioned, the building of the bridges over the numerous wadis is very behindhand, while the rails between them are already laid.

This difficulty is surmounted by avoiding the bridges by means of a provisional curved line, which descends to the bottom of the valley, crosses it, then rises again in the old direction so as to regain the railway beyond the wadi. In this way it is possible to transport the water by rail at no great cost, and to bring it to the foremost bodies of workers. The danger of the provisional lines at the bottom of the valley being washed away by rains is but slight on account of the very rare rainfalls in these districts.

On the branch line Haifa-Der'à the water conditions are more favourable than on the main line. At Haifa, Tellusch Schmam, Apule, Samach and Muserib there are wells rich in water, and even though in summer some of the tributaries of the Jordan, including the Jarmuk, are dried up, still water is to be found in the Jordan itself at all times.

2. *Fuel.*

Both Syria and Arabia have few woods and coal-beds, and in the districts bordering on the Hedjaz Railway, and the branch line, Haifa–Der'à, there are none at all. It was therefore necessary to import coal from abroad as fuel for the locomotives and stations. The principal coal depôts for the Hedjaz Railway and its branch line are at Damascus and Haifa. From there all the coal needed for the railway as well as for workers on the line has to be sent to its various destinations—to Medina, for instance, a distance of about 1,400 kilom. This difficulty is, however, somewhat lessened by the fact that in those regions the temperature seldom falls below zero, even in winter, and that a minimum amount of such is required for the heating of station buildings, &c. As a rule only fuel for the cooking and baking for the workmen on the line come into consideration.

In consequence of the dearth of fuel the idea of making lime-kilns in the zone of construction had to be given up, although in many places on the line there are good chalk beds. The lime required for mortar is brought from abroad in the form of hydraulic lime, and from calculations made it has been proved that this is cheaper than the making and working of kilns in a country where there is almost no fuel.

Material for lighting has also to be imported.

The problem of heating and lighting, which, by the way, also concerns the railways in Turkey run by foreign Companies, still awaits a satisfactory solution. The whole working of the railway becomes much more expensive through the importation of all the fuel from abroad. But the further towards Medina the railway advances the more difficult becomes the solution of the question.

The Trans-Caspian Railway, built by the Russian General Annenkow through the Kara-Kum Desert, would have had to contend with the same difficulties had there not been the great petroleum springs on both sides of the Caspian Sea. The naphtha residuum obtained there not only provided excellent fuel for the locomotives, station buildings and kitchens, and for the camp ovens of the workmen, but was also successfully used in the lighting of the station buildings. The thought occurs that the large petroleum and naphtha springs near Mosul might be used in a similar way for the Hedjaz Railway. Certainly the first condition would be the continuation of the Bagdad Railway from its present end station Bulgurlu to the petroleum region near Mosul. As soon as this railway has been built and the short junction of this line with the line Damascus–Aleppo has been made it seems to be a matter of course that the stores of naphtha at Mosul should be employed as burning and lighting material on the Hedjaz Railway—assuming a rational exploitation of the naphtha springs.

3. *Drift Sands.*

Along the whole line of the Hedjaz Railway as far as Mudewwere there is no drift sand. The only bed of it, found near this place, has been circumvented by the railway. The ground has rather the character of a chalk steppe than of a sand desert, and therefore forms an excellent foundation for the railway. According to Moukhtar Bey's survey, however, there are several beds of drift sand beyond Mudewwere, which endanger the solidity of the railway, and might interrupt the traffic by drifting and choking the line.

In the building of the Trans-Caspian Railway General Annenkow has shown us that this evil may be overcome. He increased the firmness of the railway foundation at the spots where it was threatened by drift sand either by covering the sand bank with a layer of clay, or by introducing horizontal layers of wattles, or by planting sand plants, especially wild oats or tamarisk, the roots of which bind the sand together. At places where there was any special danger he protected the line from the sand by putting up a balustrade, covered with shingles, against which the sand broke and collected.

As there is an absolute dearth of trees and bushes both in the districts bordering on the Hedjaz Railway and those further off, it will be at some spots impossible to combat the drift-sand by the same means as General Annenkow, though similar methods will be resorted to. Quite near the station Batu-ul-Ghul (520 kilom.) there are extensive clay beds; the neighbourhood is also rich in stones of all sizes. In my opinion there is no doubt that it will be possible with this stone and clay to make the sand banks in this region sufficiently firm, and that by building a narrow stone dam

running parallel on the line, all danger of its getting covered by drift sand will be avoided. Only time and labour are required to overcome these difficulties; and in the construction of the Hedjaz line both are to be had in plenty.

4. *Labour.*

In Part XIII the difficulty for obtaining labour for the Hedjaz Railway is gone into at greater length. Although this disadvantage has been for the greater part overcome by employing Turkish troops on the line, there still remains the difficulty of getting the necessary contractors and workmen for the construction of engineering works, bridges, stations, buildings, &c. The natives have had but little experience of this sort of work, therefore the assistance of foreigners as managers and artisans is indispensable.

The latter, however, fear the discomforts of a stay in the desert, and the hardships which they have to bear. Added to this, in consequence of the great distance from Haifa to the head of the railway, provisions and building material do not always arrive in time, and thus the normal course of the work is impeded and made more difficult. Every kilometre that the line advances into the desert adds to these difficulties, the communication backwards lengthens and thus increases the need for working material and in consequence the cost.

The best solution of the question of labour and supplies would be to construct a short branch line south of Ma'an to the sea; or the suggestion of Gehimer Haaret Kapp von Gulstein might be followed, and the line Damascus-Medina, might be met by a line from Jeddah viâ Mecca and Medina.

Part IX.—*The Work of Construction.*

To understand the difficulties in the construction of a railway in the desert, it is necessary to cast a glance at the work going on at the head of the line.

Three chief zones of work must be distinguished on the section now in course of construction.

The most advanced is the reconnoitring (preliminary surveying) zone, then follows the surveying zone, and lastly the building zone. The length of these zones vary according to the conditions of the ground, but it is in general from 50 to 150 kilom. In each zone there are special divisions, which, following the naming of the zones, I shall call the reconnoitring, surveying, and building parties.

Since the 1st December, 1905, the preliminary survey party has been working between the stations Tebuk and Medina Salih, the survey party between the stations Mudewwere and Sal-ul-Hadj.

Note.—The building party, having completed the section Mudewwere-Sal-ul-Hadj in the course of this summer (1906), is now at work on the section Sat-ul-Hadj–Tebuk, and the reconnoitring and survey parties have made a corresponding advance.

The duty of the reconnoitring party is to make the necessary studies of the ground intended for the railway with compass pedometer and barometer, and to mark out the route of the line. The result of these studies, which take several months, is embodied in a report with accompanying sketch. To carry them out a complete caravan is equipped, for the reconnoitring party must take with it not only all the necessary technical personnel and instruments, but also, as it is to work on the desert, tents, fuel, and provisions to last throughout the expedition, saddle and pack animals for transport, and a cavalry detachment as guard against Bedouin brigands. Such a caravan consists of:—

1 railway engineer as leader.
2 civil engineers or engineer officers.
1 doctor.
10 railway soldiers to assist in the survey.
20 cavalry as escort, and a number of camels, horses, and mules for the transport of personnel and provisions.

Among the soldiers there is a cook who looks after the feeding of the Company during the expedition. The food consists of Kaurma (tinned, mutton) rice, and rusks. If there is no prospect of finding water, a supply is carried in goat or sheep skins. A camel carries four or five of these bags, which hold 30 to 40 litres. The nights are spent in tents.

Similar caravans are necessary for the survey parties working on the middle zone and following the reconnoitring party. As a rule the surveying zone is divided into three equal parts, and surveyed by three separate parties, each of which has a section of 30 to 50 kilom.

Making use of the sketches and plans of the preliminary survey party, these parties establish the exact levels of the projected railway line by means of the tachymeter. Each of the three parties puts down the result of these surveys in a book of measurements, which is submitted to the manager of the engineering works or to the technical bureau which is under his supervision. This bureau, which moves along as the railway advances, is now at Ma'an.

In the zone which is furthest back, the real work of constructing the railway is carried on.

In this zone the work is divided as follows: earthworks, that is the making of embankments and cuttings, the substruction of the railway, that is bridges, culverts, &c., superstructures or bedding, with sleepers and rails.

The work is so organized that the infantry detachments, which are scattered over the whole zone of construction, do the earthwork; contractors and artisans undertake the substructure, that is the engineering works, including tunnels and station buildings, and the railway battalions lay the sleepers and rails.

The superstructure generally advances more rapidly than the substructure. The contractors necessary for the latter are hard to procure as they object to the hardships they would have to bear, and there are hardly any labourers to be found in these almost unpopulated regions. Bedouins absolutely refuse to carry out earthwork. It therefore sometimes happens that the rails are laid on a part of the line where the substructure (bridges, culverts, &c.) are still very much in arrear.

The transport of water to the head of the line has been described in the preceding chapter. Provisions are forwarded in the same manner.

Four divisions of the railway troops are at work on the substructures at the same time, viz.:—

1 division for marking the trace.
1 „ laying the bedding.
1 „ laying sleepers.
1 „ placing the rails.

The laying down of the line is performed by hand. The goods train with sleepers and rails is propelled by a light locomotive advancing with the work. This train can pass slowly over the line as soon as the rails are laid on the plates and two bolts and three screws have been put in.

As soon as the men have had a little practice at this work, it was possible in this way to lay 2 to 3 kilom. of rails a-day on the prepared bedding.

Further back there are still more parties of men engaged in supplementing the work already done by filling up cavities under the sleepers, repairing embankments, &c.

The troops live to the right and left of the railway in tent camps that are moved forward as the work progresses. Apart from the consideration that in the region which the railway crosses dwelling-houses are very rare, the quartering of soldiers in villages is avoided on principle in Turkey.

Each battalion, each company, has a separate camp, where the food for officers and men alike is prepared in one great cauldron. The bread is baked on the spot in portable camp ovens. The soldiers generally work in their cloth uniforms in winter, in summer in white linen suits. As protection from the sun, they wear the Arab "keffije."

The men continue to receive their regular pay during the time that they are commanded to the Hedjaz Railway. Extra pay is granted them at the following rates:—

		Piastres.
1.	Digging out 1 cubic metre of earth	1
2.	„ „ rock	3
3.	Gathering up 1 cubic metre of stones from the neighbouring fields and piling them up beside the railway	2
4.	Spreading 1 cubic metre of stones of the railway	1
5.	Laying rails .. .. per metre ..	0·6
6.	Propping and putting position rails [?] .. .. .. „ ..	0·6

(1 piastre = 2*d.*)

Presuming that by working hard a man can cut out 3 cubic metres of earth or 1 cubic metre of rock in a day, his extra daily pay amounts to 3 piastres (about 6*d.*) Nor do the other sorts of work yield any greater increase of pay. The soldiers can only earn pay five days a-week, as Thursday is their washing day and Friday the Turkish Sabbath, and a further reduction in their pay is caused, as only two-thirds of the troops work at the railway at one time. The other third is occupied by service in camp and by drill.

Extra pay is also granted to the officers occupied in the railway construction.

Salary and wages are paid by the War Office. Extra pay is defrayed from the funds of the Hedjaz Railway.

The extra pay granted to officers and men has borne good fruit, for more work is done, and with greater zest. In spite of the comparatively good pay, only the greatest economy and self-sacrifice make it possible to bear for years such a life as the Turkish troops engaged on the railway lead on those inhospitable regions. But with their eyes fixed southwards towards the holy aim which they have in view, these courageous men bear all the hardships of their lot—the burning hot summer days and the abrupt changes of temperature at night, the tortures of thirst, and the bivouac-like accommodation summer and winter. Even the severe cholera epidemic, which in 1902 attacked the troops working up the line and carried off 100 soldiers within a short time, did not lessen their zeal. This is worthy of special commendation, as most of the soldiers had been kept on "under the flag," that is to say, at the railway construction longer than the regulation three years, as they were regarded as being on active service. It is not uncommon for these men to serve six years.

It may with perfect truth be maintained that, without the extensive help of the troops—by the 1st September, 1904, they had moved 3,800,000 cubic metres of earth—the construction of the Hedjaz Railway would have been out of the question, as the necessary labour could not have been found in these desert regions, even for high pay.

As the railway battalions are a new creation of the Turkish army, a few words as to their formation and training may be of interest, and may, at the same time, give an idea of the Turkish gift of improvisation. About the time of the Imperial Iradé for the building of the railway (1st May, 1900), a second Iradé ordered an increase in the army of one railway battalion (No. 1). This battalion was formed in Damascus by suitable men, mostly artisans, from the detachments of the 5th Army Corps, and the gaps in the latter were filled up again by recruits. The officers' posts were filled by engineer officers.

Some months later it was found necessary to form a second railway battalion to assist in the construction of the railway, as in the first case the men were taken from the 5th Army Corps in Damascus. This battalion was formed only for the time of construction of the railway, and the gaps caused by the withdrawal of the men from this old detachment were therefore not filled up. The men are considered as still belonging to their old corps, and, in case of mobilization, would return to them. It may, however, be presumed that Railway Battalion No. 2 will also later on be incorporated with the army.

Recruits joining the railway battalions are at once attached to the troops engaged on the railway, where they receive their military and technical training.

Part X.—*The Speed and Cost of Building.*

Although the construction of the railway between Muserib and Der'à was begun in 1900 the progress made was so slight, through the lack of suitable technical direction, that it is not worth taking into account.

The regular construction only began on the appointment of Chief Engineer Meissner to be Engineering Manager in January 1901.

From that time up to January 1906 have been completed—

	Kilom.
On the main line from Damascus to Mudewwere	572
Between Mudewwere and Sat-ul-Hadj, about	17
On the branch line from Haifa to Der'à	161
Total	750

This in five years gives an average of 150 kilom. a-year. This result may be considered favourable in a country which is but sparsely inhabited, and where there is

a scarcity of water. The interruptions in the work in the beginning caused by the negotiations with a French Railway Company, Damascus–Muserib, and the delay in the delivery of sleepers and rails must also be taken into consideration.

Let us compare this work with that of the other railways built in Turkey:—

The line Ismidt–Angora (121 kilom. per year) ..	486 kilom.	completed in	4 years.
Salonica–Monastir (73 kilom. per year)	200 „	„	3 „
Salonica–Dedeagatch (170 kilom. per year) ..	510 „	„	3 „
Alashhehir–Afion Kara Hissar (100 kilom. per year)	252 „	„	2½ „

In the construction of the Anatolian Railway also an output of more than 150 kilom. per year was not attained.

It must, however, be taken into consideration that the above-mentioned railways are nominal-gauge railways, while the Hedjaz Railway is narrow gauge.

Up to September 1903, before the commencement of the costly construction in the Jarudak Valley, the outlay for the Hedjaz Railway, including rolling-stock, station buildings, &c., amounted to £ T. 1,500, equal to about 35,000 piastres, per kilom. The balance-sheets drawn up after the completion of the section through the Jarmuk Valley at the end of 1905 showed a rise to £ T. 2,200, equal to about 50,000 piastres per kilom.

But even taking into consideration only this latter sum, the cost of construction may be considered comparatively low. The reason of this cheapness may be ascribed chiefly to the extensive assistance given by the Turkish troops in the building.

Part XI.—*The Capabilities of the Hedjaz Railway.*

Having acquainted ourselves with the line and the rolling-stock of the Hedjaz Railway as well as with the distances between the stations we can judge of the capabilities of the railway. We will begin with the transport of troops, as the railway will be employed chiefly for this purpose.

For such transport the section Damascus-Ma'an first comes into consideration, as it is the shortest way to the Gulf of Acaba, the Red Sea, and the Arabian vilayets.

The longest distance between any two stations on this section is between Djruf-ed-Derwisch and Anese—25·3 kilom. As there are no steep gradients at this point, the speed which is set at 23 kilom. per hour on the Hedjaz Railway can here be increased to 27 kilom. The return journey between these two stations, including the time necessary for the crossing of trains, occupies about two hours. The interval between trains leaving Damascus or those returning from Ma'an must, therefore, be fixed at two hours.

Thus, in twenty-four hours, ten military trains could leave Damascus at intervals of two hours, and after the departure of the last train there could be an interval of four hours.

On the second day the same number of trains could be dispatched from Damascus, and on the evening of this same day, the first train from Ma'an could already reach Damascus.

The new locomotives on the Hedjaz Railway (46 tons weight) can all draw a weight of 168 tons at a speed of 23 kilom. per hour. Only on the gradient south of Amman must the speed be diminished to 15 kilom. per hour.

A goods waggon loaded with forty men (4 ton) weighs, including its own weight (8 tons) 12 tons.

The number of waggons needed for the transport of a battalion of 800 men may be seen from the following computation:—

	Waggons.	=	Tons.
For 800 men, per waggon 40 men	20	=	240
„ 60 pack animals, per waggon 6 animals	10		120
„ ammunition	1		23
„ tents	1		23
„ baggage	1		23
„ officers	1		12
1 luggage van for officers of battalion	1		12
1 cistern waggon for train	3		106
Total	38		558

As ten trains of 168 tons weight could be sent from Damascus in one day it would be possible to transport three battalions from Damascus to Ma'ân in one day, provided that the regular working of the railway was assured by a sufficient supply of water.

As the distance, Damascus–Ma'ân, is 458 kilom. the journey could be done comfortably in twenty-four hours by one of these transport trains at a speed of 23 kilom. allowing for the necessary stops at stations and sidings.

Similar records were made by the railway at its opening.

On the 30th August, 1904, the participants in the inauguration festivities were sent in five special trains (including one provision train) dispatched at intervals of two hours from Damascus to Ma'ân. In spite of an official reception at each station, which greatly lengthened the regular time of stoppage, the first train arrived at Ma'ân within the twenty-four hours. In thirty-two hours all the trains had arrived at their destination.

In summer 1905 also, twenty-eight Syrian battalions destined to quell the disturbances in the Yemen were dispatched from Damascus to Ma'ân, though in this case at irregular intervals. These trains took one or two days to reach their destination. The time of passage was increased by the long stops made at night. From Ma'ân the troops made their journey to Acaba, 110 to 120 kilom. in four days, a very creditable performance, when one takes into consideration that they had to march over strong broken ground, without any regular roads.

At Acaba the troops were shipped to Hodeidah, which they reached in five days.

Part XII.—*The projected Branch Line Ma'ân–Amman and Acaba–Es Salt.*

A glance at the map is sufficient to demonstrate the great strategic and economic advantages of a branch line Ma'ân–Acaba. By means of such a railway Turkey would be in direct touch with the Red Sea, and make itself independent of the Suez Canal, by way of which all communication between Turkey and the Arabian provinces takes place. The cost to the Turkish Government of this route may be seen when one considers that 10 fr. duty per ton has to be paid on every vessel passing through the Canal.

The strategic advantages of a railway connection Ma'ân–Acaba consists chiefly in the fact that in case of disturbances in the Arabian provinces troops could be transported to the sphere of action much more quickly than by way of the Suez Canal. As was seen in the previous chapter, in summer 1905, part of the Syrian troops required for the suppression of disorder in the Yemen were moved to Hodeidah in ten to eleven days, while the transport of the Turkish troops viâ the Suez Canal took weeks to accomplish.

As is known, the building of the branch line Ma'ân–Acaba has been abandoned in consequence of the frontier dispute between Egypt and Turkey. This necessitates Turkey finding another outlet to the sea south of the Ma'ân, which she urgently requires, not only for the afore-mentioned reasons, but also that the building material for the Hedjaz Railway and the provisions for the troops and labourers employed in the building may be brought more quickly to the head of the railway. The route viâ Haifa is too long, so that interruptions even now occur in the transport of goods, besides which it requires too much rolling-stock and causes enormous expense.

If the Hedjaz Railway is successful in establishing a communication with the Red Sea south of Ma'ân, it will be both quicker and cheaper to procure railway material and provisions, and the whole work of construction will proceed more smoothly and speedily. Such a connection would, for instance, be practicable between Acaba and Mudewwere, where the ground is particularly favourable to the laying of a railway. The country between Tebuk and Dhaba (Siba), or Tebuk and Muveila, would also be suitable for the construction of a branch line. According to native information, camel riders cover the distance from Tebuk to Dhaba in two and a-half days.

In any case, the latter branch line project presents fewer engineering difficulties than the one from Ma'ân to Acaba.

Ma'ân is about 110 kilom. (as the crow flies) from Acaba. The difference in level between the two places is 1,074 metres. From Ma'ân the railway would have to rise 1,600 metres in about 30 kilom., and would then, following the Wadi-el-Araba, descend in steeper gradients to the flat shore of the Red Sea. The upper part of the valley especially, which descends 600 to 800 metres in 10 kilom., would require engineering works of $\frac{32}{1000}$. The total length of the branch line Ma'ân–Acaba would have to be

150 to 160 kilom., about the same as the branch line Haifa–Der'à, and its cost would probably be the same.

Even though the construction of the branch line Ma'ân–Acaba has been given up, the advisability of thoroughly examining this neighbourhood with a view to building a military road to facilitate the eventual transport of troops should be considered. On a road of this sort—100 kilom. long—the gradient need not exceed , and the sharpest curve would be 10 metres radius.

On completion of this road troops could cover the distance, between Ma'ân–Acaba on foot, without difficulty in three days, provided that there were two halting places with barracks on the way where the necessary water could be obtained.

For the present a telegraphic connection between Ma'ân and Acaba has been established by the troops, with one intermediate station. It is served by military telegraph clerks.

The projected branch line Amman-es-Salt (38 kilom.) is for the purpose of opening up the phosphate beds between these two places, which, as has already been mentioned, have been handed over to the Hedjaz Railway for exploitation. This branch would also be the beginning of a connection between the Hedjaz Railway and the English line Jaffa–Jerusalem, and so would lead with a further communication with the sea.

The phosphate beds are very important, and contain 55 per cent. to 85 per cent. phosphates. They extend over several square kilometres, and are 20 metres deep.

Recent estimates of the cost of exploiting the phosphate beds and of the transport to the European markets have awakened doubts as to the profitableness of the undertaking, and so the surveys for this branch line have for the present been discontinued.

Part XIII.—*Continuation of the Line to Mecca.*

How will the further construction of the Hedjaz Railway shape itself? When can we count on the completion of the line to Mecca? These questions force themselves upon any one who has seen for himself the difficulties with which the Hedjaz Railway has to contend.

To answer them, an examination of Moukhtar Bey's report is necessary. In this report all the circumstances which tend to hasten or impede the progress of the railway through the desert region between Mudewwere and Mecca are considered from an engineering point of view. At the same time it gives a general picture of a land which has not been the object of much scientific research. Consequently I have kept as closely as possible to the Turkish original, a translation of which I append (see Appendix I). In judging of the report it must not be forgotten that Moukhtar Bey had an opportunity of examining only those districts through which the pilgrim caravans passed, a deviation from which for surveying purposes was out of the question.

Moukhtar Bey sums up the result of his survey as follows:—

"The railway will meet with few engineering difficulties between Mudewwere and Mecca. The trace will necessitate neither costly tunnels, big bridges, nor other extensive engineering works. The railway could therefore be built at a cost of £T. 2,400 per kilom. or even less, if other special conditions did not make it more expensive.

"The price of building will, however, be increased for the following reasons:—

"1. The road passes through very dry land, where water is found not only in very small quantities, but also at points far apart. The procuring of water for the building and working of the railway will therefore be extremely difficult and increase its cost.

"Between Ma'ân and Medina it would be necessary to assure a supply of water a year beforehand; that is to say that where water was to be got by boring, these borings would have to be made a year before the construction of the railway on that section, and where it was not to be had by boring, covered cisterns would have to be built, which would collect the rain-water and protect it from evaporation.

"If a supply of water were not assured in time, the work would frequently be interrupted for want of it, and the building programme for the year in question could not be carried out.

"2. In the whole neighbourhood between Mudewwere and Medina which the road crosses, there are no villages. The nomadic Bedouins of this district are unaccustomed to work, and it would be difficult to obtain their assistance. Labourers will therefore have to be brought from other places. It is clear that they will demand higher wages than men working near their villages.

"3. The further into the desert the railway advances the greater will be the cost per kilometre; for the further the building material has to be transported, the more locomotives, waggons and coal are required for the working of the railway. The personnel also will have to be increased to a corresponding extent.

"4. A greater number of troops will be required to protect the workers on the line, guard the building material, &c., and this too will increase the cost."

The objections mentioned in 2nd and 4th have been for the greater part overcome by the employment of the Turkish troops in the construction, who at the same time take over the work of guarding the line. Points 1 and 2, however, remain, and will increase the cost of building in proportion as the railway approaches Mecca.

To make these disadvantages less perceptible, it would be advisable to commence the Hedjaz Railway from a second point—from Jeddah, and to first build the section Jeddah–Mecca, and then to work via Medina towards the main line coming from Damascus.

At the close of his report Moukhtar Bey illustrates the great financial and moral advantages which would accrue from the building of the railway from Jeddah to Mecca, and warmly advocates the construction of this section.

In this he is supported by Geheimer Baurat Kapp von Gulstein, an authority on railway construction in the East, who, in his report to the General Commission in Constantinople after an inspection of the railway in autumn 1905, brings forward the following interesting considerations and proposals.

"There are two ways to bring the Hedjaz Railway enterprise to a successful issue:—

"1. The continuation to Medina (1,400 kilom.), and to Mecca (1,800 kilom.) of the railway built from Damascus, which on the 1st January, 1906, had attained a length of 590 kilom.

"2. The commencement of the railway at a second point by building the section Jeddah–Mecca, and from there working northwards to meet the railway running in the direction of Medina.

"1. At the present rate of construction (an average of 150 kilom. per annum) the completion of the railway might be counted on to Medáin Salih (360 kilom.) in about two years, or the 31st December, 1907; to Medina (800 kilom.) in about five years, or the 31st December, 1910; to Mecca (1,200 kilom.) in about eight years, or the 31st December, 1913.

"2. Should it, on the contrary, be decided to build the line during the year 1906, from Jeddah to Mecca (7 kilom.), which might be completed by September 1907, it would be easy, during the years 1908–1910 to build the 400 kilom. between Mecca and Medina, and at the end of 1910 to effect the connection with the main line coming from Damascus."

By this means the Hedjaz Railway would be completed three years sooner and through the line Jeddah–Mecca would have gained another valuable outlet to the sea.

According to Moukhtar Bey's report (Annex 2) the building of the section Jeddah–Mecca would present hardly any difficulties. The necessary gradients would not exceed $\frac{1}{100}$ and the curves would not be below a radius of 300 metres. Kapp von Gulstein estimates the cost of the line Jeddah–Mecca, including rolling-stock and station buildings at 3,750,000 fr., presuming that 1,000 Turkish troops are told off to assist in the work of construction.

But as the yearly income of the Hedjaz Railway, amounting to 7·5 million francs will be required for further construction of the main line Damascus–Mecca, which advances 150 kilom. each year, the General Commission would either have to develop new sources of income, or borrow money for the line Jeddah–Mecca and its continuation to Medina, on the security of fixed revenue granted to the General Commissioners by the Government out of stamp duties, &c.

One can only agree with Kapp von Gulstein when he considers such a loan as particularly profitable. At the same time he proves that the railway Jeddah–Mecca would pay its way by the following computation:—

"Mecca, with its environs has about 100,000 inhabitants, the food for whom all comes exclusively by way of Jeddah. Counting but 300 kilog. per head per year, with a transport tariff of 0·05 fr. per ton and kilom.—

	Fr.
The transport would yield an income per annum of	1,500
Assuming the number of pilgrims going from Jeddah to Mecca at the minimum of 30,000, a fare of 0·10 fr. per kilom. there and the same back would yield 0·20 fr. × 30,000 = ...	6,000
Total	7,500
Substracting the working expenses per year and kilom.	3,000
There remains per year and kilom.	4,500

"This sum represents the net income for an outlay of 3,750,000 fr. = 8 per cent. When one considers that the pilgrims pay 6–7 medjidies—50–60 piastres for the journey from Jeddah to Mecca, and as much for the return journey—it must be granted that the price of 2 75, 0·10 = 15 piastres for a return railway ticket is very low.

"The price might be doubled or trebled, or the pilgrims might be made to pay £ E. 1 for the return railway journey, as a contribution to the building fund of the Hedjaz Railway. The yearly income of the section Jeddah–Mecca would then rise from £ T. 13,000 to £ T. 43,000, and, in spite of this, the pilgrims would save money and make the journey more comfortably.

"On the absence of curves on this line, 480 pilgrims in twelve good trucks, could be taken from Jeddah to Mecca in two hours (40 kilom. per hour) if there were three locomotives. . . . . of 30 tons, fifty good trucks of 15 tons and fifteen passenger waggons (already included in the total cost of 3,750,000 fr. as rolling-stock on this line), three trains (the goods trucks to be used for third class passengers) could be sent off in the day, each of which could make the journey four times. In this way 5,760 pilgrims could be forwarded from Jeddah to Mecca daily. So that the above assumed number of pilgrims could cover this section by rail in one week."

Lastly, Kapp von Gulstein adduces the following reasons for the necessity for building the line Jeddah–Mecca:—

"1. The Moslem world which choses the route viâ Jeddah for the pilgrimage to Mecca—by far the greater part of the pilgrims—and which has contributed voluntary offerings for the Hedjaz Railway, sees nothing of this railway construction which is being carried on north of Medina. Whereas a railway from Jeddah to Mecca would give the generous donors a visible proof that this money was being well spent, and would encourage them to make fresh sacrifices.

"2. Through the railway, Jeddah–Mecca, a new outlet to the sea would be created for the Hedjaz Railway. The transport trains, which would have to forward railway building material a distance of 1,500 kilom. (Medina) and 1,900 kilom. (Mecca), would be an enormous expense (the railway transport to Medina would amount to 106 tons × 0·05 fr. × 1,500 = 7,950 fr., and to Mecca 106 × 0·05 × 1,900 = 10,070 fr.), which would be almost out of the question.

"It would therefore be better to divide into two the 1,200 kilom. of the line Damascus–Mecca, which, on the 1st January, 1906, still remained to be constructed and begin the building of the southern half from Mecca or Jeddah. In any case it would be best to begin the construction of the 400 kilom. between Mecca and Medina from the southern end.

To save three years in the construction of the Hedjaz Railway would result in infinitesimal political and moral advantages. Considerations of foreign policy would have to be waived in view of the great importance which the railway Jeddah–Mecca would have for the advancement and rapid completion of the main line Damascus–Mecca.

Such are the considerations advanced by Kapp von Gulstein. So far there has been no official intimation that his proposals, the great advantages of which are obvious, have been entertained by those in authority. All that one sees is that work is being pushed along the main line Damascus–Medina with great energy.

(Extracts only.)

PART XIV.—*The Importance of the Hedjaz Railway, and its prospects as a business undertaking.*

The political and military importance of the railway will be considerably increased when, perhaps at no very distant date, the connection with the Bagdad Railway has been made. The latter has already been completed as far as Burgurlu, at the foot of the Taurus Mountains, by the Anatolian Railway Company, and the French Lebanon Railway Company, to whom belongs the railway from Damascus to Hamer viâ Rajak, is about to continue this line to Aleppo. Only the gap between Burgurlu and Aleppo would have to be filled in order to establish direct railway communication between Constantinople and Mecca and the Red Sea.

For the transport of troops the delay at Rajak would have to be taken into consideration. At this station the normal gauge line coming from Constantinople changes to narrow gauge, which would necessitate the unloading and reloading of horses, carriages, and war material. This difference in gauge and the consequent difference in rolling-stock would, of course, necessitate a change of speed. Nevertheless, after the junction of the two railways at Burgurlu the journey from Constantinople to Mecca could be made in the following time:—

			Per hour.		Hours.
Constantinople–Burgurlu	948 kilom.	60 Kilom.	=	15·8
Burgurlu–Aleppo	510 "	*50 "	=	10·2
Aleppo–Rajak	352 "	60 "	=	5·5
Rajak–Damascus	60 "	23 "	=	3·0
Damascus–Mecca	1,500 "	23 "	=	78·5
Total	..	..	..	113·0

Or, 4½ days.

Counting seven hours for stoppage at stations, the total length of the journey would be 120 hours = 5 days. Taking into consideration the reloading in Rajak and other possible delays, about six days would have to be counted for the transport of troops.

. . . . Neither in the East Jordan district nor in the Hedjaz are there at present any industries of note, though they might be developed. At Wady Sirhan, near the foot of the spurs of the volcanic Hauran Mountains, near Kef and Etseri, salt is found, which is only exploited partially and in the most primitive manner by the inhabitants of these villages. The salt is carried to Damascus on camels, and is there greatly esteemed on account of its quality. In the Hauran–Adjling regions there are sulphur and petroleum springs, which till the present have remained almost untouched. Iron ore and other metals—to what extent is not even known—were also to be found. In the Adjling district (near Jedâr) there are large quarries where large, excellent mill-stones are got.

It may be expected that the railway will further the exploitation of these mineral treasures. The old Roman mines of the land of Midian, now in ruins, and even now rich in silver, and especially turquoises, will perhaps take a new lease of life.

. . . . Herr von Kapp expresses himself as to the railway paying its way as follows:—

"The yearly income of the section Haifa–Der'â–Damascus, and maybe also Der'â–Ammân (together 385 kilom.), will hardly exceed 3,000 fr. per kilom. As the whole Haifa line in the wild valleys of the Jârmuk and Jordan will contribute nothing, and the section on the plain of Jezreel but little, owing to the camel competition near the sea, the whole income, therefore, must come from the Hauran, and this income will have to be shared with the line Muserib–Damascus. The income may suffice to cover the working expenses. The whole of the long section south of Ammân will, however, remain without any income worth mentioning. The Mecca pilgrims travel free of charge, and the few tourists who will travel every year to Petra viâ Ma'ân will make no appreciable difference.

"It is intended to regard the line south of the Ma'ân as a purely military railway, and to hand over the working of it, with one train a week, to the railway battalions.

"With such a limited amount of traffic the expenses can be covered by 1,500 fr. per kilom., which makes a yearly outlay of 2·5 million francs for the 1,600 kilom. under

* On account of the rise in the Taurus.

consideration. As, however, at least a part of the taxes created for the payment of the construction of the Hedjaz Railway can still be levied after the completion of the railway, there is no reason to fear that the enterprise will come to an untimely end for want of funds."

Inclosure 3 in No. 122.

Newspaper Extracts.

Extract from the "Ikdam" of August 19 (September 1), 1906.

ON this glorious day takes place the opening of the portion of the Hedjaz Railway, extending from Damascus to the 692nd kilometre, which coincides with the sacred city of Tebûk. This extraordinary work, accomplished in such a short time, is self-speaking evidence of the numerous successes of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan. It is to be hoped also, that the remaining portion of the Hedjaz line, which stands so high and so sacred before the eyes of all the Moslems, will happily reach an end very soon, so that the pilgrims within reach of these facilities will be able to go and pray in those holy regions. Is it possible to conceive any other religious service more sublime than this? The whole Moslem nation is naturally proud of the accomplishment of such a superhuman and sacred work of our illustrious Sovereign, work, accumulating in itself all the greatest, religious, and non-religious, advantages. Its moral advantages, besides the advantages of securing, at the same time, the welfare of all the faithful there, are beyond conception.

This huge line, which is to surpass 2,000 kilom., will revive and immerge into prosperity and wealth all those regions. Especially as the Hedjaz line will be joined by branch lines to the great Bagdad line, no single point of the vast Turkish Empire will remain deprived of profiting from the infinite resulting advantages.

Remarkable also is the extraordinary speed exhibited since the beginning of the construction of the Hedjaz line up to this date, because the distance from Damascus to Tebûk, requiring all the way along bridges, tunnels, and lots of other things, which of course require time; thanks, nevertheless, to the praiseworthy measures taken by His Imperial Majesty, everything attained its end with extraordinary rapidity. Every single person hopes, and most sincerely wishes, that such a noble work, attracting both God's satisfaction and the Prophet's contentment, should be accomplished as soon as possible. It is quite obvious that as the most important part of the great line was finished in a very short time, the remaining portion also, will attain its end before long.

We are happy in publishing to-day herewith the progress made with the line, as well as a detailed account of all the receipts and expenses made up to date.

LIST of the Receipts and Expenses of the Hamidié-Hedjaz Railway up to the end of July, 1322, and cash existing on that date.

RECEIPTS.

	Piastres.	p.
1. Contributions	88,448,161	30
2. Various receipts	92,051,773	29½
3. Contributions of the Bank of Agriculture in conformity with different Imperial Irades	30,399,301	14
4. Profit resulting by the change of foreign coins to Turkish coins in places where foreign currency exists	36,999,127	16
5. Products of passengers and goods transports of this line, with its Haifa branch	6,190,336	16½
6. Road contributions of the provinces on the line, and some other incomes	1,467,505	26½
7. Income from the pensions of the line's employés	100,813	14
8. Deposits of the auctions of the various factories and other (?) ..	1,816,787	38
Total	257,476,807	32½
Counting the medjidié at 19 piastres and the lira at 102 piastres 50 p. difference of coin for the contributions and other incomes, and again counting the lira at 100 piastres for the expenses, resulting sum to deduct for balance	4,239,186	4½
Sum	253,237,621	28

Expenses.

	Piastres.	p.
All the salaries and other respective expenses for the construction of the Hedjaz Railway—		
1. For rails, splinters, parquets, and iron objects	37,563,185	4
2. For locomotives, passenger and goods waggons, baggage waggons ("fourgons")	16,877,183	11½
3. Engineering and technical instruments, balancing bridges, stone-breaking machinery, and others	3,316,971	32
4. Steel and wooden cross-bars ("traverses"), &c.	26,652,018	38
5. Hydraulic lime, cement, telegraphic wire, and various other wooden material	4,968,414	5½
6. Salaries	11,327,295	15
7. Travelling expenses	320,266	8
8. Sums given on account according to contracts of purchase, and moneys given for deposit of line bags ..	2,230,234	21
9. Quay taxes paid to the Beyrout Quay Company for the passing of railway material	484,521	0
10. Construction expenses, moneys paid to the undertakers for technical operations, for soil levelling, for rail placing, and rewards to military troops and officers	116,877,861	37½
Total	221,108,012	8½
Expenses for the exploitation administration, and figuring among the salaries, purchases, and other general expenses	7,943,620	2
Balance	213,164,392	6½
Expenses for the Haifa Line	56,298,914	0
Expenses for the Great Hedjaz Line	147,141,478	6½
	203,440,392	6½
Value of rails and cross-bars existing and not used yet	9,724,000	0
Total	213,164,392	6½
Expenses not referring to the construction of the line—		
1. Printing, transport, and other expenses for the collection of the contributions and the receipts	1,120,712	28
2. Freight and insurance expenses made for the exchange of foreign coins by mediidies, to places where foreign currency exists ..	676,709	11
3. Expenses for making the railway medals	170,003	2
4. Moneys paid to the preliminary fixed places from the fire contributions, and the prize of the "Harémaïne" (the two holy cities)	1,636,924	17
	3,605,335	18
Previously stated expense	221,108,012	8½
Total expenses	224,713,347	26½
1. Cash existing in the Imperial Ottoman Bank in current account ..	22,792,321	23
2. Cash existing in the Ministry of Finance	790,108	10½
3. Cash existing in the Bank of Agriculture in current account ..	2,506,531	18½
4. Cash existing in small money in the Imperial Ottoman Bank, and not sold yet	422,108	29
5. Cash existing in the Committee of Syria	1,450,971	18½
6. Cash from the pensions of the line, existing in the Bank of Agriculture in current account	95,115	32
7. Equivalent of foreign coinage made annually in the Imperial Mint ..	148,168	34
8. Money existing in Yemen in order to be exchanged with foreign coinage	228,941	35
	28,524,274	1½
Total receipts as above	253,237,621	28
Total expenses as above	224,713,347	26½
Cash existing in hand	28,524,274	1½

Extract from the "Ikdam" of August 21 (September 3), 1906.

REPORT of the High Committee of the Hamidié-Hedjaz Railway to his Excellency Izzet Pasha, Second Secretary of the Palace.

As already reported, the trains conveying the Special Committee and all other members, to assist in the inauguration of the Hedjaz Railway to the sacred Tebûk point, started from Damascus amidst all the honours of dignity and the tune of Imperial music, which all the way was continuously playing. Enormous crowds of people were standing in front of the various stations splendidly decorated, and, together with all the school pupils, they were exclaiming, "May the Lord help the Sultan." In this way the Committee arrived yesterday at Tebûk. Early this morning all of us were wearing our official uniforms and our decorations, and in the company of all the Chiefs of the various tribes, the leading members, merchants and others, proceeded to the Mosque, and after making our morning prayer, we prayed also for His Majesty's health, after which we returned to the magnificently decorated tents, where general congratulations were proposed to His Majesty's name.

The Committee, with the one battalion accompanying it, and all the crowd again offered prayers. The Inspector of the Damascus line wished for the full success of His Majesty's intentions, and delivered a few speeches appropriate to the occasion. Numerous sheep were sacrificed as usual, and after my delivering the following oration, His Majesty's special envoy, his Excellency Rahim Pasha, read aloud the telegram of our beloved Sovereign, through which the Imperial greetings and satisfaction were transmitted to me. The whole congregation prayed again in great enthusiasm for the long life of the Sultan, and then the band played the Hamidié March, and the inauguration ceremony was accomplished.

Then those of the soldiers, who proved worthy to be released from working in the construction of the line, received with flags in hand their tezkerés, the commemorative medal of the line graciously sent for them, as well as one month's wages as a present; and for all these benevolences, with tears in their eyes, raised to the Lord their inmost prayers for the precious health of His Majesty. Afterwards, all those present traversed by rail every single point constructed, and in two and a-half hours a distance of 2 kilom. was travelled with extraordinary speed, and thus the fine work accomplished by the troops has been admired by everybody. Five times during this glorious day cannon were fired, splendid illuminations were to be seen the whole night everywhere, and a general enthusiasm was to be remarked. To-morrow morning the Special Committee will proceed to Haifa.

August 19, 1322.

TELEGRAM sent from the first divisionary his Excellency Rahmi Pasha, Aide-de-camp of His Majesty, and a member of the High Committee of Military Inspection, to his Excellency Izzet Pasha, Second Secretary of the Imperial Palace.

Early in the morning of this sacred holiday for the whole of Islam, which coincides with the anniversary of the Imperial accession, we all went to the Holy Mosque of Tebûk, and there morning prayers were read by the Mufti of Damascus. Further prayers were raised for His Majesty's precious health, at the end of which we passed in front of the standing Imperial troops, and went to the great tent, erected behind a beautiful arch, where, the music playing the Hamidié march, the ceremony of congratulations took place, and refreshments and coffee were offered to all those present.

A multitude of Arabs coming from Medina and Syria, prayed again for His Majesty, sheep were immolated, several speeches delivered, and thus the inauguration of the Tebûk portion of the great Hamidié-Hedjaz Railway line has been magnificently celebrated. In the meantime I transmitted the Imperial greetings to the troops and all the eminent persons of the congregation; at the same time the inauguration of the newly built Mosque of Tebûk, as well as of the placing of the foundation stone of the military hospital of Tebûk having taken place, twenty-one cannon sent by Imperial order from Damascus were fired, and amidst the most enthusiastic exclamations of "Long live the Sultan," medals, wages, and tezkerés were distributed to all the retiring

soldiers of the construction battalions; then a beautiful military review of all the battalions found here took place, the cavalry detachments, and a great many Bedouin cavalry gladly joined in the party, and thus the whole ceremony most imposingly ended with the repeated exclamations of "Padishahim tchok yasha."

August 19, 1322.

Extract from the "Ikdam" of August 23 (*September* 5), 1906.

Report of the High Committee of the Hamidié-Hedjaz Railway; telegram of the first divisionary his Excellency Rahmi Pasha, Aide-de-camp of His Majesty, and member of the High Military Inspection to his Excellency Izzet Pasha, Second Secretary of the Imperial Palace.

Cannon fired five times during the glorious day of yesterday, were announcing each time the sacred character of the day, and all the Sheikhs and Bedouins, who arrived in Tebûk, Imperial troops and other visitors, were exclaiming prayers that the Lord may help our Sovereign. All the day through, mutual congratulations were expressed, and at 9 o'clock we went to a distance of 2 kilom. from Tebûk where all present assisted in carrying cross-bars. Then the Imperial troops completed a distance of 1,200 metres in the course of an hour and a-half, and we afterwards returned to Tebûk, where pilaff, with meat, halvas (sort of cake), and refreshments were duly served to all the Sheikhs and Bedouins, and various other delicious dishes to the troops and the visitors. At night the whole city was splendidly illuminated with thousands of lanterns, artificial fires were burned, and the greatest enthusiasm lasted up to the morning. Exclamations for the Sultan's health were to be heard everywhere, and early in the morning we started for Haifa. On our arrival to-morrow in Damascus, the money presents of our beloved Sovereign will be distributed to each one of the artillery and band officers, as well as to all the other simple soldiers of your Excellency, &c.

(Signed) RAHMI.

August 20, 1322.

[40061] No. 123.

Sir C. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 28.)

(No. 352.) *Tehran, November* 28, 1906.
(Telegraphic.) P.

KERBELA disturbances.

Much excitement is being caused here by the attack on Persians at Kerbela. Pilgrimage may be stopped altogether, for the Persian Government is issuing warnings to intending pilgrims. Threats have been made against the Turkish Ambassador, and his Excellency has, by order of the Sultan, informed the Persian Government that if an attack is made on the Embassy his Government will regard it as an act of war.

There are rumours as to action on the part of His Majesty's Government in consequence of Consulate having been fired on.

[40554] No. 124.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 3.)

(No. 771.) *Constantinople, November* 26, 1906.
Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a translation from the "Ikdam" on the trade possibilities of Mesopotamia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 124.

Extract from the "Ikdam" of November 18, 1906.

(Translation.)

AS we have had occasion to observe, the low rivers, Tigris and Euphrates, in the Province of Mesopotamia are navigable, but the produce of the villages and arable lands on the banks of those rivers is exported by means of rafts of a kind known as "keleks"; the amount of the export that can be effected in this way may be regarded as nothing compared with what might be exported under more favourable conditions, and owing to the existence of certain impediments to navigation the greater part of the produce of the district in question remains unexported. The country is thus deprived of the full benefit that ought to accrue from its abundant produce, and accordingly, with a view to facilitating the transport of goods, an Administration was formed under the name of Omani Osmani to improve the means of communication between Bussorah, Bagdad, and Meskene under the egis of the proper Ministry.

As the steamers of the Administration in question were insufficient to cope with the traffic thus started, two new steamers were recently bought and the amount of business thereby increased; and with a view to the clearing and deepening of the beds of the rivers, and in order that every effort might be made for the advancement of agriculture, it was decided to construct dams and open canals. A technical committee composed of engineers was formed and sent to make the requisite investigation and carry out the necessary measures, and a Report on the subject has been referred to the proper quarter, and the sums required for the carrying out of these operations and constructions have been set aside by the Departments concerned.

According to information received, with a view to the reorganization of the Omani Osmani and its being put on a basis like that of the Shirketi Hamidie at Salonica, so that it may be attached to the Shirketi Khairie and carried on in accordance with the conditions that obtain in the case of that Company, a special Company is to be formed. In order to provide for such an extension of traffic as is likely to result from the operation of clearing and deepening the beds of the said rivers, and the measures shown to be requisite by the technical commission for the prevention of harm accruing from the overflow of the Shat-el-Arab are to be adopted as soon as possible, so that agriculture may be improved and that, at the period of the overflow, no harm may be done to the produce of the lands on the banks of the rivers. Thus navigation will be carried on by the steamers there on an extended scale as far as Meskene, and in order to bring about its extension to places below Meskene the necessary steps have been taken by the Ministry concerned.

Accordingly, his Excellency Emin Pasha, commandant of a brigade, commander of the Vilayet of Bussorah and Chief of the Administration of the Omani Osmani, being well acquainted with the commercial needs and the conditions of navigation of those parts, has been selected by the Ministry of Marine, and a committee has been formed, consisting of the Shirketi Khairie and other persons, by whom the necessary investigations are being made. Regulations have been drawn up with regard to the formation and scope of action of the new Company that is to be established, and also with regard to the progress of navigation, and the gathering of shareholders, and these negotiations have been submitted for investigation to the Ministry concerned. We hear with satisfaction that steps have been taken with a view to the formation of the said Company under the necessary conditions.

Inclosure 2 in No. 124.

Extract from the "Ikdam" of November 19, 1906.

(Translation.)

OUR issue of yesterday, as our readers will bear in mind, contained a paragraph giving a piece of news which they will not have forgotten. Its substance was that there are many ways of deriving benefit from the bounteous gifts of Providence conferred on the Province of Mesopotamia, and, as facility of means of communication is the very essence and soul of commerce and agriculture, vigorous efforts have been made to regulate the navigation of the Tigris and Euphrates so as to increase the opportunities afforded by the bounty of Nature.

According to information just received, a suitable steamer has been ordered from Armstrong's factory, with the condition that it is to be ready in the spring. It will be a paddle steamer of 180 feet in length and of a speed of 12 miles an hour. Its price will be £T. 20,800, it will have 205 tons displacement, and will be provided with electric light. Care will be taken to make it suitable for the transport of passengers and merchandise.

[40557] No. 125.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 3.)

(No. 774.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November 28, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Bagdad, being the political diary of the Bagdad Residency for the week ending the 29th October, 1906.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 125.

Political Diary of the Bagdad Residency for the Week ending the 29th October, 1906.

140. IT appears that the excitement at Mosul lasted from about the 10th to the 15th October. It was caused by an attempt to register the female population. The people objected to this and shut their shops, and made a demonstration against the proposed registration. The authorities made some arrests, and an attempt was made to rescue from the gaol the men arrested. On Friday, the 12th October, one of the men who had been arrested was found dead, and it is said by some people that his throat was cut; the relations of the deceased paraded the body through the streets, and the excitement grew. The mob seemed to be annoyed with the Christians, apparently because they were sitting quietly in their houses, but I have not heard that any steps were taken against the Christians. On Sunday the people were on the point of attacking the Serai, but were dissuaded from doing so. On Monday, the 15th, the Ulemas persuaded the Vali to withdraw his orders for the registration of women and to release the men who had been taken prisoners. The shops were then opened and peace was restored.

The above information is from the Consular Agent; it is generally corroborated by information from other sources (see paragraph 138).

141. It is reported that about the 11th October a number of rafts on their way from Diarbekir to Mosul were pillaged. The Consular Agent says that the robbery was committed by Abdul Karim Pasha, whose regiment of Hamidieh cavalry has just been dismissed, while another informant says that the robbery was committed by Ibrahim-ibn-Mostow and Aghayi Lour. Whoever were the robbers, the traders are feeling insecure (*vide* paragraph 136).

142. Lamberti Vannutelli, "Tenente di Vascello," has lately been in Bagdad. He came down the Tigris from Mosul and has returned by Der, and I think Damascus. I have not found out what was the exact object of his journey. He is a member of some Geographical Society, and seems to have travelled a great deal. He is apparently an expert on cotton in its various stages.

143. Captain McConaghy returned from leave and took over charge on the 26th (forenoon).

144. The Persians still persist in their demands to be considered as under British protection.

145. M. Papow, the Russian Consul at Bussorah, has come to Bagdad on a visit.

146. A Christian assistant of the Mission at Mosul has been stabbed in the market by a Moslem.

(Signed) J. RAMSAY, *Major,*
Officiating Political Resident in Turkish Arabia and Acting British Consul-General, Bagdad.

[41359] No. 126.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 10.)

(No. 781.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 3, 1906.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from the Acting British Consul-General at Bagdad, inclosing his diary for the week ending the 29th October.

I venture to draw attention to the fact that the disturbances at Mosul, described in paragraph 140, ended, like those at Erzeroum last month, and those at Sinope and Kastamouni earlier in the year, in a victory for the agitators.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 126.

Political Diary of the Bagdad Residency for the Week ending October 29, 1906.

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(Signed) J. RAMSAY, *Major.*

[41361] No. 127.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 10.)

(No. 783.)
Constantinople, December 4, 1906.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from Vice-Consul Richardson, repoating his return to Camaran, and giving an account of the situation in the Yemen Vilayet.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 127.

Vice-Consul Richardson to Dr. Hussain.

(No. 94.)
Camaran, November 6, 1906.

Sir,

I DULY reported by telegraph to His Majesty's Embassy my return from Sana'a on the 18th ultimo at the same time that I wired to you.

I was obliged to return directly to Hodeida without visiting Kuttaea and Marawar as intended, owing to the arrival at Camaran of pilgrim vessels from India.

I hope to submit in due course some information about the country between Sana'a and Hodeida, and of the principal towns to be met *en route*.

Since my despatch of the 5th September to Sir N. O'Conor, there has been no change in the state of affairs in the vilayet as far as I can learn, and no activity has been shown on the part of the Imam.

Amongst other proposals put forward by the Mission under Shercef Hamza of Mecca (referred to in my despatch No. 76 of 5th September, 1906), it would appear from what I inferred from conversation with many prominent Sheikhs and certain Turkish officials, that the Imam rejected one offering him a position in the Yemen under the Turkish Government with a residence at Sana'a, similar to that held at Mecca by the Grand Shereef. He (the Imam) insisted that the basis of an understanding with the Turks should commence with the withdrawal of the latter to Menakha, in accordance with the Treaty signed at the capitulation of Sana'a in April 1905.

I learnt also that a counter-proposition was made by Syyed Yahya (the Imam), who suggested that he should administer as the Suzerain of the Sultan, the mountainous part of the Yemen that formerly belonged to his ancestors, paying tribute to the Ottoman Government. A small Turkish garrison, it was added, would be admitted at Sana'a.

Numerous Sheikhs had begun to arrive daily from all parts ever since I took up my residence at Sana'a. These Chiefs, in tendering their submission and avowing their allegiance to the Turkish Government, represented to Fezi Pasha, the Acting Vali, that the Imam had held their sons and kinsmen as hostages ever since the beginning of the general uprising in the vilayet. They declared that it was impossible for them not to assist the Imam while these hostages were held, and begged that steps might be taken to cause them to be released.

Some uneasiness must have been felt at head-quarters at the impending departure of all Turkish reserves in the vilayet and their substitution by recruits at the present juncture.

The Imperial authorities, thinking that all was going well in the province in spite of the remonstrances of the Acting Vali, had now begun to withhold the periodical remittances of funds.

All the above circumstances combined seem to have compelled the Ottoman Government, whether on the advice of Fezi Pasha or not is not quite certain, but most probably at the suggestion of Ferid Pasha, the President of the Reform Commission, to approach the Imam with a view to ascertain whether he would receive a Mission from the Yemen Vilayet, with whom he might discuss in a friendly spirit the basis of a peaceful and permanent understanding.

The Imam at last agreed to send his representative and a few of his principal followers to Raidah, about 30 miles north of the capital, to meet the Turkish Mission consisting of Mahomed Pasha, second member of the Reform Commission, Mahmoud

Nedim Bey, the Adjoint of the Vali, and Ahmed Bey, one of the secretaries at the vilayet.

The latter officials left Sana'a on the 7th October for Amran *en route* to Raidah, that was reached three or four days later.

The Mission returned to Sana'a on the 22nd October, but the result of their negotiations with the Imam is kept secret, although it is not expected that much could have been accomplished.

The Acting Vali informed me a few days prior to my departure that the Mission was sent to the Imam to induce him to cease hostilities that were a source of bloodshed on both sides, without any apparent advantage to either; secondly, to arrange about the release of the Arab hostages held by him, and, lastly, to cause him to return to the Turks the guns, rifles, and ammunition taken from Sana'a. These proposals seem absurd, considering that the Turks have not been able to attain their ends by military operations during the past eighteen months, in spite of a considerable force at their disposal.

About a fortnight ago, I learnt that a messenger had just returned to Hodeida from a visit to the new Imam at Sada, Syyed Hassan-el-Kasimi, where he had been sent by the local authorities through Syyed Ahmed-es-Sherai of Hodeida, to convey a present of 20,000 dollars, Maria Theresa (2,200*l.*), to assist him in his projected operations against Syyed Yahya.

It would appear that the former has now sent a request to the Field-Marshal to supply him with two guns and a force of Turkish troops to enable him to successfully oppose his rival, to which Fezi Pasha replied that he would ask instructions from Constantinople.

I take this opportunity of bringing to notice, and of expressing my thanks to the Acting Governor-General and his Adjoint, as also to the President of the Reform Commission, for their marked courtesy to me during my stay at Sana'a, to whom also must be attributed the success of my visit for the kind assistance they caused to be rendered me during my movements.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. A. RICHARDSON.

[41365] No. 128.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 10.)

(No. 786.)
Pera, December 5, 1906.

Sir,

SINCE my complaint against Mejid Bey, the Vali of Bagdad, reported in my despatch No. 731 of the 30th October, in connection with the recent massacre of Persians at Kerbela, I have abstained from pressing the matter at the Porte pending the receipt of the report from His Majesty's Consul-General, who had proceeded to Kerbela in order to inquire into the circumstances of the incident. For some time past the Grand Vizier has wished to get rid of Mejid Bey, but the latter's Palace protection has been so far too strong. The incident at Kerbela offered his Excellency a good opportunity for once more urging his removal at the Palace, and with his hands strengthened by this Embassy's complaint, and by the representations of the Persian Ambassador, the Grand Vizier has now succeeded in securing his dismissal. Mejid Bey's successor is Hazim Bey, whose previous record is unfortunately not such as to inspire much confidence as to his fitness for his new post. There is nothing, however, to show that his attitude will be anti-British, and in this respect at least he can hardly fail to be an improvement on his predecessor.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[39339] No. 129.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Foreign Office, December 10, 1906.

Sir,

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 22nd ultimo containing observations on the French Memorandum of the 5th ultimo in regard to the questions which have still to be settled in connection with the Arbitral Award of The Hague Tribunal respecting dhows flying the French flag in Muscat.

Sir E. Grey understands that Mr. Secretary Morley does not consider it of essential importance to resist the French reservations as to:—

(1.) The finality of M. Laronce's opinion after a fresh examination of the list of dhows and flagholders;

(2.) The jurisdiction of the French Consul over crimes committed by an Omani on the high seas while sailing in a dhow flying the French flag; and

(3.) The status of the six Zanzibar dhow-owners.

In this view Sir E. Grey entirely concurs.

The French claim that Omanis in the service of French residents in Muscat are entitled under the Treaty of 1844 to the grant of the French flag is now put forward for the first time, and it would be impossible to deny that the acceptance of this contention without reserve might result in the perpetuation of a list of French flagholders which would deprive the Arbitral Award of its finality. The possibility of successfully contesting the French claim is, however, open to doubt. The question seems really to turn upon the exact meaning to be assigned to the words "personnes qui sont *bond fide* au service des Français," which occur in the penultimate recital in the Award to the answers to the second question submitted to the Tribunal.

Sir E. Grey does not consider, as suggested in your letter, that these words could be held to include persons who can only be colourably represented as being in the service of a French resident, but it would be difficult to contend that they are not sufficiently wide to justify the grant of a French flag to persons who are admittedly in the *bond fide* service of Frenchmen.

In these circumstances Sir E. Grey would be glad to learn whether Mr. Morley considers that the point should be pressed, and, if so, whether he can suggest the wording of a reservation which might be attached to the acceptance of the French claim by His Majesty's Government.

Sir E. Grey considers that it would certainly be desirable, if possible, to avoid the delay which would be involved in referring the point to M. Lammasch for his decision.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GORST.

[42085] No. 130.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 17.)

(No. 794.)

Constantinople, December 10, 1906.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that, according to a telegram received from His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah, an engagement took place at Hassa (presumably El Hofuf is meant) on the 22nd October between Turkish troops and Arab tribes who had attacked the town. The Turks lost a considerable number of men, besides a cannon and many rifles, as well as mules. The Arabs also plundered a village named Shigegg belonging to the Seniye. Eventually, the tribes were bought off, the cannon returned to the Turks, and peace restored.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[42561] No. 131.

Mr. Lloyd to Sir C. Hardinge.—(Received December 19.)

Dear Sir Charles Hardinge, *December* 18, 1906.

WITH reference to conversation respecting Tigris Euphrates Company's steamers, you wished me to put down on paper the ideas discussed.

I suggested that, in view of the new organization of the Sennya Company on the Tigris, it was fairly clear that there was a strong intention in Constantinople to do all they could to get the British steamers off the river. That unless something were soon done it was increasingly probable that the intention would be successfully carried out. It is quite clear that the British Company can only stay on the river so long as there is profitable traffic to carry, and when their opponents are in possession of a considerably larger fleet and of all the good-will of the authorities, which latter can very largely influence the traffic in favour of the Turkish Company by coercion, bribe, &c., it seems very likely that the British Company will before very long find themselves in difficulties.

I suggest that though the present time is not particularly auspicious for pressing a claim for a third steamer, yet it is unlikely that there will be a more auspicious time during the present reign; on the contrary, short of entirely new influences at the Palace, the difficulties of getting a permission for a third steamer will only increase after the Turkish Company has got reorganized and more established on the river.

I suggested that His Majesty's Government should take the case up now, because (1) there is now an excellent grievance in the shape of a large accumulation of British goods lying on the quays at Bussorah which are suffering for want of transport; (2) because once the new steamers said to be ordered for the Turkish Company have arrived they would be able to deal with the traffic, and the opportunity to press for another British steamer might not easily reoccur; and (3) because until the 3 per cent. is granted there exists always the possibility that the Government might make a sacrifice to please us, a sacrifice that they would regard as temporary, but whose duration would, like the barges, depend upon the amount of traffic there was to be dealt with and the future attitude of His Majesty's Government on the question.

I suggested that if His Majesty's Government were really anxious that British interests on the Tigris should run no risk of being seriously weakened by unfair competition, and if they considered that a third steamer would really place Messrs. Lynch Brothers in a stronger position to fight against competition, if the matter were taken up strongly and in the right way there should at any rate be a fair chance of success.

If His Majesty's Government decided to press the point now before the Sennya Company has become strong and in possession of any very large preponderance of traffic, a strong protest might be entered against the treatment of British goods on the Tigris, stating that His Majesty's Government absolutely refuse to permit such an arbitrary restriction of British trade on the Tigris; that they cannot permit that British goods shall be allowed to rot on the quays without some reason, when there is transport ready to hand in the shape of Messrs. Lynch's steamer; and that His Majesty's Government ask for immediate permission for Messrs. Lynch to run a third steamer temporarily until the accumulation of traffic has been dealt with.

I understand that Messrs. Lynch are prepared to pay a fair sum at the Palace for the temporary privilege, and a much larger sum for a permanent right. It would lie with Messrs. Lynch Brothers to negotiate with Izzet Pasha on a personal financial basis, probably on a monthly payment basis, with the prospect held out of a large sum when permanent permission had been granted. It would depend largely on the strength of His Majesty's Government's protest as to whether the backsheesh would have great effect.

If, on the other hand, it is not considered a sufficiently good time to press for this permission, I suggested that it would at all events be of great value if a protest were entered on the question, and that the Porte might be notified in so many words that His Majesty's Government do not intend to see the British Company run off the river by any unequal competition, and that they cannot look favourably upon attempts to increase the competing Company without granting equal facilities to the British Company.

At any rate, some protest of this sort might serve as a basis for action at some later time, when the question is fairly certain to come up again in an only more aggravated form.

I venture to submit that any weakening of our present position on the Tigris

means not only a weakening of our whole position in Mesopotamia, but a corresponding increase of German trade and activity; and that they are only waiting to seize an opportunity is evident by their starting a line of steamers to the Persian Gulf, where they have at present practically no trade or interests.

I suggested also that, in view of the river being one of the important lines of communication to Persian Gulf and India, it was wise to be careful that it should in no way fall from our grasp, and that our privileged position on the river was now becoming daily more valuable, in view of the approach of the Bagdad Railway, and in view of the fact that navigation may probably be the only communication from the railway head at Bagdad to Bussorah. It was probably in view of this fact, and not only in view of the general development schemes that the Civil List had in Mesopotamia, that the Turkish steamers were about to be made into more formidable and up-to-date competitors against us.

Yours sincerely, &c.
(Signed) GEORGE LLOYD.

[42648] No. 132.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received December* 20.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, a paraphrase of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 18th instant, relative to the Muscat Arbitration Award.

India Office, December 20, 1906.

Inclosure in No. 132.

Mr. Morley to Government of India.

India Office, December 18, 1906.

(Telegraphic.) P.

MUSCAT Arbitration Award.

Please refer to Memorandum, dated the 8th ultimo, by French Ambassador, and letter dated the 22nd ultimo from this Office to Foreign Office, forwarded, respectively, with Political Secretary's letters of the 23rd and 30th ultimo.

His Majesty's Government do not propose, subject to any observations you may desire to make, to resist reservations of French Government in respect of following points:—

Status of six Zanzibari dhow owners, jurisdiction over crimes on high seas, and finality of Laronce's opinion.

As regards Omanis in French service, His Majesty's Government recognize far-reaching effects that might be caused by unreserved acceptance of French claim. Can you suggest any form of reservation, consistent with maintenance of French rights under the Treaty of 1844, which could be attached to our acceptance?

Award of The Hague Tribunal, in last paragraph but one of reply to second question, refers to that Treaty as still in force.

[43071] No. 133.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 24.)

(No. 805.)

Pera, December 14, 1906.

Sir,

WITH reference to your despatch No. 507 of the 20th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith a Memorandum by Mr. G. H. Fitzmaurice respecting the alleged collection of revenue by Turkish officials at Ad Doka. Mr. Fitzmaurice points out that, according to a Report inclosed in General de Brath's despatch of the 19th July, the collection of dues would seem to have taken place actually at Hobat Absi, which is certainly in Turkish territory, but the Turkish authorities were not justified in ordering the rebuilding of a post at Nobat-al-Mikrad.

I have the honour to inclose a translation of the *pro-memorid* which, in accordance with Mr. Fitzmaurice's suggestion, I have caused to be presented to the Sublime Porte, requesting that immediate orders may be sent to the local authorities at Mafalis to refrain from further violation of the boundary agreement.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 133.

Memorandum by Mr. Fitzmaurice respecting Turkish Encroachments in Wadi Sha'b.

WITH reference to Foreign Office despatch No. 507 of the 20th November, transmitting the India Office's letter of the 15th November on the subject of the alleged collection by Turkish officials of certain dues at Al Doka, in Subaihi territory, and authorizing representations to the Sublime Porte, it would appear from the correspondence that there has not been any actual collection of customs at Al Doka (No. 123 on Boundary Commission map forwarded with their despatch of the 11th June, 1904). The dues would seem rather to have been collected at a small tower situated to the north-west of the hamlet Ad Doka and in the gorge of the nullah known as Wadi Doka. This spot is referred to in the official description of this part of the boundary (point 61 to 62) exchanged at Perim with the Turkish Commissioners, as follows: "From Jabal Rakiza the border follows the line of peaks along the north-western edge of Wadi Sha'b Valley, bending slightly to the south, where it crosses the Wadi Doka, so as to include a small tower, Nobat Absi, used by the Absi as a customs post, on the Turkish side and continues nearly in a south-western direction to Jabal Nabat." The Turks would thus seem to have been within their rights in the matter of the collection of dues, but the Mudir of Mafalis apparently attempted to violate the boundary settlement by "ordering the rebuilding of the dilapidated post about 1 mile or more distant from Rakaiza" (*i.e.*, at Nobat-al-Mikrad), as stated by Sheikh Abdul Kawi in his letter inclosed in the officiating Political Resident Aden's letter of the 19th July, 1906, to the Political Secretary to the Government of Bombay.

As the negotiations and final detailed settlement of the Subaihi border were conducted and arranged between the Turkish Second Commissioner and myself, it may not be out of place if I give a word of explanation as to the origin of, and the nature of, the settlement arrived at concerning the customs post north of Ad Doka, more especially as the latter spot and Ouja (lying immediately south of Mafalis in the Wadi Ma'den) are the only points on the Subaihi boundary of over 100 miles in extent which are likely to give rise to disputes between the Arabs and consequent questions between their respective Governments.

About 1885–1886, or the date of the withdrawal of the Abdali Sultan's posts from the Subaihi country, the Turks sent a force of over 2,000 men to collect taxes and strengthen their hitherto nominal hold over the Absi and Kubati tribes, as also the Wadi Sha'b. After prolonged hostilities the tribesmen submitted, but the Turks consented to recognize the old tribal claim to levy customs or octroi dues on the local traffic between the Subaihi plains and the hills, and a post, or a semi-official customs-house, was established on the south side of the Wadi Sha'b, just under the col or pass known as Nijd-al-Mikrad, and mentioned in Sheikh Abdul Kawi's letter above referred to. One of the principal items of the receipts at the Doka customs is derived from the tax of 1 dollar per camel levied on caravans transporting bee-hives. Bees are extensively cultivated in the Absi and Kubati Hills, and the bee-hives are conveyed on camel-back down into the Subaihi country before the monsoon rains in July, August, and September, after which they are sent back into the hills. The proceeds of the Doka customs or octroi dues went mainly to the Absi and Kubati head Sheikh, only a trifling proportion being paid to the Mafalis Customs, and their collection was agreed to by the Turks as an indirect way of subsidizing and thus securing the allegiance of the Sheikhs in question.

The Nijd-al-Mikrad post was subsequently abandoned and allowed to fall into disrepair, a small tower being built in the Wadi Doka to the north-west of the hamlet of Ad Doka, the "Customs officials" consisting of three Arabs (two from the Athwari and one from the Subaihi, *i.e.*, British tribes). Before delimitation started the Turks appear to have brought the Doka post into closer connection with the Mafalis

Customs with a view to exercising more direct control over the Wadi Sha'b, and, being able to claim the customs there, as a regular Turkish Government building and post.

When the Boundary Commission was engaged on that part of the frontier in March and April 1904, the heat was so excessive that the General in Aden found it necessary to insist on the withdrawal of the troops employed in the Subaihi country in connection with the Commission, while the necessity had been intimated to the latter of avoiding any reference to Constantinople likely to involve the procuring of an Imperial Iradé with its attendant delays of at least two or three months. Under the circumstances the Commission felt bound to have recourse to the only style of argument likely to bring conviction to the Turkish Commissioners and Yemen authorities by blowing up with gun-cotton the Towers of Auja, situated within the territory claimed by the Turks and almost on the outskirt of the Turkish Commission camp. This action, coupled with subsequent British claims to the country stretching well-nigh up to the gates of Mocha, had the effect of inducing the Turks to surrender their pretentions to the Wadi Ma'den, the entire Wadi Sha'b and to a strip of territory to the south of the latter, but, as the customs post to the north-west of Ad Doka was officially regarded as a Turkish Government administrative building, and the Turkish Commissioners could not consequently agree to its inclusion within British limits without the sanction of an Imperial Iradé, the post, which was a small one resembling those existing on tribal borders within the Aden Protectorate, was allowed to stand and the boundary-line slightly deflected to the south, where it crosses Wadi Doka so as to leave Nobat Absi on the Turkish side.

"Noba" in Arabic means a post, while the word "Absi" refers to the fact that the dues originally levied were collected on behalf of the Absi Sheikh. The name was consequently first applied to the old post at Nijd-al-Mikrad, on the south side of the Wadi Sha'b, and when the Absi post was transferred to the small tower subsequently built in the Wadi Doka the name went with it. This explains the cross-examination of Sheikh Abdul Kawi by the Mudir of Mafalis and the Kubati and Absi Sheikhs concerning the nomenclature of the place, as set forth in the third paragraph of Sheikh Abdul Kawi's letter forwarded in the Aden Resident's despatch of the 19th July to the Government of Bombay. The Mudir evidently had a Turkish translation of the description of the border, and was endeavouring, with the aid of the Kubati and Absi Sheikhs, to prove that the "Nobat Absi" mentioned in the official description of the border was at Nijd-al-Mikrad. His subsequent orders for rebuilding the tower at Nijd-al-Mikrad were apparently based on this misinterpretation and assumption. From the fifth paragraph of the same letter, as also from the Political Resident at Aden's despatch of the 2nd September, 1906, it would appear that Sheikh Abdul Kawi has been able to prevent the execution of the orders of the Mudir. The latter, too, has made no attempt to enforce his orders, which not impossibly were the outcome of the soreness felt by the Turks at having to relinquish Wadi Sha'b. It is comparatively rich in cultivation and had been administered by them for many years. The Mudir's language may then have been an idle threat meant to save his face *vis-à-vis* the Arabs. It may, however, be as well to lay the facts in writing before the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and request him to warn the Mafalis local authorities to desist from any pretensions to Nijd-al-Mikrad.

I may mention that Sheikh Abdul Kawi is a comparatively enlightened Arab who has travelled much in India and resided at Hyderabad. He has also spent some time in Persia, speaks Persian, and is suspected of having leanings towards the Shiah "heresy." He is thus most obnoxious to the orthodox Sunni Turks, who imprisoned him on some frivolous pretext shortly before the arrival of the Boundary Commission on the Subaihi border. I procured his release, and found him most useful in collecting evidence in support of Subaihi (*i.e.*, British) claims, though I never confronted him with the Turks owing to their extreme aversion to him as a renegade.

I may add that it is not impossible that the withdrawal from the interior to Aden of British and Indian troops may be given out by the local Turks and Arabs as the result of "orders from the Sultan of Roum," may be interpreted by them as a sign of weakness or fear, and may embolden them to make encroachments, especially in places like Wadi Sha'b and the Auja gorge, the surrender of which was distinctly galling to the Turks.

(Signed) G. H. FITZMAURICE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 133.

Pro-memorid in Turkish to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated December 4, 1906.

(Translation.)

ON the 12th June, 1322 (25th June, 1906), a *pro-memorid* was presented to your Excellency complaining of the action of the Customs officials of Mavia in transgressing the border of the Subaihi Canton, in Wadi Sha'b, and requesting that instructions be sent to prevent the recurrence of such conduct, which is calculated to lead to trouble between the tribes, and consequently between the two friendly Governments. Instructions in the desired sense were dispatched, but before their arrival it would appear, from information which has reached His Majesty's Embassy, that the Mudir of the Mufalis Customs, accompanied by a force of the Imperial troops, visited the neighbourhood of Ad Doka, in the Wadi Sha'b, and ordered the establishment of a customs post at a spot called Nijd-al-Mikrad, situated on the south side of the Wadi Sha'b. Now, according to the settlement arrived at as the result of the delimitation of the border of the Nine Cantons, the entire Wadi Sha'b is included within the limits of the Subaihi Canton, and the conduct of the Mudir of Mufalis in attempting to establish a customs post at Nijd-al-Mikrad constitutes a violation of the boundary, which will lead to a conflict between the tribesmen. Such an incident must entail serious consequences and responsibility, and cannot, consequently, under any circumstances, be approved by the Imperial Government. The British Embassy therefore requests that immediate and stringent orders be sent by telegraph to the local authorities at Mufalis to refrain from such acts, which are a violation of the Boundary Agreement.

[42561] No. 134.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 559.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December 24, 1906.*

I HAVE received your despatch No. 776 of the 1st instant reporting, in reply to my inquiry, that there is, in your opinion, but little chance of a successful issue to any representations which might now be made to the Sublime Porte with a view to obtain permission for the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to run a third steamer and barge between Bussorah and Bagdad.

While fully appreciating the force of the arguments adduced by you against compliance with the desire of the Company, I cannot but feel that the injury to British trade resulting from the excessive accumulation of goods at Bussorah is so serious as to call for an immediate attempt to remedy it, and that it affords at the same time a strong argument in favour of approaching the Porte on behalf of the Company with the request that they should receive permission, at all events temporarily, to run a third steamer and barge in that section of the river.

You should accordingly decide, after consultation with Colonel Picot, the agent of the Company, who, as I understand, is now at Constantinople, what action on your part would have the best chance of attaining the object in view. It will rest with him to make use of such means as he possesses to influence the Palace in the desired sense, and eventually to secure permanency for the temporary permission which you may be able to obtain for the use of the steamer and barge.

It is probable that the report which Mr. Weakley is to furnish on the condition of the custom-houses will show that much remains to be done in order to fulfil the conditions laid down by us as necessary to our assent in the proposed increase of the Turkish customs duties. If this is so, you might point out to the Porte that, in order to relieve the situation at Bussorah, and as an alternative to proceeding immediately to an expenditure of money on custom-house accommodation in that port, they could diminish congestion by giving the Company permission to use their third steamer. This expedient should, however, be used with care lest the Ottoman Government should themselves put another steamer on the river, and subsequently invoke this measure as an argument against improving the defective custom-house accommodation.

I transmit to you herewith copy of a letter on this subject from Mr. George Lloyd

to Sir Charles Hardinge,* in which arguments of some force are brought forward in favour of action on the Company's behalf.

I understand that the Company are not unwilling to run their steamers under the Turkish flag, a concession which should help towards inducing the Porte to grant the required permission.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[43652] No. 135.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 31.)

(No. 818.)
Sir, *Pera, December* 22, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from Acting Vice-Consul Graves respecting the state of affairs in the Vilayet of Diarbekir. Representations have already been made by this Embassy to the Sublime Porte in regard to the pillaging of the villages of Jezireh, and from the postscript to Mr. Graves' despatch I gather that they have not been without effect. The matter will not be lost sight of.

With regard to Mr. Graves' remarks concerning the Vali of Diarbekir, Fehmi Pasha, I may observe that his Excellency was only transferred to his present post a few months ago from Kharpout, which was reported to have been reduced to a state of anarchy under his Governorship. As, however, he appears for the moment to be acting on Mr. Graves' representations I do not propose to suggest his removal for the present.

A good appointment has just been made by the Porte to the Vilayet of Van, Ali Bey, the official selected, who is a member of the Court of Cassation, having a good reputation for honesty and efficiency.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 135.

Acting Vice-Consul Graves to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 37.)
Sir, *Diarbekir, December* 3, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 20th November M. Degrand, the newly-appointed French Vice-Consul at Mosul, was attacked by Kurdish tribesmen at Mezré, on the Tigris, about two hours' distance below Jezireh, while proceeding to his post. M. Degrand was accompanied by some zaptiehs, and his kelek was flying the French flag at the time of the attack. The zaptiehs returned the Kurdish fire, and in all about a hundred shots were exchanged. There were no casualties. M. Guys, French Vice-Consul at Diarbekir, on hearing of the incident, immediately brought the matter to the notice of the Vali, Fehmi Bey, demanding an explanation and the punishment of the offenders for the insult offered to the French flag. After some procrastination a Commission, presided over by a Colonel of Hamidieh cavalry, was formed at Jezireh, and proceeded to Mezré to hold an inquiry. The finding of the Commission was that the assailants were members of a Kurdish tribe belonging to the Vilayet of Mosul. The view taken by M. Degrand, and generally followed by competent judges, is that the attacking party was composed of dependents of Abdul Kerim Bey, of Jezireh, a Hamidieh Chief whose reputation is notoriously bad. Abdul Kerim himself seems to have volunteered the information that he was engaged elsewhere on the day of the attack. It appears probable that unless the French Government brings pressure to bear upon the Ottoman authorities the guilty persons will go unpunished.

This incident is typical of the lawlessness that prevails throughout the vilayet, and of the impotence of the local authorities when brought into collision with the Hamidieh, who may be regarded as a force of chartered criminals recognizing no authority but that of Ibrahim Pasha.

* No 131.

The Vali informs me that he has received no answer from the Vali of Mosul respecting the Christian and Moslem villages of Jezireh, which were pillaged by Arabs at the end of last September (*cf.* Mr. A. Shipley's despatch No. 34). It is conceivable, though most unlikely, that the Vali of Mosul may have caused the offenders to be punished, or at least to restore the stolen cattle, but the silence of the authorities renders me unable to report as to what steps have actually been taken. I venture to suggest that if His Majesty's Embassy is able to get at the facts of the case pressure might be brought to bear at Constantinople to have this matter satisfactorily terminated.

A deputation of Christian villagers from Haini, a nahiyé about twelve hours north of Diarbekir, headed by the Protestant pastor, arrived here about ten days ago to complain to the Government of the constant robbery and oppression to which they are exposed at the hands of their Kurdish neighbours. Housebreaking appears to occur nightly with the connivance of the five zaptiehs, who are considered sufficient to police a district containing sixty-six villages, while during the daytime the Kurdish Aghas take what they need from the shops without payment. The Christians, who are unarmed, are naturally incapable of resistance, and many of them have been reduced to a condition of beggary. I urged the Vali to take immediate and active measures for the relief of the inhabitants, advising him to remove the present force of zaptiehs, and to replace it by at least a dozen men drawn from other districts, who should accompany the members of the deputation to their homes, and protect them from the vengeance which they have every reason to fear. His Excellency has promised to act upon this suggestion, and has sent for the Kaïmakam of Lidjé, to whose kaza the Haini district belongs. He also undertook to see that the criminals, whose identity is well known, were punished and restrained from further lawlessness. It would, perhaps, be too optimistic to expect that these measures will be carried out in a thoroughly satisfactory manner, but I have reason to believe that the Vali, though incapable of any act of spontaneous energy, will do his best to see that his orders are executed.

His Excellency is old and infirm in body and mind. His memory is defective—so much so that it was not until I reminded him of his duty that he returned my official visit—and he appears to take little or no interest in the government of his district. The first reform required to produce an improvement in the state of this vilayet is the appointment of a vigorous and determined Governor, who would be sure of the support of the Central Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) R. M. GRAVES.

P.S.—I learn through the Chaldean Bishop that the lieutenant in charge of the troops stationed at Takian with object of protecting the Chaldean villages of Jezireh has been removed, and will be replaced by an officer from Mardin, whose appointment has given satisfaction to the Christian inhabitants.

R. M. G.

[43654] No. 136.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 31.)

(No. 820.)
Sir, *Constantinople, December* 26, 1906.

THE Vali of Bussorah has asked His Majesty's Consul for explanations as to a report, which he has received officially, to the effect that an English steamer made surveys at Ras Tamura on the 29th ultimo, and two days later erected a flagstaff and hoisted the British flag at Nejwa, an island opposite Dowerin, one hour and a half from Katif Harbour.

A similar communication was made to the First Dragoman of His Majesty's Embassy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the 22nd instant. Mr. Lamb told the Secretary-General that His Majesty's Embassy had no information on the subject, and suggested that if the Imperial Government desired to learn the facts they should inquire through their Ambassador in London. Mr. Lamb added that the island, if it existed, was apparently outside the territorial waters of the Empire.

I should be glad to learn what answer should be made here or at Bussorah to these or further inquiries.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.